De La Cerda v. San Diego Convention Center Corporation, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 10, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01058
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JOSE DE LA CERDA, Case No.: 24cv1058-CAB-DDL

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS [Doc. No. 4] 13 SAN DIEGO CONVENTION CENTER CORPORATION, INC., 14 Defendant. 15

16 On August 19, 2024, Defendant San Diego Convention Center Corporation, Inc. 17 (“Defendant”) filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. [Doc. No. 4.] 18 On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff Jose De La Cerda (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. [Doc. 19 No. 5.] On September 16, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. [Doc. No. 6.] Pursuant to 20 Civ.LR. 7.1.d.1, the Court deems oral argument to be unnecessary. For the reasons set 21 forth below, the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is DENIED. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Defendant owns and operates the San Diego Convention Center. Plaintiff is 24 currently employed by Defendant as a Carpenter and has worked for Defendant since 25 February 2017. As a condition of his employment, Plaintiff was required to join the 26 Cabinet Makers, Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Local 721, United Brotherhood of 27 Carpenters and Joiners of America (the “Union”). There is a collective bargaining 28 1 agreement (“CBA”) between Defendant and the Union. The CBA includes an arbitration 2 provision. 3 On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Collective Action Complaint under the Fair 4 Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The complaint alleges that Defendant failed to (1) pay 5 all overtime wages and (2) pay employees for all hours worked. [Doc. No. 1.] 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires the district courts to compel 8 arbitration on all claims subject to arbitration agreements. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 9 v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 - 4) (“By its terms, the Act [FAA] 10 leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that 11 district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an 12 arbitration agreement has been signed.”). The FAA creates a general presumption in 13 favor of arbitration and requires the enforcement of a written agreement to arbitrate. 14 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–25 (1991). A court must 15 interpret arbitration provisions liberally, resolving doubts in favor of arbitration. Moses 16 H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 17 Under the FAA, a party moving to compel arbitration must show two things: “(1) 18 the existence of a valid, written agreement to arbitrate; and, if it exists, (2) that the 19 agreement to arbitrate encompasses the dispute at issue.” Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. 20 Mgmt., Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015). The party seeking arbitration need only 21 prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. 22 Norcia v. Samsung Telecoms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). Because 23 the FAA favors arbitration, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the arbitration 24 agreement is, in fact, unenforceable. See Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc'ns, LLC, 722 25 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]hose parties challenging the enforceability of an 26 arbitration agreement bear the burden of proving that the provision is unenforceable.”). 27 As part of the collective bargaining process, a union may agree on its members' 28 behalf to require arbitration of employment-related disputes. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 1 556 U.S. 247, 256–57 (2009). But in so far as those agreements relate to statutory claims, 2 there must exist a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of the right to a judicial forum. Wright 3 v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80–82 (1998). Provisions that attempt “to 4 provide a blanket waiver to all federal and state causes of action[ ] have been routinely 5 rejected by both the U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit.” Smith v. Serv. Emps. Int'l 6 Union, Local 521, No. 16-CV-02547-LHK, 2016 WL 4268713, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 7 2016) (collecting cases). A CBA must identify specific statutes to provide a clear and 8 unmistakable waiver. Wawock v. CSI Elec. Contractors, Incl., 649 F.App’x 556, 558 9 (9th Cir. 2016)(unpublished)(citations omitted). 10 DISCUSSION 11 In this motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to mandatory 12 arbitration pursuant to the provisions contained within the CBA. Plaintiff argues his 13 FLSA claims are not subject to arbitration for several reasons: (1) there is no agreement 14 to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Defendant because the plain language of the CBA states 15 that arbitration is voluntary and only applies to a grievance or dispute that was “filed by 16 the Union”; (2) Even if the CBA’s arbitration clause applies to this case, it does not 17 clearly and unmistakably waive Plaintiff’s right to file his FLSA collective action in 18 court; (3) Even if the CBA did require arbitration of the claims, Plaintiff is entitled to 19 proceed with his FLSA claims without first having to arbitrate them; and (4) the 20 arbitration provision is unenforceable as it is procedurally and substantively 21 unconscionable. 22 Article IX of the CBA states in pertinent part: 23 A grievance or dispute that arises during the life of this Agreement and filed by the Union shall be adjudicated according to the following procedures. A 24 grievance or dispute, shall pertain only to the interpretation or application of 25 the terms of this Agreement. . . . [Doc. No. 4-1 at 29 (emphasis added).] 26 Assuming arguendo there is an agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and 27 Defendant, Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are not included within the scope of the CBA. As set 28 1 || forth above, in so far as CBAs relate to statutory claims, there must exist a “clear and 2 || unmistakable” waiver of the right to a judicial forum. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-82. A CBA 3 || must identify specific statutes to provide a clear and unmistakable waiver. Wawock v. 4 || CSI Elec. Contractors, Incl., 649 F.App’x at 558. Here, the CBA does not reference any 5 || statutory claims and, in fact, limits grievances and disputes to “the interpretation or 6 || application of the terms of this Agreement.” Thus, there is no “clear and unmistakable 7 || waiver” of Plaintiff's FLSA claims. 8 Defendant essentially concedes this point when it argues, in reply, that the 9 || language of the CBA “implicitly” includes disputes over FLSA claims because the 10 || “broad language” “strongly suggests” that the CBA contemplates arbitration for such 11 disputes. However, “[a] CBA requirement to arbitrate a statutory claim must be 12 || explicitly stated.” Id. at 559; See also Martinez v. J. Fletcher Creamer & Son, Inc., No. 13 10-0968 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 3359372, at *4 (Aug. 13, 2010) (concluding that a 14 || collective bargaining agreement that “does not expressly reference any of the statutory 15 || provisions at issue,” does not “constitute a ‘clear and unmistakable’ waiver of an 16 employee's right to sue in a judicial forum under those statutes”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs 17 FLSA claims do not fall within the scope of the CBA. 18 Given that Plaintiff's claims are not included within the scope of the CBA, the Court 19 || declines to reach the other issues raised by Plaintiff. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons set forth above, the motion to compel arbitration and stay 22 || proceedings is DENIED. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: December 10, 2024 € Z 25 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 26 United States District Judge 27 28