WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
{1 Defendants, two corrections officers and the warden who had charge of the plaintiff as a prisoner, appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff's claims arise from injuries suffered in a vehicle accident while being transported in custody. The plaintiff brought the claims under our state constitutional prohibition on unnecessary rigor in confinement. On the basis of the pleadings alone, the trial court determined that the complaint, if proven true, made sufficient allegations to establish a violation of the Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor clause. We agree but remand for additional proceedings in due course on other material factual issues that may, or may not, make the claim defective as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
1 2 When reviewing a motion to dismiss we assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and consider them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 In this instance, that is the plaintiff, Kelvin Dexter. As such, we recite the facts in that light.
13 In December 2000, Utah State Prison guards Jason Bosko and Barry Sanns loaded Dexter and eight other inmates into a fifteen-passenger van for transport by freeway to the Beaver County Jail. The van was equipped with working seatbelts; but the inmates, who were handcuffed and shackled, were unable to buckle their own seatbelts. Several inmates asked to have their seatbelts fastened,2 but Bosko and Sanns refused.3 Bosko, the driver, then fastened his own seatbelt and began driving. During the journey, Bosko momentarily diverted his attention from the road, the van drifted, Bosko overcorrected, and the van went into the median. As a result, the van rolled three times, and Dexter was thrown from the vehicle. Dexter was paralyzed as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and died five years later due to complications from those injuries.
'I 4 Dexter filed a complaint against Defendants in December 2004, contending that the prison officials failure to place him in a seatbelt violated his rights under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Dexter's complaint was sufficient to state a claim under the unnecessary rigor clause.4 Defendants subsequently filed an [595]*595interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
15 The central question on appeal is the seope of the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution and how, if at all, the clause applies here. "[ Wle review de novo a district court's interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference." 5
I. SCOPE OF THE UNNECESSARY RIGOR CLAUSE
T6 Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution states as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall eruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." 6
17 Although the first sentence of article I, section 9 closely approximates the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,7 the unnecessary rigor provision has no federal counterpart. Nearly identical provisions, however, exist in only four other state constitutions.8 The relative rarity of unnecessary rigor clauses results in a dearth of unnecessary rigor jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, and we have had few opportunities to interpret or apply the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution.
T8 In our 1996 decision in Bott v. DeLand, we said that "the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment ... protects [prisoners and arrestees] against unnecessary abuse."9 We also said that the applicable "definition of 'abuse' focuses on 'needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing' treatment of prisoners."10
T9 Defendants argue that the somewhat broad interpretation of unnecessary rigor in Bott should be rejected and that a historical analysis supports a more narrow interpretation of the clause. The unnecessary rigor clause, they contend, was meant by the framers and Utah citizens as a proscription only against the physically eruel and barbarous treatment of prisoners that characterized the American colonial era. According to Defendants, the only important distinction between the unnecessary rigor clause and the cruel and unusual punishment clause is the stage of criminal proceedings at which the protection applies, rather than in the scope of the protection granted.
10 Dexter, on the other hand, argues that the interpretation of the unnecessary rigor clause in Bott is supported by the plain language and historical context of the provision, and that Defendants' proposed interpretation must be rejected because it would render the unnecessary rigor clause meaningless. Dexter further asserts that the authors of the Utah Constitution intended the clause to provide protection from inhumane treatment and to regulate conditions of confinement and treatment of inmates.
%11 In interpreting provisions of the Utah Constitution, we begin with a review of the constitutional text. We also "inform our textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent."11 Finally, we may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made by courts of last [596]*596resort in sister states with similar constitutional provisions.12
1 12 The term "rigor" is defined as "an act or instance of strictness, severity, harshness, oppression, or cruelty."13 Such a meaning applies well in this context. It appears supported by the plain language of the unnecessary rigor provision itself, which prohibits unnecessarily rigorous treatment of persons arrested or imprisoned, particularly when considered in conjunction with the other language of the same section regarding excessive fines, bail, or punishments. The history of the provision, which remains unchanged since statehood, is also consistent with such a use of the word.
{13 At the Utah constitutional convention of 1895, Delegate, and later Governor, Heber M. Wells proclaimed that the object of the unnecessary rigor provision was to "protect persons in jail if they shall be treated inhumanely."14
T14 By today's standards, the conditions in the prison and county jails at the time of the Utah constitutional convention were bleak. Surely this inhumane treatment influenced the convention delegates to include the unnecessary rigor clause in the Utah Constitution. The territorial prison was reportedly in terrible condition, and the county jails were reported to have "barbarous practices."15 "In Utah, the desire to eliminate brutality and to ensure decent and humane treatment for convicts may have been the catalyst of the unnecessary rigor provision."16
115 Statutes in effect at the time suggest the same meaning.
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WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
{1 Defendants, two corrections officers and the warden who had charge of the plaintiff as a prisoner, appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff's claims arise from injuries suffered in a vehicle accident while being transported in custody. The plaintiff brought the claims under our state constitutional prohibition on unnecessary rigor in confinement. On the basis of the pleadings alone, the trial court determined that the complaint, if proven true, made sufficient allegations to establish a violation of the Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor clause. We agree but remand for additional proceedings in due course on other material factual issues that may, or may not, make the claim defective as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
1 2 When reviewing a motion to dismiss we assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and consider them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 In this instance, that is the plaintiff, Kelvin Dexter. As such, we recite the facts in that light.
