DeFoe Corp. v. New York City Department of Transportation

665 N.E.2d 158, 87 N.Y.2d 754, 642 N.Y.S.2d 588, 1996 N.Y. LEXIS 307
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 28, 1996
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 665 N.E.2d 158 (DeFoe Corp. v. New York City Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeFoe Corp. v. New York City Department of Transportation, 665 N.E.2d 158, 87 N.Y.2d 754, 642 N.Y.S.2d 588, 1996 N.Y. LEXIS 307 (N.Y. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

In this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging a determination to deny registration of a contract with a municipal agency, the issues are (1) whether the New York City Comptroller’s objection to the registration of the subject contract was timely and (2) whether the refusal of the Comptroller and the Mayor to register the contract was arbitrary and capricious.

On December 1, 1992, after public solicitation of bids, appellant DeFoe Corporation and American Bridge Company, a joint venture (Joint Venture)1 was awarded New York City Contract No. HBX644 (the contract), for repairs to the Madison Avenue Bridge based on its bid price of $34,093,799.2 On or about March 24,1993, respondent New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT) submitted the contract to the New York City Comptroller (Comptroller) for registration. NYCDOT withdrew the contract on April 20, 1993, prior to registration, indicating a need to reconsider "the appropriateness of pursuing registration of the contract” in light of new information received pertaining to DeFoe Corp. (DeFoe). The Comptroller responded to NYCDOT’s withdrawal of the contract in an 11-page letter, dated April 26, 1993, from Elizabeth Lang, Special Counsel— Investigations to Steven Pacheco, Director, Contract Management, Bureau of Bridges, NYCDOT. The letter cited information, relating specifically to DeFoe and its principals, that NYCDOT should thoroughly consider "in determining the responsibility of the DeFoe/ American Bridge Company joint [758]*758venture”. The Comptroller’s office followed up the first letter to NYCDOT with two additional letters (April 29, 1993 and May 7,1993) between Lang and Pacheco, each providing more information on DeFoe for NYCDOT to consider while making its determination.

After its withdrawal of the contract from the Comptroller, NYCDOT entered into negotiations with appellant to address concerns and objections and remove potential barriers to registration respecting appellant’s responsibility status. A "Responsibility Certification,”3 dated November 19, 1993, resulted from these discussions, by which DeFoe agreed to limit the involvement of five persons associated with DeFoe, four of whom who had previously been convicted of criminal tax violations involving DeFoe.4

NYCDOT resubmitted the contract to the Comptroller on December 1, 1993. The Comptroller objected to the registration of the contract and notified the Mayor of her objection in a letter dated December 30, 1993. Specifically, the Comptroller objected that two of DeFoe’s principals who had previously been convicted of fraud might still play an integral part in DeFoe’s operations. Additionally, the Comptroller objected to appellant’s failure to disclose prior statutory and OSHA violations on its VENDEX Business Entity Questionnaire.5 Moreover, the Comptroller expressed concern that DeFoe had [759]*759an outstanding Federal civil tax lien, in excess of $5 million and possibly as much as $11 million, which DeFoe was contesting. With respect to the Federal tax liability, DeFoe indicated that a portion of the contested liability related to illegal payments made to minority construction worker groups seeking to extort money. DeFoe, however, declined to identify any of the recipients of such payments or provide any further information regarding the payments. Based on the Comptroller’s objection, in a letter dated March 25, 1994, the Mayor refused to require registration of the contract.

Joint Venture commenced this article 78 proceeding by order to show cause, dated April 4, 1994, seeking an order (1) vacating the New York City Mayor’s decision denying registration of Joint Venture’s publicly bid contract as arbitrary and capricious and (2) declaring that the City Comptroller’s objection to the registration of the contract was untimely.

Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition and dismissed the proceeding, finding that the Comptroller’s objection was timely and rational. The court stated that under section 328 of the New York City Charter and related statutes, the contract registration procedure may not be circumvented by allowing an agency to withdraw a contract before registration. After rejecting appellant’s argument that the Comptroller’s objection was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of NYCDOT’s initial submission, Supreme Court concluded that appellant waived any objection to NYCDOT’s removal of the instant contract by working with NYCDOT to eliminate any hurdles that might impede the contract’s registration and the subsequent resubmission of the contract to the Comptroller for registration. Further, citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. (34 NY2d 222, 231), the court found the Mayor’s denial of registration rationally based on the Comptroller’s timely and sound objection. The court found appellant’s declination to provide the identity of the parties involved in the extortion scheme a sufficient basis for objection under section 328 of the New York City Charter.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court. This Court granted leave to appeal.

Appellant maintains that (1) the Comptroller’s objection to registration upon which the Mayor’s determination not to require registration was based was untimely filed and (2) the [760]*760Mayor’s decision to deny registration of the contract was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in light of the approval of three other contracts for repairs to bridges in 1992.6

This Court’s review of this article 78 proceeding is limited, inter alla, to "whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, supra). Because we find that the Comptroller and the Mayor performed a lawful duty and there was no showing that they acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

Chapter 13 of the New York City Charter establishes the rules for procurement of New York City contracts. Section 328 provides for the registration of City contracts by the Comptroller and authorizes the Comptroller to object to the registration of a contract within 30 days of the date of filing of such contract with the Comptroller’s office (NY City Charter § 328 [c]).7 If the Comptroller has not objected within 30 days, the contract is deemed registered (NY City Charter § 328 [a], [c]). Although a contract has been awarded by a municipal agency, such contract is not effective until it has been registered (NY City Charter § 328 [a]; see also, Procurement Policy Board Rules, 9 RCNY 2-08 [c] [3]; 5-07 [b]).8

Appellant maintains that the 30-day period within which the Comptroller had to object to the registration of appellant’s contract began on March 24, 1993, when NYCDOT initially [761]*761submitted the contract for registration.9 Although NYCDOT withdrew the contract prior to the expiration of the 30 days, appellant maintains that the 30-day period was tolled when the contract was withdrawn and recommenced once NYCDOT resubmitted the contract in December 1993. To do otherwise, appellant maintains, would circumvent the statutory time limitations. This argument is rejected.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
665 N.E.2d 158, 87 N.Y.2d 754, 642 N.Y.S.2d 588, 1996 N.Y. LEXIS 307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/defoe-corp-v-new-york-city-department-of-transportation-ny-1996.