RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1208-24
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
B.L.F.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
J.D.L.C.Q.C.,
Defendant. ___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF G.L.F., a minor. ___________________________
Submitted October 6, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-0102-24.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Christine Olexa Saginor, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lakshmi Barot, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor G.L.F. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant B.L.F. appeals from a Family Part judgment terminating her
parental rights to her daughter, G.L.F. ("Grace").1 After reviewing the record,
considering the parties' arguments and the governing legal principles, we affirm
for the cogent reasons set forth in the written opinion of Judge Margaret M.
Marley.
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the parties' and child's confidentiality. R. 1:38- 3(d).
A-1208-24 2 I.
We glean the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the
record. Beatrice and J.D.L.C.Q.C. ("Jose") are the biological parents of Grace,
born in 2009, and J.F. ("James"), born in 2006. Jose died in 2012. The New
Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") first became
involved with the defendant's family in 2017, after a referral alleging excessive
corporal punishment of Grace. The investigation resulted in a "not established"
finding, and no court actions were initiated nor were any services for the family
mandated.
In May 2021, a new referral to the Division was made by a municipal
police department, which reported that Grace, age eleven, had been sexually
abused and had undergone an abortion after pregnancy. Grace initially stated
she was abused by an unidentified perpetrator at a neighbor's house while
defendant was working, leaving Grace and her brother unsupervised or
supervised by another adult. Defendant claimed no prior awareness of abuse,
only discovering the pregnancy after noticing Grace's changes and administering
a home test. She accompanied Grace for the abortion and reported the abuse to
police in June 2021.
A-1208-24 3 The Division's investigation was unable to identify the perpetrator but,
because there was evidence that Grace had not been in defendant's direct
supervision at the time, the Division determined the allegations to be
"unfounded." Thereafter, services remained open, including psychological and
medical evaluations, counseling for Grace and defendant and a parenting
evaluation of defendant. Grace was additionally recommended for speech,
language therapy, special education, and a sexual abuse victim program: Project
Safe.
In February 2022, Grace's school reported a second pregnancy. Grace
identified another student as the father but later claimed it was a cousin. During
this time, defendant continued working overnight, leaving her children with an
adult or alone. Services continued, including counseling and therapy
interventions for Grace and skills training for defendant.
In May 2022, Grace, then age twelve, gave birth to Archie. Grace and
defendant initially refused to disclose the father's identity. DNA testing later
confirmed James, Grace's fifteen-year-old brother, was the biological father. He
was subsequently charged with child endangerment after admitting to years of
sexually abusing Grace which began when she was ten. James was later
A-1208-24 4 sentenced to probation, required to register under Megan's Law, and ordered to
have no contact with Grace.
Grace informed the Division that James began sexually assaulting her
when she was ten years old. She also reported that she told defendant about
James's abuse after her first pregnancy, but defendant's only response was to
instruct Grace to lock herself in her room and to tell James to stop. Allegations
against defendant for inadequate supervision and placing Grace at risk were
substantiated with defendant not contesting these findings. At that time, the
Division removed both Grace and Archie from defendant's residence and the
court ordered supervised visitation due to defendant's threats to flee the country.
Thereafter, Grace went through five non-relative placements. Defendant
objected to placing Grace with relatives. Two relatives living abroad ultimately
expressed interest, but Grace was unwilling to relocate due to immigration status
issues and potential difficulties in returning to the country. Defendant stated
she desired reunification with Grace and planned to install cameras or remove
James, neither of which ever occurred. Grace also reported discomfort and
mental health struggles in caring for Archie and told the Division she did not
want to parent Archie, who was a "trigger" for her. Once Grace left defendant's
A-1208-24 5 residence, James continued to reside there, even after reaching eighteen years of
age.
