IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1593 Filed August 7, 2019
DENA JEAN BLAZEK, Administrator of the Estate of ADAM WILLIAM BLAZEK, Deceased; DENA JEAN BLAZEK, Individually, and as Next Friend of C.B. and A.B., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF NEVADA, IOWA and CITY OF NEVADA, IOWA EMPLOYEES DOE, Defendants-Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James A. McGlynn,
Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s decision granting the motion for
summary judgment filed by the City of Nevada and unnamed City of Nevada
employees in a suit seeking money damages for the death by suicide of Adam
Blazek and the conduct of City of Nevada police officers. AFFIRMED.
William T. Talbot of Newbrough Law Firm, LLP, Ames, for appellants.
Jason C. Palmer, Thomas M. Boes, and Catherine M. Lucas of Bradshaw,
Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, Judge.
Dena Blazek appeals the district court’s decision granting the motion for
summary judgment filed by the City of Nevada and unnamed City of Nevada
employees in a suit seeking money damages for the death by suicide of her
husband, Adam Blazek, and the conduct of City of Nevada police officers. Dena
brought the suit in her personal capacity and in her representative capacities as
the administrator of Adam’s estate and as next friend of C.B., Dena’s child from a
previous marriage, and of A.B., Dena and Adam’s child.1 For the plaintiffs’ tort-
based causes of action (claims I, II, III, and V), the district court determined
summary judgment was proper because the defendants did not owe a duty to
Adam, Dena, or the children individually. For the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims,
the district court determined summary judgment was proper regardless of
whether the claims were based on constitutional torts brought under Godfrey v.
State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017) or substantive due process claims. On
further review, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment
on all claims.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
All the facts pertinent to this appeal occurred within a twenty-four-hour
period. The parties stipulated to the facts for the purpose of summary judgment.
On the morning of February 3, 2016, Adam was at the family’s home with C.B.
and A.B., then thirteen and six years old respectively. Dena was at work. The
children were loudly playing and laughing in C.B.’s bedroom when Adam came
into the bedroom and told them to be quiet. He then left the room. The children
1 For clarity, we use “plaintiffs” to refer to Dena in all three capacities collectively. 3
continued to play loudly, and Adam returned and told them if they would not be
quiet, he would get his gun. A.B. responded that they would call 911 if he did
that, to which Adam responded that they would be dead before the police
showed up. Adam then left the bedroom again, returning a short time later with a
handgun. Adam held the gun against his chest, frightening the children. He left
the room again, and C.B. went into the bathroom to hide. She sent Dena a
series of six to eight text messages at around 10:40 a.m., telling Dena what had
happened.
Dena noticed the messages around 11:00 a.m. and was shocked by what
she read. Adam had never threatened the children with the gun before, nor had
he taken the gun out in Dena’s presence before. Dena called C.B. and told her
to get A.B. and get out of the house. Dena then called her father, Phil, who also
lived in Nevada. She told Phil what had happened and asked him take the
children to his house. He told her he would. C.B. tried to call Phil around this
time, but Adam took her phone while C.B. was making the call. Dena then called
Adam and told him her father would be picking the children up. During this call,
Adam smashed C.B.’s phone. The children waited outside where Phil picked
them up and brought them back to his house.
Dena then left work and travelled to Phil’s house, where she spoke with
the children. Around 3:45 p.m., she and her cousin Charlie traveled back to the
Blazeks’ home to gather the children’s clothing and other items. Adam was
present while they were there. Adam and Dena agreed to talk the next day about
what had happened. While Dena and Charlie were leaving, Dena told Charlie
she believed Adam would kill himself. She based this belief on the “eerie” feeling 4
she had while at the home and on how calm Adam had been while she was there
with Charlie.
