Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC

Opinion

23-1337 Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of August, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

EUNICE C. LEE,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

Circuit Judges. *

_____________________________________

JAVIER DEL RIO, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES, COLIN MEUNIER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES, AARON DELAROCHE, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES,

* While this appeal was pending, Judge Debra Ann Livingston and Judge Alison J. Nathan recused themselves from the matter. Following their recusals, Judge Livingston and Judge Nathan have taken no part in the consideration of this case. Pursuant to this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, Judge Bianco and Judge Lee were assigned to this case by random selection. See 2d Cir. IOP E(b).

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. 23-1337

AMAZON.COM.DEDC, LLC, AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Defendants-Appellees. **

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: RICHARD E. HAYBER, Hayber, McKenna &

Dinsmore, LLC, Hartford,

CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jason C. Schwartz, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,

Washington, DC.

Appeal from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is VACATED.

Plaintiffs-Appellants—Del Rio, Meunier, and Delaroche—are former employees

** The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as reflected above.

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of Amazon.com Services LLC (“Amazon”) who worked in Amazon’s warehouse facilities in Connecticut. 1 They filed a class action complaint against Amazon alleging that Amazon’s failure to compensate employees “for time spent undergoing mandatory security screening” violated Connecticut’s wage laws. Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 132 F.4th 172, 174–76 (2d Cir. 2025), certified question answered sub nom. Del Rio v. Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 349 A.3d 570 (Conn. 2026). The District Court granted Amazon’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims, and Plaintiffs appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to vacate the judgment of the District Court.

I. Background As we explained in our previous opinion, for nearly two years, Amazon required employees to “undergo security screenings before leaving the secured area of the fulfillment centers where merchandise was stored.” Id. at 174. Employees were required to pass through a metal detector and, depending on the personal items they carried with them, might also be required to screen their belongings separately. If

1 Meunier was employed by Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, which subsequently merged with Amazon.com Services, Inc. and now is known as Amazon.com Services LLC. See Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 132 F.4th 172, 174 n.1 (2d Cir. 2025), certified question answered sub nom. Del Rio v. Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 349 A.3d 570 (Conn. 2026).

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employees did not have any personal items with them, they were permitted to walk through an express lane without stopping for additional screening. Amazon gave employees the choice to either leave their personal belongings in a locker and walk through the express lane or bring their belongings with them and undergo additional screening. Employees were required to clock out before they went through security and “were therefore not compensated for time they spent undergoing the security screening procedures.” See id. at 174–75.

Plaintiffs sued Amazon under Connecticut’s wage laws. They claim “they are owed straight-time wages pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71b et seq., and Conn. Agencies Regs. § 31-60-11, and overtime wages pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-68 and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-76b(2)(A) et seq.” Id. at 175. The District Court granted summary judgment for Amazon, concluding “that the time Plaintiffs spent in security lines is not ‘work’ compensable under Connecticut’s wage laws.” Del Rio v. Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 3d 301, 310 (D. Conn. 2023) (quoting Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2014)). Plaintiffs appealed.

On Plaintiffs’ motion, we certified two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which has now issued an opinion resolving those questions. First, “[u]nder Connecticut’s wage laws and regulations, must employees be compensated for the time

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spent going through mandatory security screenings at their place of employment?” Del Rio v. Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 349 A.3d 570, 573 (Conn. 2026). The Connecticut Supreme Court answered “in the affirmative.” Id. Second, “does a de minimis exception apply, and, if so, what factors should be considered in determining whether the uncompensated time is de minimis?” Id. The Court answered “in the negative.” Id. In view of these twin holdings, we now turn to the merits of the instant appeal.

II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the District Court’s “grant of summary judgment de novo, ‘construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’” United States v. Reyes, 164 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting Horn v. Med. Marijuana, Inc., 80 F.4th 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2023)).

III. Discussion The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision on the certified questions conclusively resolves this appeal. First, the Court held that “the time an employer requires its employees to spend undergoing mandatory security screenings on the employer’s

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premises is compensable as ‘hours worked’ under the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-76b (2) (A).” Del Rio, 349 A.3d at 585. Second, the Court “conclude[d] that Connecticut wage laws do not incorporate a de minimis exception to compensability . . . .” Id. at 589. Thus, taken together, any time that Amazon employees were required to spend undergoing mandatory security screenings, no matter how brief, was compensable under Connecticut law.

This conclusion is squarely at odds with the District Court’s summary judgment ruling. 2 Indeed, Amazon implicitly concedes as much in its supplemental briefing, proffering only an alternative basis on which to affirm the District Court’s judgment in light of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding—namely, that any unpaid time Amazon’s employees spent undergoing security screenings was caused by their own choice to bring personal belongings into the secure workplace. See Appellees’ Suppl. Br. at 1–2. While we are free to affirm a summary judgment ruling on any ground the record supports, see Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 363 (2d Cir. 2025), we decline to do so here, see Rosenthal ex rel. B.B. v. Hochul, 166 F.4th 259, 280 (2d Cir. 2026) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.” (citation modified) (quoting Havens v.

2 Of course, the District Court was working without the benefit of an authoritative state supreme court opinion on point.

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James, 76 F.4th 103, 123 (2d Cir. 2023))). Amazon is free to raise this argument on remand, but we do not pass on it here. 3 Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order and the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court.

IV. Conclusion We have considered Amazon’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

3 Amazon also asks that we “clarify” that Plaintiffs waived their “walking time theory.” Appellees’ Suppl. Br. at 3–4. We decline to entertain Amazon’s request for what amounts to a piecemeal ruling.