Delee Vongdara, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. Tech Digital Corporation; Becton Dickinson and Company; and Does 1 to 100, inclusive

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 27, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01168
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DELEE VONGDARA, on behalf of Case No.: 3:25-CV-01168-H-AHG himself and others similarly situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO STAY ACTION v. 14 [Doc. No. 30.] TECH DIGITAL CORPORATION; 15 BECTON DICKINSON AND 16 COMPANY; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18

19 On October 15, 2025, Defendants Becton, Dickinson and Company (“BD”) and 20 TechDigital Corporation (“TechDigital”) filed a motion to stay. (Doc. No. 30.) On January 21 13, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition by Plaintiff Delee Vongdara to its 22 motion. (Doc. No. 37.) On January 14, 2026, the Court took the matter under submission. 23 (Doc. No. 38.) For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay. 24 Background 25 Defendants are temporary service employers within the meaning of California Code 26 of Regulations, Title 8 § 11040. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶ 13.) Defendants employed 27 Plaintiff and other employees on an hourly basis as non-exempt workers to perform work 28 in California for various customers. (Id. ¶ 14.) 1 I. Federal Action 2 On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 3 situated, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County 4 of San Diego against Defendants BD and TechDigital. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.) Plaintiff 5 alleges claims against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked at 6 minimum wage in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197; (2) failure to pay overtime 7 wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194; (3) failure to authorize or permit meal 8 periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512; (4) failure to authorize or permit rest 9 periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; (5) failure to provide accurate wage 10 statements in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; (6) failure to timely pay all wages earned 11 in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203; and (7) unfair business practices in violation of 12 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42.) Plaintiff 13 brings this action on behalf of himself and the “California Class,” comprising of “all current 14 and former hourly non-exempt employees employed by Defendants” of multiple 15 subclasses, including: 1) a minimum wage class, 2) an overtime class, 3) a regular rate 16 class, 4) a meal period class, 5) a meal period premium wages class, 6) a rest period class, 17 7) a rest period premium wages class, 8) a wage statement class, and 6) a waiting time 18 class. (Id. ¶ 43.) On May 7, 2025, Defendant BD removed this action pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 1332(d) to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 20 (Doc. No. 1.) 21 II. Underlying State Court Action (“Sipos”) 22 On June 30, 2023, Marioara Sipos filed a class action complaint in the Superior 23 Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego against Defendants BD and 24 Pharmigen Inc. Marioara Sipos v. Becton Dickinson and Company, et al., No. 37-2023- 25 00027633-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego Cnty. June 30, 2023) (“Sipos”). (Doc. 26 No. 30-1 at 1.) Sipos alleges claims for: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked at 27 minimum and straight time wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1197; (2) 28 failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1998; (3) failure to 1 authorize or permit meal periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512; (4) failure 2 to authorize or permit rest periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; (5) failure to 3 timely pay all wages earned in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203; (6) failure to 4 provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; (7) failure to 5 indemnify employees for expenditures in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; and (8) unfair 6 business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Doc. No. 30-6, 7 Sipos Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.) The proposed Sipos California Class is defined as “[a]ll persons 8 who worked for any Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at 9 any time during the period beginning four years and 178 days before the filing of the initial 10 complaint in this action and ending when notice to the Class is sent” with additional 11 subclasses. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 29-30.) The parties have exchanged discovery responses and 12 scheduled a mediation for March 31, 2026. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 5; Doc. No. 30-3, Ferrantella 13 Decl. ¶ 3.) 14 By the present motion, Defendants move the Court to stay Plaintiff’s complaint, 15 pending a decision in Sipos by the California Superior Court of San Diego County. (Id. at 16 15.) Defendants argue that Sipos alleges “the same legal claims” as the present action “and 17 relies on largely the same factual allegations”; was filed two years before the present action; 18 covers an overlapping class that includes all BD non-exempt, hourly employees; and has a 19 significantly more developed procedural posture. (Id. at 4, 7-8.) Defendants opine that 20 staying the present action and allowing Sipos to proceed will narrow the scope of claims 21 at issue before the Court, avoid the unnecessary expenditure of resources, and prevent 22 potentially conflicting judgments. (Id. at 5-6.) 