Supreme Court
No. 2023-44-Appeal. (PB 11-5398)
Deutsche Bank National Trust : Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1
v. :
Alebia, Inc. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Deutsche Bank National Trust : Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, Alebia, Inc. (Alebia or
defendant), appeals from the Superior Court’s entry of a partial judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered
Holders of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank or plaintiff), in accordance with
Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment reforms a
mortgage that is at the center of this dispute. This case came before the Supreme
Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the
parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that
-1- cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing
or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court.
I
Facts and Travel
Alebia is a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business
located at 284-286 Atwells Avenue, Providence (the property). Alebia was the
record owner of the property at the time of the execution of the mortgage in dispute.
Carmela Natale and Walter Potenza are purportedly the only owners and
shareholders of Alebia. Deutsche Bank is a national trust company.
In September 2005, Natale and Potenza executed a promissory note (the note)
and mortgage in favor of Equity One Mortgage Company (Equity One). The
mortgage lacked a legal description of the property to be used as collateral for the
note; the loan proceeds, however, were used to pay off and discharge prior mortgages
encumbering the property, as well as the City of Providence taxes due on the
property. The remaining proceeds of the loan were paid to Natale and Potenza. The
plaintiff is the current holder of the note. According to plaintiff, all parties to the
transaction intended both for the note to be secured by the property and for the
mortgage to be executed by Natale and Potenza as authorized officers of Alebia.
-2- Instead, however, Natale and Potenza signed the mortgage in their individual
capacities.
Despite this, in 2007, Natale and Potenza executed a loan modification
agreement with plaintiff, acknowledging that the note was secured by the property.
Additionally, several other documents–including the homeowner insurance
verification and authorization, truth-in-lending disclosure, numerous documents
related to the refinancing request, and affidavit of title–all referred to Natale and
Potenza as the borrowers and the property as the collateral to which the security
interest was attached.
On September 19, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County
Superior Court against Natale and Potenza asserting breach-of-contract claims and
seeking damages in the amount equal to the payment remaining under the note,
property taxes, attorneys’ fees, expenses, and interest. On the same day, plaintiff
also filed a complaint against Alebia seeking reformation of the mortgage, the
imposition of an equitable mortgage, a declaratory judgment declaring the mortgage
reformed, and damages. Eventually, on April 10, 2017, plaintiff obtained a
judgment against Natale and Potenza for their remaining obligations under the loan.
But because Natale and Potenza had executed the note in their individual capacities
and not on behalf of Alebia, plaintiff was unable to proceed against the property as
collateral for the debt. Accordingly, on June 18, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion to
-3- equitably reform the mortgage in its case against Alebia and requested an evidentiary
hearing. The defendant objected.
A justice of the Superior Court presided over three remote evidentiary
hearings between September 2021 and February 2022. At the first hearing, on
September 17, 2021, defendant objected to holding the hearings remotely. The
defendant argued that because the hearing justice was making an ultimate decision
on the merits of the litigation, the hearings constituted a bench trial and that, under
an executive order issued by the Supreme Court during the pandemic, all bench trials
were to be held in court unless all parties agreed to hold them remotely. The hearing
justice denied defendant’s objection, however, and the hearings proceeded remotely.
Over the course of the hearings, four witnesses testified, viz.: Howard
Handville, a senior loan analyst for Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen); Karen
Medeiros, Esq., a former closing attorney for Residential Title and Escrow Services,
Inc.; Leonard Accardo, Jr., Esq., who testified as an expert witness in commercial
real estate transactions; and Danielle Smith, the managing paralegal and firm
administrator for Savage Law Partners (SLP), the law firm representing the plaintiff
in this action. We recite only the testimony necessary to decide the issues before us.
Mr. Handville was, at the time, a senior loan analyst at Ocwen. He testified
that since the loan originated in 2005, the loan has been serviced by several different
loan servicing companies, the most recent of which was PHH Mortgage (PHH) in
-4- 2019. Following a merger between PHH and Ocwen in 2019, PHH became a
subsidiary of Ocwen. Handville further testified that he had reviewed the files of
PHH related to the mortgage more than half a dozen times and that those files were
maintained by Ocwen in the normal course of business. Handville testified that
“[t]here was no question the loan was secured by an asset, [the] real estate asset.”
Ms. Smith was the managing paralegal at Shechtman, Halperin & Savage
(SHS) and then at SLP, attorneys for plaintiff and the entities that kept physical
possession of the original note. Smith testified that the note was received by SHS
and then transferred to SLP. She further testified that the note was kept and
maintained in the ordinary course of business since its initial arrival and that she had
been responsible for overseeing the safekeeping and transportation of the note and
the attached documents between the two firms. Smith was asked to compare the
photocopy of the note offered as an exhibit with the original note she had on file in
her office. In her comparison, the only differences she noted were initials on the
lower corner of the original note.
