Denmark v. Tzimas

871 F. Supp. 261, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17031, 1994 WL 668675
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedNovember 21, 1994
DocketCiv. A. 94-0135
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 871 F. Supp. 261 (Denmark v. Tzimas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Denmark v. Tzimas, 871 F. Supp. 261, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17031, 1994 WL 668675 (E.D. La. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER AND REASONS

FELDMAN, District Judge.

Before the Court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, on the ground of forum non conveniens. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

*264 Background

This case began when criminal charges were filed against Gillian Denmark, a British citizen, 1 in June 1992 by British authorities accusing her of theft and handling of stolen goods belonging to Nicholas Aris Tzimas, also a British citizen. During the criminal proceedings, Mr. Tzimas obtained a High Court writ against Mrs. Denmark and another individual. The writ charged Mrs. Denmark with the unlawful seizure and detention of certain valuable ceramic objects that Mr. Tzimas claimed she wrongfully removed from his vehicle. In addition to the Ipswich writ, Mr. Tzimas also obtained something called a “Mareva Injunction,” which restrained Mrs. Denmark and another from removing assets from the jurisdiction of the English courts and prohibited withdrawals from a bank account controlled by Mrs. Denmark at the National Westminster Bank in Cambridge, England.

In September 1993 Mrs. Denmark and her co-defendant were acquitted of the criminal charges. The English court found that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a pending civil suit in the English courts by Mr. Tzimas against Mrs. Denmark to recover the value of the items he claims were wrongfully taken by her as well as for lost business profits has not yet been decided. Thus, the Mareva Injunction remains in effect.

On January 12, 1994 Mrs. Denmark and her husband, a Louisiana citizen, filed suit in this Court against Mr. Tzimas. The plaintiffs contend that Mr. Tzimas accused Mrs. Denmark of a theft which, they claim, never occurred. They sue him for malicious prosecution. Mr. Denmark claims for loss of consortium. The Denmarks also add a claim for libel and slander based on Mr. Tzimas’ false accusation and for his having “caused to be published” an article in the British magazine “Collecting Doulton,” which described Mrs. Denmark’s arrest and prosecution. 2 They charge that Mr. Tzimas “told numerous customers, potential customers, and fellow dealers that the plaintiffs were thieves.” 3 In their recently filed first amended and supplemental Complaint, the Denmarks allege that Mr. Tzimas telephoned Mr. Denmark at his home in Louisiana on two occasions to communicate his claim that Mrs. Denmark was “a burglar, a thief, and was probably having an affair with the man arrested as her co-defendant.” Mr. Tzimas also is said to have sent Mr. Denmark facsimile copies of articles describing Mrs. Denmark’s arrest and prosecution. Finally, the Denmarks broadly complain that Mr. Tzimas tortiously interfered with their business relationships in violation of the Louisiana “Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,” LSA-R.S. 51:1401 et seq., “by his deliberate spreading of tales he knew to be untrue.”

Mr. Tzimas now moves, for the second time, 4 to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Complaint for *265 lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Court finds that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is warranted. The Court also finds that this case should be dismissed on the ground oí forum non conveniens.

I. Personal Jurisdiction

In this motion setting, the plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case that this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical, Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 193, 121 L.Ed.2d 136 (1992). The Court is empowered to determine the propriety of its exercise of jurisdiction by reviewing discovery material, such as affidavits or depositions. Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S.Ct. 2886, 61 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979). In evaluating the issue, however, “[t]he allegations of the complaint, except insofar as controverted by opposing affidavits, must be taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction has been established.” Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir.1985).

In suits based on diversity jurisdiction, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. Quasha v. Shale Development Corp., 667 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.1982). Here, the plaintiffs assert jurisdiction under the Louisiana Long Arm Statute, LSA-R.S. 13:3201 5 , which permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 786 (5th Cir.1990). Thus, the jurisdictional inquiry in this ease invokes a two-step due process analysis. It is remarkably straightforward. The exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend due process requirements if (1) the foreign defendant has some minimum contacts 'with the state resulting from affirmative or purposeful conduct of the defendant, and (2) it is not unfair or unreasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in the local host forum. Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir.1990); Growden v. Ed Bowlin and Associates, Inc., 733 F.2d 1149, 1150 (5th Cir. 1984). Each of the two steps of this constitutional test must be independently satisfied; “the fairness prong cannot compensate for or overcome the requirement of some minimum contacts with the forum state.” Growden, 733 F.2d at 1150-51 (footnote omitted). If one test fails, the Court must decline to exercise its limited jurisdiction.

A. Minimum Contacts

The first inquiry requires that the defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to justify an acceptance of personal jurisdiction. The degree of minimum contacts required to satisfy due process necessarily varies with the nature of the underlying claims. If the cause of action arises out of, or is directly related to, the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum, the court may exercise “specific jurisdiction.” Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cardiorentis AG v. Iqvia Ltd.
Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2020
Cardiorentis Ag v. Iqvia Ltd.
2018 NCBC 137 (North Carolina Business Court, 2018)
Long v. Grafton Executive Search, LLC
263 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Texas, 2003)
Nelson v. Bulso
979 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1997)
Denmark v. Tzimas
78 F.3d 582 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
871 F. Supp. 261, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17031, 1994 WL 668675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/denmark-v-tzimas-laed-1994.