During the attempted reunification period, the Division provided
defendant with tailored Spanish-speaking therapy but discharged her from
multiple programs for lack of progress and missing appointments. The Division
coordinated extensive services for Grace, including psychological,
neuropsychological, psychiatric testing, therapy, and education. Treatment
included trauma-focused therapy and partial hospitalization, with chronic
suicide attempts and self-harm. Grace's visits with defendant became volatile
due to arguments between them. Defendant made promises to Grace that she
could return home despite James residing there and violations of cell phone
restrictions for Grace were shown. When confronted about these violations,
defendant was unreceptive to the Division's concerns about Grace's internet
access.
Based on the lack of progress with reunification, in May 2023, the court
shifted Grace's permanency goal to termination of parental rights with a
concurrent goal of reunification. Grace's mental health continued to decline,
with her communicating her desire to simply "be a young girl."
A-1208-24 6 Thereafter, because little to no progress was accomplished concerning
reunification, the Division moved forward to a termination hearing. At trial, the
Division presented witnesses who testified that defendant never accepted the
DNA results, failed to remove James, and hampered relative assessments. One
Division witness stated that Grace told her she "felt bad" but welcomed
adoption. Another Division case worker explained Grace could only be matched
with select adoptive homes after being declared legally free and Grace reported
to her she was afraid of reunification and sexual abuse recurrence.
The Division also called Dr. Frank Dyer, Ph.D., as an expert witness. Dr.
Dyer opined defendant was intellectually impaired, unable to protect Grace,
lacked capacity for insight, never accepted the abuse of Grace by James or
Archie's paternity, and prioritized James over Grace and concluded there was no
realistic chance of improvement. He testified that Grace disclosed persistent
delusions and self-harm, stating defendant did not believe her when she reported
continued abuse. Dr. Dyer found defendant failed to provide a true parent-child
bond nor protection, and recommended termination for defendant and adoption
for Grace.
Dr. Kinya Swanson, Psy.D., testified on behalf of defendant and
essentially agreed with Dr. Dyer that defendant's cognitive deficits impaired her
A-1208-24 7 parenting ability and judgment, but she believed a close, healthy bond existed
with Grace. Dr. Swanson opined terminating defendant's parental rights would
provide Grace with no benefit and the complete and permanent loss of her
relationship with defendant would actually cause Grace severe and enduring
harm because termination would take away all motherly emotional support. She
found this would affect Grace's emotional and psychological development and
would cause her to experience feelings of abandonment, dejection, poor self-
esteem, and identity issues. While Dr. Swanson ultimately agreed that
defendant was not fit to currently, or in the near future, independently parent
Grace, she opined that severing their relationship at this stage would not be in
Grace's best interests.
In a thorough eighty-five-page written opinion, the trial court terminated
defendant's parental rights to Grace, finding that the Division proved by clear
and convincing evidence that termination was in Grace's best interests under the
four-prong test set forth at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING GRACE'S SAFETY, HEALTH, OR DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE
A-1208-24 8 ENDANGERED BY A RELATIONSHIP WITH [DEFENDANT].
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING [DEFENDANT] IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO REMEDIATE HER PERCEIVED PARENTING ISSUES.
POINT III
[THE DIVISION] FAILED TO MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE [DEFENDANT'S] FAMILY WITH SERVICES AND DID NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION OF [DEFENDANT'S] PARENTAL RIGHTS.
POINT IV
THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE OPINION OF THE EXPERT RETAINED BY [THE DIVISION].
The Law Guardian and Division both argue the judgment terminating
B.L.F.'s parental rights should be affirmed as the record clearly and
convincingly supported the court's determination that all elements of N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a) were satisfied.
A-1208-24 9 II.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the governing legal principles
in this appeal. An appellate court's review of a Family Part judge's factual
findings in a guardianship trial is limited. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J.
440, 472 (2002). Those findings are "binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412
(1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)). The court may reverse a factual finding only if there is "'a denial of
justice' because the family court's 'conclusions are [ ] "clearly mistaken" or
"wide of the mark."'" Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196
N.J. 88, 104 (2008)); see also Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (holding that an appellate
court should not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are "so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice") (quoting Rova
Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484).
