Davis 093417 v. Thornell

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided September 23, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-00054·Unknown

Opinion

1 NH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Willard Edward Davis, Jr., No. CV-25-00054-PHX-JAT (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Ryan Thornell, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On January 8, 2025, Plaintiff Willard Edward Davis, Jr., who is confined in the 16 Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a May 15, 2025 Order, 18 the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff 19 had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint 20 that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 21 On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17). The Court 22 will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 23 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 24 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 25 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 27 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 28 1 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 3 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 4 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 9 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 10 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 11 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 12 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 13 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 14 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 15 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 16 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 17 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 18 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 19 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 20 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 21 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 22 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 23 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 24 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 25 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 26 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, but 27 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 28 to amend. 1 II. First Amended Complaint 2 In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for failure 3 to protect. Plaintiff names as Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) 4 Director Ryan Thornell, Warden John Mattos, Deputy Warden Cameron, and NaphCare. 5 Plaintiff seeks an “SMI Program for sex offenders absent general population inmates,” 6 placement in a segregated yard for sex offenders, and $2,500,000. 7 In Count One, Plaintiff claims that in November 2024, he sought protective 8 segregation and requested to be placed in a sex-offender yard but was transferred to a 9 general population unit. He claims the inmates in general population had “someone” look 10 up his charges online and “had the tower officer open [his] cell without a floor officer 11 present in violation of protocol and rushed into the cell assault[ing] [him] causing [him] to 12 bleed from a head wound, develop a swollen eye over the next 24 hours or less.” Plaintiff 13 asserts this caused him post-traumatic stress, nightmares, and constant fear for his life. He 14 claims that ADOC segregated sex offenders in 1999 and “therefore . . . knew that placing 15 [him] with general population posed a substantial risk to [his] safety.” Allegedly, since the 16 assault, Plaintiff has been “threatened daily,” has been “spit upon,” and “[has] been paying 17 extortion to prevent being assaulted further or from being killed.” Plaintiff claims he 18 “requested protective segregation verbally and in writing[] but was denied” and that he 19 previously spent ten1 years in a sex-offender yard. Plaintiff asserts he has a constant fear 20 of being killed by general population inmates. 21 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges he made several verbal and written requests to be 22 placed in protective segregation under Department Order 805 and has been denied each 23 time. Plaintiff asserts he was told that he “could not [illegible] up or refuse to house from 24 severely mentally ill transition program.” He claims this has caused him to be “constantly 25 threatened, spit upon, and extorted.” As for his injury, Plaintiff alleges he fears for his life 26 and is losing money due to extortion. 27 . . . .

28 1 The number of years is not completely legible in the complaint. 1 III. Failure to State a Claim 2 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 3 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 4 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 5 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 6 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 7 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 8 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 9 72, 377 (1976). 10 In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect, an 11 inmate must allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a 12 substantial risk of serious harm and that jail officials were “deliberately indifferent” to that 13 risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Davis 093417 v. Thornell, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Davis 093417 v. Thornell (Davis 093417 v. Thornell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)