Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton

Supreme Court

Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton

183 U.S. 23, 22 S. Ct. 5, 46 L. Ed. 61, 1901 U.S. LEXIS 1250

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedOctober 21, 1901

Docket26

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 183 U.S. 23 (Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U.S. 23, 22 S. Ct. 5, 46 L. Ed. 61, 1901 U.S. LEXIS 1250 (1901).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Shiras,

after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question presented for our consideration in this record is the validity, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, of the act of the legislature of the State of Tennessee, prescribing that corporations and other persons, issuing store orders in payment for labor shall redeem them in cash, and providing a legal remedy for bona fide holders of such orders.

In the case of The Knoxville Iron Company v. Samuel Harbison, in error to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, decided at the present term, we affirmed the judgment' of that court sustaining the constitutional validity of the state legislation in question, and the cause now before us is sufficiently disposed of by a reference to- that case.

The only difference in the cases is, that in the former the plaintiff. in error was a domestic corporation of the State of Tennessee, while, in the present, the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation. If that fact can be considered as a ground for a different conclusion, it would not help the present plaintiff in error, whose right, as a foreign corporation, to carry on business in the State of Tennessee, might be deemed subject to the condition of obeying the regulations prescribed in the legislation of the State.' As was said in Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 566, that “ which a State may do with corporations of its own creation it may do with foreign corporations admitted'into the State. . . . The power of a State to impose conditions upon, foreign corporations is certainly as extensive as the power over domestic corporations, and is fully explained in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.”

We do not care, however, to put our present decision upon the fact that the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation, nor *25 to be understood to intimate that state legislation, invalid as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, can be imposed as a condition upon the right of such a corporation to do business within the State. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 254.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justioe Brewer and Mr. Justice PecehaM dissented.

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Mr. Justice Shiras,

after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question presented for our consideration in this record is the validity, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, of the act of the legislature of the State of Tennessee, prescribing that corporations and other persons, issuing store orders in payment for labor shall redeem them in cash, and providing a legal remedy for bona fide holders of such orders.

In the case of The Knoxville Iron Company v. Samuel Harbison, in error to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, decided at the present term, we affirmed the judgment' of that court sustaining the constitutional validity of the state legislation in question, and the cause now before us is sufficiently disposed of by a reference to- that case.

The only difference in the cases is, that in the former the plaintiff. in error was a domestic corporation of the State of Tennessee, while, in the present, the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation. If that fact can be considered as a ground for a different conclusion, it would not help the present plaintiff in error, whose right, as a foreign corporation, to carry on business in the State of Tennessee, might be deemed subject to the condition of obeying the regulations prescribed in the legislation of the State.' As was said in Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 566, that “ which a State may do with corporations of its own creation it may do with foreign corporations admitted'into the State. . . . The power of a State to impose conditions upon, foreign corporations is certainly as extensive as the power over domestic corporations, and is fully explained in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.”

We do not care, however, to put our present decision upon the fact that the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation, nor *25 to be understood to intimate that state legislation, invalid as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, can be imposed as a condition upon the right of such a corporation to do business within the State. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 254.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justioe Brewer and Mr. Justice PecehaM dissented.

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183 U.S. 23, 22 S. Ct. 5, 46 L. Ed. 61, 1901 U.S. LEXIS 1250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dayton-coal-iron-co-v-barton-scotus-1901.

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