M. Warshawsky, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board which denied him disability benefits for injuries he suffered during an assault that occurred in defendant’s plant on October 4, 1978.1 The WCAB reversed the decision of a hearing referee and denied benefits on the ground that plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of his employment under MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1).
[768]*768Plaintiff was assaulted while working at defendant’s Pontiac Assembly Plant by Ralph Miller, a co-employee and the husband of plaintiff’s ex-wife. Miller struck plaintiff on the right jaw with his left hand, causing plaintiff to fall and hit his head on the plant’s concrete floor. Plaintiff suffered closed head injuries which left him totally and permanently disabled.
The WCAB found that the record consistently indicated that the origin of Miller’s animosity toward plaintiff was Miller’s wife’s relationship with plaintiff. (Miller and plaintiff’s ex-wife have since divorced.) Miller admitted knowing plaintiff only through his wife and that all of his earlier confrontations with plaintiff, at or away from work, were of a personal nature. Although Miller and his wife were co-employees with plaintiff, they worked in a different section of the plant.
Miller testified that certain phone calls to his home by plaintiff and a personal contact at work from plaintiff had caused his wife to become more nervous and resulted in his taking over her job on occasion, making him more "uptight” about his job performance. The WCAB found that there was no evidence, however, that this contributed to the personal anger provoking his attack on plaintiff.
According to Miller’s testimony, the provocation for the attack was plaintiff’s refusal to pay the expenses for his own daughter’s dental braces while she continued to live with her mother (Miller’s wife) and Miller. Another cause for the assault was Miller’s learning that plaintiff’s daughter had attempted, two weeks earlier, to commit suicide after plaintiff had reportedly visited the Friend of the Court concerning his support payments.
Miller testified that after learning of plaintiff’s refusal to pay for his daughter’s braces, he became angry and drove from his home to defendant’s [769]*769plant complex to confront plaintiff. He gained admittance to the complex by lying to the guard at the second gate that he was late for work, after being refused entry at the first gate by disclosing his purpose for entering the plant. Miller then discovered plaintiff’s new reassigned work station within the multi-plant area and hitched a ride on a maintenance truck to plaintiff’s location. The WCAB found from Miller’s and other employees’ testimony that Miller acted as the clear aggressor against plaintiff, giving plaintiff no opportunity to retreat before landing the blow which caused the injury.
Appellate review of a decision by the WCAB is limited. Findings of fact made by the WCAB are conclusive and may not be set aside if supported by record evidence, absent a showing of fraud. An appellate court may examine the board’s application of legal standards, however. Spencer v Clark Twp, 142 Mich App 63, 66; 368 NW2d 897 (1985); Const 1963, art 6, §28; MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861). This Court errs if it substitutes its findings of fact for those of the WCAB on the question of an injury’s work-relatedness. Brady v Clark Equipment Co, 72 Mich App 274; 249 NW2d 388 (1976), rev’d 400 Mich 806; 282 NW2d 921 (1977).
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that "[i]n all successful workers’ compensation cases, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence both a personal injury and a relationship between the injury and the workplace”. Miklik v Michigan Special Machine Co, 415 Mich 364, 367; 329 NW2d 713 (1982). Claimants carry the burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. McClain v Chrysler Corp, 138 Mich App 723, 727-728; 360 NW2d 284 (1984). The occurrence of an injury on an employer’s premises in the [770]*770course of employment does not, by itself, establish a prima facie showing that the injury arose out of the employment. McClain, supra, pp 731-732.
The following passage, quoted with approval by the Michigan Supreme Court in Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303, 311-312; 91 NW2d 493 (1958), explains well what is required for a causal connection to be found between an injury and a workplace:
"Not the particular or peculiar character of the associations and conditions, but that the work creates and surrounds the employee with them is the basic thing.
"Nor is it necessary, as these cases show, that the particular act or event which is the immediate cause of the injury be itself part of any work done for the employer by the claimant or others. * * * Not that the act is in the line of duty, or forwards the work, or creates special risks, but that the work brings the employee within its peril, makes it, for purposes of compensation, 'part of the work.’ ” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Cardillo, 72 US App DC 52; 112 F2d 11 (1940), cert den 310 US 649; 60 S Ct 1100; 84 L Ed 1415 (1940). (Emphasis supplied.)
The Crilly Court also cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case in which the cause of a workplace assault was found to be a personal conflict, as here, and noted that the causal connection requirement was lacking:
"The requirement that there be a causal connection between the work, or the incidents thereof, the working conditions, and the injury, serves to exclude the purely personal, nonwork connected, disputes, such as that which arose after one Harry Elrod attempted to 'date’ the wife of a fellow workman whom he had met in a tavern the night preceding the altercation. Elrod v Union Bleachery, 204 SC 481 (30 SE2d 73).” Crilly v Ballou, supra, pp 326-327. (Emphasis supplied.)
[771]*771It has been generally recognized that where an assault is unconnected with the employment and motivated by personal reasons, the injury that results does not normally "arise out of’ the employment.2
Plaintiff sets forth five arguments on appeal as to why his injury arose out of his employment for purposes of MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1). His first argument is that Miller’s employment with defendant afforded him special knowledge that it was company policy not to deny admittance to an employee who claimed he was late for work. Thus, he claims the injury was employment related because Miller gained knowledge on the job which allowed him to gain access to plaintiff. The WCAB rejected this argument because it found as a fact that defendant had a flexible enforcement policy concerning admissions and departures. The board also found that Miller had used a lie to gain entrance to the plant which was a "common technique”, not related to any "special knowledge” of plant regulations. Since this finding of fact is supported by the record, we do not substitute our own findings for those of the board. Brady v Clark Equipment Co, supra.
Plaintiff’s second argument on appeal is that Miller had special knowledge of defendant’s plant complex and was therefore able to quickly and easily track down plaintiff prior to the assault.
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M. Warshawsky, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board which denied him disability benefits for injuries he suffered during an assault that occurred in defendant’s plant on October 4, 1978.1 The WCAB reversed the decision of a hearing referee and denied benefits on the ground that plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of his employment under MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1).
[768]*768Plaintiff was assaulted while working at defendant’s Pontiac Assembly Plant by Ralph Miller, a co-employee and the husband of plaintiff’s ex-wife. Miller struck plaintiff on the right jaw with his left hand, causing plaintiff to fall and hit his head on the plant’s concrete floor. Plaintiff suffered closed head injuries which left him totally and permanently disabled.
The WCAB found that the record consistently indicated that the origin of Miller’s animosity toward plaintiff was Miller’s wife’s relationship with plaintiff. (Miller and plaintiff’s ex-wife have since divorced.) Miller admitted knowing plaintiff only through his wife and that all of his earlier confrontations with plaintiff, at or away from work, were of a personal nature. Although Miller and his wife were co-employees with plaintiff, they worked in a different section of the plant.
Miller testified that certain phone calls to his home by plaintiff and a personal contact at work from plaintiff had caused his wife to become more nervous and resulted in his taking over her job on occasion, making him more "uptight” about his job performance. The WCAB found that there was no evidence, however, that this contributed to the personal anger provoking his attack on plaintiff.
According to Miller’s testimony, the provocation for the attack was plaintiff’s refusal to pay the expenses for his own daughter’s dental braces while she continued to live with her mother (Miller’s wife) and Miller. Another cause for the assault was Miller’s learning that plaintiff’s daughter had attempted, two weeks earlier, to commit suicide after plaintiff had reportedly visited the Friend of the Court concerning his support payments.
Miller testified that after learning of plaintiff’s refusal to pay for his daughter’s braces, he became angry and drove from his home to defendant’s [769]*769plant complex to confront plaintiff. He gained admittance to the complex by lying to the guard at the second gate that he was late for work, after being refused entry at the first gate by disclosing his purpose for entering the plant. Miller then discovered plaintiff’s new reassigned work station within the multi-plant area and hitched a ride on a maintenance truck to plaintiff’s location. The WCAB found from Miller’s and other employees’ testimony that Miller acted as the clear aggressor against plaintiff, giving plaintiff no opportunity to retreat before landing the blow which caused the injury.
Appellate review of a decision by the WCAB is limited. Findings of fact made by the WCAB are conclusive and may not be set aside if supported by record evidence, absent a showing of fraud. An appellate court may examine the board’s application of legal standards, however. Spencer v Clark Twp, 142 Mich App 63, 66; 368 NW2d 897 (1985); Const 1963, art 6, §28; MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861). This Court errs if it substitutes its findings of fact for those of the WCAB on the question of an injury’s work-relatedness. Brady v Clark Equipment Co, 72 Mich App 274; 249 NW2d 388 (1976), rev’d 400 Mich 806; 282 NW2d 921 (1977).
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that "[i]n all successful workers’ compensation cases, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence both a personal injury and a relationship between the injury and the workplace”. Miklik v Michigan Special Machine Co, 415 Mich 364, 367; 329 NW2d 713 (1982). Claimants carry the burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. McClain v Chrysler Corp, 138 Mich App 723, 727-728; 360 NW2d 284 (1984). The occurrence of an injury on an employer’s premises in the [770]*770course of employment does not, by itself, establish a prima facie showing that the injury arose out of the employment. McClain, supra, pp 731-732.
The following passage, quoted with approval by the Michigan Supreme Court in Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303, 311-312; 91 NW2d 493 (1958), explains well what is required for a causal connection to be found between an injury and a workplace:
"Not the particular or peculiar character of the associations and conditions, but that the work creates and surrounds the employee with them is the basic thing.
"Nor is it necessary, as these cases show, that the particular act or event which is the immediate cause of the injury be itself part of any work done for the employer by the claimant or others. * * * Not that the act is in the line of duty, or forwards the work, or creates special risks, but that the work brings the employee within its peril, makes it, for purposes of compensation, 'part of the work.’ ” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Cardillo, 72 US App DC 52; 112 F2d 11 (1940), cert den 310 US 649; 60 S Ct 1100; 84 L Ed 1415 (1940). (Emphasis supplied.)
