Dekovic v. Rubio

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 24-1431
• Status: Published

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1431 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 10, 2026

Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

DALILA DEKOVIC; ALEJANDRO JIMENEZ RAMIREZ,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. No. 24-1431

MARCO RUBIO, United States Secretary of State; CATHERINE MCGEARY, Director, National Visa Center, United States Department of State,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02728-REB) _________________________________

Mark Robert Barr, Lichter Immigration, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Christopher G. Gieger, Trial Attorney (Lindsay M. Vick, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Jessica A. Dawgert, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, with him on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________

Before McHUGH, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Appellate Case: 24-1431 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2026 Page: 2

This appeal presents a question that has been considered by three of our sister

circuits: whether “a child of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who was deemed by

statute to be a minor child until the very day his [parent] naturalized, still qualified as

a minor on that day, or whether instead his [parent’s] naturalization transformed him

on the spot from a minor into an adult.” Tovar v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 895, 896 (9th

Cir. 2018). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Tovar, the Government has

parsed individual provisions of the labyrinthine Immigration and Nationality Act to arrive at the latter position, with the effect that a parent’s naturalization can cause a child to be deported forthwith and to wait for decades in a foreign land for an immigrant visa—a visa that he would have had in a short period of time if his parent had not become a citizen.

Id. But viewing the statute as a whole, we reject this interpretation. Instead, we agree

with our sister circuits that

anyone who under the relevant statutes is considered a minor child of an LPR on the date of the parent’s naturalization (and who is the beneficiary of a valid petition for an immigrant visa based on that status) can obtain a visa as the minor child of a citizen following his parent’s naturalization.

Id. at 896–97.

We therefore reverse the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the

Government and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. LEGAL OVERVIEW

To properly evaluate the issue before us in this appeal, “we need to review not

only the various steps in the process of seeking a visa but also the special rules that

apply to each of the distinct types of visas that are in play.” Teles de Menezes v.

Rubio, 156 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2025). We therefore “spend some time up front

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working through the relevant statutory provisions, technical though they are, before

then turning back to the case at hand.” Id.

Federal law establishes several categories of immigrant visas that LPRs and

citizens of the United States can seek on behalf of their family members. See Cuthill

v. Blinken, 990 F.3d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 2021). When an LPR or citizen, referred to in

this context as the “sponsor,” seeks a visa for an unmarried son or daughter, referred

to in this context as the “beneficiary,” the visa will fall into one of four categories.

Id. These four visa categories, also referred to as preference categories, are

determined based on the sponsor’s citizenship status and the beneficiary’s age. See

id. As the Second Circuit explained in Cuthill, these four categories consist of the

following:

• Immediate-relative visa: for minor (under 21) sons and daughters of citizens.

• F1 visa: for adult (21 and over) sons and daughters of citizens.

• F2A visa: for minor (under 21) sons and daughters of LPRs.

• F2B visa: for adult (21 and over) sons and daughters of LPRs.

Id. 1

For each of these types of visas, the visa application process begins with the

parent filing a petition—often referred to as a Form I-130—with the United States

All of these visa categories apply only to unmarried sons and daughters. See 1

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) and (a)(2). F3 visas may be available for the married sons and daughters of citizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3). Because this case does not involve a married beneficiary, we do not further address F3 visas here. 3 Appellate Case: 24-1431 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2026 Page: 4

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1); Cuthill,

990 F.3d at 274. USCIS “thereafter reviews the petition and, if everything is in order,

approves it. This process can take up to a year or more.” Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 274. In

cases where the beneficiary will seek a visa while located outside of the United

States, USCIS forwards the I-130 to the Department of State’s National Visa Center

after approval. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(3); see also Teles de

Menezes, 156 F.4th at 4 & n.2.

After USCIS has approved and forwarded an I-130 petition, “[t]he next step

involves the beneficiary submitting a visa application to [the Department of State].”

Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th at 4; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a). Importantly, however,

“a beneficiary may submit an application for a visa only once a visa in that category

is available.” Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th at 4. “[I]n some circumstances, the visa

that the beneficiary seeks may not be available upon approval of their petition due to

the annual numerical caps that have been placed by statute on visas in the relevant

category.” Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a). However, after “a visa becomes

available, the beneficiary can apply for a visa, schedule an interview, and, if all goes

right, come to the United States.” Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 275.

Immediate-relative visas “are not subject to any numerical caps, so [applicants

in this category] can receive their visas soon after their petitions are approved.” Id.

at 274. But for beneficiaries in the F1, F2A, and F2B preference categories, which

are subject to annual caps, approval of an I-130 petition generally “results not in

getting a visa, but only in getting a place in a second, often longer line.” Id. at 274–

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75. Because the demand for these visas frequently exceeds the annual caps, “the

beneficiary of an approved petition [in one of these categories] is placed in a first-

come, first-served queue with others in her category in order of ‘priority date’—that

is, the date on which the visa petition was filed.” Id. at 275.

