[390]*390OPINION
By the Court, Maupin, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment in an action to enforce Nevada’s Open Meeting Law. Appellant, the Attorney General, contends that the district judge erred in determining as a matter of law that telephone polling does not constitute a meeting under any circumstances. We agree. However, we affirm on other grounds the district judge’s decision to dismiss the action.
FACTS
Nancy Price is a duly elected member of the Board of Regents (hereinafter “the Board”) for the University and Community College System of Nevada (hereinafter “the University”). On several occasions prior to April 5, 1992, Price made comments to the press criticizing the conduct of her fellow Regents. In these public statements, she objected to the process by which the Board selected an external auditor and the processes by which the presidents of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the Western Nevada Community College were selected. Thereafter, at least seven Board members individually expressed their concerns about these comments to the chairman, James Eardley.
On April 5, 1995, Eardley met with Constance Howard, Interim Director of Public Information for the University. Eardley asked Howard to draft a response to Price’s comments. Howard then drafted a “media advisory.”
After Eardley reviewed the media advisory, it was disseminated by facsimile transmission to all of the Board members except Price. The draft advisory stated:
The individual members of the University and Community College System of Nevada Board of Regents wish to express their concern and opinion that recent statements to the media by Regent Nancy Price are unsubstantiated, incorrect and potentially damaging to the Board and the University System [391]*391as a whole. While the members of the Board respect the right of any one member to express his or her opinions, it is their sense that some of Regent Price’s comments go beyond opinion and are, in fact, unsubstantiated accusations of wrong doing. The members of the Board feel it is important to protest publicly against these statements in the interests of protecting the integrity of the Board and its policy-making rote for Nevada's higher education system.
(Emphasis added.)
A memorandum written by Howard accompanied the draft advisory requesting feedback on the draft, and seeking advice as to whether the proposed course of action should be pursued. The memorandum further indicated Eardley’s two-fold purpose in issuing the advisory: to protest some of Price’s earlier comments and to seek more balanced coverage from the media. Finally, the memorandum stated that no release would occur without Board approval.
On April 5, 1995, the recipients of the draft advisory responded by way of telephone calls to either Eardley, Howard, or both. These calls were charged to University calling cards. Some of the Regents who responded disagreed with the use of their names and, in varying degrees, to the language of the advisory itself.1 On April 6, 1995, Eardley decided not to issue the advisory.
After receiving a complaint from Regent Price regarding these facsimile transmissions and telephone calls, the Attorney General filed the instant lawsuit. Four counts of the Attorney General’s complaint charged the Regents with violating the Open Meeting Law by deciding whether to release the draft privately by “fax” and telephone rather than by public meeting. The other two counts alleged that the Regents had conducted a closed meeting to consider the character, alleged misconduct and professional competence of Price without giving her notice of the meeting. The Attorney General sought to establish violations of several sections of NRS chapter 241. She also sought injunctive relief prohibiting the Regents from repeating those violations, and a judgment voiding the result of the non-public poll. The district court granted summary judgment in the Board’s favor on these issues.
DISCUSSION
In 1993, NRS 241.020(1) provided that “all meetings of public bodies must be open and public, and all persons must be permit[392]*392ted to attend any meeting of these bodies.” NRS 241.020(1) (amended 1995).2 The term “ ‘[m]eeting’ means the gathering of members of a public body at which a quorum is present to deliberate toward a decision or to make a decision on any matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.”3 NRS 241.015(2) (1995).4 Furthermore, “electronic communication . . . must not be used to circumvent the spirit or letter of [NRS chapter 241] in order to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory powers.” NRS 241.030(4).
The Attorney General argues that the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that these individual telephone calls and faxes between Regents and/or their employees did not constitute a “meeting” as defined by NRS chapter 241.
1. Statutory Construction
“The construction of a statute is a question of law.” General Motors v. Jackson, 111 Nev. 1026, 1029, 900 P.2d 345, 348 (1995). “Courts must construe statutes ... to give meaning to all of their parts and language. . . . The court should read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation.” Board of County Comm’rs v. CMC of Nevada, 99 Nev. 739, 744, 670 P.2d 102, 105 (1983) (citations omitted). “A statute should always be construed to avoid absurd results.” General Motors, 111 Nev. at 1029, 900 P.2d at 348.
“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning is clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.” State v. Jepsen, 46 Nev. 193, 196, 209 P. 501, 502 (1922), quoted in Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990). “It is well settled in Nevada that words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act.” McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986) (hereinafter “McKay”).
