Department of Transportation v. Stapleton

97 P.3d 938, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 695, 2004 WL 2029711

• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado
• Decided: September 13, 2004
• Docket: 03SC616
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice RICE

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The Petitioners, the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) and the Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County (the “County”), seek review of the court of appeals’ decision that they each lack statutory authority to condemn property owned by the Respondent, Craig R. Stapleton. Because we find that CDOT has the necessarily implied statutory authority to condemn the property at issue, we reverse.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

This case arises out of a condemnation action in which the trial court awarded the Petitioners immediate possession of property owned by the Respondent and located near the Buttermilk Ski Area outside the city of Aspen. The Petitioners had brought a joint condemnation action in which they sought to acquire certain parcels for their independent but overlapping needs.

Prior to the condemnation action, CDOT and the County had entered into an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) which addressed various long-term and short-term needs of both CDOT and the County. In particular, the IGA covered the reconstruction of State Highway 82, which included a partial expansion from two lanes to four lanes and consolidation of the three existing accesses to the highway into one single access point. The project further provided that Highway 82 would remain as a two-lane highway at a point outside of Aspen, across from the Buttermilk Ski Area. Ultimately, the Petitioners also hoped to construct a light-rail transit and parking facility for approximately 750 cars, at the point where the highway reverts to two lanes, in order to reduce air pollution and traffic congestion into the city of Aspen.¹ CDOT claimed that the proposed parking and transit facility would satisfy federal Clean Air Act requirements and that such compliance was necessary in order to secure federal funding for the Overall Highway 82 project. The County added that the facility would also serve as an intercept lot for visitors to Aspen and would provide parking for and access to a large public trail system owned by the County.

After the condemnation action was filed, the Petitioners and the Respondent reached a stipulated agreement regarding certain parcels to be used for the Highway 82 expansion, county road relocation, airport runway zones, open space, and wetland replacement and mitigation. However, the Respondent continued to challenge the authority of CDOT and the County to condemn the remaining parcels for the purpose of constructing the parking and transit facility. The, trial court held an immediate possession hearing with regard to the remaining disputed parcels, at which time the court addressed whether the Petitioners had legal authority to condemn the property; whether the property was being acquired for predominately public purposes; whether good faith negotiations had been conducted prior to the fifing of the condemnation action; and whether the Petitioners had an immediate need to take possession of the property.

At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from CDOT’s project manager regarding the need for the property within the context of the Highway 82 project, as well as from a former County Manager regarding the County’s overlapping need for the property as an intercept lot and as an access point to the County’s recreational trail system. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order detailing findings of fact and conclusions of law. In particular, the court concluded that CDOT possessed legal authority to condemn the property for parking and transit purposes, stating:

While it is true that none of the statutes relied upon by petitioners expressly grant a right to condemn for parking purposes, the evidence establishes that transit parking is required to comply with the Clean Air Act. Without compliance with the Clean Air Act, the project cannot be done. The Department of Transportation has the power to condemn for highway purposes. Where the parking is a required element of highway construction, the right to condemn for parking must therefore be necessarily implied.

Thus, the trial court ruled that CDOT had the implied statutory authority to condemn the parcels for a transit and parking facility. Having found that CDOT possessed authority for the condemnation, the trial court did not reach the issue of whether the County had its own implied authority to condemn the property.

After the immediate possession hearing, the Respondent sought extraordinary relief with this Court pursuant to C.A.R. 21, which was denied. Subsequently, the trial court held a valuation hearing in order to determine the amount of compensation owed to the Respondent. After a final order was issued, the Respondent appealed the trial court’s ruling to the court of appeals. Specifically, the Respondent challenged the trial court’s findings that CDOT possessed legal authority to condemn the property, that the property was being acquired for a public purpose, that the condemnation was necessary, and that the Petitioners had negotiated in good faith prior to the condemnation.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that neither CDOT nor the County had statutory authority to condemn the property for a parking and transit facility. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Stapleton, 81 P.3d 1105 (Colo.App.2003). The court of appeals ruled, as pertinent here, that parking and transit facilities did not fall within the purview of CDOT’s authority to condemn for “state highway purposes” pursuant to section 43-1-208(3), 11 C.R.S. (2003), nor could CDOT condemn the property as a remainder pursuant to section 43-1-210(1), 11 C.R.S. (2003). Stapleton, 81 P.3d at 1107-08. Additionally, the court of appeals found that the County lacked authority to condemn the property as necessary for “recreational facilities” under section 29-7-104, 9 C.R.S. (2003). Stapleton, 81 P.3d at 1109. Thus, the court of appeals held that the Petitioners lacked any statutory authority to condemn the disputed parcels. This appeal followed.²