13 In December 2000, Utah State Prison guards Jason Bosko and Barry Sanns loaded Dexter and eight other inmates into a fifteen-passenger van for transport by freeway to the Beaver County Jail. The van was equipped with working seatbelts; but the inmates, who were handcuffed and shackled, were unable to buckle their own seatbelts. Several inmates asked to have their seatbelts fastened,2 but Bosko and Sanns refused.3 Bosko, the driver, then fastened his own seatbelt and began driving. During the journey, Bosko momentarily diverted his attention from the road, the van drifted, Bosko overcorrected, and the van went into the median. As a result, the van rolled three times, and Dexter was thrown from the vehicle. Dexter was paralyzed as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and died five years later due to complications from those injuries.
'I 4 Dexter filed a complaint against Defendants in December 2004, contending that the prison officials failure to place him in a seatbelt violated his rights under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Dexter's complaint was sufficient to state a claim under the unnecessary rigor clause.4 Defendants subsequently filed an [595]*595interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
15 The central question on appeal is the seope of the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution and how, if at all, the clause applies here. "[ Wle review de novo a district court's interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference." 5
I. SCOPE OF THE UNNECESSARY RIGOR CLAUSE
T6 Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution states as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall eruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." 6
17 Although the first sentence of article I, section 9 closely approximates the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,7 the unnecessary rigor provision has no federal counterpart. Nearly identical provisions, however, exist in only four other state constitutions.8 The relative rarity of unnecessary rigor clauses results in a dearth of unnecessary rigor jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, and we have had few opportunities to interpret or apply the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution.
T8 In our 1996 decision in Bott v. DeLand, we said that "the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment ... protects [prisoners and arrestees] against unnecessary abuse."9 We also said that the applicable "definition of 'abuse' focuses on 'needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing' treatment of prisoners."10
T9 Defendants argue that the somewhat broad interpretation of unnecessary rigor in Bott should be rejected and that a historical analysis supports a more narrow interpretation of the clause. The unnecessary rigor clause, they contend, was meant by the framers and Utah citizens as a proscription only against the physically eruel and barbarous treatment of prisoners that characterized the American colonial era. According to Defendants, the only important distinction between the unnecessary rigor clause and the cruel and unusual punishment clause is the stage of criminal proceedings at which the protection applies, rather than in the scope of the protection granted.
10 Dexter, on the other hand, argues that the interpretation of the unnecessary rigor clause in Bott is supported by the plain language and historical context of the provision, and that Defendants' proposed interpretation must be rejected because it would render the unnecessary rigor clause meaningless. Dexter further asserts that the authors of the Utah Constitution intended the clause to provide protection from inhumane treatment and to regulate conditions of confinement and treatment of inmates.
%11 In interpreting provisions of the Utah Constitution, we begin with a review of the constitutional text. We also "inform our textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent."11 Finally, we may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made by courts of last [596]*596resort in sister states with similar constitutional provisions.12
1 12 The term "rigor" is defined as "an act or instance of strictness, severity, harshness, oppression, or cruelty."13 Such a meaning applies well in this context. It appears supported by the plain language of the unnecessary rigor provision itself, which prohibits unnecessarily rigorous treatment of persons arrested or imprisoned, particularly when considered in conjunction with the other language of the same section regarding excessive fines, bail, or punishments. The history of the provision, which remains unchanged since statehood, is also consistent with such a use of the word.
