Daniels v. Moores

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 24-30
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-30-(L) Daniels et al. v. Moores

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of March two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, GUIDO CALABRESI, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. ___________________________________________

Mark Daniels, Rashid Rahman, Felipe Rivera- Cruz, and Terry Mathis, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Peter Allen, Brian Bernard, Shannon Dickinson, Aaron Dockery, John Gradia, Angel Hernandez, Hugh Knight, Harold Ortiz, Sean Pritchett, Wayne Stewart, and Derrick Williams,

Plaintiffs v. Nos. 24-30-pr; 24-785-pr

Dr. Carol Moores, in her official capacity,

Defendant-Appellant,

Carl Koenigsmann, MD, John Morley, MD, Susan Mueller, MD, David S. Dinello, MD, Paula Bozer, MD, John Hammer, MD, Ann Andola, MD, Mikhail Gusman, MD, Chun Lee, MD, Kathleen Mantaro, MD, Peter Braselman, MD, David Karandy, MD, Albert Acrish, NP, Kristin Salotti, NP, Mary Ashong, NP, John Doe #1, MD, Jane Doe, MD #3-#50, NP or PA #1-#50, John Doe, MD #3-#50, NP or PA #1-#50, and John Doe #2,

Defendants. ___________________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES: BRIAN MARC FELDMAN, Sheila Baynes, Aurelian Law PLLC, Rochester, NY, Amy Jane Agnew, Law Office of Amy Jane Agnew, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ORIANA L. KILEY, William S. Nolan, Robert S. Rosborough, IV, Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany, NY.

Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Preska, Judge). 2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgments of the district court are

AFFIRMED.

Plaintiffs-Appellees are prisoners in the custody of New York State

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), of which

Defendant-Appellant Dr. Carol Moores is the Chief Medical Officer. Moores

appeals from the grant of a permanent injunction against her in her official

capacity and the grant of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiffs. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to

which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm the judgments

below.

This case concerns DOCCS’s treatment of patients in its custody who suffer

from chronic pain. In 2017, DOCCS promulgated a “Medications with Abuse

Potential” Policy (MWAP Policy), which required a Regional Medical Director to

approve the use of medications that have abuse potential before a care provider

could prescribe them. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that Regional Medical Directors categorically refused to approve

the use of MWAP medications notwithstanding patients’ needs or the

3 recommendations of their treating physicians, and that this deprivation of effective

pain medication violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs moved for class

certification and for a preliminary injunction.

In February of 2021, DOCCS rescinded the MWAP Policy and replaced it

with Policy 1.24A. Policy 1.24A provides that primary care providers “will

prescribe any medications deemed appropriate for treatment of the patient’s

chronic pain condition,” overhauling the requirement of approval by a Regional

Medical Director. App’x 776. Policy 1.24A further provides that patients with

chronic pain will be coded accordingly and assessed periodically, and that

discontinuation of medication shall only occur after a provider has met with a

patient and made an individualized determination that it is in the patient’s best

interest.

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint as moot.

After an evidentiary hearing on whether the challenged conduct persisted after

the promulgation of Policy 1.24A, the district court denied the motion to dismiss,

granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and certified Plaintiffs’

injunctive class.

After a four-day bench trial, the district court converted the preliminary

4 injunction to a permanent injunction. The court subsequently entered the terms

of the permanent injunction, which primarily requires Moores to enforce

compliance with Policy 1.24A. The court then awarded attorneys’ fees for

Plaintiffs’ counsel. On appeal, Moores raises challenges to the permanent

injunction, the class certification, and the awarding of attorneys’ fees.

I. Permanent Injunction

“Following a bench trial, we review the district court's conclusions of law de

novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 189

(2d Cir. 2007). “The trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction is reviewed for

abuse of discretion.” Id. To obtain a permanent injunction, “[a] plaintiff must

demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies

available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that

injury; 3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would

not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,

561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388,

391 (2006)); cf. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (third and fourth factors

“merge when the Government is the opposing party”).