We granted certiorari to address whether either or both of the Petitioners have the statutory authority to condemn the disputed property in order to construct a parking and transit facility.³ We now find that CDOT’s authority to condemn land for “state highway purposes” under section 43-1-208(3) includes the authority to condemn lands adjacent to a state highway for the construction of a parking and transit facility that is an integral part of a broader state highway improvement project. Because CDOT’s implied statutory authority to condemn the disputed parcels is sufficient to support the condemnation action before us, we do not reach the issue of whether the County also possesses statutory authority to condemn the same property. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals insofar as it held that CDOT lacked statutory authority to condemn the disputed parcels pursuant to section 43-1-208(3), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Analysis

We have long held that in Colorado the power of eminent domain lies dormant in the state until the legislature speaks. Potashnik v. Pub. Serv. Co., 126 Colo. 98, 101, 247 P.2d 137, 138 (1952). Accordingly, a party may not condemn private property without demonstrating that the taking has been statutorily authorized, either expressly or implicitly. See State Dep’t of Highways v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 789 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Colo.1990) (holding that the Department of Highways did not have statutory authority to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks on behalf of a landlocked ranch operator). Thus, in order for the Petitioners to condemn the Respondent’s property, they must demonstrate that either CDOT or the County has been expressly or implicitly authorized by statute to condemn the disputed parcels. Buck v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 344, 347, 608 P.2d 350, 352 (1980) (“Private property may not be condemned, even for a purpose which is judicially determined to be a public use within the meaning of Colo. Const. Art. II, See. 15, in the absence of express or necessarily implied statutory condemnation authority.”). Here, both CDOT and the County concede that condemnation of this property to construct a parking and transit facility is not expressly authorized by any statute, but instead argue that their authority to condemn the Respondent’s property is necessarily implied. Consequently, in order to resolve this action, we must determine the scope of condemnation authority implicitly granted by the legislature through the relevant statutes.

A. Doctrine of Necessary Implication

To begin, we note that “narrow construction is the rule in determining the scope of the condemnation power delegated pursuant to legislative enactment.” Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 522 (Colo.1982) (finding that a federal oil and gas lessee could not condemn private property for private use as a right-of-way based on a condemnation statute which was silent as to whether federal oil and gas lessees could exercise the power granted therein). Because we construe the statute against the entity asserting the authority, we will not find an implied grant of the condemnation authority through “vague or doubtful language.” Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 272, 248 P.2d 732, 735 (1952) (holding that a municipality could not condemn private property under a statute granting certain enumerated parties the authority to condemn such lands where the statute did not include municipalities); see also, e.g., Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Colo. 337, 339, 191 P. 101, 101 (1920) (‘When the right to exercise the power [of eminent domain] can only be made out by argument and inference, it does .not exist.”) (quoting with approval John Lewis, A Treatment on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States § 371 (3d ed. 1909)). Accordingly, we have declined to find an implied grant of authority to condemn property where the statute relied upon by the condemning body is either silent on the subject of condemnation altogether or does not clearly indicate that the legislature intended for the body asserting the power to have such authority.

In Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 655 P.2d 831 (Colo.1982), for example, we affirmed a trial court’s ruling that a county lacked statutory authority to condemn buildings needed for county office space. There, the county relied upon statutes which directed that “[e]ach county, at its own expense, shall provide a suitable courthouse, a sufficient jail, and other necessary county buildings, and keep them in repair,” and that counties “provide suitable rooms for county purposes.” Id. at 832 n. 1. Thus, the “Board argue[d] that since the county has a mandatory duty to provide county offices, the power to acquire property to carry out that duty must necessarily be implied.” 655 P.2d at 833.

