Deborah Bennett v. SEPTA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-1376
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

No. 24-1376 _____________

DEBORAH BENNETT, Appellant

v.

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; SCOTT SAUER _____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2:23-cv-01271) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert _____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 14, 2025 _____________

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 30, 2025) ____________

OPINION* ____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

Deborah Bennett appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in her

suit alleging race discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation against the

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) and then-Assistant

General Manager Scott Sauer. The District Court held that Bennett failed to show a

genuine dispute as to any material fact and did not postpone its decision for Bennett to

conduct further discovery. For the reasons below, we will affirm.

I.

We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our

decision. Bennett began working for SEPTA in 2000 as a Passenger Receipt Clerk. She

received a promotion in 2014, becoming an administrative assistant. From 2015 to 2021,

she achieved satisfactory marks in her annual performance reviews. Those performance

assessments, as well as whether one’s current salary is above or below the position’s

midpoint, influence SEPTA’s decision on employees’ salary raises. Bennett received

raises ranging from 1% to 4% across these years.

At the same time, however, Bennett experienced some workplace disputes. In

2021, she alleges that at the Philadelphia Flower Show, where she was responsible for

showing SEPTA employees to their assigned areas, she directed Sauer to a different

section than where he was standing. She alleges that Sauer took umbrage with this

directive and changed his “entire demeanor” toward her. Bennett Br. 8. Sauer reduced

her raise that year from 4.5% to 3.5%, using his authority to approve and adjust merit

increases. But Bennett, who is African American, alleges that this action was racially

2 discriminatory, as she heard rumors that a white administrative assistant, Mariellen

Medernach, received a 4.5% merit increase despite working only two years at SEPTA.

Sauer also discussed Bennett’s use of “excessive” overtime with her that year. Appendix

(“App.”) 575. Bennett alleges that Sauer accused her of stealing hours, yelled at her for

excessive overtime work, and belittled her in front of staff during this conversation, but

Sauer denies these allegations.

Bennett, upset after these developments, reached out to SEPTA’s Equal

Employment Office (“EEO”) and alleged that she felt “subject to an atmosphere of

workplace harassment and intimidation from Scott Sauer.” App. 730. She filed a formal

complaint a few days later, demanding an apology as well as a retroactive increase in her

salary to match the 4.5% raise she says she deserved. At the same time, Sauer instructed

Bennett’s supervisors to reassign work to prevent Bennett from working overtime.

Bennett eventually took medical leave later that year.

Bennett then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) as well as the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission (“PHRC”). She alleged race and age discrimination as well as retaliation.

At the start of 2022, Bennett received a 3% raise to her salary, but she also believed that

this action was racially discriminatory and retaliatory because two white employees who

were similarly situated allegedly received higher marks, entitling them to a greater salary

increase. SEPTA explained that due to her absence during the merit consideration

process, she received the average increase amount in accordance with SEPTA policy.

Bennett filed an additional EEOC charge of race discrimination for this action.

3 Two years later, Bennett was transferred to work under a new supervisor. She did

not apply for this position and considered it less desirable than her old one, as it came

with different hours and no telework privileges. Bennett alleges that she should have

been compensated more highly, but her compensation remained the same.

Bennett then filed this lawsuit against SEPTA and Sauer, claiming intentional

race discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). SEPTA

moved for summary judgment, but Bennett sought to defer the District Court’s decision

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) until SEPTA produced Medernach’s

compensation and employment records. Yet Bennett’s failure to move to compel SEPTA

to disclose these documents led the District Court to proceed. It granted summary

judgment for SEPTA and Sauer, concluding that nothing in the record showed Bennett

was subject to intentional racial discrimination, a hostile work environment, or

retaliation. Bennett timely appealed.

II.1

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Cranbury Brick Yard,

LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is

warranted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We resolve all factual

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

4 doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. DL Res., Inc.

v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007).

The denial of a motion for additional discovery under Rule 56(d) is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See Murphy v. Millenium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 310 (3d

Cir. 2011). Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration

that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the

court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits

or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”

III.

A.

1.

Bennett contends that she experienced intentional race discrimination at SEPTA in

violation of Title VII and the PHRA.2 Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to

“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff

may prove discrimination according to the burden-shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). That framework requires

showing that: (1) the plaintiff was “a member of a protected class”; (2) she “was

2 Courts “generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts.” Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).

5 qualified for the position” she held; (3) she “suffered an adverse employment action”;

and (4) “the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of

intentional discrimination.” Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). Once

those factors are satisfied, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff once again has the

burden to “show that the defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for intentional

discrimination.” Makky, 541 F.3d at 214.

Bennett’s claim regarding the 2021 reduction of her salary increase fails at the

prima facie stage. She provides no evidence of racial discrimination, stating only that she

heard that Medernach received greater compensation for similar work. To give rise to an

inference of discrimination, “comparator employees need not be identical but must be

similarly situated in ‘all material respects.’” Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 474 (3d

Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018)). But

Bennett provided no details on why Medernach is a suitable comparator-employee,

alleging only that Medernach was compensated more highly based on “rumors” and

Medernach “talking about it.” App. 180. And, as detailed below, Bennett failed to

compel discovery from SEPTA about Medernach’s compensation. “Bare assertions,

conclusory allegations or suspicions will not suffice” to show the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288–89 (3d

Cir. 2017) (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Even if Bennett could make a prima facie claim, SEPTA had a legitimate,

6 nondiscriminatory reason for lowering her salary increase. Sauer alleged that he adjusts

the proposed merit increases of employees for budgetary reasons every year. Yet Bennett

provides nothing to suggest that this explanation is pretextual.