The Department of State issues a monthly Visa Bulletin listing the priority

dates that have become “current” based on the beneficiary’s preference category and

country of origin. Tovar, 882 F.3d at 897; see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.51(b). Visas are

only available to beneficiaries with “current” priority dates, meaning that their I-130

petitions were filed on or before the cutoff date in the monthly Visa Bulletin. Tovar,

882 F.3d at 897.

The priority dates for different types of visas vary dramatically. For instance,

in January 2025, the current priority dates for beneficiaries from Mexico were

(1) November 22, 2004, for F1 visa seekers; (2) May 15, 2021, for F2A visa seekers;

and (3) July 1, 2005, for F2B visa seekers. Thus, as of January 2025, the only F1 visa

seekers from Mexico who could apply for a visa based on their approved I-130

petitions were those whose petitions had been filed more than twenty years earlier,

prior to November 23, 2004. Mexican F2B visa seekers—who, like F1 visa seekers,

are those statutorily categorized as adults—were likewise able to apply for a visa

only if they had filed their petitions approximately two decades earlier. On the other

hand, F2A visa seekers’ waitlist was less than four years long, while immediate-

relative beneficiaries could apply for a visa immediately. As these priority dates

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demonstrate, the beneficiary’s “age is extremely important” in determining when the

beneficiary can apply for a visa. Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 275.

Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, “child” is defined in pertinent

part as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).

Several other statutory provisions rely on this definition to differentiate between

categories of visa applicants, with those statutorily defined as children receiving

more preferential treatment. However, due to the long waiting periods involved in the

visa application process, prior to 2002 “there existed a serious problem whereby

child beneficiaries ‘aged out’ of their immediate-relative or F2A visa eligibility.”

Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 275. “To fix this problem, Congress in 2002—with unanimous

bipartisan support—enacted the Child Status Protection Act (‘CSPA’).” Id. at 275–

76. This statute added several provisions to the Immigration and Naturalization Act

to ensure that this preferential treatment for children is extended to beneficiaries who

were children when their I-130 petitions were filed. See Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th

at 5.

“The CSPA protects against ‘aging out’ in several ways.” Id. First, for the

children of U.S. citizens who are younger than twenty-one when the I-130 is filed,

the CSPA provides that, “for purposes of [§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), the statute governing

immediate-relative visas], a determination of whether an alien satisfies the age

requirement [of § 1101(b)(1)] shall be made using the age of the alien on the date on

which the petition is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(1). “Thus, for children of U.S.

citizens who are under 21 on the date their parent’s visa petition is filed, their

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‘statutory’ age remains frozen throughout the entirety of the visa process, no matter

how much time has passed. As a result, the ‘aging out’ problem no longer arises for

them.” Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th at 5–6.

“Second, with respect to the children of LPRs—those in the F2A category—

the CSPA provides for more limited protection.” Id. at 6. Specifically, the CSPA

provides:

(h) Rules for determining whether certain aliens are children (1) In general. For purposes of [§ 1153(a)(2)(A), the statute governing F2A visas], a determination of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement [of § 1101(b)(1)] shall be made using— (A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien . . . , but only if the alien has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year of such availability; reduced by (B) the number of days in the period during which the [I-130 petition] was pending. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1).

To understand the effect of this provision, it is important to understand that an

F2A visa seeker has “two relevant waiting periods” between filing an I-130 petition

and filing a visa application: “(1) the time it takes for the agency to process the

petition and (2) the time it takes for a visa to become available.” Cuthill, 990 F.3d

at 275. The CSPA “provides that the former source of delay—the bureaucratic

processing time—should be subtracted from the biological age of a visa beneficiary

for purposes of determining their minor status.” Id. at 276. On the other hand, “the

time lost because of the latter source of delay—time spent waiting in a visa queue—

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is not subtracted from the beneficiary’s age.” Id. But as soon as a visa becomes

available, the beneficiary’s statutory age is frozen at this point in time, meaning that

no delay in the subsequent visa approval process will be counted against the

beneficiary in determining whether he meets the age requirement of § 1101(b)(1)

unless he fails to seek a visa within the next year. See § 1153(h)(1); see also Teles de

Menezes, 156 F.4th at 6. Thus, under the CSPA, the only time that counts against an

F2A beneficiary is the time in which she is “waiting in a visa queue,” i.e., waiting for

her priority date to become “current” in the Department of State’s Visa Bulletin.

Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 276.

“The CSPA also addresses one additional eventuality: the possibility that the

sponsoring parent of a beneficiary in either the F2A category (for children of LPRs)

or the F2B category (for adult sons or daughters of LPRs) naturalizes during the

pendency of the visa process.” Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th at 6. With respect to the

F2B category, when the parent of an adult son or daughter naturalizes, “the CSPA

gives the beneficiary a choice.” Id. By default, the F2B petition will be converted to

an F1 petition, but the beneficiary may “elect[] not to have such conversion occur.”

8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(2). If the beneficiary so elects, the eligibility determination “shall

be made as if such naturalization had not taken place.” Id.