In rejecting the county’s argument, we noted that the statutes relied upon by the county, which directed it to provide and maintain certain county buildings, made no mention whatsoever of the power of eminent domain. Id. On the other hand, we cited to several statutes which did expressly delegate to county commissioners the right to condemn properties for various county needs, including roads, airports, and cemeteries. Id. Thus, we agreed with the district court’s conclusion “that the legislature’s failure to grant specific authority for such- condemnation indicates a legislative judgment that counties are not empowered to invoke eminent domain to acquire property for office space.” Id. at 834. We therefore declined to find implicit statutory authority to condemn the property at issue.

In Buck, 199 Colo. 344, 608 P.2d 350, however, we found that a railroad did possess implied statutory authority to condemn lands outside its express statutory right-of-way. There, the railroad company sought to condemn certain parcels for the purpose of constructing “dust levees” parallel to its railroad tracks. Id. at 345-46, 608 P.2d at 351. The company relied upon a statute providing that a railroad “may acquire title ... in the manner provided' by law for the condemnation of real estate or right-of-way.” Id. at 347, 608 P.2d at 352. The landowners, however, relied upon a separate statute stating that a railroad corporation may “lay out its road, not exceeding two hundred feet in width, and to construct the same; and for the purpose of cuttings and embankments to take as much more land as may be necessary for the proper construction and security of the railway.” -Id. Thus, according to the landowners, the railroad could only condemn property needed for the dust levees within the two hundred foot right-of-way because the statute only expressly allowed railroad companies to condemn land for “cuttings and embankments” beyond that geographical limitation.

We disagreed with the landowners. Noting our responsibility to construe the statutes together and to give effect to each, we determined that the legislature did not intend such a rigid reading of the right-of-way statute. Id. at 347-48, 608 P.2d at 352. Instead, we concluded that the statutes, when read together, necessarily implied that the railroad had authority to condemn land beyond the statutory right-of-way for the purposes of constructing “a railroad’s physical facilities ... which have a sufficiently direct functional relationship to the operations of the railroad.” Id. at 348, 608 P.2d at 352 (emphasis added). Thus, because the dust levees were integral to the effective operation of the railroad, we found that the General Assembly must have intended for the railroad company to have implied authority to condemn land needed for their construction.

In sum, while we have acknowledged the presumption against implicit grants of condemnation authority based on “vague and doubtful” language, we have also recognized that such authority is nepessarily implied under certain circumstances. Central to our analysis has always been the underlying intent of the legislature in enacting the relevant condemnation statute. In particular, where the General Assembly has granted to a body the authority to condemn property for a specific use, we may infer that the General Assembly intended that the body would also have authority to condemn land for purposes bearing a “sufficiently direct functional relationship” to the specified use. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to the instant action.

B. Condemnation of Property for a Parking & Transit Facility

CDOT argues that the condemnation of the property for the construction of a parking and transit facility, as part of a larger highway improvement project, falls within the scope of authority granted to it under the statute allowing CDOT to condemn' land necessary for “state highway purposes.” § 43-1-208(3). Applying the principles set forth above, we must determine whether the General Assembly intended CDOT to have such condemnation authority. Taking into consideration the language used in section 43-1-208(3) and the goals it seeks to further, we conclude that the legislature intended CDOT to have the authority to condemn those properties which are necessary in order for CDOT to effectively complete state highway improvements. Specifically, we find that CDOT has implied statutory authority to condemn lands needed for construction of a parking and transit facility bearing a direct and functional relationship to the State Highway 82 improvement project.

We begin with the language of section 43-1-208(3) itself, noting that while section 43-1-208(3) authorizes CDOT to condemn lands for “state highway purposes,” and other sections define “state highway” and “highway,” the term “state highway purposes” is nowhere defined by the legislature. As such, we must resort to basic principles of statutory construction in order to determine the intended scope of the term “state highway purposes.” See, e.g., Civil Service Comm’n v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645, 648 (Colo.1991) (noting that “[o]ur primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted”). We construe a statute as a whole, ascribing to each word and phrase its familiar and generally accepted meaning, so as to reflect the legislative intent of the General Assembly. Cacioppo v. Eagle County Sch. Dist., 92 P.3d 453, 463 (Colo.2004). In particular, we presume that the General Assembly understands the legal import of the words it uses and does not use language idly, but rather intends that meaning should be given to each word. People v. McNeese, 865 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo.App.1993). Finally, in determining the meaning of any one statutory section, we may look to the legislative scheme as a whole in order to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 59 (Colo.2003).

