O 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California
9 10 11 DANA TOMPKINS BARNETT, Case No. 2:20-cv-02530-ODW (ASx) individually, and as Successor in Interest 12 of the Estate of JEFFREY BARNETT, 13 deceased, ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST 14 Plaintiff, AMENDED COMPLAINT [30] [36] 15 16 v.
17 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; ALEX 18 VILLANUEVA; JONATHAN E. SHERIN, M.D., Ph.D.; and DOES 1 19 through 10, inclusive, 20 21 Defendants. 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 Plaintiff Dana Tompkins Barnett, individually and as successor in interest to the 25 estate of Jeffrey Barnett (“Decedent”), brings this action against Defendants County of 26 Los Angeles (“County”) and Sherriff Alex Villanueva for violations of federal and 27 state law stemming from Decedent’s suicide while incarcerated at a Los Angeles 28 County Jail. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 5–9, 16–21, ECF No. 25.) The 1 County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and sixth claims, and Villanueva moves to 2 dismiss Plaintiff’s first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims. (Cty. Mot. Dismiss 3 (“Cty. Mot.”), ECF No. 30; Villanueva Mot. Dismiss (“Villanueva Mot.”), ECF 4 No. 36.) Both Motions are fully briefed. (See Cty. Mot.; Opp’n Cty. Mot., ECF 5 No. 32; Reply Cty. Mot., ECF No. 33; Villanueva Mot.; Opp’n Villanueva Mot., ECF 6 No. 38; Reply Villanueva Mot., ECF No. 39.) For the following reasons, Villanueva’s 7 Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the County’s Motion is 8 DENIED.1 9 II. BACKGROUND2 10 On March 15, 2019, Decedent was booked into the Men’s Central Jail (“MCJ”) 11 in Los Angeles, California. (FAC ¶ 13.) At the time of his arrest, Decedent “was 12 suffering from serious mental illness and required psychotropic medications.” (Id.) 13 When booked, Decedent completed a medical history which detailed his mental 14 illness, his use of psychotropic medications, and a prior suicide attempt that had 15 resulted in a coma. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Furthermore, Defendants “knowingly and 16 willfully deprived [Decedent] of his medications . . . despite the fact that he showed 17 severe signs of mental deterioration.” (Id. ¶ 15.) 18 On April 6, 2019, Decedent was booked into the Los Angeles County Jail 19 Inmate Reception Center (“IRC”). (Id. ¶ 16.) At the time, the Los Angeles County 20 Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) were informed by “arresting and/or custodial 21 officers . . . that Decedent had mental health issues and had attempted suicide less than 22 six months earlier,” and that “Decedent was gravely disabled.” (Id.) During 23 Decedent’s booking at IRC, LASD was required to administer a “Medical/Mental 24 Health Intake Screening” survey. (Id. ¶ 17.) That screening “would have included a 25
26 1 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 27 2 For purposes of these Rule 12(b)(6) Motions, the Court takes all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded 28 allegations as true. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 suicide risk assessment.” (Id.) However, LASD did not properly monitor Decedent, 2 deprived him of his necessary psychiatric medication, and provided no mental health 3 evaluation or services. (Id. ¶ 18.)3 Further, Defendants failed “to prevent 4 unsupervised access to the means to commit suicide by hanging” and “permitted 5 Decedent to be alone in a cell/room unrestrained and/or unmonitored, and deprived of 6 his necessary medication.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Then, while in custody on April 6, 2019, 7 Decedent fashioned a ligature and hanged himself. (Id. ¶ 21.) 8 Defendant Villanueva, a Los Angeles County Sheriff, headed the Jail where 9 Decedent was held at the time of his death. (Id. ¶ 7) Villanueva was responsible for 10 management of the facility and all employee-related matters within it. (Id.) 11 Villanueva “was regularly provided with reports concerning the treatment of mentally 12 ill inmates, improper classification of inmates in the jails, jail suicides, and other 13 violations involving the housing, care, mental health care, and treatment of inmates.” 14 (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Villanueva “knowing[ly] fail[ed] to ensure enforcement 15 of policies, rules or directives that set in motion a series of acts by others which he 16 knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional 17 injury on Decedent.” (Id.) 18 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that several investigations, conducted by the United 19 States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) over the past few decades, indicate that 20 Defendants maintain a “practice, custom, and policy of providing inadequate mental 21 health care and suicide prevention measures.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–27.) Plaintiff alleges that 22 “[d]espite the DOJ’s findings and recommendations over the years, LA County 23 3 Plaintiff states in paragraph 18 of the FAC that “Decedent received of monitoring or assessment by 24 LASD, was deprived of the necessary medication to manage his psychiatric disabilities, despite 25 being placed in circumstances with a high risk for psychiatric decompensation, and received no mental health evaluation or treatment, despite his known history of suicidal tendencies.” (FAC ¶ 18 26 (emphasis added)). Given the context of the paragraph’s allegations, the Court reads the insertion “received of” to be a typographical error on the part of Plaintiff. Construed otherwise, the paragraph 27 would allege that Decedent both received and was denied monitoring and assessment. See Resnick 28 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 433, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ll allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff.”). 