“In this way, the CSPA altered the pre-existing framework.” Teles de Menezes,

156 F.4th at 6. Prior to passage of the CSPA, “F2B beneficiaries did not have the

option to remain in the F2B category upon their parent’s naturalization even if

reclassifying into the F1 category would mean a longer wait to submit a visa

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application.” Id. “Thus, the CSPA removed the risk that an F2B beneficiary—by

converting automatically to the potentially longer F1 queue—would be made worse

off by their parent’s naturalization.” Id.

As for children in the F2A category, the CSPA provides:

In the case of [a visa petition] initially filed for an alien child’s classification as [an F2A beneficiary], based on the child’s parent being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if the petition is later converted, due to the naturalization of the parent, to a petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative under [§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)], the determination described in [§ 1151(f)(1), the provision describing the age determination for immediate relatives,] shall be made using the age of the alien on the date of the parent’s naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2). It is the interpretation of this provision that is before us in this

appeal.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 2017, Dalila Dekovic, then an LPR, filed an I-130 visa petition

for her son, Alejandro Jimenez Ramirez, seeking his classification in the F2A

preference category. Because Mr. Jimenez Ramirez was twenty years old and

unmarried when his mother filed the I-130, he was statutorily defined as the minor

child of an LPR. Mr. Jimenez Ramirez was born in Mexico.

After a delay of almost two years, USCIS approved the I-130 in the F2A

preference category on November 15, 2019. At that time, the F2A visa category for

Mexico was “current,” meaning that a visa was then available. App. at 66. Because a

visa was immediately available, Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s statutory age under

§ 1153(h)(1)—calculated by taking his age when a visa became available and

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subtracting the amount of time his mother’s petition was pending—remained twenty

years old.

USCIS forwarded the approved I-130 to the National Visa Center, and

Mr. Jimenez Ramirez began the process to receive a visa. However, a visa had not yet

been issued on April 2, 2021, when Ms. Dekovic became a naturalized U.S. citizen.

Ms. Dekovic informed the National Visa Center of her naturalization in April

2021. Shortly thereafter, the National Visa Center changed Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s

classification from F2A to F1, switching his designation from the minor child of an

LPR to the adult son of a U.S. citizen.

This change has significant ramifications for Ms. Dekovic’s ability to obtain

an immigrant visa for her son. Although a visa had been available for Mr. Jimenez

Ramirez when his mother naturalized, the reclassification decision removed his

current visa availability and placed him on a waitlist that is approximately twenty

years long, meaning that Mr. Jimenez Ramirez may need to wait for two decades or

more before he can rejoin his family in the United States based solely on the fact that

his mother became a U.S. citizen.

To challenge this decision, Ms. Dekovic and Mr. Jimenez Ramirez

(collectively, “Appellants”) sued several government officials from different

agencies in their official capacities. Appellants contended that Mr. Jimenez Ramirez

should have been reclassified instead as an immediate relative, given that his

statutory age was under twenty-one at the time of his mother’s naturalization.

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The district court held that the lawsuit could proceed against the Secretary of

State and the Director of the National Visa Center 2 (collectively, “the Government”).

The district court also held that the reclassification decision qualified as a final

agency action subject to judicial review. But on the merits, the district court affirmed

the reclassification decision, reasoning that the plain language of the statute referred

to chronological age. The district court therefore entered judgment in favor of the

Government. Appellants then filed this timely appeal.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s

holding that the reclassification decision qualified as a final agency action but reverse

the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the Government.

III. DISCUSSION

We first address the Government’s argument that the district court erred in holding

that the National Visa Center’s reclassification decision was a final agency action subject

to judicial review. We then turn to Appellants’ argument that the agency erred in

changing Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s classification from F2A to F1 rather than immediate

relative.

A. Final Agency Action

The Administrative Procedure Act provides in pertinent part that a “final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial

2 The district court dismissed Appellants’ claims against government officials from other agencies for lack of standing, reasoning that the alleged injuries were caused by the Department of State and the National Visa Center, not by other agencies’ actions. Appellants do not challenge that ruling on appeal. 11 Appellate Case: 24-1431 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2026 Page: 12

review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. “To be ‘final,’ an agency action must (1) ‘mark the

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely

tentative or interlocutory nature’; and (2) ‘be one by which rights or obligations have

been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.’” Custodia Bank v. Fed.

Reserve Bd. of Govs., 157 F.4th 1235, 1249 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)).

“[A]n agency action can, in certain cases, ‘qualify as final agency action even if

the ultimate impact of that action rests on a decision by another administrative agency or

conduct by a regulated party.’” Id. (quoting Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep’t

of Airforce, 128 F.4th 1089, 1110 (9th Cir. 2025)). Moreover, “[w]here an agency has

issued a definitive statement of its position, determining the rights and obligations of the

parties, the agency’s action is final notwithstanding the possibility of further proceedings

in the agency on related issues.” Cure Land, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 833 F.3d 1223,

1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“There is a ‘presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.’”

Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348 (1984)). “Additionally, we

construe the concept of final agency action pragmatically, rather than inflexibly.” Id.

“Even if ‘the agency has not dressed its decision with the conventional procedural

accoutrements of finality, its own behavior could belie the claim that its interpretation is

not final.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.

