Drewry-Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton

92 S.E. 818, 120 Va. 859, 1917 Va. LEXIS 167
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJune 14, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 92 S.E. 818 (Drewry-Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Drewry-Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, 92 S.E. 818, 120 Va. 859, 1917 Va. LEXIS 167 (Va. 1917).

Opinion

Prentis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Drewry-Hughes Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Virginia for the purpose of doing a wholesale dry goods and notion business, found its business unprofitable and decided to distribute its assets. All of the debts of the corporation have been paid, and the question •here involved is as to the amount of dividend to be paid to Throckmorton, trustee, the holder of eight shares of its cumulative six per cent, preferred stock.

The controversy was submitted to the arbitrament of Honorable Beverley T. Crump, who is also judge of the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond. The parties, proceeding in accordance with ch. 143, secs. 3006-3010, inclusive, of the Code, providing a method by which an award' may be made the judgment of a court, agreed that the award should be made the judgment of the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond, and the submission [862]*862provided that “the award and judgment in pursuance thereof should be appealable to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, as are other judgments of this court upon proper proceedings taken for the purpose.”

The question at issue depends upon the proper construction of the agreement between the preferred and common stockholders of the corporation.' embodied in the charter and in the stock certificates, and the opinion of the learned arbitrator contains áll the facts necessary for the determination of the issue involved, and so fully accords with our views, that we hereby adopt it as the opinion of the court in this case. It reads as follows:

“Upon the question submitted to me as arbitrator in the matter of Throckmorton, Trustee, versus Drewry-Hughes Company, I have reached the following conclusions:

“1. The character and privileges of the preferred stock are definitely fixed by a sentence in the stock certificate issued to the preferred stockholders and by a sentence in the charter of the company authorizing the issuance of such stock. Both in the charter and in the certificate it is provided that the preferred stock shall be entitled to a dividend of six per cent. (6%) out of the aet earnings of the company, and that the claim to such dividend if not earned in any one year is to accumulate and to constitute a preferred charge over the common stock on the income of succeeding years until the same is discharged. The import of this language is perfectly clear and under its authority the directors would not be justified in declaring or paying dividends on preferred stock in any one year if not earned, but the dividends which would have been paid, if they had been earned, would remain as a claim upon the earnings of each succeeding year in which earnings were made, to be paid in preference to the common stockholders, as well as the dividends accruing in the succeeding years. It was plainly the intention thus to provide, that so long as the cor[863]*863poration conducted its business and was a going concern the dividends should be guaranteed and cumulative. After making this provision, and following thereupon after a semicolon, the charter and the certificate each provide for the preferential rights of the preferred stockholders, in the event that the corporation ceases to do business or goes into liquidation. Provision for such a contingency is made in the certificate in the following language: * * and the preferred stock is likewise to have a prior claim, in the event of liquidation or dissolution, to the amount of its face value and of any arrears of dividend due and unpaid to it upon the assets of the company over and above the common stock, but in no case is the preferred stock to be entitled to receive more than its regular 6 per cent, yearly dividend and any arrearages, with interest, that may be due to it on that account, and to the amount of its face value in the event of liquidation or dissolution.5 And in the charter in the following language: ‘ * * and the preferred stock is likewise to have a prior claim, in the event of liquidation or dissolution, to the amount of its face value and of any arrears of dividends due and unpaid to it, upon the assets of the company over and above the common stock.5

“There is no practical difference between the language of the charter and the certificate and it is, it seems to me, impossible to resist the conclusion that the writer of the charter and of the certificate intended to state that if and when the corporation ceased to do business and was wound up, there should be paid out of the assets of the corporation, after satisfying all creditors and before the payment of anything on the common stock, both the face value of the preferred stock and any arrears of dividends on that stock due and unpaid. In fact, that is the language of both the charter and the certificate and it is thus plainly provided in both that if, at the time the corporation goes into liquidation or becomes dissolved, there are unpaid cumulative [864]*864dividends due to the preferred stockholders, such dividends ought to be paid as well as the capital of the preferred stock in preference to the common stockholders. Inasmuch as it had been just stipulated in the charter and in the certificate that the dividends, although not earned in any one year, were to constitute a standing claim against the income of future years, it is evident that the ‘arrears of dividends’ mentioned in the above quotations from the charter and the certificate had reference to the unpaid dividends existing at the time the corporation ceased to do business without reference to the reason for nonpayment, whether because of a failure on the part of the directors to order their payment or because they had not been earned during the year for which they became in arrears.

“I conclude, therefore, that the corporation had agreed with its preferred stockholders that so long as the corporation did business it would pay or allow to accumulate as a preferred claim a dividend of six per 'cent. (6%) annually and that, when the company ceased to do business, the face value of the preferred stock and any of the dividends unpaid and in arrears were to be paid out of the assets of the corporation in preference to the common stockholders.

“2. In determining the legal effect of such a stipulation as that just stated, I have examined the 16th chapter of Cook on Corporations, which treats exhaustively of the rights of preferred stockholders. Review of the earlier authorities may be found in 27 L. R. A. 136 in a note to the Massachusetts case of Field v. Lamson, etc. Co., there reported.

“It is fundamental in the law of corporations that the directors have no authority to declare a dividend upon any of its stock, common or preferred, unless the dividends are earned; and it is, therefore, not permitted to a corporation to agree to pay annual dividends on preferred stock, at all events, whether or not the earnings of the company be [865]*865sufficient to pay them. While these principles are acknowledged it is, nevertheless, a further fundamental principle of corporation law that, as to the rights between themselves, stockholders may agree and bind themselves so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of the public or of its creditors and those dealing with it, to have its capital kept unimpaired.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
92 S.E. 818, 120 Va. 859, 1917 Va. LEXIS 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drewry-hughes-co-v-throckmorton-va-1917.