Devore v. State
This text of 657 N.E.2d 740 (Devore v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
This is the second of two appeals asking whether a conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated which is enhanced from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony under the provisions of Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-3 may be enhanced a second time under the habitual substance offender provisions of Section 85-50-2-10.
Two panels of the Court of Appeals split on this question. In this case, the court held that appellant Eric S. Devore could be sentenced under both statutes. We conclude otherwise.
I. Statement of Facts
In October 19983, the police arrested De-vore for driving while intoxicated. The State charged him with operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), Ind.Code Ann. § 9-80-5-2 (West 1992),1 and sought to elevate the charge from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony, Ind.Code Ann. § 9-80-5-8 (West 1992).2 It further charged him with being a habitual substance offender, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-10 (West Supp.1994), and with multiple other driving infractions.3
A jury found Devore guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a class D felony, and the trial court adjudged him a habitual substance offender.4 The court sentenced him to three years imprisonment for O.W.I. and enhanced that sentence by five years for the habitual substance offender determination.
Devore appealed his cause to the Indiana Court of Appeals and it affirmed. Devore v. State (1995), Ind.App., 650 N.E.2d 37. We grant Devore's petition for transfer.
Devore presents the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in enhancing Devore's punishment under both the OWI statute and the habitual substance offender statute;
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment that Devore was a habitual substance offender;
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Devore's conviction for OWI; and,
4. Whether Devore's sentence enhancements placed him twice in jeopardy.
We answer the first issue affirmatively and thus reverse Devore's habitual substance offender adjudication. We therefore need not address the second and fourth issues. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was sufficient evidence to support Devore's OW1I conviction and thus summarily affirm its opinion on that third issue. Ind.Appellate Rule 11(B)(B).
II. Double Emhancement of Devore's Sentence
Devore alleges that the trial court erred by twice enhancing his penalty for operating a vehicle while intoxicated: first, when the [742]*742court increased his penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony under the authority of Sections 9-30-5-2 and 3 and, second, when it enhanced his term of imprisonment by finding him a habitual substance offender under Section 35-50-2-10.
We explain today in Freeman v. State (1995), Ind., 646 N.E.2d 1021, that a defendant's sentence should not be twice enhanced through chapter 9-30-5 5 and Section 30-50-2-10, the same statutes under which Devore was convicted. We conclude that chapter 9-30-5 is a definite and specific statute which supersedes the general habitual substance offender statute. Freeman (1995), Ind., 646 N.E.2d 1021. In the absence of clear legislative language to the contrary, such double enhancement cannot be permitted.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse Devore's enhancement as a habitual substance offender.
The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
657 N.E.2d 740, 1995 Ind. LEXIS 165, 1995 WL 689767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/devore-v-state-ind-1995.