David Pryor v. City & County of San Francisco

Ninth Circuit

David Pryor v. City & County of San Francisco

672 F. App'x 751

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 5, 2017

Docket14-15210

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 672 F. App'x 751 (David Pryor v. City & County of San Francisco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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David Pryor v. City & County of San Francisco, 672 F. App'x 751 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-Appellant Latiya Pryor appeals several district court rulings following a jury verdict in favor of the sole defendant remaining in the case following pretrial proceedings.

1. The district court did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Deputy Grant because even taking Pryor’s version of events as true, no reasonable jury could determine that Deputy Grant’s actions were anything but “de min-imis and thus constitutionally reasonable.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). Pryor’s Bane Act claim also fails because there was no constitutional violation. See King v. State, 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 (2015) (requiring interference with a constitutional right).

2. Because Pryor failed to object to the expert testimony of defense witness Michael Pickett on the same grounds that she raises on appeal, we review her challenges to that testimony for plain error. United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court did not plainly err. Pickett permissibly testified that San Francisco Sheriffs Department policy requires officers to remove hairpieces that can be removed without injuring a prison-' er and that removing only several natural hairs would not constitute an injury for purposes of the policy. Even if Pickett offered an impermissible legal conclusion about the nature of “force,” that testimony did not “affect[] the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

3.The district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions. See United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015). “[Ljooking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law” on excessive force was “fairly and correctly covered,” even if the jury was not separately instructed on Pryor’s alternative factual theory of the case. Gantt v. City of L.A., 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-Appellant Latiya Pryor appeals several district court rulings following a jury verdict in favor of the sole defendant remaining in the case following pretrial proceedings.

1. The district court did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Deputy Grant because even taking Pryor’s version of events as true, no reasonable jury could determine that Deputy Grant’s actions were anything but “de min-imis and thus constitutionally reasonable.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). Pryor’s Bane Act claim also fails because there was no constitutional violation. See King v. State, 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 (2015) (requiring interference with a constitutional right).

2. Because Pryor failed to object to the expert testimony of defense witness Michael Pickett on the same grounds that she raises on appeal, we review her challenges to that testimony for plain error. United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court did not plainly err. Pickett permissibly testified that San Francisco Sheriffs Department policy requires officers to remove hairpieces that can be removed without injuring a prison-' er and that removing only several natural hairs would not constitute an injury for purposes of the policy. Even if Pickett offered an impermissible legal conclusion about the nature of “force,” that testimony did not “affect[] the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

3.The district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions. See United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015). “[Ljooking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law” on excessive force was “fairly and correctly covered,” even if the jury was not separately instructed on Pryor’s alternative factual theory of the case. Gantt v. City of L.A., 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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