The hearing justice thereafter issued a written decision granting the motion to
equitably reform the mortgage, thereby reforming the mortgage to have been
executed by Natale and Potenza in their capacities as corporate representatives of
Alebia instead of in their individual capacities. A partial final judgment was entered
-5- pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure on July 19,
2022. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 20, 2022.
II
Standard of Review
This Court has held that “[t]he admissibility of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial justice.” Estrella v. Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, 296 A.3d
97, 103 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722, 729 (R.I. 2017)).
“This Court will not interfere with the trial justice’s [evidentiary] decision unless a
clear abuse of that discretion is apparent.” Id. (quoting Cappuccilli, 174 A.3d at 729).
Additionally, “[i]t is well-established that the findings of fact of a trial justice,
sitting without a jury, will be given great weight and will not be disturbed absent a
showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was
otherwise clearly wrong.” Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497, 502 (R.I. 2018) (quoting
Fravala v. City of Cranston ex rel. Baron, 996 A.2d 696, 704 (R.I. 2010)). “A trial
justice’s findings on questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.” Estrella, 296
A.3d at 106 (quoting Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association v.
Langlois, 45 A.3d 577, 581 (R.I. 2012)).
-6- III
Discussion
On appeal, defendant asserts five errors that, it argues, warrant reversal of the
Rule 54(b) judgment, two of which focus on the admission of evidence. First,
defendant argues that the hearing justice erred in admitting the testimony of senior
loan analyst Howard Handville into evidence. In support of its claim of error,
defendant argues that Handville’s testimony lacked the required foundation and that
the hearing justice incorrectly applied the business records exception to the hearsay
rule. Second, defendant contends that the hearing justice erred in admitting a
photocopy of the note into evidence because the note was improperly authenticated.
Further to this point, defendant argues that it did not have the opportunity to inspect
the original note and that the hearing justice improperly denied defendant’s request
to call a new expert witness to inspect the note.
Next, defendant raises an issue regarding the hearing justice’s evaluation of
the weight of the evidence. The defendant contends that there was not sufficient
evidence presented at the hearings to determine the intent of the original lender at
the time the mortgage was signed, and, thus, the hearing justice erred in reforming
the mortgage under the doctrine of mutual mistake.
The defendant also raises two issues that implicate the hearing justice’s
interpretation of law. First, it asserts that the hearing justice erred in reforming the
-7- mortgage without also reforming the note and that failure to also reform the note
renders the note void. Finally, defendant claims that the hearing justice erred by
refusing to conduct an in-person hearing and that defendant was thereby denied its
right to due process.
We initially observe that, notwithstanding defendant’s claims of error on
appeal, it advanced only one argument in its post-hearing memorandum below, viz.:
“[F]or the reformation to be effective, the note must also be reformed so that the
mortgagor Alebia, Inc. is also a borrower under the note.” To the extent that the
remainder of defendant’s appellate arguments have not been waived, they are
without merit.
The defendant assigns two errors to the admission of the promissory note
allegedly signed by Natale and Potenza. First, it argues that the only persons who
testified concerning the note were Handville, an Ocwen loan analyst, and Smith, an
employee of the law firm representing plaintiff, and that these two witnesses did not
provide the foundation necessary to admit the note through their testimony.
Specifically, defendant asserts that Handville knew nothing about the transfer of the
note or mortgage prior to the involvement of PHH and, therefore, could not himself
verify the accuracy of any records of prior mortgage servicers. To this point,
defendant argues that none of Handville’s testimony should be considered for want
of a proper foundation. As a result, defendant argues, the hearing justice erred “by
-8- admitting into evidence what was claimed to be a note with an allonge * * * despite
the lack of any foundation * * *.” Second, and related to its first argument, defendant
argues that Smith also “did not authenticate the note.” In further support of this
argument, defendant claims that it was denied the opportunity to inspect the note and
to have an expert inspect the note.
The abuse-of-discretion “standard is applicable to a trial justice’s
determinations with respect to both the relevancy of proffered evidence and the
adequacy of the foundation laid for its admission.” Malinowski v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 792 A.2d 50, 53 (R.I. 2002) (quoting ADP Marshall, Inc. v. Brown
University, 784 A.2d 309, 314 (R.I. 2001)).