457, 479 (2001)). An agency cannot prevent an action from being considered final by

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simply leaving open the possibility that it may “revisit” its decision in the future; rather,

an agency action that takes a definitive and rights-determining position on an issue is a

final agency decision even if the agency indicates that it may change its position in the

future if circumstances change. Cure Land, 833 F.3d at 1230–32.

On appeal, the Government does not dispute that legal consequences will flow

from the National Visa Center’s decision to reclassify Mr. Jimenez Ramirez from F2A

status to F1 status. However, the Government nonetheless argues that the National Visa

Center’s reclassification decisions are never final because a beneficiary’s visa category

could theoretically be affected in the future by new life circumstances and because “the

final visa classification determination will not occur until [the beneficiary] appears before

a consular officer and executes a visa application.” Appellees’ Br. at 14.

In reply, Appellants point out that a consular officer cannot evaluate a

beneficiary’s visa classification until the beneficiary’s priority date has become “current”

based on the National Visa Center’s earlier classification decision. Reply Br. at 2–3.

Moreover, there is no right to an administrative appeal of a National Visa Center

classification decision. Accordingly, the National Visa Center’s classification

determination is effectively the final word on how the beneficiary’s priority date will be

determined, which carries significant legal and practical consequences for the beneficiary

and sponsor.

Appellants further point out that “[a]dopting the [G]overnment’s view on finality

would strip [them] of any possibility of judicial review.” Id. at 4. Under the

Government’s view, Mr. Jimenez Ramirez “would have to wait until he was comfortably

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in middle age and had completed his visa interview before he could challenge the

[National Visa Center’s] decision not to schedule an earlier interview.” Id. And if a court

then agreed with him that he should have been allowed to receive a visa interview as a

minor child twenty years earlier, there would be no remedy for the twenty years in which

he was separated from his mother based on this erroneous agency decision. “The only

scenario in which the [G]overnment’s position would make sense is if [Mr. Jimenez

Ramirez] could still schedule an interview now, with a disputed claim to immediate

relative status, and then bring suit if a consular officer disagreed . . . .” Id. “But as the

[G]overnment has conceded, that is not possible, because the [National Visa Center]

schedules the interview, and only after it has determined that a visa is available.” Id.

We agree with the district court that the National Visa Center’s reclassification

decision is a final agency action. It is a definitive, otherwise unreviewable determination

of how the agency will calculate the beneficiary’s priority date, which has a direct and

immediate impact on the complaining parties by determining when the beneficiary will

be able to schedule a visa interview. See Cure Land, 833 F.3d at 1230–32. Even if the

consulate officer might decide after the interview that the National Visa Center’s

classification decision was incorrect, this will have no effect on the length of time the

beneficiary had to wait before this interview occurred. The National Visa Center’s

classification decision thus has immediate legal consequences for a beneficiary even

though the consulate officer will have the ultimate say in the beneficiary’s immigration

status. See id.; Custodia Bank, 157 F.4th at 1249. And the possibility that the National

Visa Center might engage in a future reclassification decision based on changed life

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circumstances does not change this analysis. See Cure Land, 833 F.3d at 1230–32; see

also Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1330 (10th Cir. 2007)

(recognizing, in the context of a challenge to the Forest Service’s reduction in authorized

cattle grazing under its Annual Operating Instructions (“AOIs”), that “events during the

grazing season (such as a fire) can require further modifications to what grazing is

permitted,” but holding that the AOIs are nevertheless final agency actions because they

provide “the last word before grazing begins and undoubtedly have clear and definite

consequences for [grazing] permittees, who need to make their plans based on what the

AOIs authorize”).

Moreover, we agree with Appellants that the National Visa Center’s classification

decisions would be effectively shielded from judicial review if they could not be

reviewed when they occurred but could instead only be reviewed after the beneficiary

was finally able to receive a visa interview with a consular officer—an event that might

not occur until decades later. Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s situation illustrates the weakness of

the Government’s position. Before the National Visa Center reclassified Mr. Jimenez

Ramirez from F2A to F1, he had current eligibility to apply for a visa and seek a visa

interview with a consular officer. The National Visa Center’s reclassification stripped

him of this eligibility and pushed him instead onto a decades-long waitlist. But the

Government argues that because the consular officer may reach a different result decades

from now, when Mr. Jimenez Ramirez is finally able to receive the visa interview that the

National Visa Center’s reclassification is currently preventing, he cannot challenge the

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National Visa Center’s refusal to allow him to obtain that interview now. A different

result in two decades, however, will not cure the injury caused by this twenty-year delay.

In the context of agency decisions subject to mandatory administrative appeals, the

Supreme Court has held that “‘[a]gencies may avoid the finality of an initial decision’

only ‘by providing that the initial decision would be inoperative pending appeal.

Otherwise, the initial decision becomes final and the aggrieved party is entitled to judicial

review.’” Farrell-Cooper Min. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 864 F.3d 1105, 1107

(10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152 (1993)). The same

reasoning applies here. Because the National Visa Center’s reclassification decision is

operative now, affecting Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s rights to apply for a visa and receive a

visa interview with a consular officer, the agency’s “initial decision bec[ame] final” and

is subject to judicial review regardless of the fact that it will be subject to a form of

administrative review at some unknown future date. Id.

The Government’s position, if accepted by this court, would effectively insulate a

rights-determining agency decision from judicial review. And this result would vitiate the

Administrative Procedure Act, which establishes mechanisms for judicial review of

agency decisions and further requires courts to compel agency action that has been

“unlawfully withheld . . . or unreasonably delayed.” Forest Guardians v. Babbitt,

174 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285

(10th Cir. 1990) (“At this point, justice delayed is justice denied.”).

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We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that the National Visa Center’s

decision to reclassify Mr. Jimenez Ramirez from F2A to F1 status is a final agency action

subject to judicial review.

B. Reclassification under the CSPA

We turn now to the district court’s conclusion that 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2)’s

reference to “the age of the alien on the date of the parent’s naturalization” for

petitions initially filed under F2A unambiguously refers to chronological age even

though the CSPA elsewhere establishes a specific statutory formula for calculating

the age of F2A beneficiaries.

“We review de novo a district court’s statutory construction.” Potts v. Ctr. for

Excellence in Higher Ed., 908 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2018). “When interpreting a

statute, our primary task is to determine congressional intent, using traditional tools of

statutory interpretation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our first step in

interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and

unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Id. (quotation

marks omitted). We conduct this inquiry by “examining the language itself, the specific

context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one

interpretation,” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,

764 F.3d 1199, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “capable of

being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses,”

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United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If we conclude that “the statutory language is ambiguous, we look to the

legislative history and the underlying public policy of the statute” to guide our

interpretation. Seale v. Peacock, 32 F.4th 1011, 1024 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir.

2005) (“Where the language of a statute is arguably ambiguous, courts also look to public

policy considerations to cast further elucidation on Congress’ likely intent.”).

1. Statutory Text

Because we must determine whether § 1151(f)(2), considered in the context of the

statute as a whole, “is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation,” Nomura,

764 F.3d at 1226, we begin by setting forth the arguments in favor of Appellants’

interpretation of the statute, followed by the arguments in favor of the Government’s

interpretation.

a. Arguments for interpreting § 1151(f)(2) to refer to statutory age

The CSPA provides that when a petition is initially filed under F2A and “is later

converted, due to the naturalization of the parent, to a petition to classify the [beneficiary]

as an immediate relative,” the determination of whether the beneficiary meets the age

requirement for immediate relatives “shall be made using the age of the [beneficiary] on

the date of the parent’s naturalization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2).

As the Second Circuit acknowledged in Cuthill, “[t]he term ‘age,’ standing in

isolation, normally means biological age.” 990 F.3d at 279. However, the Supreme Court

has explained that “oftentimes the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases

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may only become evident when placed in context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486

(2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).

Accordingly, “when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in

their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Id. (quoting

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133). A court’s “duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes,

not isolated provisions.’” Id. (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v.

United States ex rel. Wilson, U.S. 280, 290 (2010)).

Our sister circuits have referred to “three antecedent provisions” to interpret the

text of § 1151(f)(2) within its statutory context. Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 279. As the Second

Circuit explained in Cuthill:

First, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) provides a general definition that, subject to certain complexities not relevant here, a “child” is “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” There can be no dispute that this refers to biological age.

Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) provides that F2A visas can be given to “children of [LPRs].” As we just saw, the default definition of “child” is a person under 21 years in biological age. Section 1153(a)(2)(A) thus appears to require that F2A visa beneficiaries must be under 21 in biological years.

But the third provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), explicitly requires a different mechanism for determining a beneficiary’s age for the purposes of F2A visas and one other visa category not relevant here. It provides:

For purposes of [§ 1153(a)(2)(A), the provision discussed in the previous paragraph and which applies exclusively to F2A visas,] a determination of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in [§ 1101(b)(1), the first provision discussed above which provides for a default definition of ‘child,’] shall be made using —

(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien . . .; reduced by

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(B) the number of days in the period during which the [F2A petition] was pending.

Id. In other words, the CSPA dictates that, in determining whether an F2A beneficiary is a minor, we use a statutory formula rather than pure biological age.

990 F.3d at 279 (alterations in original).

Our sister circuits have reasoned that “[b]ecause § 1151(f)(2) refers solely to F2A

beneficiaries, and because Congress specifically provided for a modified age calculation

for F2A beneficiaries, . . . the best textual reading of ‘the age of the [F2A beneficiary] on

the date of the parent’s naturalization’ is that it refers to the F2A beneficiary’s statutory

age on such date.” Id. at 279–80; see also Tovar v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2018) (noting that “[t]he word ‘chronological’ appears nowhere in the statute” and

concluding that “[a]n explicit cross-reference” between § 1151(f)(2) and § 1153(h)(1) “is

unnecessary when the . . . provisions are so closely related and form a cohesive whole”);

Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th at 13 (“[A]s we have explained, § 1153(h)(1) supplies a

modified formula for determining the age of an F2A beneficiary, and § 1151(f)(2)

applies, by its own terms, only to such beneficiaries. Thus, the ‘age’ of every beneficiary

to whom § 1151(f)(2)’s conversion rule applies is already modified, namely, by

§ 1153(h)(1).”).