23 Discussion 24 Defendants seek a stay of the present action pursuant to both the first-to-file doctrine 25 and the Colorado River doctrine. (Doc. No. 30 at 1.) Alternatively, Defendants request a 26 discretionary Landis stay. (Doc. No. 30 at 1.) The Court will first address Defendants’ 27 Colorado River argument. 28 / / / 1 I. Colorado River 2 In general, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings 3 concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Holder v. Holder, 4 305 F.3d 854, 867 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 5 United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). However, the Supreme Court has identified 6 several instances in which it is appropriate for a federal court to abstain from exercising its 7 jurisdiction. See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813–17 (discussing traditional 8 abstention doctrines). As relevant here, the Supreme Court recognized that “a federal court 9 may stay a case in favor of a parallel state court action where doing so would give ‘regard 10 to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Franco 11 v. Cent. Transp. LLC, No. EDCV 19-1464 JGB (SPx), 2020 WL 11626531, at *1 (C.D. 12 Cal. Oct. 22, 2020) (first citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; then citing Nakash v. 13 Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989)). 14 The Ninth Circuit recognizes eight factors that courts must weigh when considering 15 a stay under Colorado River: 16 (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the 17 inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal 18 litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether 19 federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether 20 the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal 21 litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state 22 court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court. 23 R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2011). “These 24 factors are to be applied in a pragmatic and flexible way, as part of a balancing process 25 rather than as a mechanical checklist.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415. The weight “given to 26 any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of 27 the case.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). 28 The Court will address each factor in turn. 1 The first two factors are neutral because the dispute does not involve any property, 2 and both forums are located in San Diego. 3 A. Piecemeal Litigation 4 Defendants argue a stay is appropriate because “Plaintiff’s action involves the same 5 issues pending in the previously-filed Sipos action … thereby duplicating efforts, wasting 6 resources, and producing potentially different, inconsistent results as to liability and 7 remedies.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.) 8 Piecemeal litigation occurs “when different tribunals consider the same issue, 9 thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 10 979 (citations omitted). Any case in which Colorado River is implicated will inevitably 11 involve the possibility of “conflicting results, piecemeal litigation, and some duplication 12 of judicial efforts,” which are the “unavoidable price of preserving access to ... federal 13 relief.” Seneca Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 2017) 14 (citing Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 15 1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 The Court agrees with Defendants that the piecemeal litigation factor weighs slightly 17 in favor of a stay. Allowing both the underlying state action and federal suit to proceed 18 simultaneously risks duplicative efforts and inconsistent judgments in resolving nearly 19 identical legal claims. Because the basis of the Court's jurisdiction rests in the Class Action 20 Fairness Act, California state law also provides the rule of decision for all claims. Parallel 21 proceedings could waste judicial resources and cause confusion in the continuing disputes 22 between the parties. See R.R. Street, 656 F.3d at 979–80 (identifying duplication of efforts 23 and possibility of differing results as the primary concerns of the piecemeal litigation 24 factor). 25 B. Order of Jurisdiction 26 The Court next considers the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction. The 27 Supreme Court has instructed that the priority element of the Colorado River analysis “is 28 to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at 1 hand.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21, 103. “[P]riority should not be measured 2 exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress 3 has been made in the two actions.” Id. 4 Here, the state court was the first to exercise jurisdiction. The underlying state 5 court action was initiated in June 2023, and Plaintiff's complaint was filed in February 6 2025. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl.) Defendants’ motion alleges 7 that the underlying state action “has progressed significantly” as the plaintiff in Sipos was 8 deposed, the parties have exchanged discovery responses, and the parties have a 9 mediation scheduled for March 2026. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 10; Doc. No. 30-3, Ferrantella 10 Decl. ¶ 3.) By contrast, in the instant action, Defendants have answered Plaintiffs' 11 complaint, but nothing further has been done. Viewing the “realities of the case at 12 hand,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21, the Court concludes that the state action has made 13 more progress towards resolving the underlying legal issues. Thus, this factor weighs in 14 favor of Defendants' motion to stay. 15 C. Source of Law 16 Defendants assert the Court should grant a stay in this matter because “Plaintiff’s 17 action invokes no federal rights or rules.