In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–2030
Submitted March 27, 2025—Filed April 18, 2025
In the matter of Honorable David James Hanson, judicial magistrate of the First Judicial District.
On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.
The commission on judicial qualifications filed an application to discipline
a judicial officer. Application Granted; Judicial Officer Removed.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for complainant.
David James Hanson (argued), Fayette, pro se. 2
Oxley, Justice.
Over twenty years ago, we said that “[t]he strength of our judicial system
is due in large part to its independence and neutrality. These twin qualities help
remove outside influences from judicial decision-making, and promote public
respect and confidence in our system of justice.” In re Inquiry Concerning Patrick
McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). Some today might
question that underlying premise—that there is in fact public respect and
confidence in the judiciary. In an age where judges are under seemingly endless
scrutiny and attack, it is ever more critical that judges ensure that their words
and actions are above reproach.
This is a judicial disciplinary action against Judicial Magistrate David J.
Hanson (Magistrate Hanson) for the First Judicial District of Iowa related to
statements he made in two separate cases that purport to demonstrate bias,
prejudice, and a lack of impartiality. In one case, Magistrate Hanson denied an
arrest warrant in a lengthy written order that reflected his own disparaging views
about young male victims of sexual assault. In the other, Magistrate Hanson
made statements in open court using a derogatory racial slur and reflecting
stereotypes about a criminal defendant. The Iowa Commission on Judicial
Qualifications (Commission) filed an application for imposition of discipline
against Magistrate Hanson. The Commission found that Magistrate Hanson
violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that he be
suspended for ninety days without pay and ordered to participate in mandatory
anger management and bias training.
Even more concerning than the clearly inappropriate statements
Magistrate Hanson made in his written order and from the bench is his response
to the Commission’s application for disciplinary action. His complete lack of self- 3
awareness and contrition reflects an unwillingness (or inability) to change his
behavior and further undermines public respect and confidence in the judiciary.
Accordingly, we grant the Commission’s application. But we conclude that the
appropriate discipline is to remove Magistrate Hanson from his position as a
judicial officer.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
Magistrate Hanson graduated from Drake University Law School in 1987.
He was appointed to the bench in January 2022 to serve a four-year term in
Fayette County, located in Iowa’s first judicial district. At the time, he had
practiced law in Iowa for over thirty-six years. In Iowa, magistrates function as
“part-time” judicial officers serving the county they reside in or a neighboring
county. Magistrates are often the first (and sometimes only) judicial officer that
members of the public encounter when the magistrate presides over “simple
misdemeanors . . . , including traffic and ordinance violations, . . . preliminary
hearings, search warrant proceedings, county and municipal infractions, and
small claims,” or when they “hear complaints or preliminary informations, issue
warrants, order arrests, make commitments, [or] take bail.” Iowa Code
§ 602.6405(1) (2024).
The fact that magistrates serve as part-time judicial officers does not
excuse them from complying with the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, with some
limited exceptions not applicable here. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct,
Application I(B) (“A judge, within the meaning of the Iowa Code of Judicial
Conduct, is anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions, including an
officer such as a magistrate . . . .”); In re Inquiry Concerning Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d
707, 711 (Iowa 2016) (“The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct applies to both judges
and part-time magistrates, with some exceptions. . . . The exceptions carve out 4
conduct relating to the judicial restrictions governing the practice of law, select
extrajudicial activities, and public statements concerning pending and
impending cases when not serving as a judge. Otherwise, the same canons of
conduct applicable to Iowa judges apply to magistrates.” (citations omitted)).
A. The First Complaint. In August 2022, approximately six months after
Magistrate Hanson’s appointment to the bench, the Commission received a
complaint about him from the chief judge of the first judicial district based on
the contents of a written order that he had recently entered denying a request
for an arrest warrant. The administrative judge for Fayette County informed the
chief judge of the contents of the written order, and the chief judge referred the
matter to the Commission. The requested arrest warrant related to a criminal
complaint involving allegations made by a fifteen-year-old boy as the victim of a
sexual assault by a seventeen-year-old girl. A police officer with the West Union
Police Department filed an affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, describing
in detail the events giving rise to the charges as relayed to him by the alleged
victim, identified in the affidavit as “John Doe.”
Magistrate Hanson entered a six-page, single-spaced order denying the
request for an arrest warrant on the basis that he did not find John Doe credible
and therefore the warrant application lacked probable cause. In explaining the
reasons for discrediting John Doe’s allegations, Magistrate Hanson: (1) described
John Doe’s claim that he was unable to push away the female offender as
“absurd” given a male’s “innate physical advantage,” noting that the female
offender was identified as five feet eleven inches tall and weighed 290 pounds,
which he suspected “most likely represents female obesity rather than muscular
weight” such that John Doe’s will was not likely “overridden by force”;
(2) explained that “[a]ny self-respecting young male” would have simply removed 5
himself from any sexual touching that was truly unwelcomed, describing
Magistrate Hanson’s own response when he received an “unwelcome[d] sexual
touch” as a teenager; (3) described John Doe’s actions as “contrary to nature”
because the “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy’s reaction to being undressed
by a teenage girl” is, “Alright! I’m gonna GET some!”; and (4) claimed as fact what
“[c]ommon human experience suggests: if a man imbibes a truly substantial
quantity of alcohol, to the point that he cannot rationally consent to engage in
sex[ual] relations, that man’s physical ability to perform sexually also goes away
until he sobers.” The order then went into graphic detail about the physiology of
the male sex organ—which we choose not to repeat—explaining why “[c]ommon
human experience” undermined John Doe’s story.