5 a. Mootness

The core of Moores’s challenge is that the recission of the MWAP Policy and

implementation of Policy 1.24A foreclosed Plaintiffs’ claim. However, the district

court made the factual finding that the MWAP Policy was still de facto in place,

despite being formally rescinded, because prisoners in DOCCS custody continued

to have their MWAP medications systematically denied without medical

justification and without regard to medical need. See Special App’x 173 (“DOCSS’

MWAP policy is responsible for ongoing violations of federal law because its

impact remains in place despite its being officially rescinded by DOCCS.”). This

finding was not clearly erroneous. Indeed, the record from trial and from the

previous evidentiary hearing demonstrate that patients continued to be deprived

of their MWAP medications after Policy 1.24A was promulgated.

Accordingly, Policy 1.24A did not render Plaintiffs’ claim moot. A threshold

inquiry is “whether the challenged conduct has, in fact, ceased,” or “if the

defendant’s change in conduct is merely superficial or suffers from similar

infirmities as it did at the outset.” Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,

815 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Here, the district court concluded that

6 the challenged conduct had not in fact ceased. 1

b. Permanent Injunction Factors

The district court’s finding that the MWAP Policy was still ongoing in

practice supports its conclusion that Plaintiffs suffered actual Eighth Amendment

violations, and therefore irreparable harm. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482

(2d Cir. 1996). “In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of

inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs.” Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (cleaned

up). “This standard incorporates both objective and subjective elements.” Id.

“The objective ‘medical need’ element measures the severity of the alleged

deprivation, while the subjective ‘deliberate indifference’ element ensures that the

defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at

1Moores makes a related argument that, even if some claim against her persisted after the promulgation of Policy 1.24A, it was not pled in Plaintiffs’ operative complaint. However, the final pretrial order established that Plaintiffs brought a claim for injunctive relief against Moores to cure ongoing practices of denying and/or discontinuing necessary and effective pain medication without medical justification or regard for individual need. This pretrial order “controls the [subsequent] course of the action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d), and “it is irrelevant that the pleadings were never formally amended.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 n.1 (1974); see also Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 (2007).

7 183–84. Under the objective prong, this Court has considered “the pain suffered

by the plaintiff,” “deterioration . . . due to a lack of treatment,” “or the inability to

engage in normal activities.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998).

Under the subjective prong, deliberate indifference is met “when [an] official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety, a state of

mind equivalent to the familiar standard of ‘recklessness’ as used in criminal law.”

Smith, 316 F.3d at 184 (cleaned up).

On the objective prong, the district court credited testimony at trial

demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ lack of effective pain medication caused severe pain,

deterioration, and an inability to engage in normal activities. See Chance, 143 F.3d

at 703. We give great deference to the credibility determinations of the district

court, JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 658, 670 (2d Cir. 2023), and see no clear error

in its factual determinations.

On the subjective prong, the court did not clearly err in concluding that the

providers who denied Plaintiffs effective medical treatment did so with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. The district court credited testimony that

patients were repeatedly denied pain medication that had previously worked for

them, that patients’ repeated complaints of debilitating pain were ignored, and

8 that patients were told the discontinuation of their medication was based on

generalized policy decisions rather than individual need or medical justification. 2

These factual findings establish deliberate indifference caused by the MWAP

Policy.

Moores tries to cast the litigation as a “mere disagreement over the proper

treatment.” See Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. But “a deliberate indifference claim can

lie where prison officials deliberately ignore the medical recommendations of a

prisoner’s treating physicians,” and where defendants “reflexively rel[ied] on . . .

the substance abuse policy when they had been put on notice that the medically

appropriate decision could be, instead, to depart from the [policy] and prescribe

[the medication] to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 404, 406 (2d Cir.

2005). The district court found that the MWAP Policy resulted in an ongoing,

systemwide problem of providers depriving patients of effective pain medication

without medical justification and without providing effective alternatives, which

2 Moores challenges the district court’s admission of testimony from prisoners about statements made to them by DOCCS employees, arguing it is inadmissible hearsay. “Judges are entrusted with considerable discretion when deciding which evidence to admit or exclude at trial,” and we reverse for an abuse of discretion “only when an evidentiary ruling is manifestly erroneous or arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 788 (2d Cir. 2021). No such error was made here. See Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 131 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). 9 “evince[d] a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Chance,

143 F.3d at 703.

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

Plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim, which

establishes irreparable harm. 3 See Jolly, 76 F.3d at 482. The court also did not abuse

its discretion in determining that the other factors relevant to the permanent

injunction analysis favored Plaintiffs: the public interest favors protecting

constitutional rights, and any administrative burdens of compliance are

outweighed by this interest. See New York v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d