"[T]he conclusions that logically flow from those findings of fact are,
likewise, entitled to deferential consideration upon appellate review." N.J. Div.
of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 89 (App. Div. 2006).
A-1208-24 10 However, the "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). "Whether
the facts found by the trial court are sufficient to satisfy the applicable legal
standard is a question of law subject to plenary review on appeal." State v.
Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div. 2004); see also N.J. Div. of
Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017) ("[W]e review the
judge's legal conclusions de novo."). In addition, no appellate deference is owed
to a trial court's interpretation of a statute. Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 574
(2014) (citing Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 597 (2011)); see also N.J. Div.
of Child Prot. & Permanency v. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165, 177 (2014) ("[W]e need not
defer to [a lower] court's interpretive conclusions.").
Turning to the substantive legal principles, the Legislature created a multi-
part test to determine when it is in the child's best interests to terminate parental
rights. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires the Division to prove four
prongs by clear and convincing evidence, which are:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
A-1208-24 11 provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;
(3) [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
These requirements "are not discrete and separate; they relate to and
overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a
child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).
"The considerations involved in determinations of parental fitness are 'extremely
fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that address the specific
circumstances in the given case." Ibid. (quoting Matter of Adoption of L.A.S.,
134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
III.
We first address defendant's argument that the Division did not satisfy
prong one and the trial court erred in finding her relationship endangers Grace.
Defendant supports this contention by pointing to a lack of prior incidents;
certain safety precautions she instituted to protect Grace; her lack of knowledge
A-1208-24 12 of the abuse; her willingness to relocate James; her cooperation with placement
of Grace; and her cognitive limitations. We are not persuaded by these
contentions.
To satisfy prong one, there must be evidence the parent caused harm or
created a threat to the child's health and development. The Division need not
wait for irreversible impairment; existing harm threatening ongoing detriment
is sufficient. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.M., 430 N.J. Super. 428,
444 (App. Div. 2013). The trial court's findings that the ongoing sexual abuse
by Grace's brother, defendant's refusal to believe Grace, and her refusal to act
to protect her were a serious risk to Grace's safety and development were
supported by substantial evidence in the record. The record exhibits substantial
proofs that defendant repeatedly sought to deflect responsibility and hindered
the Division's search for placements, which supported the trial court's finding
that Grace's interests were not a priority.
Further, the court appropriately rejected defendant's argument that Grace's
own challenges would preclude adoption, noting that progress was impeded by
defendant's denial and lack of support. Defendant's claim that she cooperated is
belied by evidence of threats to obstruct any placement and minimal family
placement suggestions. Here, we conclude clear and convincing evidence
A-1208-24 13 existed in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that prong one was
satisfied.
As to prong two, defendant asserts the court erred by finding the Division
satisfied this prong because she acted in good faith toward reunification despite
the Division's alleged failure to accommodate her cognitive limits. Prong two
requires a showing of parental unfitness and inability or unwillingness to
eliminate harm. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352; In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161
N.J. 365, 379 (1999).
The trial court found there was no significant improvement in defendant's
capacity to parent based on the expert testimony that her mental health and
cognitive limitations persist. The record shows that defendant's participation in
therapy was inconsistent, with multiple discharges and refusals to address
necessary behavioral changes. The evidence at trial also indicated the therapy
and services offered did not lead to progress or improvement.
Defendant's claim that specialized services were required is contradicted
by the expert's assessment that even tailored interventions would not remedy
these deficits. Here, the Division provided extensive services to defendant, none
of which succeeded in her making the necessary changes or improvements.
A-1208-24 14 Furthermore, contrary to defendant's contention, there is no evidence in the
record that the Division denied any service requested by defendant.