From this discussion, Magistrate Hanson declared that “John Doe knew
exactly what Defendant was doing to him, welcomed the advance, and both freely
consented and actively participated in the sex acts,” only to “later regret[] his free
will choice.” He concluded the order with:
In summation[,] Confidential informant John Doe’s allegations of his curious passivity in warding off or purporting to refuse offers of sexual favors, alleged memory blackout, and weeks- later convenient memory recovery, all strike this Court as highly unnatural. And therefore unlikely to be true. The Court concludes that John Doe lacks credibility sufficient to support a criminal charge against Defendant—particularly for a charge that as applied is a forcible felony.
B. The Second Complaint. Less than a year later, in July 2023, and while
the first complaint was still pending, the Commission received another complaint
against Magistrate Hanson. This complaint was also filed by the chief judge of
the first judicial district based on an email she received from a law school student
working as a prosecuting intern for the summer with the Fayette County
Attorney’s office. The intern raised issues of bias, discrimination, and derogatory 6
remarks made by Magistrate Hanson in open court during a proceeding in which
the intern was representing the state in prosecuting simple misdemeanor
charges. As described by the intern:
During magistrate court on July 18, 2023, Judge Hanson was reviewing a case where the defendant was of Hispanic ethnicity. Judge Hanson noted that the charges were for no license and no insurance, and asked me, “Is this guy a wetback? An illegal?” He also asked if I was sure this was the defendant’s real name and commented that the defendant probably stole someone’s ID card or identity.
We choose to only repeat the above-quoted racially derogatory slur in full once
throughout the opinion. Those remarks in open court made the intern feel
“extremely uncomfortable” and “extremely concerned about [Magistrate]
Hanson’s bias affecting defendants’ right to an impartial jurist.”
C. The Commission’s Investigation and Charges. After receiving the
second complaint, the Commission notified Magistrate Hanson that it was
beginning a preliminary investigation regarding both complaints. On May 22,
2024, the Commission issued a notice of charges and hearing thereon informing
Magistrate Hanson of the specific charges against him, his right to file an answer,
defend, and participate at the hearing in person and by counsel, and setting a
three-and-a-half-hour hearing on the matter for October 29.
The notice informed Magistrate Hanson that the conduct referred to in the
charges violated canons 1 and 2 and rules 51:1.2 (promoting confidence in the
judiciary) and 51:2.3 (bias, prejudice, and harassment) of the Iowa Code of
Judicial Conduct. With respect to the first complaint, the Commission alleged
that Magistrate Hanson’s order was “unfitting of a judicial officer because it
expressed bias, included unnecessary and inappropriate commentary about
parties, relied on extrajudicial resources of questionable substance, applied an
incorrect legal standard, and included information suggesting a conflict of 7
interest.” With respect to the second complaint, the Commission alleged that
Magistrate Hanson “made racially disparaging remarks concerning a litigant who
was to appear before him in a pending case,” raising “issues of bias and
discrimination.” The Commission concluded that its receipt of the second
complaint showed that Magistrate Hanson “repeatedly failed to meet the
requirements of both Rule 51:1:2 and Rule 51:2.3(A) & (B).”
Magistrate Hanson did not file an answer. The October 29 hearing was
canceled after Magistrate Hanson stated at a prehearing conference on October
24 that he did not intend to challenge the complaints or the charges against him,
so a hearing was not needed. Magistrate Hanson, who appeared at the
conference without counsel, declined an offer to adjourn the call to obtain
representation.
A subsequent hearing was held on November 14 to make a record of
Magistrate Hanson’s decision to forgo a hearing on the charges. When asked to
confirm his prior statement that he did not intend to contest the facts alleged
against him, Magistrate Hanson responded:
There were two issues. The more -- I assume the more significant was my ruling in anger over what I thought was a specious request for an arrest warrant, and I own up to that. If I make a decision and somebody don’t like it, well, I’m sorry.
As far as the other one, I don’t recall the circumstances, and people can say whatever they want to say. . . . [W]hatever’s said I have no way of identifying, so I’m not going to even argue the point. There’s no point to it.
