Dema v. Halikowski

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 21, 2025
• Docket: 23-3136
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR DEMA, No. 23-3136 D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00303-SMB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

JOHN S. HALIKOWSKI, (Director of) the Arizona Department of Transportation,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 15, 2025**

Before: FRIEDLAND, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Victor Dema appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his

motion to remand. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo. Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1998). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirm.

The district court properly denied Dema’s motion to remand because in the

operative complaint, Dema alleged federal constitutional violations, and

defendant’s removal was timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question

jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (allowing removal if the district court has

original jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (providing that a notice of removal of a

civil action “shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the

claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based”); Mayes v. Am.

Hallmark Ins. Co. of Texas, 114 F.4th 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that

“§ 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal time limit does not start to run until the defendant

has both received the complaint and been formally served”).

Contrary to Dema’s contentions, the district court properly determined that

this case does not meet the requirements for abstention under the Younger or

Pullman doctrines. See ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754

F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (requirements for Younger abstention); Fireman’s

Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2002)

(requirements for Pullman abstention).

To the extent that Dema intended to challenge the district court’s order

dismissing the operative complaint, we do not consider this issue because it was

2 23-3136 not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Indep.

Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not

consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”).

We reject as without merit Dema’s contention that the district court was

biased against him.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-3136