{13 At the Utah constitutional convention of 1895, Delegate, and later Governor, Heber M. Wells proclaimed that the object of the unnecessary rigor provision was to "protect persons in jail if they shall be treated inhumanely."14
T14 By today's standards, the conditions in the prison and county jails at the time of the Utah constitutional convention were bleak. Surely this inhumane treatment influenced the convention delegates to include the unnecessary rigor clause in the Utah Constitution. The territorial prison was reportedly in terrible condition, and the county jails were reported to have "barbarous practices."15 "In Utah, the desire to eliminate brutality and to ensure decent and humane treatment for convicts may have been the catalyst of the unnecessary rigor provision."16
115 Statutes in effect at the time suggest the same meaning. Officers guilty of willful acts of inhumanity or oppression toward a prisoner were themselves subject to prosecution resulting in imprisonment or fines.17 Officers who, without lawful necessity, assaulted or beat anyone were likewise punishable.18 Any injury to a prisoner not authorized by law was also punishable as if the prisoner had not been convicted.19
116 The prohibition against unnecessary rigor clearly includes intentional physical abuse of persons under arrest or imprisoned. "[Allthough police may use 'reasonable and necessary force' in making an arrest, the prohibition against unnecessary rigor does not allow police officers to commit assault and battery on a criminal suspect."20
T17 The unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution protects persons arrested or imprisoned from the imposition of cireum-stances on them during their confinement that demand more of the prisoner than society is entitled to require. The restriction on unnecessary rigor is focused on the cireum-stances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement. By contrast, the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the state constitution is directed to the sentence imposed. While there is some overlap on a factual level, the purposes are different. Torture may be cruel and unusual but strict silence during given hours may not. Strict silence, however, may impose unnecessary rigor or unduly harsh restrictions on the service of one's otherwise proper sentence.
[597]*597{18 As with all such fact-intensive inquiries, the particular event or act in question, and the context in which it arose, are necessary elements to a determination of whether a particular set of cireumstances rises to the level of a constitutionally prohibited act.
II, PLAINTIFFS UNNECESSARY RIGOR CLAIM
119 A prisoner suffers from unnecessary rigor when subject to unreasonably harsh, strict, or severe treatment. This may include being unnecessarily exposed to an increased risk of serious harm. In Bolt, we upheld a jury verdict holding prison officials Hable for violating a prisoner's rights under article I, section 9 when they failed to provide the prisoner with timely medical attention despite his repeated requests and grievances.21 We also noted, however, that not every case of retrospectively inadequate attention to prisoner requests was a constitutional violation. We declared in Bott that a violation of the prohibition on unnecessary rigor must arise from "treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified, not merely the frustrations, inconveniences, and irritations that are common to prison life."22 When the claim of unnecessary rigor arises from an injury, a constitutional violation is made out only when the act complained of presented a substantial risk of serious injury for which there was no reasonable justification at the time.
1 20 The allegations of the complaint in the record do not address the necessity, if any, of the acts involved, nor do they include any assessment of the risk inherent in the act. As such, the allegations may be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim but may not withstand further evidentiary challenge. We leave it to the district court to resolve the question in the course of further proceedings.
III "FLAGRANT" VIOLATION
{21 On remand to the district court, we also offer guidance on the requirement that the conduct at issue be more than negligent to be actionable. In Bott, we held that the unnecessary rigor clause is a self-executing provision that allows for awards of money damages.23 We also held, however, that prison employees may not be liable for all constitutional violations: "To engender liability, an employee's conduct must be voluntary and sufficiently culpable to contravene a prisoner's right to be free from ... unnecessary rigor."24
122 In Spackman v. Board of Education, we noted that the common law gives the judiciary authority to provide civil remedies for constitutional violations under appropriate cireumstances.25 Taking advantage of that authority, we specified that to proceed with a private suit for damages under a constitutional tort theory, a plaintiff must establish three elements:
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant" violation of his or her constitutional rights....
Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries....
Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and [598]*598is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights or redress his or her injuries.26
1 23 The flagrant violation element
means that a defendant must have violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. To be considered clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that [constitutional] right. The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary human frailties of forgetfulness, distracti-bility, or migjudgment without rendering [himself] liable for a constitutional violation.27
124 Defendants argue that, even if they violated the constitutional prohibition on unnecessary rigor when they failed to buckle Dexter's seatbelt, the failure to act did not constitute a flagrant violation. They argue that because there was no meaningful Utah law establishing the contours of the unnecessary rigor clause, the right to have the seat-belt buckled was not then a clearly established right. Defendants make a reasonable point. The factual cireumstances surrounding Dexter's treatment, however, are insufficiently presented to allow us to decide as a matter of law just how clearly established this particular concern may have been at the time.
125 If an official knowingly and unjustifiably subjects an inmate to cireum-stances previously identified as being unnecessarily rigorous, that is obviously a flagrant violation. Where a clear prohibition has not been previously known to the official, more may be required to establish a flagrant violation. We are satisfied that a flagrant violation of the unnecessary rigor clause has occurred whenever the following two elements are established: First, the nature of the act presents an obvious and known serious risk of harm to the arrested or imprisoned person; and second, knowing of that risk, the official acts without other reasonable justification.
126 Whether a violation has occurred will depend on the specific facts of the case. The finder of fact must first determine whether the risk of harm was serious, and whether that risk was obvious and known to the defendants. If so, the finder of fact must then address what, if any, justification existed for the act, as well as the reasonableness of that justification.
127 Affirmed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
[ 28 Justice DURRANT concurs in Associate Chief Justice WILKINS opinion.