1 continues to have a practice, custom, and policy of providing inadequate mental health 2 care and suicide prevention measures to those in custody as evidenced by the increase 3 in suicide rates in recent years.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 4 Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief, based on: (1) § 1983 liability for deliberate 5 indifference to serious medical needs and safety; (2) § 1983 liability against the 6 County under Monell; (3) § 1983 liability for failure to supervise, train and take 7 corrective measures causing constitutional violations; (4) negligence/wrongful death; 8 (5) violation of California Government Code section 845.6; and (6) violation of 9 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), 10 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“RA”).4 (See id.) Now, 11 the County and Villanueva separately move to dismiss these claims under 12 Rule 12(b)(6). (See Cty. Mot.; Villanueva Mot.) 13 III. LOCAL RULE 7-3 14 For the second time in these proceedings, the County has failed to comply with 15 Local Rule 7-3’s meet and confer obligation prior to filing its motion. (See Opp’n 16 Cty. Mot. 5.) Yet again, this has resulted in the parties bickering over the meet and 17 confer process, and again, the Court is forced to address this elementary procedural 18 issue. The County emailed Plaintiff regarding its anticipated motion on October 9, 19 2020, and again on October 13, 2020. (Reply Cty. Mot. 2.) On October 14, 2020, the 20 parties finally met and conferred telephonically, unsuccessfully, and the County filed 21 its motion later that day. (Id.) Apparently, the parties further met and conferred on 22 October 22, 2020, after the County’s Motion was filed. (Id.) 23 The County has failed to comply with Local Rule 7-3. Local Rule 7-3 24 unambiguously states, “In all cases not listed as exempt . . . counsel contemplating the 25 filing of any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, 26 preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential 27 4 Claims one, three, four, and five are directed against Villanueva and ten unnamed Doe defendants. 28 Claim two is directed against the County. And claim six is directed against all Defendants. (See FAC.) 1 resolution. The conference shall take place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of 2 the motion.” C.D. Cal. R. 7-3 (emphases added). The County’s first attempt to meet 3 and confer was less than seven days before it filed its motion. 4 Similarly, although the issue was not raised by Plaintiff, Villanueva failed to 5 comply with Local Rule 7-3 in the same way. With respect to Villanueva’s Motion, 6 telephonic conferences occurred on November 2, 2020 and November 4, 2020. 7 (Villanueva Mot. 2.) The Motion itself was filed on November 5, 2020. (Id.) Again, 8 this was not seven days. 9 Compliance with the District’s Local Rules is not optional. See Lopez v. Wells 10 Fargo Bank, N.A., No. SACV 16-01409 AG (KESx), 2016 WL 6088257, at *2 (C.D. 11 Cal. Oct. 17, 2016) (“Local Rule 7-3 isn’t just a piece of petty pedantry put down to 12 trip up lawyers. Nor is Local Rule 7-3 a mere formalism simply there to be checked 13 off by lawyers.”). “The district court has considerable latitude in managing the 14 parties’ motion practice and enforcing local rules that place parameters on briefing.” 15 Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002). This includes 16 discretion to deny a motion that fails to comply. See U.S.A. v. Kan-Di-Ki LLC, No. 17 CV 10-965-JST (RZx), 2013 WL 12147597, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013). 18 The Court already warned the County that “[m]oving forward, the Court will 19 require strict compliance with Local Rule 7-3.” (Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 20 Compl. 3, ECF No. 24.) Yet the County failed to strictly comply with Local Rule 7-3 21 in bringing its motion. This is the first reason the County’s Motion is DENIED.5 22 Although Villanueva shares the same counsel as the County, the Court acknowledges 23 Villanueva’s Motion is the first such motion brought by this Defendant. Thus, rather 24 than denying Villanueva’s Motion outright, this shall serve as Villanueva’s first and 25 only warning that the Court will continue to strictly enforce Local Rule 7-3 moving 26 forward. 27
28 5 Notwithstanding this basis for denial, the County’s Motion also fails on the merits, as detailed infra. 1 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 3 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 4 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 5 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 6 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 7 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 8 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 10 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 13 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 14 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 15 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 16 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679 (9th Cir. 17 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted 18 deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 19 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 A court dismissing a complaint should provide leave to amend if the complaint 21 could be saved by amendment. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 22 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The Court 23 should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). Reasons to deny leave to amend 24 include “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” 25 Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting William O. Gilly 26 Enters. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 669 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Foman v. 27 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 28 1 V. DISCUSSION 2 Because the County and Villanueva move to dismiss separately, the Court 3 examines their motions in turn. 4 A. Villanueva’s Motion to Dismiss 5 Villanueva moves to dismiss all claims against him, namely Plaintiff’s first, 6 third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims. 7 1. Section 1983 Liability: Deliberate Indifference (Claim 1) 8 First, Plaintiff brings a survivor claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate 9 indifference to Decedent’s medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 (FAC ¶¶ 39–42.) Villanueva moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 11 Section 1983 allows for a civil action against any person who, under color of 12 law, causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 13 Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 14 Process Clause gives pre-trial detainees the right to “adequate” mental health care. 15 NeSmith v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 15cv629 JLS (JMA), 2016 WL 4515857, at *4 16 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (citing Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 17 1994)); Sandoval v. Cty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021). A 18 defendant is liable for violating § 1983 where, in light of that right, the defendant was 19 deliberately indifferent towards an individual’s “serious medical needs.” Jett v. 20 Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “A heightened suicide risk . . . is a 21 serious medical need.” Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) 22 (citing Doty, 37 F.3d at 546), vacated, City of Reno, Nev. v. Conn, 563 U.S. 915 23 (2011), reinstated in relevant part, Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 24 2011). 25 “To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the 26 defendant purposefully acted or failed to respond to the incarcerated individual’s pain 27 or possible medical need and (2) that this indifference caused the incarcerated 28 individual harm.” NeSmith, 2016 WL 4515857, at * 5 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). 1 This is an objective standard, which hovers at a level “more than negligence but less 2 than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Gordon v. Cty. of 3 Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). In Gordon, the Ninth Circuit 4 articulated the following: 5 [T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 6 Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with 7 respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) 8 those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to 9 abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 10 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking 11 such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 12 Id. “More generally, deliberate indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, 13 delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment . . . .” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 14 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “The rule . . . is 15 clear: a prison official who is aware that an inmate is suffering from a serious acute 16 medical condition violates the Constitution when he stands idly by rather than 17 responding with reasonable diligence to treat the condition.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 18 679–80. 19 Further, courts “have long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually 20 liable in § 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributable to 21 them.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Liability as a supervisor 22 under § 1983 attaches where the defendant was either personally involved with the 23 constitutional violation or there is a sufficient causal connection between their conduct 24 and the constitutional violation. Id. at 1207; see Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 25 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor 26 breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. The law 27 clearly allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient 28 1 causal connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a 2 federally secured right.” (quoting McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695 (10th 3 Cir. 1979))). 4 “The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a 5 series of acts by others, or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by 6 others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause 7 others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207–08 (internal citations 8 omitted). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable 9 action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 10 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless 11 or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. (quoting Watkins v. City of 12 Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks 13 omitted)). “To establish that a supervisor was deliberately indifferent to the actions of 14 his subordinates, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly establish the 15 defendant’s knowledge of and acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of his 16 subordinates.” Wishum v. Brown, No. 14-cv-01491-WHO, 2015 WL 1408095, at *2 17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hydrick v. 18 Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012)). 19 Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts showing Villanueva 20 plausibly knew of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. 21 Although Plaintiff asserts Villanueva’s involvement in generalities, (see Villanueva 22 Mot. 5–7; FAC ¶ 7), allegations of a Sheriff’s “knowledge of the unconstitutional 23 conditions in the jail, including [Sheriff’s] knowledge of the culpable actions of his 24 subordinates, coupled with his inaction, amount[s] to acquiescence in the 25 unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. Indeed, 26 “under California law, ‘the sheriff is required by statute to take charge of and keep the 27 county jail and the prisoners in it, and is answerable for the prisoner’s safekeeping.’” 28 Id. (quoting Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446). 1 Additionally, Plaintiff identifies several systematic problems of which 2 Villanueva was allegedly aware. (FAC ¶¶ 22–26); see Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 3 (reversing dismissal where plaintiff alleged that defendant “was given notice, in 4 several reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under his supervision that 5 have resulted in these deaths and injuries”). Indeed, the FAC lists five specific 6 investigations and reports of systematic issues in the Jail, all of which plausibly 7 suggest the existence of widespread constitutional deprivations, and all of which 8 Villanueva allegedly had knowledge by virtue of his position as Sheriff. (FAC ¶¶ 22– 9 26.) Plaintiff also alleges that “well-established” prevention measures existed to 10 prevent the constitutional deprivation that occurred and staff did not follow them, 11 though the exact details of what these measures consisted of or why they were not 12 followed is absent from the FAC. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) 13 Taking these factual assertions as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences 14 therefrom, the Court is left with the impression that the FAC “contain[s] sufficient 15 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 16 defend itself effectively.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Thus, to the extent Villanueva 17 moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s first claim, Villanueva’s Motion is DENIED. 18 2. Section 1983 Liability: Failure to Train (Claim 3) 19 Plaintiff third claim is a § 1983 survivor claim against Villanueva for failure to 20 supervise, train, and take corrective measures causing constitutional violations. (FAC 21 ¶¶ 51–56.) Villanueva moves to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Villanueva 22 Mot. 7–8.) Plaintiff concedes she has failed to allege sufficient facts to support her 23 third claim. (Opp’n Villanueva Mot. 9.) Therefore, Villanueva’s Motion is 24 GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action, which is DISMISSED. 25 Notably, Plaintiff requests “leave to amend at a later time should additional 26 facts become available through discovery.” (Id.) This request is purely speculative 27 and at best, premature. Although Plaintiff may seek leave to amend if such leave 28 becomes warranted, the Court does not grant leave to amend at this time. 1 3. Negligence (Claim 4) 2 With her fourth claim, Plaintiff claims Villanueva breached a duty of care to 3 Decedent, resulting in Decedent’s suicide. Villanueva moves to dismiss this claim on 4 the basis that Decedent’s suicide was an unforeseeable intervening action that severed 5 the chain of causation. (Villanueva Mot. 8–9.) 6 Under California law, proximate causation is a necessary element of a claim for 7 negligence. McGarry v. Sax, 158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 994 (2008). “Proximate cause, 8 or legal cause, is absent where an intervening act or event breaks the chain of 9 causation between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of 10 law.” Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 11 2014) (citing Conn, 591 F.3d at 1101); Lombardo v. Huysentruyt, 91 Cal. App. 4th 12 656, 665–66 (2001)). “Generally, an act is an intervening cause where it is 13 unforeseeable or extraordinary.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 14 2009). 15 “[S]uicide has historically been viewed as an intervening event that always 16 breaks the chain of causation, thereby precluding any tort liability for a suicide.” 17 Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (citing Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 18 901–03, 913 (1960)). However, the Ninth Circuit has identified two exceptions to this 19 general rule: (1) the widely recognized “uncontrollable impulse” test derived from 20 Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898 (1960), and (2) the “special relationship” 21 exception laid out in Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278 (1988). 22 Under the uncontrollable impulse exception, “if the negligent wrong causes 23 mental illness which results in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, then the 24 wrongdoer may be held liable for the death.” Tate, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 915. In other 25 words, suicide is not an intervening factor where a defendant’s negligent actions cause 26 an “uncontrollable impulse” to commit suicide. Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 27 Under the special relationship exception, “[c]ourts generally have imposed a 28 duty to prevent suicide . . . where the defendant has physical custody and substantial 1 control over a person, or where the defendant has special training or expertise in 2 mental illness and has sufficient control over a person to prevent the suicide.” Id. 3 at 1085. This exception typically is found where “defendant is a prison, jail, or 4 hospital.” Id.; see also Campos v. Cty. of Kern, No. 1:14-cv-01099-DAD-JLT, 5 2017 WL 915294, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017) (collecting cases). 6 Here, Villanueva contends Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a basis for 7 applying the uncontrollable impulse test. (Villanueva Mot. 9.) The Court disagrees. 8 Plaintiff alleges that Decedent had a serious mental illness and that LASD “deprived 9 [Decedent] of the necessary medication to manage his psychiatric disabilities.” (FAC 10 ¶¶ 17–18.) Further, Decedent allegedly received no other treatment for his condition, 11 was not monitored adequately by staff, and was placed in a high-risk environment. 12 (Id. ¶¶ 18–20.) Plaintiff alleges Villanueva caused this situation, through negligence 13 in his performance of hiring subordinates, establishing policies and procedures to 14 prevent the harm which befell Decedent, and enforcing those same policies and 15 procedures. (Id. ¶ 7.) While it is true that there are no specific allegations of what 16 mental illness Decedent had, nor what medicine he was prescribed to treat it, the 17 deprivation of medication necessary to a seriously ill pre-trial detainee, along with the 18 other allegations, support a reasonable inference that Villanueva’s actions created an 19 uncontrollable impulse. See also Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., 399 F. 20 Supp. 3d 986, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[W]hether [decedent] suffered from an 21 uncontrollable impulse to end his life appears to be a question of fact that is 22 inappropriate to decide at the pleading stage.”). 23 Further, Plaintiff adequately establishes a duty to prevent suicide under the 24 special relationship exception. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that “Defendant 25 failed to implement policies to properly monitor the cell of a known suicidal inmate 26 who had attempted suicide only months before . . . and failed to ensure a policy that a 27 suicidal inmate did not have access to an object that could be sued to hang himself.” 28 (Opp’n Villanueva Mot. 10; see also FAC ¶¶ 19–20, 27, 60.) Whereas Villanueva had 1 “physical custody and substantial control over” Decedent, these allegations are 2 enough to impose a special duty on Villanueva to prevent Decedent’s suicide. See 3 Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 4 Assuming these allegations are true, Plaintiff has asserted a plausible theory of 5 relief for negligence. It is plausible that Villanueva had a special duty of care to those 6 in his custody, and that he breached that duty in a manner which caused a foreseeable 7 injury to Decedent. Thus, to the extent Villanueva moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth 8 claim for negligence, Villanueva’s Motion is DENIED. 9 4. Violation of California Government Code § 845.6 (Claim 5) 10 With her fifth claim, Plaintiff alleges Villanueva violated California 11 Government Code section 845.6 because he knew or had reason to know that 12 Decedent needed immediate care and failed to take reasonable action to provide that 13 care. (FAC ¶¶ 63–64). 14 Villanueva moves to dismiss this claim on grounds that (1) Plaintiff fails to 15 allege that Villanueva had any direct contact with Decedent or any actual knowledge 16 of Decedent’s conditions; (2) the alleged conduct does not rise to the level of severity 17 contemplated by section 845.6; and (3) Government Code section 855.6 provides 18 further immunity from liability for incorrectly assessing whether a person has a 19 hazardous physical or mental condition. (Villanueva Mot. 10–11.) These arguments 20 are not persuasive. 21 Section 845.6 provides, in relevant part: 22 Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain 23 medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise 24 provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public 25 entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is 26 in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action 27 to summon such medical care. 28 Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6 (emphases added). 1 “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical 2 conditions requiring immediate care.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Watson v. State 3 of California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841 (1993)). That said, California courts have 4 construed the provision to create limited liability only “when: (1) the public employee 5 knows or has reason to know [of the] need, (2) of immediate medical care, and (3) 6 fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Castaneda v. Dept. of 7 Corr. & Rehab., 212 Cal. App. 4th 1051, 1070 (2013); Johnson v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 8 143 Cal. App. 3d 298, 317 (1983) (“[M]erely calling a doctor or other trained health 9 care provider to examine a prisoner may be sufficient.”). 