1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 HERBERT NATHANIEL DEATON, Case No. 24-cv-04328-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT 10 v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 11 JOSE DIAZ, et al.,
Defendants. 12
13 Pro se plaintiff Herbert N. Deaton, a pretrial detainee,1 filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983 against staff at San Francisco County Jail #3. Dkt. No. 1.2 Mr. Deaton’s motion for leave 15 to proceed in forma pauperis has already been granted. Dkt. Nos. 2, 7. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 The following facts are based on the allegations in Mr. Deaton’s complaint. 18 Mr. Deaton is currently confined at the San Francisco County Jail #3 (“Jail”), where the 19 events in question took place. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He names the following as defendants: Jose Diaz, 20 Aramark Food Director; Captain James Quanico, Facility Commander; and the City and County of 21 San Francisco. Id. 22 Mr. Deaton says that since April 6, 2024, his “medically approved facility ordered 23 soy/gluten free diet” was improperly prepared or not provided to him. Id. Mr. Deaton says he had 24 been denied 82 proper meals as of the date he filed the complaint, and that he continues to be 25 26 1 See https://sfsheriff.com/find-person-jail 27 1 denied proper meals. Id. at 2-3. He filed grievances which were ignored for more than two 2 months and asserts that he therefore exhausted grievance procedures. Id. at 3. Mr. Deaton was 3 repeatedly told by Jail staff that Aramark is responsible for feeding detainees and that it is not the 4 Jail’s “job” to feed him. Id. Mr. Deaton states that Mr. Diaz informed one of the Jail staff that “he 5 would not comply with [Mr. Deaton’s] diet order [because he is] a ‘piece of shit, lying criminal.’” 6 Id. Mr. Deaton claims that this action was “against policy violating [his] Title 15 and prisoner’s 7 civil rights for a meal.” Id. He seeks compensation for the denial of “medical diet compliant 8 meals” and on 30 occasions, “any meal at all.” Id. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 11 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915A(a). A court must dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it 13 determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 14 may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 15 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In conducting its review, the court must identify any 16 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon 17 which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 18 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, 19 particularly in civil rights cases. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 20 Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 22 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 23 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 24 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Pretrial detainees may not be punished before an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 27 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Thus, when a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, 1 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 535 n.16. A condition of pretrial detention is 2 punishment if (1) it causes the detainee to suffer some “harm” or “disability,” and (2) its purpose 3 is to punish the detainee. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 4 U.S. at 538). Under the first prong, the harm in question must “significantly exceed, or be 5 independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.” Id. at 1030 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 6 537). And under the second prong, the condition in question must be incidental to a legitimate 7 government purpose. Id. at 1030-31 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 539). Punitive intent may be 8 inferred if there is no rational relationship to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or if 9 the condition is “excessive” in relation to its stated purpose. Houston v. Maricopa County, 10 Arizona, 116 F.4th 935, 940 n.4 & 941 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39). 11 As a pretrial detainee, Mr. Deaton’s allegations that he was denied meals that complied 12 with certain dietary requirements and/or was denied any meal at all on some occasions implicate 13 his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Food is among the “basic 14 human needs” to which a detainee is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. DeShaney v. 15 Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). The complaint plausibly alleges 16 that Mr. Deaton was arbitrarily or deliberately denied adequate food in the absence of any 17 legitimate governmental objective, and that he was harmed thereby. Such a claim may proceed 18 against Mr. Diaz, assuming Mr. Diaz was acting under color of state law. However, the claim may 19 not proceed against the other named defendants, Captain Quanico and the City and County of San 20 Francisco, because it contains no specific factual allegations against them. 21 To the extent Mr. Deaton attempts to hold Captain Quanico liable as a supervisor, Captain 22 Quanico cannot be held liable solely on the theory that, as a supervisor, he is responsible for the 23 actions or omissions of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. 24 Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, a 25 supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the 26 constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 27 conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1 opportunity to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Captain Quanico as a supervisor. 2 With regard to the City and County of San Francisco, it appears that Mr. Deaton may be 3 attempting to assert a claim for municipal liability. See Monell v.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 HERBERT NATHANIEL DEATON, Case No. 24-cv-04328-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT 10 v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 11 JOSE DIAZ, et al.,
Defendants. 12
13 Pro se plaintiff Herbert N. Deaton, a pretrial detainee,1 filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983 against staff at San Francisco County Jail #3. Dkt. No. 1.2 Mr. Deaton’s motion for leave 15 to proceed in forma pauperis has already been granted. Dkt. Nos. 2, 7. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 The following facts are based on the allegations in Mr. Deaton’s complaint. 18 Mr. Deaton is currently confined at the San Francisco County Jail #3 (“Jail”), where the 19 events in question took place. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He names the following as defendants: Jose Diaz, 20 Aramark Food Director; Captain James Quanico, Facility Commander; and the City and County of 21 San Francisco. Id. 22 Mr. Deaton says that since April 6, 2024, his “medically approved facility ordered 23 soy/gluten free diet” was improperly prepared or not provided to him. Id. Mr. Deaton says he had 24 been denied 82 proper meals as of the date he filed the complaint, and that he continues to be 25 26 1 See https://sfsheriff.com/find-person-jail 27 1 denied proper meals. Id. at 2-3. He filed grievances which were ignored for more than two 2 months and asserts that he therefore exhausted grievance procedures. Id. at 3. Mr. Deaton was 3 repeatedly told by Jail staff that Aramark is responsible for feeding detainees and that it is not the 4 Jail’s “job” to feed him. Id. Mr. Deaton states that Mr. Diaz informed one of the Jail staff that “he 5 would not comply with [Mr. Deaton’s] diet order [because he is] a ‘piece of shit, lying criminal.’” 6 Id. Mr. Deaton claims that this action was “against policy violating [his] Title 15 and prisoner’s 7 civil rights for a meal.” Id. He seeks compensation for the denial of “medical diet compliant 8 meals” and on 30 occasions, “any meal at all.” Id. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 11 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915A(a). A court must dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it 13 determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 14 may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 15 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In conducting its review, the court must identify any 16 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon 17 which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 18 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, 19 particularly in civil rights cases. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 20 Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 22 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 23 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 24 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Pretrial detainees may not be punished before an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 27 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Thus, when a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, 1 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 535 n.16. A condition of pretrial detention is 2 punishment if (1) it causes the detainee to suffer some “harm” or “disability,” and (2) its purpose 3 is to punish the detainee. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 4 U.S. at 538). Under the first prong, the harm in question must “significantly exceed, or be 5 independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.” Id. at 1030 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 6 537). And under the second prong, the condition in question must be incidental to a legitimate 7 government purpose. Id. at 1030-31 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 539). Punitive intent may be 8 inferred if there is no rational relationship to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or if 9 the condition is “excessive” in relation to its stated purpose. Houston v. Maricopa County, 10 Arizona, 116 F.4th 935, 940 n.4 & 941 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39). 11 As a pretrial detainee, Mr. Deaton’s allegations that he was denied meals that complied 12 with certain dietary requirements and/or was denied any meal at all on some occasions implicate 13 his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Food is among the “basic 14 human needs” to which a detainee is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. DeShaney v. 15 Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). The complaint plausibly alleges 16 that Mr. Deaton was arbitrarily or deliberately denied adequate food in the absence of any 17 legitimate governmental objective, and that he was harmed thereby. Such a claim may proceed 18 against Mr. Diaz, assuming Mr. Diaz was acting under color of state law. However, the claim may 19 not proceed against the other named defendants, Captain Quanico and the City and County of San 20 Francisco, because it contains no specific factual allegations against them. 21 To the extent Mr. Deaton attempts to hold Captain Quanico liable as a supervisor, Captain 22 Quanico cannot be held liable solely on the theory that, as a supervisor, he is responsible for the 23 actions or omissions of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. 24 Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, a 25 supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the 26 constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 27 conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1 opportunity to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Captain Quanico as a supervisor. 2 With regard to the City and County of San Francisco, it appears that Mr. Deaton may be 3 attempting to assert a claim for municipal liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 4 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In order to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a 5 “policy or custom” led to the plaintiff's injury. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 6 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate 7 that the policy or custom of a municipality “reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional 8 rights of its inhabitants.” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)). Mr. 9 Deaton’s allegations are not sufficient to state a Monell claim because he does not allege a policy 10 or custom, reflecting deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, that is the cause of his 11 injury. In fact, Mr. Deaton specifically alleges that Mr. Diaz’s conduct was “against policy.” See 12 Dkt. No. 1 at 3 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Mr. Deaton shall be granted leave to file an 13 amended complaint so that he has an opportunity to allege facts sufficient to state a Monell claim 14 against the City and County of San Francisco. 15 Lastly, it is not clear whether Mr. Deaton’s allegation that he was denied a “medically 16 approved” diet or “medical diet compliant meals” is an attempt to assert a claim for inadequate 17 medical care. Like food, medical care is among the “basic human needs” to which a detainee is 18 entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Gordon v. County of 19 Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated under an objective 20 deliberate indifference standard: 21 [T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 22 Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with 23 respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 24 serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 25 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct 26 obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 27 the plaintiff's injuries. 1 objectively unreasonable and not merely negligent—“a test that will necessarily turn[] on the facts 2 and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If 3 he chooses to file an amended complaint, Mr. Deaton may attempt to state a claim for inadequate 4 medical care against an appropriate defendant. 5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 After screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that the 7 complaint states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Mr. Jose Diaz for the denial of meals but 8 fails to state a claim against Captain Quanico or the City and County of San Francisco, and fails to 9 state a claim for inadequate medical care against any defendant. Mr. Deaton may file an amended 10 complaint to attempt to correct these deficiencies. An amended complaint must be filed no later 11 than December 16, 2024. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number 12 used in this order, Case No. 24-cv-4328-VKD, and the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the 13 first page. If using the court form complaint, Mr. Deaton must answer all the questions on the 14 form in order for the action to proceed. 15 Mr. Deaton is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the original complaint, 16 the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent. Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 17 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, claims not included in an amended complaint are no 18 longer claims and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See 19 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). 20 If Mr. Deaton fails to file an amended complaint in time, or if the amended complaint fails 21 to cure all defects described above, the Court may issue an order reassigning the case to a district 22 judge with a recommendation that any deficient claims be dismissed. 23 The Clerk of the Court shall include two copies of the Court’s form complaint with a copy 24 of this order to Mr. Deaton. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: 3 4 Virginia K. DeMarchi 5 United States Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27