The Respondent asserts that statutory definitions of “state highway” and of “highway” preclude a finding that a parking and transit facility may be deemed a “state highway purpose” in the context of this condemnation action. Section 43-1-204, 11 C.R.S. (2003), defines a “state highway” as a “right-of-way or location, whether actually used as a highway or not, designated for the construction of a state highway upon it.” Section 43-1-203 further states that a “‘[hjighway’ includes bridges on the roadway and culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining walls, trees, shrubs and fences along or upon the same and within the right-of-way.” According to the Respondent, these statutory sections, read in pari mate-ria with section 43-1-208(3), limit CDOT’s authority to condemn for “state highway purposes” only within the right-of-way area and only to construct those structures specifically enumerated in the “highway” definition. We disagree.

Instead, applying the principles of statutory construction set forth above, we presume that in using the phrase “state highway purposes,” the General Assembly intended that CDOT have a condemnation authority which was broader than that needed simply for constructing “state highways.” To read the grant of authority as restricted to the list of structures included in the definition of “highway” under section 43-1-203, as urged by the Respondent, would render the word “purposes” in section 43-1-208(3) superfluous. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo.2001) (“We construe statutory and constitutional provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever possible.”). Thus, in order to avoid such a construction, we conclude that the legislature intentionally included the word “purposes” in order to give CDOT a condemnation authority which encompasses needs beyond those lands strictly necessary for construction of a “highway” as defined in section 43-1-203. Instead, the phrase “state highway purposes” must be read as conferring upon CDOT the authority to condemn lands for purposes which are integral to the construction, maintenance, and improvement of state highways.

Our reading of the phrase “state highway purposes” is bolstered by consideration of the legislative scheme as a whole. In its legislative declaration regarding the creation of a department of transportation, the General Assembly observed that the creation of CDOT was necessary in order to:

(a) Provide strategic planning for statewide transportation systems to meet the transportation challenges to be faced by Colorado in the future;

(b) Promote coordination between different modes of transportation; [and]

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(e) Enhance the state’s prospects to obtain federal funds by responding to federal mandates for multi-modal transportation planning.

§ 43-1-101(1), 11 C.R.S. (2003). Thus, the General Assembly clearly intended CDOT to adopt a comprehensive approach to transportation issues in Colorado.⁴

Viewing the use of the phrase “state highway purposes” within the context of the legislative scheme as a whole, including the General Assembly’s statements regarding the comprehensive objectives of CDOT, we conclude that the legislature intended that CDOT’s condemnation authority would allow it to effectively carry out a large state highway improvement project. Specifically, we find that in authorizing CDOT to condemn lands needed for “state highway purposes,” the General Assembly intended that CDOT would have the implied authority to condemn lands for uses bearing a “sufficiently direct functional relationship” to a state highway project.⁵ Buck, 199 Colo. at 348, 608 P.2d at 352. Of course, whether such a relationship exists between the expressly authorized use and the use for which the condemning body seeks implied condemnation authority will turn upon the facts and circumstances surrounding each condemnation action.

Here, CDOT has demonstrated that the lane reduction from four lanes to two lanes across from the Buttermilk Ski area, as provided for in the Highway 82 improvement project, combined with projected increases in traffic, would lead to traffic congestion as well as pollution levels which exceed federal Clean Air Act requirements. Thus, CDOT concluded that the parking and transit facility, to be built at the site of that lane reduction, was necessary in order to reduce traffic congestion and pollution, to encourage drivers to transfer to buses and, eventually, light-rail transportation, and to ensure receipt of federal funding associated with the State Highway 82 project. Accordingly, CDOT has shown that the parking and transit facility is an integral part of the Highway 82 improvement project, and will certainly further the legislature’s stated goals of strategically addressing transportation challenges, “[p]romot[ing] coordination between different modes of transportation,” and enhancing Colorado’s “prospects to obtain federal funds.” § 43 — 1—101(1)(b), (e). As such, we find that the construction of the parking and transit facility bears a “sufficiently direct functional relationship,” see Buck, 199 Colo. at 348, 608 P.2d at 352, to the improvement of State Highway 82.⁶ We therefore conclude that, pursuant to its authority to condemn lands needed for “state highway purposes” under section 43-1-208(3), CDOT has the implied authority to condemn the disputed parcels at issue today.⁷

