UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSCAR C. DANTZLER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:24-cv-00986 (ACR)
WILLIAM W. JORDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Oscar C. Dantzler, a resident of the Parish of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, sought to
run for governor of Louisiana in 2023, but a state court disqualified him for filing a false
certification on his notice of candidacy form. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sues all the parties
involved in his disqualification for allegedly conspiring to prevent him from becoming governor
of Louisiana.
Defendants move to dismiss on multiple grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12. See Dkts. 20, 22, 25. The Court agrees that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s 28 U.S.C. § 1361 claims and that it lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants.
Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims on these grounds, the Court need not
address Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 20, 22, 25. And because it is not in the interest of justice
to transfer this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Dkts. 21, 26.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139
1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court must construe a pro se complaint together with all the plaintiff’s
filings, see Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and must
read all pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s claims stem from a Louisiana state court lawsuit that resulted in his
disqualification from the 2023 Louisiana governor’s race. Dkt. 1 at 3. In August 2023,
Defendant Anthony L. Jackson, Jr. filed a petition in the Louisiana Nineteenth Judicial District
Court to disqualify Plaintiff from the gubernatorial race for filing a false certification on his
notice of candidacy form. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that the judge presiding over the lawsuit,
Defendant Judge William W. Jorden, allowed fraudulent and perjurious pleadings to be filed
against Plaintiff, engaged in unethical behavior, and interfered with Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Dkt. 5 at 9–13. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Mr. Jackson and Judge Jorden,
as well as Douglas Welborn, Alvin Johnson, Cherie T. Henley, John B. Edwards, Yolanda Cezar,
and the Nineteenth District Court of Louisiana, conspired to prevent him from becoming
governor of the Pelican State.1 Id.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against all Defendants except Ms.
Cezar. Dkt. 1. A month later, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Ms. Cezar to the list
of Defendants. Dkt. 5. The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaints are long, repetitive, vague, and hard
to parse. That said, the Court understands Plaintiff’s claims to be for general violations of his
1 Many a pelican call Louisiana home: the brown pelican is Louisiana’s state bird, and a mother pelican and her three chicks appear on the state flag. See State Symbols, LOUISIANA.GOV, https://www.louisiana.gov/about-louisiana/state-symbols/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2024). 2 rights of due process, equal protection, and access to courts, as well as for specific violations of
28 U.S.C. § 1361, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
Five of the eight Defendants moved to dismiss in three separate motions. See Dkts. 20,
22, 25. All motions argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, see id.,
and two of the three motions argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s section 1361 claims, see Dkts. 20, 25. The motions advance additional arguments in
support of dismissal: improper venue, see Dkts. 20, 22, 25, insufficient service of process, see
Dkts. 20, 22, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Dkts. 20, 25, and lack
of procedural capacity and violations of the judicial immunity doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and the Eleventh Amendment, see Dkt. 22.
In response to this flurry of motions, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Transfer Venue. See Dkts.
21, 26.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Of the multiple grounds for dismissal that Defendants raise, only two are necessary to
dispose of this case: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), a court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and
construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 F.3d at 1139. A court may consider “the
complaint standing alone”; alternatively, it may consider the “complaint supplemented by
3 undisputed facts evidenced in the record.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff also bears the burden of “establishing a factual basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s].” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1990). To do so, the plaintiff “must allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant
with the forum.” Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (cleaned up). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), a court may again
consider materials outside the pleadings, see Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
and any “factual discrepancies appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff,”
Crane, 894 F.2d at 456.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSCAR C. DANTZLER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:24-cv-00986 (ACR)
WILLIAM W. JORDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Oscar C. Dantzler, a resident of the Parish of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, sought to
run for governor of Louisiana in 2023, but a state court disqualified him for filing a false
certification on his notice of candidacy form. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sues all the parties
involved in his disqualification for allegedly conspiring to prevent him from becoming governor
of Louisiana.
Defendants move to dismiss on multiple grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12. See Dkts. 20, 22, 25. The Court agrees that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s 28 U.S.C. § 1361 claims and that it lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants.
Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims on these grounds, the Court need not
address Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 20, 22, 25. And because it is not in the interest of justice
to transfer this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Dkts. 21, 26.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139
1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court must construe a pro se complaint together with all the plaintiff’s
filings, see Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and must
read all pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s claims stem from a Louisiana state court lawsuit that resulted in his
disqualification from the 2023 Louisiana governor’s race. Dkt. 1 at 3. In August 2023,
Defendant Anthony L. Jackson, Jr. filed a petition in the Louisiana Nineteenth Judicial District
Court to disqualify Plaintiff from the gubernatorial race for filing a false certification on his
notice of candidacy form. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that the judge presiding over the lawsuit,
Defendant Judge William W. Jorden, allowed fraudulent and perjurious pleadings to be filed
against Plaintiff, engaged in unethical behavior, and interfered with Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Dkt. 5 at 9–13. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Mr. Jackson and Judge Jorden,
as well as Douglas Welborn, Alvin Johnson, Cherie T. Henley, John B. Edwards, Yolanda Cezar,
and the Nineteenth District Court of Louisiana, conspired to prevent him from becoming
governor of the Pelican State.1 Id.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against all Defendants except Ms.