[393]*393The Board argues that a meeting could not have taken place because a quorum of the members was not “present” to make the decision. It claims that the term “present” means “in view” or “at hand.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 910 (1975). The Board further argues that it was neither “in view” nor “at hand” because the words “at hand” are defined as “near in time or place.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 514 (1980). However, the term “present” is also defined as “within reach, sight or call.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1783 (1968) (emphasis added).
The Attorney General, in a 1985 opinion, interpreted the term “present” as follows:
[WJhere ... the members of a public body agree that action will be taken by that body through the use of a predetermined mail poll procedure, the members of the public body should be treated by the law as “present” to conduct business. This conclusion is especially warranted in circumstances such as are presently considered where the members have consented in advance to be ready in mind, if not physically, to deliberate and decide public business in private without the statutorily mandated scrutiny of a public meeting. . . . Under these circumstances, a mail balloting by a public body would constitute a meeting within the statutory purview of NRS 241.015(1).
85-19 Op. Att’y Gen. 90, 92 (1985).
Thus, the term “present” can logically be interpreted in different ways. “Where a statute is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably informed persons, the statute is ambiguous.” McKay, 102 Nev. at 649, 730 P.2d at 442. Once the statute is deemed ambiguous, the plain meaning rule has no application and “[t]he leading rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. . . . This intent will prevail over the literal sense of the words. . . . The entire subject matter and policy may be involved as an interpretive aid.” Id. at 650-51, 730 P.2d at 442-43.
2. Legislative Intent
The purpose of this legislation is set forth at NRS 241.010 which provides that “[ijn enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and declares that all public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of people’s business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.”
[394]*394This court has held that “[t]he spirit and policy behind NRS chapter 241 favors open meetings.” McKay, 102 Nev. at 651,730 P.2d at 443. “[T]he intent of the law [is] that the actions and deliberations of public bodies be taken openly." Id.
An examination of legislative history is also useful to determine legislative intent. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986); see also McKay v. Board of Cty. Comm’r, 103 Nev. 490, 492 n.2, 746 P.2d 124, 125 n.2 (1987) (failure to adopt a proposed amendment is evidence of legislative intent to the contrary).
NRS chapter 241 was adopted in 1960 and revised dramatically in 1977. In 1977, the legislature adopted the current definition of the term “meeting.” See NRS 241.015(2). In doing so. it considered two bills, A.B. 437 and S.B. 333. The legislature specifically considered the issue raised in this case in 1981 and again in 1995. Additionally, the Attorney General has, either by opinion or instruction, considered this issue in 1980, 1983, 1985 (see 85-19 Op. Att’y Gen. 90 (1985), supra, (prohibiting mail polling), 1988, and 1991.
a. A.B. 437 and S.B. 333 (1977)
The first draft of A.B. 437, submitted on March 10, 1977, proposed to define a “meeting” as the
gathering of members of a public body at which a quorum is present to deliberate toward a decision or to make a decision on any matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.
A.B. 437, 59th Leg. (Nev. 1977). On March 16, 1977, Deputy Attorney General Bill Isaeff testified before the Assembly Governmental Affairs Committee. He opined that the definition of meeting should include telephone conference calls or communication by electronic means. See Hearing on A.B. 437 Before the Assembly Governmental Affairs Committee, 59th Leg. (Nev. 1977). Other witnesses also recommended that the committee include electronic means of communication in the definition of a “meeting.” Id.
The first reprint of S.B. 333 proposed to define a “meeting” as “the gathering of a quorum of the constituent membership of a public body, whether in one place or by electronic means, to discuss or act upon a matter over which the body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.” S.B. 333, 59th Leg. (Nev. 1977) (emphasis added). The legislature ultimately adopted the current version of NRS 241.030(4), prohibiting only the use [395]*395of electronic communication to “circumvent the spirit” of chapter 241.
The Board argues, and the district court agreed, that enactment of the first version of A.B. 437, the rejection of S.B. 333, and the apparent rejection of testimony specifically proposing that electronic communications be considered “meetings” when used by a quorum to make decisions demonstrates the legislature’s intent not to prohibit the electronic communications utilized in this case.