10 Here, Villanueva’s main contention is that he was never in contact with 11 Decedent prior to Decedent’s death and, as a result, cannot be held liable under 12 section 845.6. (Villanueva Mot. 10–11.) Regardless, Plaintiff has pleaded each 13 required element as listed in Castaneda—she alleges that Villanueva knew or had 14 reason to know of Decedent’s mental condition and need of immediate medical care, 15 and that care was totally denied. (See FAC ¶¶ 16, 18–20 (alleging that “Decedent was 16 gravely disabled,” “was deprived of the necessary medication to manage his 17 psychiatric disabilities,” and showed “behavior indicating a clear decompensation of 18 Decedent’s mental health status”)); see also Medina v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 19 19-3808-GW-Ex, 2020 WL 3964793, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020) (indicating that 20 a supervisor could be held liable under section 845.6 depending on his “supervisory 21 capacity/responsibility over the conduct of safety-checks”). 22 Furthermore, “questions of Sheriffs’ actual or constructive knowledge of 23 Decedent’s need for immediate care, and of Sheriffs’ reasonable action to summon or 24 not to summon such care, are questions of fact to be determined at trial,” and Plaintiff 25 has sufficiently alleged their existence to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Johnson, 26 143 Cal. App. 3d at 317; see Zeilman v. Cty. of Kern, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 1187 27 (1985) (“Regardless of how remote these possibilities may seem, the remoteness 28 affects only plaintiff’s difficulty of proof, i.e., plaintiff in the instant case may well 1 have a difficult time proving her claim against [defendant]. But difficulty in proof 2 does not equate to resolution as a matter of law.”) 3 Lastly, the Court notes that Government Code section 855.6 does not apply to 4 the present situation. In relevant part, section 855.6 protects public employees from 5 liability “for injury caused by the failure to make a physical or mental examination or 6 to make an adequate . . . examination, of any person for the purpose of determining 7 whether such person has a disease or physical or mental condition that would 8 constitute a hazard to the health or safety of himself. Cal. Gov. Code § 855.6. “While 9 the immunity granted under this section is broad, it has been held that it does not 10 extend to a situation where the defendant fails to provide medical care for a prisoner 11 in obvious need of such care.” Lum v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 12 1257 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Lucas v. City of Long Beach, 60 Cal. App. 3d 341, 349 13 (1976)). The Court thus finds this code provision inapplicable, for reasons already 14 discussed above. 15 For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff adequately alleges a violation of 16 Government Code section 845.6. Accordingly, to the extent Villanueva moves to 17 dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth claim, Villanueva’s Motion is DENIED. 18 5. Violation of ADA and RA (Claim 6 against Villanueva) 19 With her sixth claim, Plaintiff alleges Villanueva violated Title II of the ADA 20 and section 504 of the RA. Villanueva moves to dismiss this claim on grounds that 21 such claims can only be brought against a public entity and not an individual 22 defendant. (Villanueva Mot. 13 (citing Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n.7 23 (9th Cir. 2002).) Plaintiff concedes this point and agrees to dismissal. (Opp’n 24 Villanueva Mot. 11.) Therefore, Villanueva’s Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 25 sixth cause of action, which is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Villanueva. 26 B. County’s Motion to Dismiss 27 The Court now turns to the County’s Motion. The County moves to dismiss the 28 claims asserted against it, namely Plaintiff’s second and sixth claims. (See Cty. Mot.) 1 1. Section 1983 Liability: Monell (Claim 2) 2 With her second claim, Plaintiff brings a survivor claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 and Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 4 (FAC ¶¶ 43–50.) The County moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Cty. Mot. 5–8.) 5 As noted above, § 1983 allows for a civil action against any person who, under 6 color of law, causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 7 by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the statute does not define 8 “person” or address whether a governmental unit may be sued under its provisions, the 9 United States Supreme Court in Monell held that a local government may be sued 10 under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by 11 its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 12 policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 13 To hold a municipality liable for the actions of its officers and employees, a 14 plaintiff must allege one of the following: “(1) that a [municipal] employee was acting 15 pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy; (2) that a [municipal] employee was 16 acting pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) that a [municipal] 17 employee was acting as a ‘final policymaker.’” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 18 (9th Cir. 2004). Where there is a policy at play, plaintiff must prove “(1) that 19 [plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [they] were deprived; (2) that the 20 municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 21 plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the 22 constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 23 2011). Additionally, under some circumstances, a municipality can be held liable for 24 failure to train its police officers. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 25 However, a governmental unit may not be liable under § 1983 simply based on a 26 “respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 27 Here, the County seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim on grounds that 28 (1) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy, 1 custom, or practice of deliberate indifference, and (2) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently 2 allege causation. (Cty. Mot. 5–8.)6 The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 3 a. Unconstitutional Policy, Custom, or Practice 4 First, the County argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that demonstrate the 5 existence of an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference. 6 (Cty. Mot. 5–6.) To be sure, “a plaintiff must do more than allege that a Monell 7 defendant ‘maintained or permitted an official policy, custom or practice of knowingly 8 permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs’ alleged elsewhere in the complaint.” 9 Cain v. City of Sacramento, No. 2:17-cv-00848-JAM-DB, 2017 WL 4410116, at *3 10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017) (quoting A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 11 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing pleading standard for Monell claims)). “Facts 12 regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, custom, or practice are required; 13 merely stating the subject to which the policy relates (i.e. excessive force) is 14 insufficient.” Id. 15 This Court explained in its previous order that Plaintiff’s allegations in her 16 initial Complaint presented little more than legal conclusions, and “[w]hile legal 17 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by 18 factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; (see Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 19 Compl. 7). The County now argues that Plaintiff has failed to meaningfully amend 20 her claim, as “Plaintiff has not identified any expressly adopted policy” and “the FAC 21 still fails to allege sufficient facts, rising above conclusory assertations, showing that 22 Decedent’s act of committing suicide was the result of a long-standing practice or 23 custom.” (Cty. Mot. 5.) 24 To the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s newly added assertions create 25 reasonable inferences which carry her claim through the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading 26 standard. In particular, Plaintiff’s newly added allegations of repeated, systematic 27 6 Because Plaintiff concedes she does not sufficiently allege a theory of ratification or failure to train 28 to support her Monell claim, the Court need not address the County’s arguments on those points. (See Opp’n County Mot. 7–8.) 1 constitutional violations, plus the new allegations of Decedent’s experience at MCJ 2 prior to April 6, 2019, sufficiently establish a plausible “policy, practice or custom.” 3 (See FAC ¶¶ 13–15, 22–27.) These factual allegations support the legal framework of 4 this claim, even if they do not outline the exact contours of the alleged policy, custom, 5 or practice. See Cain, 2017 WL 4410116, at *2 (citing Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900) 6 (“In certain circumstances, a failure to train, a failure to supervise, or a failure to 7 respond to repeated constitutional violations of which an entity had notice may 8 amount to a policy of deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff 9 pleads facts sufficient to show the existence of a practice, custom, or policy giving rise 10 to Monell liability. 11 b. Causation 12 The County also argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts that establish causation. 13 (Cty. Mot. 8.) Indeed, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving 15 force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 (citing 16 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (emphasis added). 17 However, Plaintiff provides numerous allegations related to causation. Plaintiff 18 alleges, for instance, that “[d]ue to Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the serious 19 nature and life threatening condition of Decedent, and their failure to timely intervene 20 to provide reasonable security, monitoring and safety, and psychiatric medical 21 intervention necessary to prevent his efforts to harm himself, Decedent suffered 22 preventable serious injury and harm.” (FAC ¶ 40.) Plaintiff also alleges that despite 23 knowledge of Decedent’s condition and need for medication, the County “deprived 24 [Decedent] of his medications for several weeks.” (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) In other words, but 25 for the County’s alleged policy, practice, or custom of providing inadequate mental 26 health care to detainees, Decedent would have received necessary medication and 27 proper supervision such that his death could have been prevented. These alleged 28 “facts demonstrat[e] that [the] constitutional deprivation was the result of a custom or 1 practice” and “the custom or practice was the ‘moving force’ behind [the] 2 constitutional deprivation.” See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. The Court thus finds 3 that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads causation with respect to her Monell claim. 4 In summary, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a viable Monell claim. The Court 5 therefore DENIES the County’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s second claim. 