D.E.&J. Ltd. Partnership v. Conaway

133 F. App'x 994
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 10, 2005
Docket03-2334, 03-2417
StatusUnpublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 133 F. App'x 994 (D.E.&J. Ltd. Partnership v. Conaway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D.E.&J. Ltd. Partnership v. Conaway, 133 F. App'x 994 (6th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

On January 22, 2002, Kmart Corporation, one of the most familiar brands in discount retailing and one of the largest— operating through approximately 1,900 stores with approximately 234,000 employees — filed for bankruptcy. Kmart’s bankruptcy announcement was followed by a predictable drop in its stock price, by the restatement of some of its interim financial reports and by this securities fraud lawsuit.

On February 21, 2002, D.E.&J. Limited Partnership filed this lawsuit on behalf of a class of Kmart stockholders who purchased their stock from March 13, 2001, to May 15, 2002, against several of Kmart’s senior executives and its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The district court dismissed D.E.&J.’s complaint with prejudice for failing to meet the pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). As the plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead “loss causation” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005), we affirm.

I.

Kmart is a Delaware Corporation. Its principal place of business is Troy, Michigan, where it was first incorporated as the successor to the business developed by its founder, S.S. Kresge.

*996 In May of 2000, Kmart hired Charles Conaway and gave him a mandate to revitalize the discount-retail chain. During his tenure as Kmart’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer from May 2000 until his resignation in March of 2002, Conaway replaced much of Kmart’s existing management. Two of the individual defendants in this case were among the officers that Conaway hired or promoted during this period: Mark Schwartz, who was Kmart’s President and Chief Operating Officer from March 14, 2001, until November 9, 2001; and Jeffrey Boyer, who was Kmart’s Chief Financial Officer from May 4, 2001, until November 9, 2001. The other two named individual defendants were among those officers whom Conaway replaced at the very beginning of the class period: Matthew Hilzinger, who was Kmart’s Vice President and Controller until July 2001; and Martin Welch, who was Kmart’s Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer until May of 2001.

In order to compete more effectively with Kmart’s two principal rivals, Wal-Mart Stores and Target Corporation, Con-away implemented several projects intended to strengthen Kmart’s inventory controls, customer service and price competitiveness. These initiatives achieved initial success, with Kmart reporting improved sales and gross margins and an improving inventory situation. The price of Kmart stock, as a result, rose from $9.19 per share on March 13, 2001, to $13.16 per share on August 7, 2001, an increase of 43% at a time when the stock market was generally stagnant or declining.

Kmart’s brief financial success during this period, D.E. & J. alleges, was the result of accounting fraud. According to D.E. & J., senior executives at Kmart represented that Kmart was experiencing a financial turnaround while concealing the extent of Kmart’s financial difficulties in several ways. First, Kmart allegedly tried to mask losses by using interim financial statements that reported rebates that it hoped to earn from its vendors at the end of the year. By reporting vendor rebates as a reduction of expenses in interim statements and by basing its interim statements on aggressive forecasts, Kmart ran the risk that it would not ultimately obtain all of the rebates and that its interim statements would reflect unrealistically high projections of future sales. Second, Kmart’s outdated internal control system failed to track and monitor inventory effectively, (1) reporting an item as “in-stock” even if the company had only one piece of inventory, (2) causing stores to accumulate obsolete merchandise and (3) ultimately misstating inventory ledgers. Third, Kmart’s aggressive efforts to obtain discounts and other benefits from its vendors damaged the company’s long-term relationships with its vendors. Fourth, Kmart’s expansion of its “Bluelight Special” discount program to a “Bluelight Always” program failed, because the company’s competitors responded by cutting their prices as well. JA 0140.

By late 2001, whether as a result of fraud or not, it was clear that Conaway’s initiatives were not succeeding. In October of 2001, the company disclosed that its sales had been flat during September, and in November and December the company disclosed a decline in sales.

On January 22, 2002, Kmart filed for bankruptcy. In a press release, the company attributed its bankruptcy filing to a “combination of factors, including a rapid decline in its liquidity resulting from Kmart’s below-plan sales and earnings performance in the fourth quarter.” JA 0155. The price of Kmart’s stock subsequently dropped from $1.74 to $0.70 per share.

*997 On January 25, 2002, Kmart disclosed that it had received an anonymous “whis-tleblower” letter expressing serious concerns about the Company’s accounting methods and financial results. The anonymous author of the letter stated that he or she had “kept copies of transactions [he or she] considered] to be inaccurate” and “recorded conversations during which distortions and misstatement[s] of records were discussed.” JA 0128. The letter directly implicated Schwartz and PwC. See JA 0128 (reporting that Schwartz told a “superior to not be surprised if Kmart shares were trading at four or five dollars per share by the end of the year”); id. (“Resident auditors from Pricewaterhouse-Coopers are hesitant to pursue these issues or even question obvious changes in revenue and expense patterns.”). Kmart announced that it would conduct an internal investigation to look into the allegations. Three similar letters followed.

On February 21, 2002, D.E. & J. brought this securities fraud lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of Kmart securities between May 17, 2001, and January 22, 2002. The lawsuit initially named only Conaway as a defendant.

On May 15, 2002, Kmart, in its Form 10-K disclosure for fiscal year 2001, reported a loss of $2.42 billion for the year. In addition to adjusting for a single vendor transaction in 2001 and moving a $167 million loss contingency from the fourth quarter to the third quarter (matters not at issue here), Kmart announced that, due to the bankruptcy and resulting inability to estimate vendor purchases and associated allowances, it had changed its policy of estimating and recording vendor allowances on an interim basis. It then restated its financial statements to lower its vendor rebates for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2001 (which until then had not been audited) by $311, $211 and $32 million respectively. In the disclosure, Kmart attributed its bankruptcy filing to a “rapid decline in our liquidity resulting from our below-plan sales and earnings performance in the fourth quarter, the evaporation of the surety bond market and erosion of supplier confidence,” and stated that “[o]ther factors including] intense competition in the discount retailing industry, unsuccessful sales and marketing initiatives, the continuing recession, and recent capital market volatility” played a role as well. JA 0205.

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