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.) “[A]lthough ‘the presence 18 of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against surrender’ [of 19 jurisdiction], the ‘presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of that surrender’ only 20 ‘in some rare circumstances.’” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1370 21 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26). This case does not present such 22 “rare circumstances.” Rather, the cases here involve “routine issues of state law.” 23 See id. (concluding the same where the cases involved state law claims for 24 misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract). As such, the Court 25 considers source of law to be a neutral factor. 26 D. Adequacy of State Court 27 Defendants argue this factor favors a stay because “California courts are able to 28 sufficiently protect the rights of employees working in California.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.) 1 “A district court may not stay or dismiss the federal proceeding if the state 2 proceeding cannot adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants.” R. R. St., 656 F.3d 3 at 981. The Ninth Circuit looks “to whether the state court might be unable to enforce 4 federal rights.” Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 862 F.3d at 845. This factor does not evaluate the 5 competency of the state judiciary but instead considers whether the state court lacks power 6 to provide the remedy the plaintiff seeks. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27. 7 Here, there is no exclusive federal jurisdiction issue. California law controls the 8 substantive Labor Code claims made in both actions, and Plaintiff asserts only state law 9 claims in this matter. (See Doc. No. 1-3.) As such, there is no question that the state court 10 has authority to address the rights and remedies at issue. “Like source of law, however, 11 this factor ‘is more important when it weighs in favor of federal jurisdiction.’” R.R. St., 12 656 F.3d at 981 (citing Travelers, 914 F.2d at 1370). Thus, the Court finds this factor is 13 neutral. 14 E. Forum Shopping 15 A Colorado River stay is appropriate when it is “readily apparent that the federal 16 plaintiff was engaged in forum shopping.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417. “Forum shopping 17 refers to the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim 18 might be heard.” R. R. Street, 656 F.3d at 981 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 726 (9th ed. 19 2009)). Here, Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court. (See Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.) The 20 present action is solely before this Court due to Defendants’ removal. (See Doc. No. 1, 21 Notice of Removal; Doc. No. 18, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.) Nothing in the record 22 suggests that Plaintiff chose this forum because federal court would provide a more 23 favorable jurisdiction than state court. Accordingly, the Court concludes the forum 24 shopping factor is neutral. 25 F. Resolution of Issues in Parallel Proceeding 26 The final factor is “whether the state court proceeding sufficiently parallels the 27 federal proceeding.” R. R. Street, 656 F.3d at 982. The parallelism factor is a “necessary 28 precondition to Colorado River abstention.” Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 862 F.3d at 845. As 1 part of this analysis, the court must determine whether the state and federal proceedings 2 are “substantially similar.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. “Exact parallelism” is not 3 required. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416 (citing Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 4 847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988)). “[T]he existence of a substantial doubt as to whether 5 the state proceedings will resolve the federal action precludes a Colorado 6 River stay....” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 982 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Here, the actions are substantially similar such that the state proceeding can resolve 8 all issues. The Court agrees with Defendants that the legal claims brought in both actions 9 are nearly identical, with the underlying state action bringing an additional legal claim not 10 brought by the federal action. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos 11 Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.) The parties are also substantially similar with overlapping putative 12 classes and defendants. As Defendants note in their motion, “both cases name BD, and 13 pursue a putative class that includes all non-exempt, hourly employees of this entity.” 14 (Doc. No. 30-1 at 7, 12-13) (citing Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 3, 43-4 and Doc. No. 30-6, 15 Sipos Compl. ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff does allege claims against Defendant TechDigital, 16 who is not named in Sipos, Defendants point out that Plaintiff “alleges BD and TechDigital 17 are virtually indistinguishable.” (Id.) (citing Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Further, 18 “[e]xact parallelism” is not required. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. The Court concludes the 19 threshold parallelism factor has been satisfied. 20 G. Evaluation of All Factors 21 “Ultimately, ‘the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel 22 state-court litigation’ hinges on ‘a careful balancing of the [relevant] factors ... with the 23 balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.’” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 24 983 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16). None of the factors that would preclude 25 a Colorado River stay—issues of federal law, inadequacy of the state court forum, or a 26 possibility that the state court proceeding will not resolve the dispute—are concerns in this 27 case. Rather, all factors are neutral or weigh in favor of granting a stay. Because the 28 avoidance of piecemeal litigation and the progress made in the underlying state action 1 weigh against jurisdiction, the Court grants a stay in this matter. 