Dena and Charlie returned to Phil’s house. On the advice of a family
friend who was a retired police officer, Dena called the Nevada Police
Department. Dena told the 911 operator what had happened, and the operator
sent Officer Kelli Springer to speak with Dena at Phil’s house. Officer Springer
spoke with Dena, her parents, and the children. Dena told Officer Springer she
believed Adam was suicidal and asked Officer Springer to perform a welfare
check on Adam, which she agreed to do. She also told Officer Springer that
Adam worked in Ames and would be leaving for work that night between 10:10
p.m. and 10:15 p.m. Dena warned Officer Springer Adam would likely not open
the door for the police. Officer Springer told Dena the police would try to arrest
Adam that night when he got to work and, if they were unable to do so, they
would try again the next morning. Officer Springer advised Dena to stay at Phil’s
house that night and that she would call her if they arrested Adam that night.
Dena agreed to stay at Phil’s house and wait for Officer Springer’s call. Officer
Springer told Dena the police would arrest Adam for child endangerment and
aggravated assault.
Officer Springer left Phil’s house and went back to the police department
building. There, she conferred with other police officers. The police determined
the safest way to apprehend Adam was to arrest him once he arrived at work.
From 9:50 p.m. to 10:50 p.m. that night, three police officers waited outside the
Blazeks’ home for Adam to come out. The police officers never observed Adam
leave the Blazeks’ home. 5
At around 3:15 a.m., the Nevada Fire Department received a call about a
fire at the Blazeks’ home. The fire department arrived at the home to find it
engulfed in flames. Once the fire was out, firefighters and police officers
searched the building and found Adam’s body in the basement. His cause of
death was determined to be a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. After an
investigation, the police determined Adam had doused the upstairs and
downstairs floors of the house in gasoline and started the fire before committing
suicide.
Dena filed the petition on July 10, 2017; she did so in three capacities: her
personal capacity, her capacity as executor of Adam’s estate, and as next friend
of C.B. and A.B. The petition alleged six causes of action: (I) negligent
misrepresentation on the part of the Nevada Police Department;2 (II) professional
malpractice on the part of the police officers; (III) negligence resulting in wrongful
death due to the Nevada Police Department’s failure to arrest Adam quickly; (IV)
violation of Adam’s rights under the Iowa Constitution by the City of Nevada; (V)
breach of fiduciary duty; and (VI) violation of Adam’s rights under the Iowa
Constitution by the anonymous City of Nevada employees. The defendants
moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion on all
claims on August 17, 2018. The plaintiffs appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review motions for summary judgment for errors of law. Slaughter v.
Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Iowa 2019).
2 Plaintiffs conceded there was no evidence supporting their claim of negligent misrepresentation in the district court. 6
“We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
(quoting Deeds v. City of Marion, 914 N.W.2d 330, 339 (Iowa 2018)). Summary
judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).
III. Analysis
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on claims I, II, III, and V because it determined neither the Nevada Police
Department nor its officers had a duty to Adam, Dena, or the children. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claims IV
and VI because the absence of evidence of malice and bad faith and the lack of
probable cause defeated the claims whether they were based on tort theories or
substantive due process theories.
A. Tort Claims
Claims I, II, III, and V require the plaintiffs to show the defendants had a
duty to Adam, Dena, or the children. Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626
N.W.2d 115, 124 (Iowa 2001) (“As with all negligence actions, an essential
element of negligent misrepresentation is that the defendant must owe a duty of
care to the plaintiff. In the context of negligent misrepresentation, this means the
person who supplies the information must owe a duty to the person to whom the
information is provided.”); see also McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C., 756 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1070 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (citing Smith v. Koslow, 757 N.W.2d 677,
680 (Iowa 2008)) (“In professional negligence actions, as in other negligence 7
actions, the plaintiff must prove a duty of care was owed to him or her . . . .”);
Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc., 595 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Iowa 1999) (“The
existence of a fiduciary relationship necessarily assumes one of the parties has a
duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of the other upon matters within the
scope of the fiduciary relationship.”). “The existence of a legal duty is a question
of law.” Kolbe v. State, 661 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa 2003). The defendants
argue the public-duty doctrine applies to the officers’ actions and their inaction
defeating the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs argue the doctrine does not apply to
their claims or one of the doctrine’s exceptions to immunity applies. We address
each argument in turn.