Her claim about her 2022 compensation meets a similar fate. Though Bennett

points to the compensation of two white employees, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason exists for the pay disparity. The other employees served as a program manager

and a director, positions that involve different responsibilities from Bennett’s position

and were thus “not similarly situated in this context.” Tribune Media, 902 F.3d at 403.

Bennett was also absent for the merit consideration process that year. SEPTA policy

requires that an absent employee receive the average raise for employees with a

satisfactory performance rating, which Bennett received. That too qualifies as a non-

pretextual reason for SEPTA’s actions.

And Bennett’s claim of racial discrimination regarding her transfer in 2023 does

not survive summary judgment either. A transfer may constitute an adverse employment

action for Title VII purposes. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 358

(2024). But Bennett does not provide any evidence to suggest that she was subject to

intentional discrimination. Though she names a host of white administrative assistants

who were not transferred, all of them reported to a manager who directly supervised them

and had no need to be transferred. By contrast, SEPTA provided a legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for transferring Bennett. Sauer stated that he had no need for a

second administrative assistant and thought it was “not fair to [Bennett] to continue

having her work with little to no direction.” App. 420.

7 Because Bennett fails to show any evidence of discrimination or explain why

SEPTA’s reasoning was pretextual, the District Court did not err in granting summary

judgment to SEPTA and Sauer on these claims.

2.

Bennett also accuses SEPTA and Sauer of creating a racially discriminatory

hostile work environment, but that claim also fails at summary judgment. A plaintiff

alleging a hostile work environment claim premised on racial discrimination must show,

among other things, “that the environment was actually hostile, i.e., that the offensive

conduct at work was either ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive.’” Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531,

537 (3d Cir. 2021). “To determine whether an environment is hostile, a court must

consider the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.’” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Because “conduct must be

extreme” to satisfy this standard, “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” do not

qualify. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Bennett’s only evidence of “severe or pervasive” harassment includes an upsetting

meeting with Sauer about her overtime work, which falls short of Title VII’s

requirements. Crediting Bennett’s account of the events, as we must on summary

judgment, such allegations do not qualify as severe or pervasive. One upsetting

discussion with a supervisor, even if it took place as Bennett alleged, does not amount to

8 the sort of extreme conduct that constitutes severe or pervasive harassment. “The relative

infrequency” of conduct, even if offensive, “indicates that [a supervisor’s] actions were

not severe or pervasive harassment.” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 571 (3d

Cir. 2023). By contrast, cognizable instances of harassment under Title VII far surpass

Bennett’s allegations in both frequency and severity. See id. at 572 (collecting cases).

The District Court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment for SEPTA and

Sauer on this ground as well.

3.

Bennett lastly appeals the denial of her Title VII retaliation claim, but that claim is

also unavailing. Bennett alleges that SEPTA retaliated against her by demanding extra

work without overtime pay, delaying her salary increase, and involuntarily transferring

her to a different office without telework privileges after she submitted her EEO, PHRC,

and EEOC complaints. A plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII must show that

she was engaged in protected activity, that she suffered an adverse employment action,

and that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. See Qin, 100 F.4th at 475 (quoting Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68

F.3d 694, 701 (3d Cir. 1995)). Bennett’s complaints constitute protected activity, see

Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015), and changes to both her

pay rate and her office location could qualify as adverse employment actions, see Torre v.

Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 831 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).

But her retaliation claims falter as well. For one, changes to Bennett’s workload

expectations began before she filed her complaints. Bennett fails to allege how her

9 working conditions worsened because of her protected activity, given her own admission

that she had to “continue performing” excess work after filing the complaints. Bennett

Br. 41. Nor does Bennett allege when her 2022 salary increase took place. As the

District Court concluded, if the 2022 salary increase occurred in a similar timeframe as

the 2021 salary increase, that would suggest that her complaint preceded the increase by

nearly a month, which by itself is not “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive. Est.

of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 513 (3d Cir. 2003); see Thomas v. Town of

Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that three weeks between

protected activity and allegedly retaliatory action did not suggest retaliation by itself).

And while the process of her transfer was close in timing to her EEOC complaint,

Bennett cannot show that SEPTA’s legitimate reason for transferring her was pretextual.

As explained above, SEPTA had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for transferring

Bennett to another office where she could work for a supervisor. And the denial of

telework privileges extended to all employees at the office to which Bennett was

transferred. As with her racial discrimination claim, Bennett does not provide any

evidence suggesting that SEPTA’s reasoning is pretextual. We will therefore affirm the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

B.

Bennett also objects to the District Court’s denial of her Rule 56(d) motion for

further discovery. We have held that Rule 56(d) requires a party seeking discovery while

a summary judgment motion is pending to “submit an affidavit specifying, for example,

what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary

10 judgment; and why it has not previously been obtained.” Dowling v. City of

Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1988). “[A] request for relief under Rule [56(d)]

is extremely unlikely to succeed when the party seeking the delay has failed to take

advantage of discovery.” Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986)

(first alteration in original) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741, at 553 (1983)).

Such is the case here. Nothing in Bennett’s Rule 56(d) motion, or any

accompanying declaration, explained why she did not move to compel the discovery she

first sought. As Bennett failed to explain her “lack of diligence” in pursuing discovery,

“we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in declining to withhold

ruling on the motion for summary judgment.” Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71–

72 (3d Cir. 1989).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.