The Attorney General argues that the legislature enacted 241.030(4) in response to the concerns raised at the hearings on these proposed measures. She contends that even if the communications in this case did not constitute a “meeting” under NRS 241.015(1), they circumvented the requirement that the Board’s decisions be made in public and violated the spirit of the Open Meeting Law. NRS 241.030(4).
b. 1980 Open Meeting Law Manual
Every few years the Attorney General publishes a Nevada Open Meeting Law manual consisting of questions and answers regarding NRS chapter 241. In 1980, question 18 stated: “May a public body convene a ‘meeting’ through the use of a telephone conference call?” The answer was given as follows:
Nothing in the Open Meeting Law appears to prohibit the members of a public body from discussing public business via a telephone conference call in which a quorum of the members are simultaneously linked to one another telephoni-cally. However, since this is a “meeting,” the . . . public must have an opportunity to listen in on the discussions and votes taking place. . . . Although a telephone conference call may be a lawful method of conducting the public’s business, it should never be used as a subterfuge to compliance with the Open Meeting Law and its stated intent that the actions of public bodies are to be taken openly and their deliberations conducted openly.
Richard H. Bryan, Open Meeting Law Manual 15 (3d ed. 1980).
Question 19 asked, “May a public body make a decision (vote) by a mail or telephone poll?” The Attorney General gave the following answer:
In view of the legislative declaration of intent found at NRS 241.010 to the effect that all actions of public bodies are to be taken openly, the making of a decision by a mail poll which is not subject to public attendance appears inconsistent with both the spirit and intent of the law. The same is [396]*396true for a telephone poll, unless it is conducted as a telephone conference call in accordance with the requirements noted in Question and Answer No. 18, supra.
Id.
c. A.B. 641 (1981)
In addition to the legislature’s consideration of electronic communication in 1977, the Board of Regents requested that the legislature consider A.B. 641 during the 1981 legislative session. That bill proposed to allow the Regents to “make investment decisions between its regularly scheduled meeting by means of a vote conducted by telephone.” A.B. 641,63rd Leg. (Nev. 1981). One of the Board’s attorneys testified before the Assembly Governmental Affairs Committee on May 19, 1981. He stated that the Board’s main concern was that “the provision in the open meeting law . . . simply prohibits these types of votes being taken between regularly scheduled meetings and the attorney general’s manual clearly says you don’t have telephone votes.” Hearing on A.B. 641 Before the Assembly Governmental Affairs Committee, 63rd Leg. (Nev. 1981). Thus, it appears the Board was conceding at that time that telephonic voting was violative of the Open Meeting Law. Although the Board’s attorney assured the committee that the Board would never use the measure as a license to make policy over the telephone, the committee ultimately voted to indefinitely postpone further activity on A.B. 641. Thus, the Regents’ proposal never became law.
This court has held that “ ‘[w]here ... the legislature has had ample time to amend an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, but fails to do so, such acquiescence indicates the interpretation is consistent with legislative intent.’ ” Hughes Properties v. State of Nevada, 100 Nev. 295, 298, 680 P.2d 970, 972 (1984) (quoting Summa Corp. v. State Gaming Control Bd., 98 Nev. 390, 392, 649 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1982)); see also Roberts v. State of Nevada, 104 Nev. 33, 39, 752 P.2d 221, 225 (1988). The legislature has had sixteen years to override the Attorney General’s interpretation of NRS 241.015(1) and 241.030(4) via amendment. This it has failed to do, notwithstanding the specific opportunity in 1981. We therefore conclude that the rejection of A.B. 641 is evidence of the legislature’s intent to preserve the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law that voting by telephone to make a public decision, whether that decision is to act or not, violates the Open Meeting Law.
d. 1983, 1988, and 1991 Open Meeting Law Manuals
In 1983, 1988 and in 1991, the Attorney General published [397]*397open meeting law manuals. In each, the Attorney General, using the questions and answers found in the 1980 Open Meeting Law Manual, stated that it was of the opinion that a public body may not, without the opportunity for public attendance, make a decision (vote) by telephone poll. Brian McKay, Open Meeting Law Manual 18 (4th ed. 1983); Brian McKay, Open Meeting Law Manual 23-24 (5th ed. 1988); Frankie Sue Del Papa, Open Meeting Law Manual 25 (6th ed. 1991).
e. A.B. 602 (1995)
In the 1995 legislative session, Nevada’s Open Meeting Law was once again before the legislature. A.B. 602, 68th Leg. (Nev. 1995). A.B. 602 proposed that NRS 241.030(4) read as follows:
[Electronic communication or polling, must not be used to circumvent the spirit or letter of this chapter in order to discuss or act upon any matter.
Id. Although several witnesses spoke before the committee expressing their concerns about polling and its impact on the open meeting requirement, the 1995 legislature did not pass A.B. 602.