The assistant attorney general clarified that Magistrate Hanson was entitled to a
hearing where the State would be required to present witnesses to support the
charges. Magistrate Hanson responded:
Well, there’s no point in dragging everybody into a day’s worth of work over what looks like about four minutes worth of testimony. I’m not going to put the Commission to that. The Commission can 8
make whatever decision it wants to make, and I will roll with the punch and take whatever you give me.
The Commission chair then clarified that the Commission makes a
recommendation to the Iowa Supreme Court, which makes the final
adjudication. Magistrate Hanson responded, “Well, I guess if they want to shoot
me, they can. Okay. I will accept whatever you think is right.”
D. The Commission’s Application for Discipline. The Commission filed
its application to the supreme court to discipline Magistrate Hanson on
December 18. The Commission concluded that the record established by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence that Magistrate Hanson’s conduct, as
asserted in the two complaints, violated rule 51:1.2 (promoting confidence in the
judiciary) and rule 51:2.3(A) and (B) (bias, prejudice, and harassment), brought
the judiciary into disrepute, and that those violations were substantial violations
of the canons of judicial ethics. See Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b) (providing that
on application of the Commission, the supreme court may “[d]iscipline or remove
the judicial officer for . . . conduct which brings judicial office into disrepute, or
substantial violation of the canons of judicial ethics”).
With respect to rule 51:1.2, the Commission concluded that “Magistrate
Hanson’s conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that he
engaged in conduct reflecting adversely on his impartiality, temperament, and
fitness to serve as a judge.” Because both incidents involved a public judicial
forum—a written judicial order and statements in open court—the Commission
believed the incidents “eroded public confidence more substantially than if his
conduct had been purely personal.”
With respect to rule 51:2.3, the Commission noted that the content of
Magistrate Hanson’s written order and the statements he made in open court
satisfied many of the examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice identified 9
in the comments to rule 51:2.3. The Commission concluded that “[b]y
manifesting bias or prejudice in the two proceedings at issue, Magistrate Hanson
impaired the fairness of the proceedings and brought the judiciary into
disrepute.”
Without the benefit of any briefing from Magistrate Hanson, the
Commission recommended that Magistrate Hanson be suspended for ninety
days without pay and ordered to participate in mandatory anger management
and bias training. The Commission relied on the facts that Magistrate Hanson’s
misconduct occurred in his official capacity, showed a pattern of alarming bias
and prejudice, and diminished public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
that a judicial officer is expected to exhibit. Noting “[n]o effort to change or modify
his conduct,” the Commission concluded that Magistrate Hanson’s “lack of
willingness to address the situation, or to express remorse, is concerning.”
E. Proceedings in the Iowa Supreme Court. Our constitution places the
final responsibility for disciplining judges with our court. Iowa Const. art. V,
§ 19; see also Iowa Code § 602.2101. But the discipline process begins with the
Commission, a seven-member body made up of a district court judge; two
practicing attorneys who are not from the same political party; and four electors
who are not attorneys, no more than two of whom are from the same political
party, and who are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state senate.
Iowa Code § 602.2102(1). Complaints about judges are directed first to the
Commission, which, after investigation, may dismiss the charges, dispose of the
charges informally, or make application for discipline to the supreme court.
Id. § 602.2104(1). And before the Commission can send the complaint to the
supreme court for discipline, the judge is provided due process through notice
of the charges and a hearing. Id. § 602.2104(2). The attorney general prosecutes 10
the charges on behalf of the state and the judge “may defend and has the right
to participate in person and by counsel, to cross-examine, to be confronted by
the witnesses, and to present evidence in accordance with the rules of civil
procedure.” Id. The judge may request the Commission to issue subpoenas on
the judge’s behalf for use at the hearing. Id. § 602.2104(3)(b). We lay out this
process to make clear that charges made against a judicial officer provide due
process for the judge at the hearing stage and are carefully reviewed and
seriously considered before they reach our docket.
The Commission’s application to discipline Magistrate Hanson was set for
nonoral submission to our court on March 26, 2025. The State filed its brief on
January 30, and Magistrate Hanson filed his responsive brief on February 28.
On March 3, the State filed a request to set the matter for oral submission, noting
that “upon review of the responsive brief, the State believes the Court and
Magistrate Hanson might benefit from a hearing.” We granted the State’s request
and heard argument on the matter on March 27.
II. Analysis.
“It is our duty to discipline judicial officers for conduct violating the canons
of judicial ethics.” In re Inquiry Concerning Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d at 711; see also
Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b) (“Upon application by the commission, the supreme
court may . . . [d]iscipline or remove the judicial officer for . . . conduct which
brings judicial office into disrepute, or substantial violation of the canons of
judicial ethics.”). We review the Commission’s recommendation to discipline a
judicial officer de novo. In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 2014). Ethical
violations supporting the discipline of a judge “must be established by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “We give respectful consideration 11
to the Commission’s findings and recommended sanctions, but [we] are not
bound by them.” In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 2015).