2 II. First-to-File Rule 3 Defendants also rely on the first-to-file doctrine. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 6-10.) 4 The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay proceedings if a similar case with 5 substantially similar issues and parties was previously filed in another district court. Kohn 6 Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2015); see 7 also Ceders–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 8 when two actions involving the same parties and issues are filed in federal courts of 9 concurrent jurisdiction, the first-to-file rule applies, giving the second court discretion to 10 transfer, stay or, dismiss the second case). The first-to-file rule is a generally recognized 11 doctrine of federal comity. Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F.Supp.2d 12 1289, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 2013). It is intended to “serve[] the purpose of promoting efficiency 13 well and should not be disregarded lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 14 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 Defendants recognize that the first-to-file rule is usually applied between two federal 16 cases but argues that the rule has “been extended to overlapping federal and state court 17 actions.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 6.) While several courts in the Ninth Circuit have ruled that 18 the first-to-file doctrine is inapplicable to cases where the first case was filed in state 19 court, Murphy v. Viad Corp., 2022 WL 3137720, *3 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2022), the Ninth 20 Circuit has not ruled definitively on the issue. There are federal district courts in the Ninth 21 Circuit that have applied the first-to-file doctrine in the state-federal 22 context. See, e.g., Shannon v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, 2018 WL 1902680 at *2 (D. 23 Or. Apr. 20, 2018); Gens v. SEZ Am., Inc., 2007 WL 832050, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 24 2007). 25 The Court need not resolve the apparent conflict because it finds that a stay is 26 warranted pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. The Court concludes that, to the extent 27 the first-to-file doctrine also applies in the state-federal context, staying proceedings is 28 appropriate. 1 The court analyzes three factors in determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule: 2 chronology of the lawsuits, similarity of the parties, and similarity of the issues. Alltrade, 3 946 F.2d at 625. Here, there is no question that Sipos was filed first. The underlying state 4 court action was initiated in June 2023, and Plaintiff's complaint was filed in February 5 2025. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl.) As discussed above, there is 6 also substantial similarity of the parties and issues. The first-to-file rule does not require 7 the parties or issues to be identical. See Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1240. Rather, the court asks 8 whether there is “substantial overlap” between the issues and claims of the two actions. Id. 9 The underlying state action and present action share overlapping putative classes and 10 defendants. (Id.) The legal claims brought in both actions are nearly identical, with the 11 underlying state action bringing an additional legal claim not brought by the federal action. 12 (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.) 13 Thus, the first-to-file doctrine supports staying the current case. 14 III. Requests for Judicial Notice 15 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of four documents filed in state 16 court, which are attached to Defendants’ motion. (See generally Doc. No. 30-6, Ex. 1; 30- 17 7, Ex. 2; 30-8, Ex. 3; 30-9, Ex. 4.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any objections to 18 Defendants’ request. 19 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact that 20 is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial 21 court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources 22 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Khoja v. 23 Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). Proper subjects 24 of judicial notice may include matters of public record. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also 25 United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 26 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 27 without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at 28 issue.”) (citation omitted); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 1 || n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public 2 ||record.”). 3 The Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of the Sipos complaint because 4 || whether the claims and parties in the Sipos action overlap substantially with those in this 5 action bears directly on whether the Court should stay this case. See ScripsAmerica, Inc. 6 || v. Ironridge Global, LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1135-36 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Accordingly, 7 ||the Court grants Defendants’ requests to take judicial notice of Doc. No. 30-6, Exhibit 8 || 1. Because the Court does not rely on Exhibits 2, 3, or 4 in reaching its conclusion below, 9 Court denies as moot these remaining requests. 10 Conclusion 1 For the reasons above, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Stay for one year 12 || with a status conference to be set for or after J anuary 25, 2027. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 27, 2026 wal | 16 MARILYN L. HUFF, Dist dge 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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