Davis v. City of Winchester

206 S.W.3d 917, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 230, 2006 WL 2706961

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: September 21, 2006
• Docket: 2004-SC-0820-DG
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion of the Court by

Justice GRAVES.

Appellant, J.D. Davis, brought an action alleging unlawful arrest, excessive use of force, and malicious prosecution. Appel-lees are the City of Winchester, police officers with the Winchester Police Department, the Clark County Jailer, and two deputy jailers. A Clark Circuit Court jury found in favor of Appellees on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted review.

On October 5, 1996, Appellant was confronted by two plainclothes police officers, Appellees Craycraft and Stone. The officers testified that Appellant was manifestly intoxicated. Appellant was accompanied by a friend, Terry Saylers, and the two men were engaging in a loud, profanity-laden conversation. Appellant asked to see the officers’ identification. At this point, the officers testified that they showed Appellant their badges and that Appellant continued to be loud and belligerent. When Appellant struck one of the officers with a closed fist, they grabbed Appellant, held him to the ground, and subdued him. Appellant testified that he did not swing at the officer, but was tackled after he asked for the officer’s identification. He testified that he broke his thumb when he was tackled, and that the Clark County jailer would not treat his injury, contact his doctor, or give him his prescribed medications.

I. Batson Objection

Appellant claims that the trial court committed a Batson violation when it allowed Appellees to strike two black jurors without articulating a race-neutral explanation. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, (1986). Appellant failed to raise his objection until after the jury was sworn in and the remaining members of the panel were dismissed, even though he had an opportunity to do so. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393 (Ky.1988) (.Batson challenge is untimely where it is not raised before the swearing of the jury and the discharge of the remainder of the panel); Cf. Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376, 378 (Ky.2000) (preserving error where Commonwealth’s failure to inform the trial court that it used a preemptory strike on a black juror denied defendant his opportunity to raise a timely Batson objection). Thus, we decline to review this argument because it is not properly preserved.

II. Evidence of Dismissed Charges

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it precluded him from introducing any evidence that the criminal charges against him had been dismissed. Appellant claims that he was entitled to introduce this evidence because one of the elements of his malicious prosecution claim is proof that the prior proceedings terminated in his favor. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.1981) (discussing the six elements of a malicious prosecution claim).

Appellee City of Winchester filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence that the criminal charges against Appellant had been dismissed. Appellee alleged that the evidence violated KRE 401 and KRE 403 because it was not relevant and overly prejudicial with regard to the issue of whether the police had probable cause to make an arrest. Prior to the start of trial, the trial judge sustained Appellees’ motion. After the trial court’s order of record sustaining the motion in limine, Appellant entered his objection to the trial court’s order and the parties engaged in a brief exchange regarding the effect the order had on Appellant’s case. During this exchange, Appellees argue that Appellant essentially waived his objection to the motion in limine by accepting a stipulation which relieved him of the obligation to prove an essential element of his case. We reject Appellees’ claims, finding that Appellant’s actions had no such effect.

Initially, we note that Appellant’s objection to the motion in limine and the trial court’s order of record sustaining the motion was sufficient to preserve the issue for review. KRE 103(d). We also do not believe, as the Court of Appeals held, that Appellant’s acquiescence to the trial court’s decision to eliminate Appellant’s burden to prove one of the essential elements of his claim somehow waived Appellant’s objection to the motion itself or was otherwise a valid stipulation. Although the trial court’s action had the effect of a stipulation, neither the trial court nor the parties ever characterized Appellant’s acquiescence as a stipulation, and a stipulation of fact was not filed or submitted to the jury. See e.g., Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. McKinney, 831 S.W.2d 164 (Ky.1992) (illustrating a “Stipulation of Facts” agreement); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824 (Ky.2000). Accordingly, we reject Appellees’ argument that Appellant’s objection to the motion in li-mine was not preserved or somehow waived.

Regarding the merits of the case, we have held in criminal cases that the Commonwealth has a right to prove each element of its case by competent evidence of its choosing. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 438-39 (Ky.2003); Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Ky.1998), see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Ky.2004) (trial court erred in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion in limine to exclude evidence where the exclusion interfered with defendant’s Due Process right to present a defense). A defendant may not unilaterally stipulate away from the jury’s consideration parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see. Johnson, supra; Barnett, supra.

We believe that the same right to present competent evidence of each element of one’s claim exists in a civil action, and the trial court’s denial of that substantial right in this case was reversible error. A plaintiff is required to prove six elements of a malicious prosecution claim. Raine, supra. By granting the motion in limine, the trial court erroneously allowed Appel-lees to unilaterally stipulate away from the jury’s consideration an entire element of Appellant’s case, as it prohibited Appellant from introducing any evidence to prove the termination of prosecution element of his claim. The trial court reasoned that this evidence could be improperly utilized for the purpose of proving that the police officers lacked probable cause to make an initial arrest. However, a more appropriate remedy would have been to issue a limiting instruction addressing this concern.¹ A trial court cannot outright preclude a party from introducing evidence to prove an element of his claim on the grounds that such evidence may be prejudicial with regard to another issue.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and the case is remanded for a new trial on Appellant’s malicious prosecution claim.

LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, MCANULTY, and SCOTT, J.J. concur. ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion which MINTON and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., join.

1 . Appellee did not request a limiting instruction, and a trial court is not obligated to give a limiting instruction sua sponte. Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 759-60 (Ky.2005).