A. Violations of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Magistrate Hanson
has never disputed the underlying facts giving rise to the two complaints or that
his conduct violated judicial ethics. And in his brief to our court, he does “not
resist anything the Commission and this Court says” and does “not complain
that the Commission is wrong.” Rather, Magistrate Hanson attempts to explain
his reasoning and make excuses for his conduct. Nonetheless, “it is our duty to
review the findings of the Commission de novo and evaluate the facts to
determine if a violation occurred.” In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d at 189.
The Commission charged Magistrate Hanson with violating cannons 1 and
2 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically rules 51:1.2 and 51:2.3(A)
and (B).1 We address each alleged rule violation in turn.
1. Promoting confidence in the judiciary. “A judge shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2; see also id. Canon 1 (“A
judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”).
This rule requires judicial officers “to preserve the crown jewels of the judiciary—
independence, integrity, and impartiality—and directs judges to uphold the
fundamental qualities of judging by avoiding impropriety.” In re Krull, 860
N.W.2d at 45 (quoting In re Block, 816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012)). The Code
defines “impartiality” to mean the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or
1“The Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe.
Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a rule, the Canons provide important guidance in interpreting the rules.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Scope [2]. 12
against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an
open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” Iowa Code of
Judicial Conduct, Terminology. And “ ‘[i]ntegrity’ means probity, fairness,
honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.” Id. “The test for appearance
of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that
reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness
to serve as a judge.” Id. r. 51:1.2 cmt. [5].
“Judges set the tone for a courtroom.” In re Russo, 231 A.3d 563, 570
(N.J. 2020). As such, they are held to a higher standard than the average citizen,
to a higher standard than an attorney—particularly when they are acting in their
judicial role. See In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 45 (“Judges are held to a higher
standard of conduct than attorneys because of the importance of maintaining an
impartial judiciary.”); In re Inquiry Concerning Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271, 277
(Iowa 2001) (“[Canon 1] imposes a duty upon a judge that rises above the normal
responsibilities he has as an attorney.”). When judges put on the black robe and
take the bench, their actions not only reflect on themselves but the entire judicial
system. See In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 1985) (en
banc) (“The canons of conduct recognize that public confidence in the judiciary
is eroded by irresponsible or improper judicial conduct.”).
A judge’s conduct—both his actions and his words—must reflect to the
outside observer that he is presiding over proceedings in the fair and impartial
manner demanded by the basic requirements of due process. See State v.
Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa 1976) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of constitutional due process. It follows a presiding judge
should not only be fair and impartial, he must conduct himself in the trial to 13
constantly manifest those qualities.” (citation omitted)). Thus, when a magistrate
takes the bench or issues an order, he is not concerned only with being fair and
impartial—he must also appear fair and impartial to the outside observer to
protect the integrity, i.e., the reputation, of the entire judiciary. See In re Inquiry
Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16 (“The focus of sanctions in judicial
disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the individual judge, but to restore and
maintain the dignity, honor, and impartiality of the judicial office, and to protect
the public from further excesses.”); In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d at
551 (“The overriding purpose of the judicial disciplinary system is to provide a
means for maintaining the integrity of the judicial branch of government.”); see
also In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99, 100 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (Kaus, J.,
concurring) (“ ‘[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ The administration of justice is prejudiced by
the public perception of racial bias, whether or not it is translated into the court’s
judgments and orders.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting The
King v. Sussex Justs. [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewart CJ))). Particularly in
criminal cases, “[t]he inherent imbalance of power between a judge and a
defendant mandates that defendants be treated with utmost professional
courtesy,” and statements from the bench that could be perceived as derogatory
toward or about the defendant “contribute to the erosion of the public perception
of the Judiciary.” In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 66 (Md. 2008). The same holds true
for statements made about victims of alleged crimes.
We have no trouble concluding that Magistrate Hanson violated rule
51:1.2 with respect to both complaints. As to the written order denying the
request for an arrest warrant, our concern is not so much that Magistrate
Hanson applied an improperly heightened standard when he treated the 14
purported victim (John Doe) who reported an alleged sexual assault as a
confidential informant whose veracity must be tested before their reported
allegations can support an arrest warrant.2 As the State candidly stated at oral
argument, the Commission did not seek to discipline Magistrate Hanson for
incompetence. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.5(A) (“A judge shall
perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently.”). Judges
are allowed to make mistakes. Correcting errors and addressing abuses of
judicial discretion are what appeals are for.
Rather, the problem with the order is that Magistrate Hanson’s written
explanation reflects a decision premised on stereotyped views and personal
experiences, not on the facts presented in the arrest warrant application,
revealing a lack of impartiality and undermining his integrity as a judicial officer.