6 2. Violation of ADA and RA (Claim 6 against the County) 7 As stated above, Plaintiff’s sixth claim for relief alleges the County is liable for 8 violations of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA. (FAC ¶¶ 65–75.) The County 9 moves to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s amended allegations are still insufficient to 10 demonstrate Decedent was deliberately precluded access to treatment because of his 11 disability and, “[a]t most, these allegations demonstrate inadequate identification of 12 the need for treatment and not deliberate discrimination or preclusion based solely on 13 Decedent’s disability.” (Cty. Mot. 10.) 14 Title II of the ADA states, “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by 15 reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 16 of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 17 discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA bars public 18 entities, including prisons, from both discriminating against disabled persons and 19 “excluding the disabled from participating in or benefitting from a public program, 20 activity, or service ‘solely by reason of disability.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 690–91; see also 21 Pierce v. Cty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is undisputed that 22 Title II applies to the . . . jails’ services, programs, and activities for detainees.”). 23 Similarly, Section 504 of the RA states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual 24 with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from 25 participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 26 program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As 27 Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled after Section 504 of the RA, the analyses 28 1 of the rights and obligations under the two statutes is largely identical. See Pierce, 2 526 F.3d at 1216 n.27. 3 With respect to a correctional facility, a plaintiff may allege disability 4 discrimination by pleading “either (i) discrimination based on disparate treatment or 5 impact, or (ii) denial of reasonable modifications or accommodations.” Atayde v. 6 NAPA State Hosp., 255 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Fortyune v. 7 Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004)). To show disparate 8 treatment, the plaintiff must allege that other non-disabled individuals without the 9 plaintiff’s disability were treated more favorably. Id. (citing McGary v. City of 10 Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2004)). To show disparate impact, a 11 plaintiff must allege that a facially neutral policy has a significantly adverse or 12 disproportionate impact on disabled persons. Id. (citing Lawman v. City & Cty. of 13 San Francisco, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1148 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 2016)). And to show 14 failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must allege that public entity knew of the 15 plaintiff’s disability but failed to provide reasonable accommodations. Id. (citing 16 Robertson v. Las Animas Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007)). 17 “A correctional facility’s ‘deliberate refusal’ to accommodate plaintiff’s disability- 18 related needs violates the ADA and the RA.” Id. (citing United States v. Georgia, 19 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006)). 20 Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts showing a deliberate refusal to 21 accommodate Decedent’s disability-related needs, which is, in turn, an ADA and RA 22 violation. Such a claim can be established by “expressly alleg[ing] that Defendants 23 failed to provide [Decedent] with any access to mental health programs and services” 24 or medication. Anderson v. Cty. of Siskiyou, No. C 10-01428 SBA, 2010 WL 25 3619821, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010). Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants 26 knowingly and willfully deprived Barnett of his medications for several weeks” and 27 Decedent “received no mental health evaluation or treatment, despite his known 28 history of suicidal tendencies.” (FAC ¶¶ 15, 18.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that the 1 || County had knowledge or reason to know of Decedent’s disability, pointing to a 2 || completed medical history, a job denial implicating his suicide attempt, and a required 3 || screening that would have revealed his condition. (FAC 4 13-14, 17.) These allegations suffice to state a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA and RA, 5 || because it is plausible that there was a deliberate refusal to accommodate. 6 Plaintiff pleads facts that plausibly show the County deliberately precluded 7 || Decedent from receiving necessary medication and treatment because of his disability, 8 | and the Court therefore DENIES the County’s Motion as to Plaintiffs sixth claim for 9 || relief under the ADA and the RA. 10 VI. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, Villanueva’s Motion is GRANTED in part and 12 | DENIED in part. (ECF No. 36.) Claims one, four, and five against Villanueva are 13 || sufficiently pled. Claim three against Villanueva is DISMISSED without prejudice, but without current leave to amend. Claim six against Villanueva is DISMISSED 15 | with prejudice. Additionally, the County’s Motion is DENIED. (ECF No. 30.) 16 || Defendants shall file their Answer(s) to the FAC in accordance with Rule 12(a)(4)(A). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 March 4, 2021 21 A 4 Géedllind 3 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25 26 27 28