Cezar. Dkt. 1. A month later, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Ms. Cezar to the list
of Defendants. Dkt. 5. The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaints are long, repetitive, vague, and hard
to parse. That said, the Court understands Plaintiff’s claims to be for general violations of his
1 Many a pelican call Louisiana home: the brown pelican is Louisiana’s state bird, and a mother pelican and her three chicks appear on the state flag. See State Symbols, LOUISIANA.GOV, https://www.louisiana.gov/about-louisiana/state-symbols/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2024). 2 rights of due process, equal protection, and access to courts, as well as for specific violations of
28 U.S.C. § 1361, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
Five of the eight Defendants moved to dismiss in three separate motions. See Dkts. 20,
22, 25. All motions argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, see id.,
and two of the three motions argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s section 1361 claims, see Dkts. 20, 25. The motions advance additional arguments in
support of dismissal: improper venue, see Dkts. 20, 22, 25, insufficient service of process, see
Dkts. 20, 22, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Dkts. 20, 25, and lack
of procedural capacity and violations of the judicial immunity doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and the Eleventh Amendment, see Dkt. 22.
In response to this flurry of motions, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Transfer Venue. See Dkts.
21, 26.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Of the multiple grounds for dismissal that Defendants raise, only two are necessary to
dispose of this case: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), a court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and
construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 F.3d at 1139. A court may consider “the
complaint standing alone”; alternatively, it may consider the “complaint supplemented by
3 undisputed facts evidenced in the record.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff also bears the burden of “establishing a factual basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s].” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1990). To do so, the plaintiff “must allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant
with the forum.” Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (cleaned up). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), a court may again
consider materials outside the pleadings, see Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
and any “factual discrepancies appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff,”
Crane, 894 F.2d at 456.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Section 1361 Claims
Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1361 as the basis for the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction for
issuing writs of mandamus against Defendants. Dkt. 1 at 1. Under section 1361, district courts
have jurisdiction over “any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361. Federal courts interpret section 1361 to apply to employees of the federal executive
branch. See United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Trackwell v. U.S.
Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007); Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379,
1384 (2d Cir. 1970); King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).
Here, Plaintiff did not file claims against any employee of the federal executive branch.
Rather, Plaintiff filed claims against private citizens who are either state government employees
or acting in an individual capacity and against a state court in Louisiana. See Dkt. 5. Because
4 section 1361 confers jurisdiction on this Court over federal executive branch employees, and
none of the named Defendants is a federal executive branch employee, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against any of the Defendants.
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s section 1361 claims against all Defendants for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over All Defendants
To establish personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff “must allege some specific facts evidencing
purposeful activity by the defendants in the District of Columbia by which they invoked the
benefits and protections of the laws of the District of Columbia.” Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 175 (D.D.C. 2018). In assessing whether it has personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident, a court “must first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable
under the state’s long-arm statute.” GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). If yes, then a court must determine “whether a finding of
jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process.” Id.
Plaintiff concedes that all Defendants reside in Louisiana. Dkt. 26 at 2. Because all
Defendants are non-residents of the District of Columbia, the Court turns to the District’s long-
arm statute. See D.C. CODE § 13-423(a). But the Court need not tarry there long because
Plaintiff fails to allege any acts committed by Defendants in or relating to the District of
Columbia. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that all events giving rise to his claims occurred in
Louisiana. Dkt. 26 at 2. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants transacted any
business, contracted to supply any services, or caused any tortious injury in the District of
Columbia. Because all Defendants are non-residents of the District of Columbia, and the
District’s long-arm statute does not reach any of the Defendants, the Court lacks personal
5 jurisdiction over all Defendants.
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s remaining claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
C. The Court Will Not Transfer Plaintiff’s Case
Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Motion to
Transfer Venue, Dkts. 21, 26. “A court may transfer a case to another district even though it
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d
779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962)). However,
“[t]he decision whether a transfer or a dismissal is in the interest of justice . . . rests within the
sound discretion of the district court.” Id. In Naartex, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an order
dismissing, rather than transferring, a case in which the district court lacked personal jurisdiction
over some defendants because “substantive problems” plagued the plaintiff’s claims. Id.
Here, “substantive problems” abound. Chief among them is lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s section 1361 claims—a problem that will persist even if the Court
transfers the case to another venue. Moreover, a cursory review of Plaintiff’s Complaints
(which, again, are long, repetitive, vague, and hard to parse) convinces the Court that he will
encounter substantive Rule 12 and constitutional problems no matter the venue.
Heeding Benjamin Franklin’s advice to “[n]ever leave till tomorrow that which you can
do today,” the Court finds that it is not in “the interest of justice” to transfer this case, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(b), and denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer, Dkts. 21, 26.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s section 1361 claims and lacks
personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. The Court finds that it is not in the interest of justice
6 to transfer this case.
For these reasons, the Court hereby
GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 20, 22, 25. The Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default, Dkt. 9, Defendant’s Motion for Pre-
Motion Conference, Dkt. 11, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Expedited Motion, Dkt.
17, Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing, Dkt. 19, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Case, Dkts.
21, 26. The Court
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 5, and
this case without prejudice. And the Court
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
This is a final appealable Order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
Date: November 20, 2024 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge