Opinion filed August 20, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00232-CR
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DAVID ANTHONY CHAVEZ, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 358th District Court Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-23-1673-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Appellant, David Anthony Chavez, by indictment with twenty-five counts of possession of child pornography, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(d) (West Supp. 2025). Without an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty before a jury to all twenty-five counts. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for ten years in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for each conviction. The trial court granted the State’s motion that all twenty-five sentences be cumulated and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to comply with Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when accepting his guilty pleas. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2025). In his second issue, he asserts that the bills of costs conflict with the trial court’s orders that Appellant pay assessed costs upon his release from confinement. We modify the bills of costs, and as modified, we affirm.
Background Facts
Initially, Appellant exercised his right to a jury trial and elected for the jury to assess his punishment. Trial was called, and voir dire commenced with Appellant present. During voir dire, the State discussed the punishment range for the offenses with which Appellant was charged: two to ten years in prison, a fine of up to $10,000, and probation when appropriate. See PENAL § 12.34 (West 2019); CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.055 (West 2018). The State noted more than once that the maximum punishment for the offense of possession of child pornography was confinement for ten years. Appellant’s trial counsel also addressed the issue of punishment during voir dire, noting again that the applicable punishment range for the offense of possession of child pornography was confinement for two to ten years with probation available in certain circumstances.
The State also informed the jury during voir dire of Appellant’s “constitutional rights,” explaining the presumption of innocence and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Additionally, the State extensively discussed its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Following voir dire, the trial court noted that Appellant’s trial counsel had previously indicated that Appellant might be pleading guilty to all twenty-five counts. Appellant’s first issue concerns the admonishments given by the trial court at that time. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to all twenty-five counts.
The State presented evidence that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children sent a CyberTip to the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Investigations Division about an individual in Ector County who had possibly uploaded images of child pornography. The tip included the name “david chavez [sic]” accompanied by a phone number, date of birth, and e-mail address. Agents used this information to retrieve a home address linked to the e-mail account, and after cross-referencing the phone number and address with the Texas driver’s license database, they confirmed that they belonged to an individual named David Chavez. A review of the images confirmed to agents that each fell within the definition of child pornography because they depicted young children and toddlers.
Agents obtained and executed a search warrant for Appellant’s home.
Appellant was taken to the Department of Public Safety Office in Odessa where he was interviewed. Agents found a total of approximately 470 images of child pornography linked to Appellant. Twenty-five images among those disclosed in CyberTips were compiled and used as evidence against Appellant.
Analysis
Guilty Plea Admonishments Appellant makes two distinct arguments in his first issue: (1) that the trial court failed to properly admonish him in violation of Article 26.13(a) as to the punishment range and the requirements of sex offender registration and (2) that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because the record contains no
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evidence as required by Article 26.13(b) regarding whether Appellant knowingly waived his constitutional rights by pleading guilty.
Article 26.13(a) requires various admonishments prior to the trial court’s acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest. Specifically, the statute requires the trial court to admonish the defendant with regard to the range of punishment attached to the offense, and the possibility of sex offender registration requirements. CRIM PROC. art. 26.13(a)(1), (5). These admonishments may be given orally or in writing; if they are given in writing, the trial court must receive a statement signed by the defendant and the defendant’s attorney that the defendant understands the admonishments and is aware of the consequences of the plea. CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(d).
A trial court’s failure to admonish a defendant under Article 26.13 is non-
constitutional error that may be raised for the first time on appeal unless it is expressly waived. Loch v. State, 621 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Because it is non-constitutional error, we disregard such error if it does not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In determining whether the error affected Appellant’s substantial rights, we examine the entire record for indications as to whether Appellant was aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty prior to the trial court’s acceptance of his plea and whether he was misled or harmed by the trial court’s failure to properly admonish him. See Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 688–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); VanNortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In this regard, facts in the record, even facts that occur after the defendant pleads guilty, may raise the inference that, at the time of his guilty plea, the defendant was actually
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aware of the consequences of his plea. Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 689; Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 640–41.
A trial court’s error is not harmful if we have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the trial court admonished him. VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 709. For example, if the record shows that the defendant was made aware of the range of punishment by means other than a formal admonishment of same, the trial court’s failure to admonish the defendant under Article 26.13(a)(1) does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 639, 641 (no harm under Article 26.13(a)(1) where the record contained the phrases “life sentence,” “life in prison,” and “five-to-99 or life,” and there was no evidence appellant was unaware of the consequences of his plea); Duncan v. State, 6 S.W.3d 794, 795–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (no harm under Article 26.13(a)(1) where defendant filed a motion mentioning the appropriate range, and the trial court stated the proper range in the defendant’s presence).
In this case, the trial court erred when it failed to admonish Appellant as required by Article 26.13(a)(1) with respect to the range of punishment. But as stated above, Appellant was made aware of the range of punishment before he pleaded guilty when it was discussed multiple times in his presence during voir dire. Additionally, the trial court read its charge aloud in Appellant’s presence at the close of the punishment phase, which included the range applicable for each count, and Appellant expressed no surprise during the reading of the charge or pronouncement of his sentence. Thus, any harm caused by the trial court’s error did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. See Sutton v. State, No. 06-23-00197-CR, 2024 WL 1690460, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 19, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because we have fair assurance that Appellant’s plea
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would not have changed had he been properly admonished of the range of punishment by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him under Article 26.13(a)(1) did not harm Appellant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
The trial court also erred by failing to admonish Appellant regarding sex offender registration requirements under Chapter 62. Under Article 26.13(h), however, any such error is not reversible. See Abrego v. State, 611 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (collecting cases). In this regard, Article 26.13(h) provides that “[t]he failure of the court to comply with Subsection (a)(5) is not a ground for the defendant to set aside the conviction, sentence, or plea.” CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(h).
Article 26.13(b) provides that a guilty plea should not be accepted “unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.” Appellant contends that, without a full colloquy between the trial court or trial counsel and Appellant concerning his plea, the court was unable to determine whether Appellant was mentally competent and his plea was voluntary. Further, he asserts that the record was devoid of a showing that Appellant understood the rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty to the offenses charged.
“Federal due process requires that ‘[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 686 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). In pleading guilty, a defendant relinquishes his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him, as well as his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. “For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
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or privilege.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). A criminal defendant must have actual awareness of the charges against him and the privileges he necessarily relinquishes. Id.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Consistent with that guarantee, a guilty plea is valid only if it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)); Brady, 397 U.S. at 747; see McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
Boykin requires that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty did so knowingly and voluntarily. 395 U.S. at 242; Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 n.4. However, “Boykin [does] not specifically set out what must be ‘spread on the record’ to comply with [its] mandate.” Gardner v. State, 164 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In this regard, a failure to admonish a defendant does not necessarily amount to a due process violation. Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 687. To amount to a due process violation, “the record must also be silent with respect to whether he was otherwise provided, or nevertheless aware of, the requisite information to render his guilty plea voluntary and intelligent.” Id.
Here, the record is replete with evidence that Appellant was aware of, or otherwise provided with, information regarding his right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, the right against self-incrimination, and the nature of the charges against him, including the range of punishment.
Appellant did not initially plead guilty to the charges against him. Instead, he exercised his right to a jury trial and only indicated his desire to plead guilty after
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trial was called and voir dire was conducted. Once empaneled, Appellant offered his pleas of guilty in the presence of the jury. By pleading guilty in the jury’s presence and electing for the jury to determine his punishment, Appellant exercised his right to a jury trial; in actually exercising this right, he was necessarily aware of it. See Gaal v. State, No. 02-08-00382-CR, 2011 WL 2754754, at *4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth July 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[A]ppellant must have been aware of his right to a jury trial since he exercised it when he announced his guilty plea in front of the jury and continued to exercise it, as to a determination of his punishment, after announcing the plea.”); see also Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (“Clearly any plea before a jury has always been considered to be a jury trial.”). Appellant participated in the trial, personally and through his trial attorney. Similarly, Appellant exercised his right to confront the witnesses against him by cross-examining, through trial counsel, the State’s witnesses.
Regarding Appellant’s right against self-incrimination, although Appellant was not formally admonished at the time he made his pleas, the State informed the jury during voir dire, prior to his pleas, about Appellant’s right against self- incrimination in Appellant’s presence:
The next one is the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. . . . [Y]ou cannot be called as a witness against yourself at trial by the other side. . . . What’s important about that is that if you are selected as a juror on this case, you cannot -- the law requires that you cannot hold it against someone if they choose not to testify.
Additionally, the trial court admonished Appellant regarding his right against self- incrimination after the State rested. The trial court addressed Appellant directly:
At this time, I just need to admonish you that you still are entitled to remain silent; so, if you want to testify, you certainly can, but you do not have to testify. However, I do need to admonish you that if you
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choose to testify, you open yourself up to full cross-examination by the State; so, that’s up to you.