The Crilly Court also cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case in which the cause of a workplace assault was found to be a personal conflict, as here, and noted that the causal connection requirement was lacking:
"The requirement that there be a causal connection between the work, or the incidents thereof, the working conditions, and the injury, serves to exclude the purely personal, nonwork connected, disputes, such as that which arose after one Harry Elrod attempted to 'date’ the wife of a fellow workman whom he had met in a tavern the night preceding the altercation. Elrod v Union Bleachery, 204 SC 481 (30 SE2d 73).” Crilly v Ballou, supra, pp 326-327. (Emphasis supplied.)
[771]*771It has been generally recognized that where an assault is unconnected with the employment and motivated by personal reasons, the injury that results does not normally "arise out of’ the employment.2
Plaintiff sets forth five arguments on appeal as to why his injury arose out of his employment for purposes of MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1). His first argument is that Miller’s employment with defendant afforded him special knowledge that it was company policy not to deny admittance to an employee who claimed he was late for work. Thus, he claims the injury was employment related because Miller gained knowledge on the job which allowed him to gain access to plaintiff. The WCAB rejected this argument because it found as a fact that defendant had a flexible enforcement policy concerning admissions and departures. The board also found that Miller had used a lie to gain entrance to the plant which was a "common technique”, not related to any "special knowledge” of plant regulations. Since this finding of fact is supported by the record, we do not substitute our own findings for those of the board. Brady v Clark Equipment Co, supra.
Plaintiff’s second argument on appeal is that Miller had special knowledge of defendant’s plant complex and was therefore able to quickly and easily track down plaintiff prior to the assault. The board rejected this contention on the grounds that the dispute involved was purely personal and that Miller’s knowledge, by itself, did not provide the required causal connection. From the facts, it is evident that Miller was determined to have his vengeance on plaintiff wherever he might find him. We agree with the board that the facts [772]*772support a conclusion that Miller’s special knowledge of defendant’s plant complex did not facilitate an assault which would not otherwise have been made.
Plaintiffs third basis for a causal connection is that the assault occurred while plaintiff was working, and that he was unable to retreat or take evasive action. The board found this argument unpersuasive because Miller testified that, had plaintiff attempted to run, he would have prevented him from leaving. Again, as this is a finding of fact, supported by the record evidence, we will not attempt to substitute our own findings. Brady v Clark Equipment Co, supra.
Further, we agree with the board’s rejection of plaintiffs positional-risk theory under Whetro v Awkerman, 383 Mich 235; 174 NW2d 783 (1970). Plaintiffs reliance on the positional-risk theory is based on a misunderstanding of the doctrine. The doctrine applies only to neutral risks, or those risks which arise neither from an employment situation nor from the acts of an employee. A classic example of a neutral risk is being struck by lightning while on the job. Plaintiff here was not injured by a neutral risk, but by an intentional act of a co-employee, motivated by private reasons:
"When it is clear that the origin of the assault was purely private and personal, and that the employment contributed nothing to the episode, whether by engendering or exacerbating the quarrel or facilitating the assault, the assault should be held noncompensable even in states fully accepting the positional-risk test, since that test applies only when the risk is 'neutral.’ ” 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Assaults, § 11.21, p 3-256. (Footnotes omitted.)
It is clear that the risk here was not neutral; [773]*773plaintiff’s positional-risk doctrine argument was properly rejected by the board.
Plaintiff’s fourth argument is that the source of the dispute between Miller and himself was a company-provided benefit, the dental care of his daughter. The board found the fact that his daughter’s braces might have been partially paid for by company-provided insurance to be irrelevant to the dispute. The basis of the dispute was plaintiff’s refusal to authorize payment, not the extent of any insurance coverage. This finding is supported by the record evidence. There appears to be no difference in the dispute here over authorization of payment and an argument over money earned through employment. The board therefore did not err on this issue.
Plaintiff’s final argument is that his working conditions, i.e., the concrete floor in the plant, increased the severity of his injuries. This argument was properly rejected by the board. In Ledbetter v Michigan Carton Co, 74 Mich App 330; 253 NW2d 753 (1977), lv den 401 Mich 829 (1977), this Court rejected a similar "arising out of’ argument as it related to idiopathic falls in the workplace. This Court stated:
"The plaintiff’s remaining argument for compensation is that the concrete or cement floor onto which the decedent fell aggravated his injury. Although we recognize that a fall onto a softer surface may have lessened the impact, we are not convinced that the composition of the floor necessarily aggravated the harm. It cannot be said with certainty that had the fall occurred at a different location, away from the employer’s premises, the injuries would have been less serious.” 74 Mich App 337.
Based on the Ledbetter holding, the board did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s final argument.
[774]*774The record thus supports the following WCAB conclusion:
"That their purely personal hostility arising from separate successive marriages to the same woman was 'imported into the work place’ did not imbue their relationship with any contribution from the employment environment.”
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury he suffered arose out of his employment for purposes of MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1).
Affirmed.
Gribbs, P.J., concurred.