The record further supports the trial court's finding that defendant
minimized responsibility in assisting placement, providing only two names, and
refusing broader cooperation, including threats there would be repercussions if
certain relatives were contacted. The expert testimony that there was a need for
permanency which required termination supported the court's findings. Thus,
the court's conclusion that defendant is unwilling or unable to remediate her
issues is supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. We further
conclude, as did the trial court, that defendant's proposal to install surveillance
and remove James was insufficient, as her own expert opined she wasn't suitable
to independently parent Grace.
We next address defendant's contention that the Division did not satisfy
prong three because it failed to engage in reasonable reunification efforts or
fully explore alternatives. We incorporate our factual determinations set forth
above concerning prongs one and two and add the following. The record clearly
supports the reunification therapy and other services offered to defendant
exhibiting substantial reunification efforts by the Division. We reiterate that the
sufficiency of services must be judged by case circumstances and parent
A-1208-24 15 participation, not on its success or failure. D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 390. We further
agree with the trial court's finding that defendant's suggestion that her adult
daughter, Felicia, be considered for placement to be inadequate, as Felicia
lacked immediate capacity for Grace's placement and did not have appropriate
living accommodations for her. We conclude the trial court's finding that
reasonable efforts were made by the Division was supported by sufficient,
credible evidence in the record.
Finally, we address defendant's contention that the Division failed to
satisfy the fourth prong, primarily asserting the trial court improperly favored
Dr. Dyer over Dr. Swanson to support its finding this prong was satisfied. The
fourth prong is a fail-safe, not requiring proof that no harm will occur from
severing ties, but that termination serves the child's best interests. N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Services v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 559 (2014); K.H.O., 161 N.J. at
355.
"It is the unique role of the [fact finder] to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony [and] [e]xpert testimony
is treated no differently . . . . " City of Long Branch v. Liu, 203 N.J. 464, 491
(2010). Generally, we rely on the trial court's "acceptance of the credibility of
the expert's testimony and the court's fact-findings based thereon . . . [because]
A-1208-24 16 the trial court is better positioned to evaluate the witness'[s] credibility,
qualifications, and the weight to be accorded [his or her] testimony." D.M.H.,
161 N.J. at 382. Expert testimony should not be given greater weight than other
evidence and should be scrutinized in light of "common sense and ordinary
experience." In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 (1989). A fact finder
is entitled to accept some of an expert's testimony and reject the rest. In re
Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 24 (1992).
We conclude the trial judge's reliance on Dr. Dyer's testimony was a
reasonable exercise of discretion. Dr. Dyer's methods were conventional,
including direct evaluations and records review, and his testimony was
appropriately considered as credible by the court. The court found the evidence
presented by defendant that she had a healthy bond with Grace was superficial
and contradicted by credible testimony and information in the Division's
records. We conclude defendant's critiques of Dr. Dyer's work for the Division
and his alleged reliance on inaccurate records are misplaced as the record is clear
that he utilized sufficient and reliable sources of information to support his
opinions. The trial court's reliance on Dr. Dyer's opinion in determining that
termination would not do more harm than good for Grace along with its overall
weighing of other relevant factors was not erroneous and was based on
A-1208-24 17 substantial evidence in the record. Additionally, we conclude the trial court's
determination that Dr. Swanson's testimony lacked factual and analytical
support is adequately borne out by the testimony and evidence.
Lastly, defendant asserts that the court erred in considering the length of
time that Grace spent in foster care to support its termination finding. Defendant
relies on N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., for the proposition that "the
period of time a child has spent in foster case is not determinative of whether
parental rights to that child should be terminated. . . ." 202 N.J. 145, 169-70
(2010). However, we conclude this is a narrow view based on the facts of the
case before us. Here, Judge Marley did not simply rely on the amount of time
Grace was subjected to foster care, rather she acknowledged this as one of many
factors it considered in concluding that termination is in Grace's best interests.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1208-24 18