See, e.g., United States v. Collier, 932 F.3d 1067, 1079 (8th Cir. 2019) (“An
opinion [by a judge] that derives from an ‘extrajudicial source’ or reflects
favoritism or antagonism to such a high degree that makes ‘fair judgment
impossible’ could support a bias challenge.” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555 (1994))); In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d
2Magistrate Hanson characterized John Doe as a “confidential informant” in the written
order based on his erroneous conclusion that he needed to treat the arrest warrant application similar to a search warrant application that relied on an unnamed police confidential informant since his identity was not revealed. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (imposing additional requirements for information provided by “an informant’s tip” included in an officer’s search warrant application). John Doe was not a confidential informant. He was the alleged victim of a sexual assault who made a report with the West Union Police Department. “This court has adopted the position that information imparted by a citizen informant,” which includes “a victim of a crime,” “is generally reliable.” State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Rapenske, 998 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (“When it is a citizen calling in the tip, the test for reliability is relaxed, as there is a ‘rebuttable presumption that “information imparted by a citizen informant is generally reliable.” ’ And, when the citizen tipster is known rather than anonymous, the case for reliability of the information is even stronger because the tipster could be held accountable if the information provided turns out to be false.” (quoting State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001))). 15
603, 608 (Wis. 1989) (per curiam) (“Judge Gorenstein repeatedly allowed his
personal perceptions to interfere with his responsibilities as a judge. For
example, he ascribed character traits to people appearing before him based on
statistical and other information he had obtained from newspapers and other
sources, thus denying those litigants the treatment as individuals they were
entitled to receive from the court.”). Specifically, his justification for denying the
arrest warrant was based on his own stereotyped beliefs about how a teenage
male sexual assault victim would, or should, react when assaulted by a teenage
girl. He buttressed his stereotyped views with his own personal experience when
he was apparently inappropriately touched as a teenager.
Magistrate Hanson also included inappropriate commentary in the written
order about his views on how a “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy” would
react and the physiology of how a male’s sex organ works, and unfounded
assumptions about the alleged female offender based on her height and weight.
These demeaning and sophomoric justifications have no place in a judicial order.
See In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 570 (“Especially when it comes to sensitive matters
like domestic violence and sexual assault, that tone [set by the judge] must be
dignified, solemn, and respectful, not demeaning or sophomoric.”). Magistrate
Hanson fails to appreciate the effect his words have on the individuals before
him seeking justice from our courts—here, the alleged victim of sexual abuse.
See In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) (“The authority
exercised by a judge is so great as to easily break ordinary people who are
rendered comparatively helpless in their relationship with a court. Such
authority should not be entrusted to those who, either deliberately or through
thoughtlessness, offend the ordinary sensibilities of citizens. . . . Nowhere is it 16
more true than in the words chosen by a judge in a decision or decree that
becomes a permanent public record.”).
Equally troubling is the fact that Magistrate Hanson admitted during the
Commission hearing to “ruling in anger” when he denied the arrest warrant
application a few days after it was filed. We recognize that judicial officers are
imperfect; we do not expect infallibility. Judges, like the parties before them,
deserve a measure of grace. But this was not a situation where a judicial officer
lost his temper in the heat of a moment. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56 (“Not
establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what
imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges,
sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even
a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration—remain immune.”). Rather, Magistrate Hanson admittedly sat
on the written order for a few days. Yet, even with that time for reflection, he
failed to recognize the improper reliance on stereotyped information based on his
own experiences and perceptions or the inappropriate language contained in the
order. In sum, Magistrate Hanson’s 2022 written order reflects a failure to
“promote[] public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary,” as required by Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 51:1.2.
The 2023 statement in open court to a law student prosecuting intern,
referring to a Hispanic criminal defendant as a “w******” and commenting that
the criminal defendant probably stole someone’s identity, further reflects
adversely on Magistrate Hanson’s impartiality and undermines his integrity as a
judicial officer. Racially derogatory remarks and stereotyped assumptions made
in open court—particularly about a criminal defendant—reflect the mindset of 17
the judge and create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge will act
based on that improper mindset. See In re Kellam, 503 A.2d 1308, 1311
(Me. 1986) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial accountability does not require all judges to
be of precisely the same temperament or to have the same personal qualities and
attitudes. A judge’s style and personality does not by itself suggest misconduct.
These canons, however, leave little room for judicial independence in the matter
of courtroom manners. Regardless of personal style, a judge is required to show
patience and dignity and to use common courtesy in daily interaction with
members of [the] public. . . . Courtroom courtesy is a duty owed to the public
and is evaluated . . . from the perspective of the ordinary, reasonable person.”
(citations omitted)).
It should go without saying that the term “w******” is a racially derogatory,
highly offensive slur that does not belong in a courtroom—and especially not
from the mouth of a judge. See, e.g., Wetback, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wetback [https://perma.cc/2R26-
LVHH] (labeling the term as “offensive” and defining it as “used as an insulting
and contemptuous term for a Mexican who enters the U.S. illegally”). We cannot
overemphasize how inappropriate it was for Magistrate Hanson to use the slur—
in open court—in reference to a Hispanic criminal defendant. See In re Goodfarb,
880 P.2d 620, 623 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (“The use of [racially inflammatory]
language during the course of judicial proceedings is so debilitating to the
administration of justice that we think the public, and the public’s perception of
justice, will be better served by suspending Judge Goodfarb for the balance of
his remaining term.”); In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam)
(“[A judge’s] racially charged assessment of the case,” referring to a murder victim
as “some old n[*****] b[****]” in a private conversation with the prosecutor, “not 18
only devalued the victim’s life but also cast doubt on the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary and, by itself, puts into question [the judge’s] fitness
to hold judicial office”).