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and return this ease to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice COATS concurs in the judgment only. Justice KOURLIS dissents.

1 . Although the immediate plan provides a surface lot that can accommodate approximately 200 cars, the Petitioners have a long-term plan which they claim will provide a larger, tiered-structure that can accommodate 750 cars.

2 . Because it reversed the trial court's order on statutory authority grounds, the court of appeals did not reach the remaining issues raised by the Respondent. Specifically, the court did not address whether the trial court erred in ruling that the property was being acquired for primarily public purposes, that the condemnation was necessary, and that the Petitioners had engaged in good faith negotiations prior to the condemnation. Thus, these additional issues are not before us.

3 . We granted certiorari on the following issues:

1.Whether CDOT’s authority to condemn land for "state highway purposes” pursuant to 43-1-208, C.R.S.,, allows it to condemn land for transit parking when such parking is mandated by federal law and integral to the state highway project.

2. Whether a local government that can condemn land "necessary, suitable, or proper for park or recreational facilities" pursuant to 29-7-104, C.R.S., can condemn to provide vehicle parking needed to serve such parks and recreational facilities.

3. Whether CDOT's authority to condemn "remainder parcels” pursuant to 43-1-210(1), C.R.S., authorizes CDOT’s condemnation of the parcels if CDOT cannot condemn for transit parking and the County cannot condemn for park and recreational facility parking.

4 . In fact, we recently acknowledged this more comprehensive approach to transportation in the context of section 38-1-114(2)(d), 10 C.R.S. (2003), which governs the method of calculating compensation for highway acquisitions:

Modem highway systems include many features not envisioned within the common understanding of the term “highway” in past generations, such as complex interchanges, high-occupancy vehicle lanes, park-and-ride facilities, and electronic message boards. The General Assembly enacted the takings compensation statute to reflect the complex nature of modern highway systems. In so doing, the General Assembly attempted to strike a balance between the interests of individual landowners whose property is taken and the interests of the taxpaying public.

E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Colo.2004).

5 . The Respondent argues that the General Assembly’s failure to pass Senate Bill 01-008, which would have expanded CDOT's express condemnation powers to include "state transportation purposes," suggests that the General Assembly did not intend for CDOT to have the implied condemnation authority at issue today. However, as we have previously recognized, "nothing of significance can be gleaned from the failure of the legislature to pass" particular legislation. U.S. Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 715 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1986) (noting that there existed many conceivable reasons for the General Assembly's failure to expand the statutory definition of "telephone corporation”); see also United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002) ("[F]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”) (internal quotations omitted); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) ("Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.”). Here, the failure of SB 01-008 may be attributable to any number of causes, including a possibility that the legislature felt that CDOT already possessed such broad condemnation authority. Therefore, we find no indication of legislative intent based on the General Assembly's failure to pass SB 01-008.

6 . Although the trial court relied largely on the necessity of federal funding to support its finding that CDOT had the necessarily implied authority to condemn the property, we do not rest our holding on such narrow grounds. Rather, in light of the many purposes which the facility will accomplish, including the reduction of traffic congestion and air pollution, as well as the receipt of federal funds, we find that the construction of the parking and transit facility is integral to the effective completion of the State Highway 82 improvement project. As such, the facility falls squarely within the notion of "state highway purposes" as intended by the General Assembly.

7 . Because we find that CDOT has the legal authority to condemn the property at issue in this action, we do not reach the issue of whether the County has authority to condemn land for a parking and transit facility under section 29-7-104, which grants local governments express statutory authority to condemn property "necessary, suitable, or proper for park or recreational facilities.”