Dennis Eugene Johnson, Jr. v. United States

374 F.2d 966, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7117

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 1967
• Docket: 10989
• Status: Published

Opinions

CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:

Dennis Eugene Johnson, Jr., was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland of transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce,¹ and was committed for treatment and supervision under the provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act.² In his motion to vacate the sentence filed in the court below Johnson contended that he had not been advised by the court at the time he pleaded guilty of the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act. He also argued that his sentence was invalid because the Youth Corrections Act provides for a longer possible term of confinement than the substantive offense of which Johnson was convicted.

The district court denied the motion without a hearing, and Johnson has appealed.

Before denying the motion, the district court examined the official reporter’s transcript of Johnson’s arraignment. A portion of that transcript indicates that the following colloquy occurred:

“The Court: And you understand that you might receive a straight sentence of up to five years as a result of your plea?

“The Defendant: Yes.

“The Court : Or because of your age you might be sentenced under the Federal Youth Correction Act, in which event you might receive a prison sentence, an indeterminate prison sentence, which might mean that you might spend as much as four years in prison and have two years probation or parol thereafter.

“The Defendant : Yes.

“The Court: You understand that?

“The Defendant: Yes.”

In Pilkington v. United States, 315 F. 2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963), relied on by Johnson, we held that before a youthful offender may be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act upon his plea of guilty, he must be advised of the potential maximum sentence under that Act as part of the determination of whether his plea was understandingly and vountarily made. But in Pilkington the trial judge had not advised the accused of his possible confinement under the Youth Corrections Act. Johnson’s situation is obviously dissimilar.

Johnson not only knew that he might be sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act but the provisions of that Act were not incorrectly explained to him. Implicit in the explanation was the possibility of confinement for as long as six years. If Johnson understood what was said to him, as he said he did, and we should not assume otherwise, then he understood that after four years confinement he might face two years probation or parole. The standard dictionary ³ defines “parole” in terms of conditional and revocable release. Four plus two makes six.

We think the information given Johnson barely sufficient to enable the district judge to determine voluntariness. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. Certainly nothing less would suffice, and it would have been far better to have flatly told Johnson that he might be confined for as long as six years. We reiterate our admonition to district judges contained in our Pilkington decision that they must “explain the sentencing possibilities presented by the Federal Youth Corrections Act before finally accepting guilty pleas from youthful defendants and passing sentence under that Act” because “it is imperative that the youthful defendant shall be aware of the range of sentences to which the plea exposes him.” Pilkington v. United States, supra, 315 F.2d at 210.

Johnson’s second contention is without merit. The Youth Corrections Act specifically provides that its provisions may be imposed in lieu of penalties otherwise applicable. 18 U.S.C.A. § 5010 (b). Its application in this respect does not violate due process. See Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958).

Affirmed.

1 . 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312.

2 . 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5005-5024.

3 . Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1644 (1961).