Except we must say the obvious—that the term is derogatory—because
Magistrate Hanson continues to defend his use of it. He does not dispute that he
said the word in open court: “I assume I did, without thinking about it.” Rather
than recognize the term as the racial epithet that it is, he labels it as “someone’s
taboo” that he “[a]pparently . . . transgressed.” He cites to a 1969 opinion from
our court, State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 1969) (describing a
federal case involving wire interceptions by a federal communications agent and
repeating what the agent overheard in that case, which included the term), to
justify his use of the term in 2023 as slang, similar to “pickpocket” used in Ette
v. Linn–Mar Comm. Sch. Dist., 656 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Iowa 2002), or “man of the
road” or “sneak thief” as used 129 years ago in Kidd v. Ward, 59 N.W. 279, 280
(Iowa 1894).
As with the complaint about the written order, we find that Magistrate
Hanson’s response to the second complaint to be as—if not more—troubling than
the underlying act itself. Whether or not Magistrate Hanson recognizes his use
of the slur as offensive, he most definitely violated Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 51:1.2’s directive to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” See
In re Inquiry Concerning Stigler, 607 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)
(“Even if Judge Stigler believed that he could be impartial (and we accept his
statement that he did so believe), this impartiality could nonetheless be
reasonably questioned by an impartial observer.”); see also Gonzalez v. Comm’n
on Jud. Performance, 657 P.2d 372, 382 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam) 19
(“[S]uch facially blatant ethnic slurs as those Judge Gonzalez uttered from the
bench are apt to offend minority members not familiar with petitioner’s views
and may be construed by the public at large as highly demeaning to minorities.”);
In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam) (“Racial epithets,
indefensible when uttered by a private citizen, are especially offensive when
spoken by a judge. Whether or not he meant [‘n***** in the woodpile’] as a racial
slur, [the judge’s] use of the term ‘n[*****]’ in any context is indefensible. That he
used the term in open court with black defendants before him and in obvious
reference to a particular black person makes his conduct especially egregious.”).
What courts recognized forty years ago should be even more obvious today.
The Commission established by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence that Magistrate Hanson violated rule 51:1.2.
2. Bias, prejudice, and harassment. Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Rule
51:2.3 (A) and (B) provides:
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, . . . national origin, [or] ethnicity . . . .
This rule is found in canon 2: “A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office
impartially, competently, and diligently.” Id. Canon 2. The comments to rule
51:2.3 provide:
[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.
[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; 20
threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; insensitive statements about crimes against women; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.
Id. r. 51:2.3 cmts. [1]–[2].
Again, we have no trouble concluding that Magistrate Hanson’s 2022
written order and his 2023 statements in open court brought the judiciary into
disrepute and violated rule 51:2.3. Magistrate Hanson’s written order and the
comments he made from the bench called into question his impartiality and
integrity in violation of rule 51:1.2 precisely because they demonstrated biases
and prejudices, which are the aim of rule 51:2.3. We agree with the Commission
that his written and verbal statements included many of the examples from
comment [2]. He used a “slur” when he asked the prosecuting intern if the
defendant was a “w******” and he “suggest[ed] [a] connection[] between race,
ethnicity, or nationality and crime” when he questioned whether the defendant
had provided his real name, suggesting he had stolen someone’s identity. Id. r.
51:2.3 cmt. [2]. His written order denying the arrest warrant relied on “negative
stereotyping” about a teenage boy claiming to be the victim of a sexual assault
by a teenage girl and made “irrelevant references to personal characteristics”
about the defendant in surmising she was obese rather than muscular in
concluding the fifteen-year-old alleged victim could have pushed her away if he
really wanted to. Id.
The Commission established by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence that Magistrate Hanson violated rule 51:2.3. 21
B. Sanctions. Determining the appropriate sanction for a judicial officer
who engages in judicial misconduct is more about “restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
the dignity, honor, and impartiality of the judicial office,” “protect[ing] the
public,” and deterring other judges from similar misconduct than it is about
punishing the wayward judge. In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting In re
Inquiring Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16). We have identified a
nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in reaching an appropriate sanction:
1. whether the misconduct is isolated or a pattern of misconduct;
2. the nature, extent, and frequency of the acts of misconduct;
3. whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom;
4. whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in his or her private life;
5. whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized the misconduct;
6. whether the judge has made an effort to change or modify his or her conduct;
7. the length of service on the bench;
8. whether there have been any prior complaints;
9. the effect of the misconduct upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and
10. the extent to which the judge exploited the judicial office to satisfy personal interests.
