Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 9, 2020
Docket1:14-cv-01115
StatusUnknown

This text of Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC (Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, (D. Del. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

DATA ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : C.A, No, 14-1115-LPS GOOGLE LLC, : Defendant. :

Brian E. Farnan and Michael J. Farnan, FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, DE Amir Alavi, Demetrios Anaipakos, Timothy Shelby, Brian Simmons, Scott W. Clark, Kyung Kim, Justin Chen, Monica Uddin, Nathan Campbell, and Louis Liao, AHMAD, ZAVITSANOS, ANAIPAKOS, ALAVI & MENSING, P.C., Houston, TX Attorneys for Plaintiff

Frederick L. Cottrell, II] and Jason J. Rawnsley, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, PA, Wilmington DE Gregory P. Stone, Eric P. Tuttle, Zachary M. Briers, Hannah Dubina, Ashley D. Kaplan, and Heather E, Takahashi, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, Los Angeles, CA Peter A. Detre, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, San Francisco, CA Attorneys for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 9, 2020 Wilmington, Delaware

(/Ly ta Judge: Pending before the Court are Defendant Google LLC’s (“Google”) motion for summary judgment (D.I. 330), Google’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Paul A. Navratil Concerning Novelty, State of the Art, and Commercial Success (D.I. 334), Google’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Michele M. Riley (D.1. 352), and Plaintiff Data Engine Technologies LLC’s (“DET” or “Plaintiff’) Motion to Strike Undisclosed Expert Opinions From the Rebuttal Expert Report of H. Scott Tucker Regarding Non-Infringement (D.I. 325). For the reasons given below, the Court will grant Google’s motion for summary judgment and deny the remaining motions as moot. 1. BACKGROUND DET filed suit against Google on September 2, 2014, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,303,146 (the “’146 patent”), 5,416,895 (the “895 patent”), 5,623,591 (the “’591 patent”), 5,590,259 (the “’259 patent”), 5,784,545 (the “°545 patent”), and 6,282,551 (the “’551 patent”) (together, the “patents-in-suit”). (D.L. 1) The patents-in-suit relate generally to the use of notebook-type tabs to organize and display information in a multipage electronic three- dimensional spreadsheet. (See D.I. 300 at 2) The accused product, Google Sheets, is a cloud- based spreadsheet application. (D.I. 333 Ex. 1 454) In January 2016, Google moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that all of DET’s asserted claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to nonpatentable subject matter. (DI. 125) The Court granted Defendant’s motion. (D.I. 263) Plaintiff appealed the entry of judgment on the pleadings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (D.I. 267)

1 The parties stipulated to dismissal of the ’895 patent on June 29, 2015. (D.L 46)

On October 9, 2018, the Federal Circuit concluded that, except for claim | of the °551 patent and the asserted claims of the ’146 patent, the asserted claims of the other asserted patents

— the ’259, °545, and ’551 patents — are directed to patent-eligible subject matter. See Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1006, 1011-13 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. On remand, DET alleges that Google directly infringes claims 12, 13, 19, and 24 of the patent, claims 1, 2, 10, 13, and 35 of the °545 patent, and claims 3, 6, 7, 12, and 13 of the patent. (D.1. 331 at 2) As part of the remand proceedings, on October 8, 2019, the Court held a claim construction hearing. (D.I. 309) The Court issued a memorandum opinion and order regarding claim construction on December 9, 2019, (D.I. 312, 313) The Court construed the disputed claim term “three-dimensional spreadsheet” to mean “a spreadsheet that defines a mathematical relation among cells on the different spreadsheet pages, such that cells are arranged in a 3-D grid.” (DI. 313) On May 26, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the pending motions. (See D.1. 379) (“Tr.”) Il. LEGAL STANDARDS Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be — or, alternatively, is — genuinely disputed must be supported either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). Ifthe moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court will “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 USS. at 586; see also Podobnik y. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating party opposing summary judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment,” a factual dispute is genuine only where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 247-48 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted,” /d. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial”). Thus, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find” for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, I. DISCUSSION A.

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Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/data-engine-technologies-llc-v-google-llc-ded-2020.