Daniel v. Florida Industrial Co.

166 S.E. 712, 159 Va. 472, 1932 Va. LEXIS 212
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 17, 1932
StatusPublished

This text of 166 S.E. 712 (Daniel v. Florida Industrial Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel v. Florida Industrial Co., 166 S.E. 712, 159 Va. 472, 1932 Va. LEXIS 212 (Va. 1932).

Opinion

Epes, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action, instituted by a notice of motion for judgment, brought by Florida Industrial Company, a corporation, against W. F. Daniel to recover the balance due on three notes for $8,797.19 each, which were given that company by Daniel for the deferred installments of the purchase price of fractional section 1, township 43 south, range 29 east, and lots three and four in fractional section 6, township 43 south, range 29 east, in Hendry county, Florida, which were conveyed by it to Daniel by a deed dated September 14, 1925.

Daniel’s defense is a plea of set-off in which he alleges that the land shown on the diagram, which we have inserted, as the area K X Y C, containing seventy-eight acres, is in section 1, township 43 south, range 29 east; that Florida Industrial Company had lost title to this seventy-eight acres through the adverse possession of other persons;

[475]*475and that he is entitled to have the value thereof at the time of his purchase of section 1 set-off against the demand of the plaintiff.

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Space forbids the insertion of a plat covering all the territory to which reference is made in the evidence; and [476]*476the diagram inserted shows in their entirety only sections 1 and 12. On this diagram the section lines called for by the Government map and field notes are shown as solid lines. The north and south lines and the east and west lines, shown as broken lines, denote lines which the defendant claims were run on the ground by the surveyor for section lines, though the locations thereof do not accord with his field notes.

The reply of Florida Industrial Company is that the area KXYC lies in section 12, not in section 1, and was not conveyed, or intended to be conveyed, in the deed from it to Daniel.

Florida Industrial Company introduced in evidence the three notes sued upon, which had endorsed thereon certain credits for sums paid to it by Daniel, the purchase money mortgage given to it by Daniel to secure the payment of these notes, and a written agreement, dated September 14, 1926, between it and Daniel by which the time for the payment of the balance due on the first note was extended to September 14, 1929. It then rested.

All other evidence was introduced by Daniel, or brought out on the cross-examination of witnesses introduced by him, or consisted of depositions, which though taken by Florida Industrial Company, were read in evidence by Daniel.

At the conclusion of the evidence for the defendant the court sustained the .motion of the plaintiff to strike out all of Daniel’s evidence. The ground of this motion was, in effect, that as a matter of .law it was insufficient to sustain a verdict finding that the land within the area K X Y C is included in the land conveyed by Florida Industrial Company to Daniel.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for an amount which is correct, unless the defendant is entitled to the set-off pleaded by him in his plea above mentioned. The court entered judgment on this verdict, to which judgment the defendant has been granted a writ of error.

[477]*477The primary assignment of error is that the court erred in sustaining the motion to strike out the defendant’s evidence. If the court was correct in this ruling, the other assignments of error are without point.

These Florida lands were a part of the public lands of the United States, and were subdivided and disposed of by it to private persons. The United States statutes prescribing rules for surveying and for ascertaining the boundaries and contents of subdivisions of the public lands have remained unchanged in any particular here material from long prior to 1872 to the present time. See sections 2395-2396, Revised Statutes U. S. 1878; U. S. Code Ann. (1928), Title 43, Public Lands, sections 751-752. The pertinent parts of sections 751-752, U. S. C. A., Title 43, Public Lands, are quoted in the footnote.1 We note below the rules of law which have been laid down by the courts relating to what constitute Government subdivisions of the public lands, and to ascertaining the boundaries thereof.

A survey of the public lands of the United States does not describe boundaries, it creates them. Cox v. Hart (Cal. 1922), 260 U. S. 427, 43 S. Ct. 154, 67 L. Ed. 332. A “Government section” or other “Government” subdivision is the land lying within the lines of that section or subdivision as surveyed and marked upon the ground by the [478]*478government surveyor. This is true, even though due to some mistake made by him the surveyor ran and marked the lines on the ground otherwise than as was required by the rules and regulations of the government, or as called for in his field notes. If the point at which a section corner was placed by the government surveyor or the line marked by him as a section line is satisfactorily established, it is conclusive as to the location of the corner or line, though the location of the corner or line does not accord with that corner or line as shown on the government map of the subdivision, or with that called for by the field notes of the surveyor who made the survey on which the government map is based. Watrous v. Morrison, 38 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805, 39 Am. St. Rep. 139; Kirch v. Persinger, 87 Fla. 364, 100 So. 166; Lawler v. Rice & Goodhue Counties, 147 Minn. 234, 178 N. W. 317, 180 N. W. 37; Nesselrode v. Parrish, 59 Iowa 570, 13 N. W. 746; Climer v. Wallace, 28 Mo. 556, 75 Am. Dec. 135; Hess v. Meyer, 73 Mich. 259, 41 N. W. 422; Puget Mill Co. v. North Seattle Imp. Co., 120 Wash. 198, 206 Pac. 954; Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N. W. 740; Anderson v. Johanesen, 155 Minn. 485, 193 N. W. 730; Galbraith v. Parker, 17 Ariz. 369, 153 Pac. 283, on rehearing Ivy v. Parker, 18 Ariz. 503, 163 Pac. 258; State v. Ball, 90 Neb. 307, 133 N. W. 412; Ogilvie v. Copeland, 145 Ill. 98, [479]*47933 N. E. 1085; Yolo County v. Nolan, 144 Cal. 445, 77 Pac. 1006.

“In the sale of lands in sections, or subdivisions thereof, including lots, according to the government survey, the survey as actually made controls. Miller v. White, 23 Fla. 301, 2 So. 614; Liddon v. Hodnett, 22 Fla. 442. It is the survey as it was actually run on the ground that governs, if the monuments, corners or lines actually established can be located or proved. Courses and distances yield to such corners and lines, so long as the latter can be located, and for the reason that the latter are the fact or truth of the survey as it was actually made while the former are but descriptions of the act done, and when inaccurate they cannot change the fact.” Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805, 807, 39 Am. St. Rep. 139.

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Bluebook (online)
166 S.E. 712, 159 Va. 472, 1932 Va. LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-v-florida-industrial-co-va-1932.