Id. (quoting In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365–66).
Most of these factors serve as aggravating factors when applied to
Magistrate Hanson’s judicial misconduct. The Commission received the first
complaint against Magistrate Hanson within six months of his appointment to
the bench. When the Commission received the second complaint less than a year 22
later, it determined that Magistrate Hanson’s conduct was not isolated, instead
representing a pattern of misconduct. Both complaints involved Magistrate
Hanson’s official duties, one in open court and one in a written order. Magistrate
Hanson does not recognize the extent of his misconduct, and he has made no
real effort to modify his behavior. It has been nearly a year since he was first
notified of the investigation by the Commission, and he is still only willing to
participate in anger management or bias training if we direct him to do so.
Not only did Magistrate Hanson not consider his conduct and statements
inappropriate when they were made, but he defended them throughout the
Commission’s investigation, even up to the time of oral argument before our
court. He has not shown regret for his choice of words. He has not shown genuine
remorse for the effect his statements likely had on the litigants. He has shown
no aptitude for self-improvement. Indeed, he suggested in his brief that the
Commission simply provide him with a list of “bad words” so that he can avoid
them in conversation.
Most concerning, though, is Magistrate Hanson’s lack of self-awareness
and his apparent inability for self-reflection as revealed in his responsive brief
filed with our court. See In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d at 426 (imposing greater
sanction for judge’s “inappropriate and unnecessary characterizations of
persons appearing before him” where “by his answer and explanation at the
hearing, he has failed to appreciate or understand that his conduct was offensive
or violated the canons”); see also In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d at 621 (noting that
“[t]he Commission . . . found Judge Goodfarb’s failure to recognize the full extent
of the harm caused to the public’s perception of the judiciary to be aggravating”
while finding as mitigating that the judge “had begun counseling to deal with his
intemperate use of language”); In re Fiffie, 395 So. 3d 738, 750 (La. 2024) (“In 23
mitigation we recognize Judge Fiffie’s relative inexperience as a judge and his
stated desire to do what he believes is right. However, his persistent refusal to
acknowledge his errors, to take unqualified responsibility for them, and to listen
to the advice and counsel of others is troubling.”); cf. In re Inquiry Concerning
Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d at 711 (noting the Commission’s reliance on Magistrate
Sevcik’s “candidness” and “his admission” of inappropriate behavior in its
recommended sanction); In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364 (“Judge Block testified
at the Commission hearing. He was contrite and honest, accepted responsibility
for his actions, and acknowledged his conduct gave the judiciary a ‘black eye.’ ”);
In re Inquiry Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 17 (“Judge McCormick was
profusely apologetic, and recognized the harm he caused.”). In his brief to our
court, Magistrate Hanson defended his order denying the arrest warrant request
by asserting that he “smelled lies” in the alleged victim’s allegations. Magistrate
Hanson is absolutely correct that he has an obligation not to rubber-stamp any
warrant application presented to him. Rather, he is expected to exercise his
judicial discretion, which often includes assessing an affiant’s credibility. But
what he cannot seem to comprehend is that our rules requiring impartiality and
integrity demand that he exercise his judicial discretion based only on the facts
before him, not his own personal code of honor and personal biases.
In his brief, Magistrate Hanson explained his view of sexual assault
allegations:
All judges should know, and fear, false accusations of sexual crimes alleged long after the supposed events. I witnessed the televised atrocities visited upon U.S. Supreme [Court] Justice nominees . . . by women, whom effective cross examinations showed to be, telling falsehoods. I will never abet such “high tech lynchings.”
(Emphasis added.) 24
Magistrate Hanson’s statements in 2022 and 2023 and this year before
our court are not those of an independent, impartial arbiter carefully considering
whether the allegations provided in the affidavit before him supplied probable
cause to support an arrest warrant. Instead, they reflect the biases of someone
with preconceived and inflexible notions about alleged sexual assault victims.
See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with Noncorroboration Instructions, 53
Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Buller] (“The English legal system was
infected with what we now call ‘rape myths’—misogynist falsehoods about sexual
assault—that eventually made their way across the Atlantic.”); cf. State v.
Sievers, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 938109, at *10 (Iowa Mar. 28, 2025)
(Waterman, J., dissenting) (discussing application of Iowa’s “outcry statute” that
allows hearsay testimony about a child sexual abuse victim’s “initial disclosure”
of the abuse to another person and explaining that “[t]he legislature enacted
section 622.31B to . . . dispel the inference that the delay in reporting the crime
to authorities casts doubt on whether it happened”). As now-Judge Buller noted
in his law review article, although many of the formal legal barriers to
prosecuting sexual assault crimes, “including the corroboration requirement,”
have been eliminated, “the implicit effects of institutionalized sexism and anti-
victim bias persist in the hearts and minds of jurors.” Buller, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. at
2. Magistrate Hanson’s statements in these proceedings reflect that those biases
persist with him as well.
