David Jacobs v. Federal Housing Finance Agency

908 F.3d 884
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedNovember 14, 2018
Docket17-3794
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 908 F.3d 884 (David Jacobs v. Federal Housing Finance Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Jacobs v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 908 F.3d 884 (3d Cir. 2018).

Opinion

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

In 2008, the U.S. government strove to rescue the collapsing economy. Its extreme measures helped many, but others suffered as a result. One of the rescue measures, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, authorized the government to act as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises with critical roles in the home-mortgage market. Under that conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie made a deal with the Department of Treasury. The deal guaranteed Fannie and Freddie access to hundreds of billions of dollars. But in return, they had to give their net profits to the Treasury-in perpetuity. Fannie's and Freddie's junior shareholders had expected to share in those future profits, but the deal wiped out that expectation. So some of those junior shareholders now challenge that deal.

We reject the shareholders' challenge on all fronts. First, the Recovery Act gave the government broad, discretionary power to enter into the deal. Second, the deal complies with the requirements of the Recovery Act, as well as Delaware and Virginia corporate law. And third, the relief sought would "restrain or affect the exercise of [the government's] powers" as conservator, which the Recovery Act forbids. 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (f). That relief, even the monetary relief, would unwind the whole deal. So we will affirm the District Court's dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory framework

1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress created Fannie, and later Freddie, to support the home-mortgage market. Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 , § 301(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 , § 731(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1451 note) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § § 1716 - 17 (Fannie Mae). Fannie and Freddie do so by borrowing money, buying home mortgages, packaging them into guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, and selling those securities to investors. 12 U.S.C. § § 1454 - 55, 1719.

By buying mortgages and then guaranteeing the resulting securities, Fannie and Freddie make the mortgage market both more liquid and more stable. Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin , 864 F.3d 591 , 599 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ( Perry Capital ), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 978 , 200 L.Ed.2d 247 (2018). They relieve mortgage lenders of the risk of default and free up their capital to make more loans. As a result, lenders can keep lending to home buyers who meet Fannie's and Freddie's underwriting standards, secure in the knowledge that Fannie and Freddie will buy those mortgages. By 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned or guaranteed five trillion dollars' worth of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities-nearly half of the market. Id. In short, they are the backbone of the U.S. residential-mortgage market.

Fannie and Freddie are government-sponsored enterprises; they were created by congressional charter but are owned by private shareholders. 2 U.S.C. § 622 (8). Although Fannie and Freddie are privately owned and publicly traded companies, the public has long viewed their securities as implicitly backed by the federal government's credit. That perceived government guarantee has helped them to borrow money and to buy mortgages more cheaply than they otherwise could have. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew , 70 F.Supp.3d 208 , 215 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd in part , 864 F.3d 591 . All that borrowing, lending, and buying propelled the housing market to record highs by the mid-2000's.

2. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Then the housing bubble burst. House prices plunged, slashing the value of Fannie's and Freddie's mortgage portfolios. Fannie's and Freddie's guarantees put them on the hook not only for the mortgages they owned, but also for many mortgage-backed securities based on loans gone bad. Congress feared that they might default, threatening not only the housing market but the precarious national economy as a whole. Perry Capital , 864 F.3d at 599 .

To ward off that threat, Congress passed the Recovery Act. The Recovery Act created the Federal Housing Financing Agency and empowered it to supervise and regulate Fannie and Freddie. 12 U.S.C. § 4511 . The Recovery Act gives the Agency many enumerated, mostly discretionary powers. For instance, it authorizes the Agency's Director to "appoint the Agency as conservator ... for the purpose of reorganizing [or] rehabilitating ... the affairs of" Fannie or Freddie. Id. § 4617(a)(1)-(2). As conservator, the Agency inherits all the "rights, titles, powers, and privileges" of Fannie, Freddie, and their officers, directors, and shareholders. Id. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i).

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908 F.3d 884, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-jacobs-v-federal-housing-finance-agency-ca3-2018.