Testimony of Howard Handville
We first address the threshold matter of whether the trial justice erred in
admitting the testimony of Handville. Here, the loan at issue originated in 2005 and
has since been serviced by several different loan servicing companies, most recently
by PHH in 2019. PHH then became a subsidiary of Ocwen. Handville was a senior
loan analyst at Ocwen. At the hearings, he testified that he had reviewed the files of
PHH and Ocwen related to the mortgage numerous times and that those files were
maintained in the course of business. In addition, Handville was subject to, and
indeed underwent, a robust cross-examination. As such, we perceive no abuse of
-9- discretion by the hearing justice in admitting Handville’s testimony and then
assigning to it whatever weight he deemed appropriate.
The Promissory Note
Having deemed Handville’s testimony properly admitted, we next address the
admission of the promissory note. On appeal, defendant’s argument that the hearing
justice erred in admitting the note into evidence for lack of authentication is twofold.
First, defendant argues that the photocopy of the note admitted into evidence was
not properly authenticated by Smith. In support, defendant claims that Smith’s
testimony about the chain of custody of the note did not clearly establish that the
note in her office was the original note. Second, defendant claims it was denied the
opportunity to inspect and authenticate the note itself and was also denied the
opportunity to call a new expert witness to testify about the lack of authenticity of
the note. Both of these errors, defendant claims, were a denial of its right to due
process.
Rule 901(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that “[t]he
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what its proponent claims.” This Court has stated that “authentication
is not a high hurdle to clear.” O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111 A.3d 317, 323
(R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d
- 10 - 853, 860 (R.I. 2014)). Furthermore, “document authenticity need not be established
by any particular means but may be accomplished by any of the methods enumerated
in Rules 901 or 902.” Id. (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting State v. Oliveira,
774 A.2d 893, 925 (R.I. 2001)).
Of these, one such method is establishing a chain of custody for the evidence.
See R.I. R. Evid. 901(b) Advisory Committee’s Notes (2024). “Although a showing
of a continuous chain of custody may operate as a ‘guarantee of the reliability,’ such
a showing is not necessary for the introduction of physical evidence.” State v.
Nelson, 982 A.2d 602, 612 (R.I. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Infantolino, 116 R.I. 303, 312, 355 A.2d 722, 727 (1976)). “Thus, a showing of
continuous chain of custody is relevant only to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility.” State v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 151, 154 (R.I. 1988).
A review of the transcripts of the hearings reveals the following: The plaintiff
first attempted to admit a document entitled “adjustable rate note” through the
testimony of Handville. He was asked to testify about the records of the mortgage
transaction at issue, which were being maintained by PHH. Handville testified that
it was common practice for a loan servicer to rely on the accuracy and reliability of
business records that are transmitted from a prior servicer. Specifically with respect
to the note, he testified that the note memorialized a loan in the amount of $883,750,
in which Equity One was the lender and Natale and Potenza were the borrowers.
- 11 - Handville stated that the original note was maintained at plaintiff’s law firm’s office.
The plaintiff then moved for full admission of the note, and defendant objected for
lack of foundation. The hearing justice indicated that he was “going to reserve on a
full exhibit until after cross, and if counsel wishes to[,] after redirect.” Handville
completed his testimony the following day, including cross, redirect, and recross
examination.
The next witness to testify was Karen Medeiros, an attorney formerly
employed by Residential Title and Escrow Services, Inc.1 She served as the closing
attorney representing the interests of Equity One at the transaction at issue in this
case. She was also asked to identify the promissory note. Although the loan closing
had occurred over fifteen years earlier, she testified that she recalled Natale and
Potenza signing the document in front of her. The plaintiff again moved to enter the
note as a full exhibit, and defendant again objected. The hearing justice thereupon
admitted the promissory note as a full exhibit, recognizing that there might be further
testimony on the note and indicating that he could decide what weight it should be
afforded.
At the third and final evidentiary hearing on the issue, plaintiff called Smith
to establish a chain of custody for the note. Smith testified that the note was received
1 In its papers, defendant does not address the effect of Medeiros’s testimony on the admission of the note.
- 12 - by the first law firm at which she worked and then transferred to the second law firm
at which she worked. She further testified that the note was kept and maintained in
the ordinary course of business since its initial arrival and that she had been
responsible for the safekeeping and transportation of the note and the attached
documents between the two firms. When Smith compared the photocopy of the note
offered as an exhibit with the original note she had on file in her office, the only
differences she noted were initials on the lower corner of the original note.