The record also shows that Appellant was aware of the nature of the charges against him and their consequences. The State explained the elements of the charge of possession of child pornography to the jury in detail during voir dire in Appellant’s presence. Additionally, during voir dire, the State explained to the venire panel, in Appellant’s presence, the applicable range of punishment for possession of child pornography. Similarly, Appellant’s trial counsel addressed with the venire panel that “the punishment range is two to ten years and, if you qualify, you can get probation in certain circumstances.”
Defense counsel also addressed Appellant’s guilty plea to the jury during closing arguments, stating:
[Appellant] pled guilty to [twenty-five] counts on the indictment.
[Twenty-five] counts of child pornography. Because he knew those to be downloaded into his account and in his possession because they were in his account. . . . He didn’t plead guilty to all these reports that they were reading. He didn’t plead guilty to all the details they were given. He pled guilty to an indictment.
Counsel also asked the jury to consider Appellant’s capability of rehabilitation when determining his sentence. Thus, the record supports the inference that Appellant’s guilty plea was a knowing and voluntary acknowledgement of his culpability to persuade the jury to assess a lighter sentence. See Gardner, 164 S.W.3d at 399.
Accordingly, this is not a silent record that might raise concerns of due process. Although bereft of a formal admonishment of his constitutional rights, the record supports the conclusion that Appellant’s pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made, which is confirmed by the discussion of his rights and potential punishment range during voir dire and the apparent trial strategy employed by Appellant’s trial counsel. Appellant did not plead “guilty” in ignorance of the factual
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assertions against him, the range of punishment he faced, his presumption of innocence, 1 his right against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, or the State’s 0F
burden of proof. 2 As to the constitutional due process afforded to Appellant, the 1F
record adequately shows that Appellant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily pleaded guilty and gives us fair assurance that he understood the consequences of his guilty pleas.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Bills of Costs In Appellant’s second issue, he asserts that the bills of costs issued by the district clerk made the assessed costs payable immediately, which conflicted with the trial court’s orders that Appellant pay costs upon his “release from confinement.” He argues that the bills of costs should be corrected by removing all costs not yet payable.
Here, the judgments provide that “[u]pon release from confinement, the Court ORDERS [Appellant] to proceed without unnecessary delay to the District Clerk’s office, or any other office designated by the Court or the Court’s designee, to pay or to make arrangements to pay any fines, court costs, reimbursement fees, and restitution due.” The district clerk issued a bill of cost for each judgment.
Appellant contends that Article 103.001(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes the bills of costs immediately payable. Specifically, Article 103.001(b) provides that “a cost is not payable by the person charged with the cost until a written
The State instructed the venire panel during voir dire, in Appellant’s presence, regarding the 1
presumption of innocence and their burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt: “The first one is the presumption of innocence. And what that means is as he sits there right now, the Defendant in this case and a defendant in any case is presumed to be innocent. And that presumption of innocence is enough to carry them forward and result in a not guilty verdict unless and until the State proves the case to you beyond a reasonable doubt. Does everyone understand that?”
The State’s burden of proof was reiterated, in Appellant’s presence, no less than ten times to the 2
venire panel.
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bill containing the items of cost is: (1) produced; (2) signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost; and (3) provided to the person charged with the cost.” CRIM. PROC. art. 103.001(b).
However, several of our sister courts have rejected the argument that Article 103.001(b) makes costs immediately payable; instead, the issuance of the bill of costs simply makes the costs payable. Abad v. State, 729 S.W.3d 108, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.); Richardson v. State, No. 02-24-00237- CR, 2026 WL 253462, at *20–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Contreras v. State, No. 05-24-01500- CR, 2026 WL 1593046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
When the bill of costs conflicts with the judgment’s requirement that costs are not due until release from confinement, the appropriate remedy is to modify the bill of costs to conform with the judgment—not to remove the costs from the bill of costs. Ray v. State, No. 05-24-00455-CR, 2025 WL 1725788, at *1–2 (Tex. App.— Dallas June 20, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying bill of costs to include statement assessed costs and fees are not due until defendant is released from confinement); Ramirez v. State, No. 02-24-00224-CR, 2025 WL 1350046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Bartley v. State, No. 06-24-00052-CR, 2025 WL 915045, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 26, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
Accordingly, we modify each of the bills of costs to state that the assessed costs are not due until Appellant’s release from confinement, in accordance with the language in the trial court’s judgment. See Ramirez, 2025 WL 1350046, at *3.
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In light of our modification of the bills of costs, Appellant’s second issue is sustained in part. To the extent that he seeks the complete removal of the assessed costs from the bills of costs, Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
This Court’s Ruling
We modify the bills of costs as stated above. As modified, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE
August 20, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.