The public-duty doctrine “does not allow individuals to sue the government
for breach of a duty owed to the public at large.” Johnson v. Humboldt Cty., 913
N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 2018). A plaintiff can maintain an action against a
government actor, however, if they “can establish, based on the unique or
particular facts of the case, a special relationship between the State and the
injured plaintiff.” Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 729 (emphasis omitted). In Iowa, police
officers “do not owe a particularized duty to protect individuals; rather, they owe a
general duty to the public.” Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Iowa 1995).
Thus, unless the plaintiffs can establish a special relationship between the
defendants and the Blazek family based on the officers’ actions, their tort claims
must fail.
We first address whether the defendants had a special relationship with
Adam. “[T]he law generally imposes no duty upon an individual to protect
another person from self-inflicted harm in the absence of a ‘special relationship,’ 8
usually custodial in nature.” Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 2000).
The plaintiffs do not allege any custodial relationship existed between Adam and
the defendants. The defendants did not interact with Adam at all. Like the
district court, we conclude the plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of a
special relationship between Adam and the defendants. As they relate to Adam,
claims I, II, III, and V fail as a matter of law.
We similarly conclude claims I, II, III, and V must fail as they relate to
Dena and the children. While the defendants did interact with Dena and the
children by speaking with them, this interaction does not create a special
relationship. Police promises to perform actions are not sufficient to create a
special relationship. Allen v. Anderson 490 N.W.2d 848, 856 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992); Hawkeye Bank & Tr. Co. v. Spencer, 487 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992). As noted above, a special relationship between the police and a member
of the public is typically custodial in nature. Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 297; see also
Cutler v. Klass, Whicher & Mishne, 473 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1991) (providing
hospitals and jails as examples of custody). Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude there was no custodial relationship
between the defendants, Dena, and the children. Dena and the children were
advised by Officer Springer to remain at Phil’s house, but they were not
compelled by Officer Springer or the defendants to do so.
The plaintiffs urge us to find a special relationship exists between the
Blazeks and the defendants because “the twin grave dangers of suicide and gun
violence” created by Adam’s actions were sufficient to create a special duty
between law enforcement and the family. The plaintiffs cite the Iowa Supreme 9
Court’s recent decision in Johnson as support for this argument. See 913
N.W.2d at 265. In Johnson, a driver had fallen asleep at the wheel and crashed
his vehicle into a concrete embankment in a ditch on the side of the road. Id. at
259. The embankment was located within the area covered by defendant
Humboldt County’s right-of-way easement related to the road. Id. The driver
argued the public-duty doctrine did not apply to defeat his claim because of “the
‘grave danger’ presented by this matter of ‘highway safety.’” Id. at 265. The
court rejected this argument. Id. The public-duty doctrine applied “even when
highway safety is involved,” and the earlier cases that supported the driver’s
“grave danger” argument had been “superseded by more recent authority.” Id. at
265 n.2. Like highway safety, the public-duty doctrine applies to situations
involving police inaction. See, e.g., Sankey v. Richenberger, 456 N.W.2d 206,
209–10 (Iowa 1990) (applying public-duty doctrine to a police chief’s failure to
prevent a fatal shooting at a city council meeting); Donahue v. Washington Cty.
641 N.W.2d 848, 851–52 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (applying public-duty doctrine to a
police officer’s failure to seize a dog known to harm people). We conclude no
exception to the public duty doctrine is created by the “twin grave dangers of
suicide and gun violence.”
Because no special relationship was present between the defendants and
any members of the Blazek family, the only duty owed by the City of Nevada
police officers to the Blazek family was their duty to protect the public at large.
We conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment on claims I, II,
III, and V. 10
B. Constitutional Claims
We next address claims IV and VI. The plaintiffs claim the defendants
violated their constitutional rights under article I, sections 1 and 9 of the Iowa
Constitution. The district court determined either both counts were based on tort
theories and should be dismissed for the absence of duty as counts I, II, III, and
V were, or the claims were based on alleged violations of substantive due
process rights and should be dismissed under the rules developed to adjudicate
§ 1983 actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Claim VI states defendants City of
Nevada employees informed “the Plaintiffs that Adam Blazek would be arrested,
or at least, that a welfare check would be made” and “[t]hat in total [the
defendants’] conduct more than shocks the conscience.”3
The parties agree the plaintiffs must prove each of the following elements
to prevail on their claims:
1. The defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right protected by the Iowa Constitution; 2. The defendant acted under color of state law; 3. The legislature has not provided an adequate remedy; 4. The defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage; and 5. The amount of damage.