In addition to this testimony, and in response to objections by defendant as to
the note’s authenticity at the hearing, plaintiff offered to make the original note
available in chambers, impliedly so that the hearing justice and defendant could
schedule a time to inspect the note themselves. Apparently, for reasons unclear in
the transcript, this never occurred. Given the low hurdle required to authenticate a
piece of evidence, the testimony offered at the hearings to establish a chain of
custody for the note, and this Court’s recognition that chain of custody goes to the
weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, we cannot say that the hearing
justice abused his discretion in admitting the photocopy of the note.
When considering defendant’s claim regarding the introduction of new expert
testimony, we note that this Court has held that “‘[t]he widest discretion must be
given to calendar justices and trial justices’ in managing a trial calendar * * *.”
- 13 - Coates v. Ocean State Jobbers, Inc., 18 A.3d 554, 558 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Bergeron
v. Roszkowski, 866 A.2d 1230, 1235 (R.I. 2005)).
At the time defendant sought to bring in new expert testimony in February
2022, the deadline to disclose expert witnesses had long passed. In fact, after the
pretrial order in February 2020 that set the expert disclosure deadline for May 2020,
defendant offered not one expert. Despite defendant’s contentions that the pretrial
order did not apply because the present case was a consolidated matter and the
pretrial order applied only to the other case, we recognize that this case has been
pending since 2011, and we see no abuse of discretion or implication of resulting
unfair prejudice in the hearing justice’s decision not to allow this new expert
testimony so long after the close of discovery.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the hearing justice did not err in admitting the
note into evidence.
Mutual Mistake
In his decision, the hearing justice comprehensively and meticulously
reviewed the evidence and concluded that “it is beyond clear to the [c]ourt, based
upon the substantial amount of evidence submitted in this case, that the parties
intended for Equity One or its designated nominee, MERS,[2] to have a first-priority
mortgage on the [p]roperty that would secure Natale and Potenza’s obligations under
2 The acronym “MERS” stands for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
- 14 - the [n]ote.” Consequently, he granted plaintiff’s motion to equitably reform the
mortgage.
The defendant claims that, because there was no testimony regarding the
intent of the original lender at signing, there was insufficient evidence to determine
the intent of the parties and, thus, insufficient evidence to reform the mortgage under
the doctrine of mutual mistake.
“When ‘the record indicates that competent evidence supports the trial
justice’s findings, we shall not substitute our view of the evidence for his or hers
* * *.’” South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)
(brackets omitted) (quoting JPL Livery Services, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of
Administration, 88 A.3d 1134, 1142 (R.I. 2014)). “This Court consistently has held
that factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury are granted an extremely
deferential standard of review.” State v. Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161, 1165 (R.I. 2011).
It is clear to us that there is competent evidence in the record to support the
hearing justice’s findings. Indeed, based on the evidence presented at the hearings,
the hearing justice found that there had been a mutual mistake between the parties at
the original signing. The hearing justice cited a wealth of evidence demonstrating
the intent of the parties. He noted that the evidence in the record, such as the
homeowner insurance verification and authorization, truth-in-lending disclosure,
numerous documents related to the refinancing request, and the affidavit of title all
- 15 - listed Natale and Potenza as the “borrowers” and the property as the “collateral” to
which the “security interest” was attached. After considering the testimony at the
hearings, the hearing justice concluded that there was “no question that the parties
to the instant transaction understood and intended for Equity One * * * to have a
first priority mortgage on the [p]roperty to secure Natale and Potenza’s obligations
under the Note * * *.” The hearing justice further determined that the fact that Natale
and Potenza had executed the mortgage in their individual capacities, thus rendering
the security interest unenforceable, was “due to a mutual mistake and/or an
unintended error” and that to not reform the mortgage “would be to go against the
interests of justice and fairness * * *.”
Accordingly, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence in the record
to support the hearing justice’s order for reformation of the mortgage.
Reformation of the Mortgage without Reformation of the Note
Finally, defendant contends that the hearing justice made two distinct errors
of law, the first of which is that the hearing justice erred in reforming the mortgage
without also reforming the note. At oral argument, defendant asserted that the
mortgage can only secure the obligation of the borrower and that, as such, both the
note and the mortgage must be reformed. Otherwise, defendant contends that the
note becomes void.