42, 87 (2d Cir. 2020).

c. PLRA

Moores further argues that the terms of the permanent injunction violated

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which allows a court to impose

prospective relief only after finding “that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends

no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18

3The district court also did not clearly err in finding that these constitutional violations were traceable to DOCCS’ failure to effectively implement Policy 1.24A, as we explained above. 10 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). The district court properly concluded that the ordered relief

comports with the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. “[A] remedy may

require more than the bare minimum federal law would permit and yet still be

necessary and narrowly drawn to correct the violation.” Handberry v. Thompson,

446 F.3d 335, 346 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). To correct the ongoing effects of the

MWAP Policy, the court ordered Moores to enforce compliance with Policy 1.24A,

develop a system of identifying patients in DOCCS custody with chronic pain,

conduct individualized assessments for patients with a chronic pain code, and

train relevant personnel. This relief “provides a practicable means of effectuation”

and satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness inquiry. Id. at 346 (cleaned up).

II. Class Certification

Moores also challenges the district court’s decision to certify a class for

injunctive relief. We review the district court’s determinations on class

certification for abuse of discretion. Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir.

2010). The district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the injunctive

class, which it defined as “[a]ll incarcerated individuals who are or will be in the

care and custody of the [DOCCS] who suffer or will suffer from chronic pain

and/or neuropathies who require individualized assessments of medical need for

11 treatment with MWAP medications.” Special App’x 68, 83.

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every class

meet four requirements: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members

is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The certified class satisfies each

requirement. At least 800 prisoners in DOCCS custody suffer from chronic pain

or neuropathy, and the district court found that many such patients were still

denied, or at risk of being denied, effective pain medication. Plaintiffs also

“suffered the same injury,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011),

satisfying commonality, and “alleged that the same unlawful conduct was

directed at or affected both the named plaintiff[s] and the class sought to be

represented,” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936–37 (2d Cir. 1993), satisfying

typicality. As to adequacy, the district court found that “Plaintiffs’ interests are

not ‘antagonistic’ to the interest of other class members and Plaintiffs’ attorneys

12 are ‘qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the litigation.’” 4 Special App’x 79

(quoting Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir.

2000)). None of these findings were clearly erroneous, and therefore the district

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a).

The court also did not abuse its discretion in finding that the injunctive class

satisfies Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that “the party opposing the class has acted

or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the

class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Here, “it is clear that the proposed

injunctive relief sweeps broadly enough to benefit each class member,” regardless

of whether some members started receiving effective medication after the

promulgation of Policy 1.24A, as “they might each still be subject to a further

action by these same defendants” depriving them of MWAP medication, absent

injunctive relief. Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 97–98 (2d Cir.

2015).

4 Assuming without deciding that ascertainability is a fifth requirement for injunctive classes under Rule 23(b)(2), see In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 264 (2d Cir. 2017) (applying ascertainability requirement to Rule 23(b)(3) class), we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the injunctive class satisfied this requirement. 13 III. Attorneys’ Fees

Lastly, Moores challenges the award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs.

When a party succeeds on a § 1983 claim, “the court, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “[W]e

review a district court’s decision on a Section 1988 fee application for abuse of

discretion,” but “[w]hether a litigant is a ‘prevailing party’ . . . presents a question

of law as to which we review the district court’s decision de novo.” DiMartile v.

Hochul, 80 F.4th 443, 450 (2d Cir. 2023).

Plaintiffs are prevailing parties because they obtained a favorable

permanent injunction. See Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 2, 4 (2012). Indeed, the

ordered relief is “a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties,’” as it requires Moores to actually enforce compliance with Policy 1.24A,

train relevant personnel, and identify and treat affected patients. Kirk v. New York

State Dep't of Educ., 644 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care

Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Moores’ request to

halve the fee award based on Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful motion to certify a damages

liability class. “[W]here, as in this case, the plaintiff[s’] claims ‘involve a common

14 core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories,’ and are therefore not

severable, attorney’s fees may be awarded for unsuccessful claims as well as

successful ones.” Green v. Torres, 361 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)) (cleaned up). The district court was within its

discretion to find that the damages class and the injunctive class were intertwined

such that the two claims could not be separated.

We have considered the Appellant’s remaining arguments and conclude

they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the District

Court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court