These circuits have concluded that this interpretation is bolstered by other aspects

of the statutory context, as “a contrary construction of the text would produce three

significant anomalies that the appellees cannot explain.” Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th

at 15; see also Potts, 908 F.3d at 613 (indicating that we will conduct a further inquiry

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into congressional intent, even if we might otherwise find the statutory language to be

unambiguous, if an interpretation would not result in a “coherent and consistent”

“statutory scheme” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))).

“The first anomaly arises because the family-based visa scheme affords

preferential treatment to the children of U.S. citizens over the children of LPRs, by

exempting ‘immediate relatives’ of U.S. citizens from the visa cap, and generally

privileging U.S. citizens over LPRs in the visa process.” Teles de Menezes, 156 F.4th

at 15 (citations omitted). However, the Government’s interpretation of the statute “has the

effect of penalizing a parent’s naturalization,” as this interpretation would allow F2A

beneficiaries to “maintain[] the CSPA’s age-out protections only so long as their LPR

parent does not naturalize.” Id. “The incongruity of this result is underscored by the

CSPA, which signals Congress’s intent not to have a parent’s naturalization penalize a

beneficiary.” Id.

“The second anomaly that the [Government’s] view occasions arises because it

would require the CSPA to be read to protect against aging out as a result of bureaucratic

delay for child beneficiaries in both the ‘immediate relatives’ and the F2A categories but

not for the subset of beneficiaries who move from one category to the other.” Id. at 16.

Construing the statute in this manner would thus “not only ‘leave a sizable hole in the

CSPA’s age-out protections,’ but also ‘defeat one of its most important purposes.’” Id.

(citations omitted) (quoting first Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 281, and then United States v. Gelin,

712 F.3d 612, 619 (1st Cir. 2013)). Of course, “Congress could choose to create such a

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hole,” but the circuits to consider the issue have held that there is “little reason to find one

when the text comfortably suggests there is none to be found.” Id. at 16.

“The third, and final, anomaly that would arise from the [Government’s]

construction of the statute is that adult sons and daughters would receive a benefit denied

to minor sons and daughters, notwithstanding that the family-based visa system generally

preferences child beneficiaries.” Id. at 17. “This anomaly would arise because, in the

[Government’s] view, the CSPA provides adult F2B beneficiaries, but not minor F2A

beneficiaries, the ability to opt out of converting to the F1 category upon a parent’s

naturalization.” Id. This interpretation would therefore mean that those who file as adult

sons and daughters, but not those who file as minor children, would “receive preferential

treatment in the form of the ability to opt out of a longer queue.” Id. “Yet the

[Government] provide[s] no explanation that would account for this departure from the

overarching statutory scheme’s generally child-favoring disposition.” Id.

In addition to introducing anomalies into the statutory scheme, the Government’s

interpretation of the statute would require us to read words into the statute that are not

included in its plain text. Section 1151(f)(2), by its terms, contemplates only one type of

reclassification—from F2A status to immediate-relative status. See § 1151(f)(2) (“[I]f [a]

petition [under F2A] is later converted, due to the naturalization of the parent, to a

petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative under [§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)], the

determination described in [§ 1151(f)(1)] shall be made using the age of the alien on

the date of the parent’s naturalization.”). Nothing in the statute seems to anticipate the

Government reclassifying a beneficiary from F2A status to F1 status. Thus, the statutory

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text as written did not permit the National Visa Center to engage in the reclassification

decision that occurred in this case. See Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 283 (“If anything, it is the

government’s proposed switch that is without precedent, as there is no express statutory

F2A-to-F1 mechanism in the CSPA.”); Tovar, 882 F.3d at 903 (“Neither the regulation

nor the statute authorizes the result the government advocates here: conversion of an F2A

petition into an F1 petition.”). And the Government does not explain why we should

interpret the statute to implicitly allow for petitions to be reclassified from F2A to F1

when other types of reclassifications are expressly provided for by the statutory text.

On the other hand, if the statute is interpreted as our sister circuits have interpreted

it, then there is no need to read words into the statute because a beneficiary will never be

converted from F2A status to F1 status. Rather, if a petition was “initially filed” under

F2A and the beneficiary’s statutory age at the time of the parent’s naturalization is under

twenty-one, then the beneficiary will be converted from F2A status to immediate-relative

status based on this interpretation of § 1151(f)(2) even if the beneficiary’s chronological

age is now twenty-one or older. And if the beneficiary’s statutory age at the time of the

parent’s naturalization has reached twenty-one, then the petition will not be converted

directly from F2A status to F1 status. Instead, the change in the petitioner’s statutory age

would have automatically changed his status from F2A to F2B before naturalization, and

the parent’s naturalization would allow the now-F2B beneficiary to either convert into F1

status or to retain F2B status under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(2). See § 1153(h)(3); see also

Cuthill, 990 F.3d at 276 (“The CSPA thus provides that if the F2A beneficiary’s statutory

age is still 21 or older even after deducting the processing time, the F2A petition

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automatically converts to an F2B petition (which, recall, is for adult sons and daughters

of LPRs).”).

By tying the age determination to the beneficiary’s age at the time of the parent’s

naturalization, the statute ensures that a beneficiary who has aged out of F2A status

waiting in a visa queue cannot seek to change from his new F2B status to immediate-

relative status simply because his petition was “initially filed” as an F2A petition. But if

the petition was “initially filed” as an F2A petition and the beneficiary’s statutory age

remains under twenty-one, then—per this interpretation of the statute—the beneficiary is

able to retain that statutory age by converting from F2A status to immediate-relative

status rather than losing the benefit of the CSPA’s tolling provisions due to his parent’s

naturalization. This interpretation of the statute thus covers all possible reclassification

decisions, whereas the Government’s interpretation leaves a significant textual gap and

allows a reclassification decision that is untethered to the statutory text.

b. Arguments for interpreting § 1151(f)(2) to refer to biological age

The district court concluded that the plain language of § 1151(f)(2) necessarily

refers only to chronological age because (1) Congress showed in the CSPA that it was

“ready, willing, and able to provide various measures of age for various purposes,” but it

did not include a specific age modification formula in the text of § 1151(f)(2); (2) the

CSPA contains numerous cross-references, but Congress did not directly cross reference

§ 1151(f)(2) to § 1153(h)(1); and (3) the phrase “‘the age of the alien on the date of the

parent’s naturalization’ is quite plain and simple.” App. at 176. The district court

acknowledged that its interpretation of the statute was “contrary to the[] general

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principles and goals” of the CSPA “[i]n some notable ways.” Id. at 177. However, the

court concluded that because “the CSPA is filled with varied categories of petitioners and

applicants who, depending on a variety of different circumstances, receive significantly

different treatment,” it would be “improper” to interpret § 1151(f)(2) by reference to

§ 1153(h)(1) when the district court found the statutory phrase “age of the alien” to be

“plain and simple” on its face. Id. at 177–78.

The Government urges us to adopt the district court’s reasoning on these points.

The Government also raises several additional arguments for affirmance, none of which

are persuasive.

First, the Government argues that the age calculation in § 1153(h)(1) cannot apply

to reclassification decisions under § 1151(f)(2) because § 1153(h)(1) provides the age

calculation for F2A beneficiaries, whereas § 1151(f)(2) establishes eligibility for

immediate-relative visas. This argument ignores the fact that § 1151(f)(2) does not

govern immediate-relative visas per se—rather, it applies on its face only to a petition

that was “initially filed” as an F2A petition and “is later converted, due to the

naturalization of the parent, to a petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative

under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i).” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2). Thus, this argument in fact cuts

against the Government, as the only individuals affected by § 1151(f)(2) are those whose

age for statutory purposes was indisputably calculated under the provisions of

§ 1153(h)(1) up until (at a minimum) the moment of their parents’ naturalization.

The Government next argues that § 1153(h)(1)(A)’s statutory age calculation

cannot apply to § 1151(f)(2) because § 1153(h)(1)(A) “requires that the beneficiary seek

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to acquire lawful permanent resident status within one year of visa availability in order to

take advantage of § 1153(h)’s age-calculation formula.” Appellees’ Br. at 21–22. The

Government reasons that this “one-year deadline makes little sense in the context of

immediate relative visas, where Congress has never limited when an eligible individual

can obtain a visa.” Id. at 22. Again, this argument ignores the fact that § 1151(f)(2) does

not govern immediate-relative visas per se, but instead only governs petitions that are

initially filed as F2A petitions by parents who later become U.S. citizens. Interpreting

§ 1151(f)(2) to define age by reference to § 1153(h)(1)(A) means that the petitioners’

actions prior to naturalization may be relevant in determining whether the beneficiary can

qualify as an immediate relative when the sponsor naturalizes. A sponsor, like

Ms. Dekovic, who files an F2A petition on behalf of her minor child and then pursues a

visa when it becomes available may be entitled to the benefit of the CSPA’s tolling

provisions. On the other hand, a sponsor who files an F2A petition but sleeps on her

rights by failing to take any action within one year of visa availability may lose her

ability to take advantage of this statutory age calculation even if she later naturalizes.

There is thus nothing nonsensical about applying this statutory age calculation in its

entirety to petitions initially filed under F2A and later reclassified based on the parents’

naturalization.

For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that “if

Congress had intended to allow an F2A beneficiary to always retain his or her child

status,” Congress would have “selected as the relevant trigger ‘the age on the date on

which the F2A petition was filed,’” rather than “‘the age of the alien on the date of the

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parent’s naturalization.’” Id. at 21–22. But Appellants are not arguing that Congress

intended to allow beneficiaries to always retain their child status; rather, they are arguing

that Congress intended the F2A age calculation set forth in § 1153(h)(1) to apply to

beneficiaries who initially file petitions under F2A but are then reclassified into a

different preference category based on their parents’ naturalization. And, contrary to the

Government’s apparent assumption, the age calculation for F2A beneficiaries set forth in

§ 1153(h)(1) does not mean that the child’s statutory age is always his age on the date

when the F2A petition was filed. Rather, as Cuthill explains, § 1153(h)(1) subtracts

“bureaucratic processing time” from the beneficiary’s biological age to derive his

statutory age, but it does not subtract “time spent waiting in a visa queue.” 990 F.3d

at 276. In Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s case, he did not spend any time waiting in a visa queue,

and thus his statutory age is equivalent to his age when his mother filed the F2A petition.