We find a recent judicial disciplinary proceeding from New Jersey
instructive. The New Jersey Supreme Court removed a judge from office based
on four acts of misconduct, the most serious of which involved an unrepresented
litigant who obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the father of
her five-year-old daughter after he allegedly forced her to have sex against her 25
will. In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 567–68. At the hearing on the final restraining
order (FRO), the judge took over questioning the complaining witness during the
defendant’s cross-examination, asking her several very pointed and “coarse
questions” about her efforts to stop the alleged assault. Id. at 568–69. The judge
ultimately dismissed the TRO and declined to enter an FRO based on his
conclusion that the petitioner was not credible in light of her responses to his
questions. Id. at 569. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s
explanation to the judicial qualifications panel that “he was trying to help a
‘demoralized’ witness on cross-examination” was not only contrary to the record
but that the questioning was also irrelevant to the issue of whether a sexual
assault occurred. Id. at 568–69. In explaining its decision to remove the judge
from office, the court reflected:
It is inconceivable that [the judge] could sit in judgment in domestic violence or sexual assault matters in the future. No reasonable victim could have confidence in a court system were he to preside over those kinds of cases again. Nor could any objective, informed member of the public.
Id. at 574–75.
We find the same to be the case here. Magistrate Hanson has an obligation
as a judicial officer to address each case before him with impartiality and based
only on the facts before him. If a judicial officer concludes that the information
provided in a warrant application is insufficient to establish probable cause or is
not credible, he should absolutely deny the application unless the affiant
provides more information. But Magistrate Hanson’s insistence that his role is
to ferret out false accusations of sexual assault by requiring corroboration is not
only contrary to the law, see, e.g., State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa
2022) (noting that it has been the law in Iowa since 1974 that a conviction for
rape can be supported solely by the victim’s testimony, without a need for 26
corroboration), it is also contrary to his oath as a judge to set aside any
preconceived biases, see Iowa Code § 63.6 (“All judges of courts of record shall
qualify before taking office following appointment by taking and subscribing an
oath to the effect . . . that, without fear, favor, affection, or hope of reward, they
will, to the best of their knowledge and ability, administer justice according to
the law, equally to the rich and the poor.”). And his refusal to take any
accountability for that fact makes him unable to preside over any proceeding
involving a sexual assault.
Magistrate Hanson’s inability to recognize the derogatory effect of his
choice of words also raises serious concerns about his ability to impartially
preside over a case involving minorities, particularly those charged as a criminal
defendant. That he believes this matter can be put behind him if we provide a
list of “bad words” he should avoid reveals how deep his lack of understanding
goes.
Finally, we note that Magistrate Hanson has an obligation to govern not
only his own conduct, but also the conduct of his staff and the lawyers in the
proceedings before him. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.3(B) (“A judge
shall not . . . by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in
harassment . . . and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject
to the judge’s direction and control to do so.”), (C) (“A judge shall require lawyers
in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice or
engaging in harassment . . . .”). If Magistrate Hanson cannot recognize bias or
prejudice in his own conduct, we cannot trust him to recognize it in those he is
tasked with policing.
Upon careful consideration, we conclude that Magistrate Hanson “is
simply and unalterably unsuited to be a judge, and no attempts at behavior 27
modification are going to change that significantly. [H]e simply should not be a
judge.” In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2000)
(en banc); see also In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d at 623 (suspending judge for the
remainder of his term despite the commission’s recommendation for a three-
month suspension based on two counts of misconduct for using racially
inflammatory language in connection with a hearing in one criminal case and
profane language in another); In re Ademiluyi, 321 A.3d 142, 201 (Md. 2024)
(concluding that removal was required “[g]iven the wide-ranging and pervasive
nature of [the judge’s] misconduct, her inability to comply with the fundamental
requirement that she perform the duties of office fairly and impartially, and her
lack of remorse for blatant and egregious violations of the [Maryland Code of
Judicial Conduct]”); In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 575 (removing judge from office
because “[t]he series of ethical failures that [the judge] committed are not errors
of law, innocent missteps, or isolated words taken out of context,” but “are
flagrant and serious acts of misconduct”); In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 123
(removing judge from office based on pattern of misconduct, including engaging
in racial epithets and ethnic slurs and intemperate behavior); In re Disciplinary
Proc. Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d at 608–09 (suspending judge for two years
based on lack of necessary judicial temperament evidenced by a pattern of
expressing insensitivity and disrespect toward litigants, witnesses, and other
courts in the judicial system).
III. Disposition.
We order the respondent, David J. Hanson, removed from office effective
ten days from the filing of this opinion unless the respondent has, in the
meantime, resigned his position. In the event he has resigned in that time, the 28
Iowa State Court Administrator must certify that fact to this court, and a
supplemental order will be filed accordingly.
Application Granted; Judicial Officer Removed.