Iowa Bar Ass’n, Iowa Civil Jury Instructions 3000.1. Because the plaintiffs
cannot show the defendants deprived any of them of any right protected by the
Iowa Constitution, we conclude the district court properly granted summary
judgment on these claims.
3 The complaint did not specify whose constitutional rights were asserted by claims IV and VI. The district court assumed all plaintiffs’ rights were asserted in both claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs state claims IV and VI were meant to include all rights of all plaintiffs. 11
We begin with claim IV, which alleges the defendants deprived Adam of
his rights under article I “by failing to intervene to prevent his death.” “There is no
constitutional right to be arrested and charged at the precise moment probable
cause comes into existence.” State v. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa
1996); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 200 (1989) (“The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s
knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf.”).
The defendants did not interact with or take custody of Adam at any point.
Neither party cites any case from any jurisdiction holding that a municipal
defendant or its employees deprives a person or their family members of a right
to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, or due process of law by failing to arrest
that person or to intervene to prevent suicide. And as addressed above, no
special relationship existed between the Blazeks and the defendants that
triggered an obligation beyond the police officers’ general duty to protect the
public at large. The Iowa Supreme Court has not held the public-duty doctrine
applies to constitutional tort claims brought under Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d
844, 846–47 (Iowa 2017). The court has clarified, however, that common law
immunities and defenses were not displaced by the all-due-care defense to
constitutional claims established in Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d
259, 281 (Iowa 2018). Venckus v. City of Iowa City, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2019
WL 2710807, at *4 (Iowa 2019) (“The Baldwin immunity is in addition to any other
common law immunities or defenses available and not a comprehensive 12
substitute immunity.”). To the extent claims IV and VI allege constitutional tort
claims, we conclude the public duty doctrine applied to the police officers’ actions
and the district court properly granted summary judgment under the same
application of the public duty doctrine as on claims I, II, III, and V.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue the defendants’ failure to intervene with Adam
created a significant risk of serious harm and their conduct “shocks the
conscience” such that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights were violated.
“[T]he shocks-the-conscience test is reserved for ‘the rarest and most outrageous
circumstances.’” Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 553 (Iowa
2019) (quoting United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir. 1988)). “[I]n
order to meet the test, government action must be, among other things,
‘offensive to human dignity.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Blumenthal Inv. Trs. v. City of
W. Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 265 (Iowa 2001)). “[T]he collective conscience
of the United States Supreme Court is not easily shocked.” Id. (quoting
Blumenthal, 636 N.W.2d at 265). Situations that meet the shocks-the-
conscience test include “outrageous utilization of physical force; state-sponsored
imposition of uncalled-for embarrassment or ridicule; or intolerable, disreputable,
and underhanded tactics that may arise from government action deliberately
designed to penetrate the attorney-client privilege.” Id.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude
the district properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
claims IV and VI to the extent those claims allege the defendants deprived the
Blazek family of their substantive due process rights under article I, section 9 of
the Iowa Constitution. “[U]nder substantive due process analysis, the state is 13
given great leeway in achieving its legitimate goals, particularly related to public
safety.” Id. (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1979)). The
undisputed facts show the City of Nevada police spoke with Dena, gathered
information from her, advised her not to return to the home, formulated a plan to
apprehend Adam based on what they knew, and then attempted to carry out their
plan. None of the actions or inactions of the police officers constituted the
outrageous use of physical force, state-sponsored embarrassment, or
underhanded tactics designed to penetrate the attorney-client privilege the Iowa
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court have held violate an
individual’s substantive due process rights.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on all claims.
AFFIRMED.