- 16 - The defendant’s argument fails. As a treatise on the topic notes, “[i]t is
axiomatic that a mortgage is security for the performance of an act * * * [and] [t]he
performance may be by the mortgagor, or by some other person; thus, a mortgage to
secure the debt of another is plainly valid.” Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman,
Real Estate Finance Law § 2.1 at 15 (3d ed. 1994). This Court, too, has recognized
that “[t]he law contemplates distinctions between the legal interest in a mortgage
and the beneficial interest in the underlying debt. These are distinct interests, and
they may be held by different parties.” Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68
A.3d 1069, 1088 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska,
708 F.3d 282, 292 (1st Cir. 2013)).
As plaintiff correctly posits, although our caselaw on the topic is not
extensive, we are not alone in recognizing that these distinct interests allow the
mortgagor and the borrower to be different parties without affecting the
enforceability of the security interest itself. See Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company v. Holden, 60 N.E.3d 1243, 1251 (Ohio 2016) (discussing the existence of
two separate legal interests where the mortgage was signed on behalf of two persons
and the note was signed on behalf of only one of those persons); Pitrolo v.
Community Bank & Trust, N.A., 298 S.E.2d 853, 856-57 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that
consideration need not flow to the guarantor for the deed of trust to adequately secure
- 17 - the note). Therefore, we hold that the hearing justice did not err by reforming only
the mortgage.
Remote Hearing
The defendant next argues that the hearing justice committed an error of law
by allowing the hearings to be conducted remotely. The defendant emphasizes that
due process requires “that trials * * * be conducted in public with access to the
evidence.” The consideration of defendant’s argument in this regard requires us to
revisit the dark days of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the courthouses in
Newport and Washington Counties were temporarily closed, and the number of
persons entering the state’s other courthouses was sharply restricted. The Court was
able to continue its business largely because judges, lawyers, litigants, and the public
adapted so readily to remote technology, including the ability to provide public
access to proceedings via live-streaming of arguments. Of significance to the case
before us, on April 2, 2021, the Superior Court amended the Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure, as approved by the Supreme Court, by allowing any hearing to
be “conducted in whole or in part by remote means on the Court’s own initiative, or
upon a request by a party and at the Court’s discretion.” Super. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(4).
On July 20, 2021, the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an
executive order providing that each court within the unified judicial system identify
“all case or hearing types that shall continue on a remote basis,” indicating that such
- 18 - hearings are “highly encouraged.” Supreme Court Executive Order No. 2021-04(4)-
(5). The executive order also stated that “[j]ury and bench trials may resume without
restriction. With the consent of all parties and the Court, bench trials may be
conducted remotely.” Id. at (3)(A).
In response thereto, on July 30, 2021, the Presiding Justice of the Superior
Court issued two administrative orders (AOs). See Superior Court Administrative
Order No. 2021-05; see also Superior Court Administrative Order No. 2021-06. AO
2021-05 provided, inter alia, that “[b]ench trials may be conducted remotely with
the consent of all parties.” AO 2021-06 established protocols for remote hearings
and included “bench trials,” “business calendars,” and “non-jury hearings” among
the “case or hearing types that may be conducted remotely * * *.”
At the time that the hearings in this case commenced, in September 2021, the
operative orders and rules allowed for remote hearings in a wide variety of case types
and permitted bench trials by remote means with the consent of all parties. The
hearing justice determined that the matter before him was a motion, not a bench trial.
As he clarified at the outset of his written decision:
“[T]he hearings held by this Court related solely to Deutsche Bank’s Motion to Equitabl[y] Reform Mortgage and was not a bench trial on Deutsche Bank’s underlying suit against Alebia. Consequently, the [c]ourt will not consider or address issues or arguments unrelated to Deutsche Bank’s Motion to Equitably Reform Mortgage.”
- 19 - We disagree. It is our belief that the proceeding before the hearing justice
was, in essence, a bench trial. The relief the plaintiff sought in the motion to
equitably reform the mortgage mirrored the relief it requested in count one of its
amended complaint, that “[t]he [m]ortgage should be reformed to be executed in the
name of the record owner of the property, Alebia * * *.” Because the hearings were
essentially a bench trial that granted the original relief sought in the underlying suit
and because the defendant did not consent to the remote hearings as thus would have
been required under AO 2021-05, we believe the hearing justice erred when he
elected to hold the hearings remotely over the defendant’s objections. We are of the
opinion, however, that the error was harmless. We reject any notion that the
defendant was denied its due-process rights, particularly in light of public access to
remote proceedings and the plaintiff’s offer to make the original note available for
inspection in chambers. We are satisfied that the remote nature of the hearings did
not affect the outcome of the proceedings. See State v. Hazard, 797 A.2d 448, 470
(R.I. 2002).
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The
record may be returned to the Superior Court.
- 20 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of CBA Commercial Title of Case Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass- Through Certificates, Series 2006-1 v. Alebia, Inc. No. 2023-44-Appeal. Case Number (PB 11-5398)
Date Opinion Filed April 17, 2025
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian P. Stern
For Plaintiff:
Michael P. Robinson, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
John B. Ennis, Esq.