The legislature has rejected language defining electronic communications as a “meeting.” Further, it has refused to specifically prohibit the telephonic polling for the purpose of enacting policy or measures within the scope of the public business. This notwithstanding, the legislature has consistently maintained that electronic communications shall not be used to circumvent the spirit or letter of chapter 241 in order to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory powers. It has also refused to amend the Attorney General’s position that telephone polling circumvents the spirit and letter of the law. Thus, we believe that the legislature intended to prohibit public bodies from making decisions via serial electronic communications.
2. Case Authority
In State ex rel. Stephan v. County Commissioners, 866 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Kan. 1994), the Kansas Supreme Court held that telephone calls between a quorum of county commissioners for the purpose of discussing county business did not constitute “meetings” within the meaning of the Kansas Open Meeting Act.5 In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the calls [398]*398did not constitute a meeting because, in 1977, the Kansas legislature rejected the following senate bill:
No chance meeting, social meeting or electronic or written communication shall be used in circumvention of the spirit or requirements of this act.
Id. at 1026. That court stated that “[cjlearly, then, these four alternative opportunities for communication were not contemplated to be within the term ‘meeting’ in K.S.A. 75-4317.” Id. at 1027.
In concluding that the Board’s actions in this matter did not constitute a “meeting,” the district court relied heavily on Stephan. The Attorney General argues that Stephan is distinguishable because at the time that case was decided, Kansas did not have legislation analogous to NRS 241.030(4), prohibiting circumvention of the “spirit” of the Open Meeting Law via electronic communication. We agree. In this case, our legislature has enacted language almost identical to that rejected by the 1977 Kansas legislature.6 Thus, we believe that Stephan inferentially supports the Attorney General’s position in this matter.
The issue in Stockton Newspapers v. Members of Redevelopment Agency, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 (Ct. App. 1985), was “whether a series of nonpublic telephone conversations, each between a member of the governing body of a local agency and its attorney, for the commonly agreed purpose of obtaining a collective commitment or promise by a majority of that body concerning public business, constitutes a ‘meeting’ within the purview of the act.” In reversing a grant of summary judgment for the redevelopment authority, the California court stated:
Defendants argue that because the alleged telephone conversations were conducted serially as opposed to simultaneously as in the case of a “speaker phone” conference call among a majority of the members, the case falls within the statutory exception to the open meeting requirement where less-than-a-quorum of the governing body is at any one time involved. . . . [AJ series of nonpublic contacts at which a [399]*399quorum of a legislative body is lacking at any given time is proscribed by the Brown Act if the contacts are “planned by or held with the collective concurrence of a quorum of the body to privately discuss the public’s business” either directly or indirectly through the agency of a nonmember.
Id. at 565 (quoting 65 Op. Att’y Gen. 63, 66 (Cal. 1982)) (emphasis added).7 The Stockton Newspapers court felt that “if face-to-face contact of the members of a legislative body were necessary for a ‘meeting,’ the objective of the open meeting requirement of the Brown Act could all too easily be evaded.” Id.
In Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496 (Cal. 1993), the California Supreme Court held that “a concerted plan to engage in collective deliberation on public business through a series of . . . telephone calls passing from one member of the governing body to the next would violate the open meeting requirement.” Id. at 503.
The Board contends that the California cases are in direct conflict with McKay v. Board of County Commissioners, 103 Nev. 490, 746 P.2d 124 (1987) (hereinafter “Commissioners”), and thus, inapplicable in Nevada. In Commissioners, this court held that the Board of County Commissioners violated the Open Meeting Law when it conducted public business (settlement of legal action) in a closed meeting with its attorney. We reasoned that, without a specific statutory exception to the Open Meeting Law, it is not the court’s place to interfere with the legislature’s clear intent that “[a] public body that meets as a body must meet in public” regardless of whether the body’s attorney is present. Id. at 495, 746 P.2d at 127. We went on to say that, because this requirement might create some measure of frustration or inconvenience in a public board’s legal dealings,
[400]*400[njothing whatever precludes an attorney for a public body from conveying sensitive information to the members of a public body by confidential memorandum; nor does anything prevent the attorney from discussing sensitive information in private with members of the body, singly or in groups less than a quorum.
Id. at 495-96, 746 P.2d at 127.
