Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedDecember 9, 2019
Docket1:14-cv-01115
StatusUnknown

This text of Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC (Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, (D. Del. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

DATA ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, :

Plaintiff, : Vv. : C.A. No. 14-1115-LPS GOOGLE LLC, : Defendant. :

Brian E. Farnan, Michael J. Farnan, FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, DE Amir Alavi, Demetrios Anaipakos, Alisa A. Lipski, Timothy Shelby, Scott W. Clark, Monica Uddin, Nathan Campbell, Louis Liao, AHMAD, ZAVITSANOS, ANAIPAKOS, ALAVI & MENSING, P.C., Houston, TX Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Frederick L. Cottrell, Jason J. Rawnsley, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, PA, Wilmington DE Gregory P. Stone, Eric P. Tuttle, Zachary M. Briers, Hannah Dubina, Ashley D. Kaplan, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, Los Angeles, CA Peter A. Detre, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, San Francisco, CA Attorneys for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

December 9, 2019 Wilmington, Delaware

oii. fA District Judge: Presently before the Court is the issue of claim construction. Plaintiff Data Engine Technologies LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendant Google LLC (“Defendant”) on September 2, 2014, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259 (the “’259 patent”), 5,784,545 (the “’545 patent”), and 6,282,551 (the “’551 patent”). (D.I. 1) The patents-in-suit generally relate to the use of notebook-type tabs to organize and display information in a multipage electronic spreadsheet. The parties completed briefing on September 10, 2019. (D.I. 300) The Court held a claim construction hearing on October 8, 2019. (D.I. 309 (“Tr.”)) BACKGROUND In 2015, the parties submitted claim construction briefing relating to disputed terms including “three dimensional spreadsheet.” (See, e.g., D.I. 53, 87, 89) At that time, Plaintiff proposed construing “three dimensional spreadsheet” as “an electronic spreadsheet where information cells are referenced by three coordinates.” (D.I. 53) Defendant proposed the plain and ordinary meaning or, in the alternative, ““a computer-based spreadsheet having cells arranged ina 3D grid.” (/d.) The parties later agreed that the term did not need construction. Subsequently, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (D.I. 125) The Court granted Defendant’s motion. (D.I. 263) Plaintiff appealed the entry of judgment on the pleadings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (D.I. 267) On October 9, 2018, the Federal Circuit concluded that, except for claim 1 of the ’551 patent, the asserted claims of the °259, °545, and °551 patents are directed to patent-eligible subject matter. See Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1011-13 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit remanded the case for further consideration.

LEGAL STANDARDS The ultimate question of the proper construction of a patent is a question of law. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996)). “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.” /d. at 1324. Instead, the Court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources “in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.” /d. “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning... [which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” /d. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The patent specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). While “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Furthermore, “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment . . . [b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” /d. (internal citation omitted).

It is likewise true that “[d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide . . . For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” /d. at 1314- 15 (internal citation omitted). This “presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.” SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It is also possible that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. It bears emphasis that “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to the specification, a court “should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The prosecution history, which is “intrinsic evidence,” “consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the

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Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/data-engine-technologies-llc-v-google-llc-ded-2019.