But this will not always be the case, and our sister circuits’ interpretation of § 1151(f)(2)

would allow F2A beneficiaries whose statutory age is under twenty-one at the time of

their parents’ naturalization to be converted into immediate-relative status, while

petitioners who filed under F2A but then aged out of F2A status in a long visa queue will

not be converted back into minor status as immediate relatives when their parents later

naturalize.

The Government further argues that “Congress may have had a reason for not

applying the § 1153(h) age calculation to those in [Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s]

circumstances[;] for example[,] doing so would disadvantage adult children who have

their own minor children they seek to bring with them, which they could not do if treated

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as immediate relatives.” Appellees’ Br. at 23. The Second Circuit rejected a similar

argument in Cuthill, concluding that “Congress made a common-sense judgment that the

immediate-relative category is far preferable to the F2A category even if that means

losing the ability to bring derivative beneficiaries.” 990 F.3d at 283. And the Government

has not and cannot provide any legislative history to support its hypothetical

congressional intent argument. Indeed, as we discuss below, the legislative history

strongly points to the conclusion that the CSPA was intended to prevent precisely the

outcomes that the Government wants to achieve in this case—penalizing child petitioners

who turn twenty-one before they can obtain a visa due to bureaucratic processing delays,

and penalizing beneficiaries for their parents’ decision to become naturalized citizens

rather than remaining LPRs.

Finally, the Government argues that we should reject our sister circuits’ thoughtful

analyses as “results-driven decisions.” Appellees’ Br. at 24. However, the “result” these

circuits sought was interpreting the statute in a manner consistent with congressional

intent and with a view of § 1151(f)(2)’s place within the statutory context as a whole.

And that is precisely our role when tasked with interpreting a statute. The fact that our

sister circuits did not arrive at the result desired by the Government is not a valid reason

to disagree with their careful consideration of the statutory text and context.

2. Legislative History and Public Policy Purpose

As the Second Circuit explained in Cuthill, “the purpose and history of the CSPA

overwhelmingly favor [Appellants’] reading of § 1151(f)(2).” 990 F.3d at 284. “There is

no dispute that Congress enacted the CSPA because it wanted to protect child

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beneficiaries from aging out of their age-dependent child visas,” and “[t]here is no

indication whatsoever that Congress wanted to single out beneficiaries like [Mr. Jimenez

Ramirez] for exclusion from the CSPA’s anti-aging-out remedies.” Id. Moreover,

“[w]hile reliance on legislative purpose is sometimes criticized on the ground that

Congress is a divided body that does not speak with a single voice or purpose, that

critique does not apply here.” Id. “It is hard to imagine a piece of legislation that speaks

with more unmistakable clarity of purpose than the CSPA,” which was passed into law

by a unanimous House and Senate. Id. No legislator opposed the statute, and the

“Senators and House members of both parties [who] spoke in support of the legislation”

all “focused on the same theme: Children should not lose their coveted status due to

agency processing time.” Id. “The House Report, moreover, indicates the drafters’

judgment that this same assurance should be afforded ‘when permanent resident parents

petition for immigrant visas for their sons and daughters and later naturalize.’” Teles de

Menezes, 156 F.4th at 17 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 107-45, at 3).

The Government’s only response to this extensive and undisputed legislative

history is to argue that “Congress clearly understood the complexity of the statute it

created and its intent was not so certain as to undermine the plain language of

§ 1151(f)(2).” Appellees’ Br. at 28.

3. Interpretation

For the reasons described above, we conclude that the text of § 1151(f)(2), when

considered in the context of the whole statute, is more properly interpreted in favor of

Appellants’ position. At best, the Government’s arguments suggest that § 1151(f)(2) is

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ambiguous—a conclusion that, if reached, would still not tilt the scales in favor of the

Government. Because even if we assume § 1151(f)(2) is ambiguous, the Government’s

position cannot overcome the clear and unrebutted statements in the legislative history

demonstrating that Congress intended to protect child beneficiaries from aging out of

their age-dependent visas due to administrative delays and to prevent children from being

penalized for their parents’ decision to become naturalized citizens. Therefore, like our

sister circuits, we interpret “the age of the [beneficiary] on the date of the parent’s

naturalization” in § 1151(f)(2) to refer to the beneficiary’s statutory age rather than his

chronological age. We accordingly reverse the district court’s conclusion that the

National Visa Center could permissibly reclassify Mr. Jimenez Ramirez’s petition from

F2A to F1 status when his mother naturalized, stripping him of the protections that the

CSPA was intended to provide.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision that the National Visa Center’s

reclassification decision was a final agency action subject to judicial review. But we

REVERSE the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the Government and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.