The above language in Commissioners does not stand for the proposition that members of a public body may vote individually in the physical absence of a quorum. Rather, in an attempt to preserve as much of the attorney-client relationship as possible, it simply reiterates that individual members may discuss sensitive information privately with counsel. While properly implying that members of a public body may ultimately make decisions on public matters based upon individual conversations with colleagues, it reiterates that the collective process of decision making, whether legal counsel is present or not, must be accomplished in public. See again, generally Stockton Newspapers, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Ct. App. 1985) (individual telephone calls with attorney to obtain collective promise concerning public business violated open meeting law).
Based on the foregoing legislative history and case law, we hold that a quorum of a public body using serial electronic communication to deliberate toward a decision or to make a decision on any matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power violates the Open Meeting Law. That is not to say that in the absence of a quorum, members of a public body cannot privately discuss public issues or even lobby for votes. However, if a quorum is present, or is gathered by serial electronic communications, the body must deliberate and actually vote on the matter in a public meeting.
Here, it is undisputed that a quorum of the members of the Board participated in the decision not to release the advisory. Thus, the Board’s interaction was more than a simple public response to Price’s comments by one or more of the Regents. Such a response would not have implicated the Open Meeting Law regardless of whether a quorum of the Board was involved. The constraints of the Open Meeting Law apply only where a quorum of a public body, in its official capacity as a body, deliberates toward a decision or makes a decision.
In this case, the chairman of the Board chose to invoke the [401]*401services of the interim director of public information for the University to draft the advisory, and the Regents responded to the draft by calling Eardley on their University-paid calling cards. Further, the draft expressed the Regents’ concern that Price’s statements were “damaging to the Board and the University System as a whole.” Most importantly, the draft protested Price’s statements “in the interests of protecting the integrity of the Board and its policy-making role for Nevada’s higher education system.”
Because the Board utilized University resources, because the advisory was drafted as an attempted statement of University policy, and because the Board took action on the draft, we hold that the Board acted in its official capacity as a public body. Thus, insofar as a quorum of the Board chose to take a position on the advisory, yea or nay, via a non-public vote, it violated the Open Meeting Law.8 Specifically, it violated NRS 241.010, 241.015, and 241.020, prohibiting closed meetings and requiring written notice of public meetings; NRS 241.030(4), prohibiting the use of electronic communications to circumvent the spirit or letter of the Open Meeting Law; and NRS 241.035, requiring a public body to keep written minutes of its meetings.9
The Attorney General asked the district court to establish that the Regents violated the above cited provisions of the Open Meeting Law, and for an injunction prohibiting the Regents from repeating those violations. She also asked that the district court void the result of the non-public poll pursuant to NRS 241.036.10
Because the Board decided not to take any action with respect [402]*402to the press release, NRS 241.036 is inapplicable. Thus, the Attorney General’s only remedy is for this court to order the district court to enjoin the Board from engaging in future conduct that would violate the Open Meeting Law.
In Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969), cited with approval in City Council of Reno v. Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. 886, 890, 784 P.2d 974, 976 (1989), the court stated:
While it is well established that courts may not issue a blanket order enjoining any violation of a statute upon a showing that the statute has been violated in some particular respects (see Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949)), . . . they do possess authority to restrain violations similar to those already committed. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Keeshin Motor Express, 134 F.2d 228 (C.C.A. Ill. 1943). This Court may enjoin violations of a statute where one violation has been found if it appears that the future violations bear some resemblance to the past violation or that danger of violations in the future is to be anticipated from the course of conduct in the past. See National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 437, 61 S. Ct. 693, 700, 85 L. Ed. 930 (1941).
Id. at 699-700.
In Reno Newspapers, this court examined the propriety of a district court’s order permanently enjoining the city council from “conducting any closed meetings in the future for the purpose of selecting a public officer” after it selected a city manager in a closed meeting. Relying on Doran, this court stated:
The district court had a clear indication that the City of Reno had violated Nevada’s Open Meeting Law. Coupled with the Council’s stipulation to a judgment that would enjoin it from violating the Open Meeting Law in the future selection of public officers, this provided sufficient specificity and basis for entering the permanent injunction.
Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. at 890, 784 P.2d at 977.
Accordingly, the district court has the authority to restrain the Board from authorizing press releases via electronic communication regarding Board and University policy. While we have chosen to decide this issue because if left unresolved, it is capable of repetition yet evading review, we agree with the district court that an injunction is not necessary at this time. In light of our ruling today, danger of similar violations in the future should be [403]*403unlikely. Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not err in declining to enter an injunction.
Therefore, although the Board violated the Open Meeting Law, the district court properly dismissed the case even though the lower court relied upon the wrong reasons.11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.12
Shearing and Rose, JJ., concur.13