Davis 093417 v. Thornell

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMay 15, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00054
StatusUnknown

This text of Davis 093417 v. Thornell (Davis 093417 v. Thornell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis 093417 v. Thornell, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 NH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 William Edward Davis, Jr., No. CV-25-00054-PHX-JAT (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Ryan Thornell, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Plaintiff William Edward Davis, Jr., who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Lewis, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). Plaintiff has 18 also filed a Motion to Cover All Court Costs and Filing Fees (Doc. 5), a Motion for Waiver 19 of Copies and Distribution Requirement (Doc. 6), and a Motion for Emergency Preliminary 20 Injunction (Doc. 7). On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Waive Requirement for 21 Copies and Distribution for Duration of Case (Doc. 10), and a Motion to Compel Response 22 to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11). On April 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed three 23 more Motions: Motion Seeking Court Order (Doc. 12), a Motion for Legal Counsel (Doc. 24 13), and a Motion to Proceed After Showing Cause (Doc. 14). 25 The Court will grant the Application to Proceed, dismiss the Complaint with leave 26 to amend, deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Response to Motion for Preliminary 27 Injunction, and deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Cover all Court Costs and Filing Fees, Motions 28 for Waiver of Copies and Distribution, Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction, 1 Motion Seeking Court Order, and Motion for Legal Counsel. The Court will grant in part 2 Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed After Showing Cause. 3 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 4 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 5 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $12.30. The remainder 7 of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 8 credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 10 government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 11 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 12 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 13 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 15 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 16 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 17 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 18 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 19 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 20 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 21 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 22 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 23 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 24 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 25 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 26 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 27 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 28 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 1 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 2 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 3 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 4 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 5 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 6 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 7 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 8 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 9 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 10 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 11 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 12 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 13 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, but because it may 14 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 15 III. Complaint 16 In his one-count complaint, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for failure 17 to protect. Plaintiff names as Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections Director 18 Ryan Thornell, Warden John Mattos, Deputy Warden S. Rogers, and Assistant Deputy 19 Warden Mannita Hudson. Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, monetary damages of 20 $1,500,000.00, and protections for all sex offenders and inmates seeking protective custody 21 pursuant to Department Order (DO) 805 of the Arizona Department of Corrections 22 Rehabilitation and Reentry Department Order Manual. 23 Plaintiff claims he was assaulted after Defendants housed Plaintiff, a sex offender 24 inmate, with general population inmates. He alleges the Arizona Department of 25 Corrections segregated sex offender inmates in 1999 after numerous assaults and murders. 26 Plaintiff asserts he was assaulted for being a sex offender and has “repeatedly sought 27 protective segregation under Department Order 805, only to be denied . . . .” His requests 28 to be returned to a sex offender unit, have “fall[en] on deaf ears.” Plaintiff states his injuries 1 include being assaulted, getting threatened daily, and “paying extortion to keep from being 2 assaulted further” which has resulted in him being “out of money.” 3 IV. Failure to State a Claim 4 In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect, an 5 inmate must allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a 6 substantial risk of serious harm and that jail officials were “deliberately indifferent” to that 7 risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher 8 standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’ s safety. Id. at 835. 9 To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a 10 defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate safety.

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Bluebook (online)
Davis 093417 v. Thornell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-093417-v-thornell-azd-2025.