Opinion by Judge BEEZER; Dissent by Judge THOMAS.
BEEZER, Circuit Judge:
Dan Marius Andreiu moves for a stay of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) final order of removal, pending our resolution of his petition for review. The government opposes the motion because Andreiu is unable to satisfy the standard for enjoining an alien’s removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (Supp. II 1996). An-dreiu argues that section 1252(f)(2) does not apply to temporary stays. A motions panel of this court requested supplemental memoranda on “the applicability, if any, of 8 U.S.C. [§] 1252(f) to petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we hold that section 1252(f)(2) applies to temporary stays.
I
Andreiu is a native of Romania, where he was a member of the National Liberation Party. During the revolution that began in 1989, Andreiu tried to open a radio station that would broadcast the party’s views. Andreiu testified that, as a result of his political activity, a group allied with the government threatened to kill him and tried to hit him with an automobile.
Andreiu escaped to Paris, where he sent an insulting postcard to the person that he believed tried to murder him. After obtaining French, German and Austrian visas, Andreiu immigrated to the United States in 1991. On September 10, 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) sent Andreiu a “Notice to Appear” to answer the charge of remaining in the United States longer than permitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996). Andreiu subsequently applied for asylum.
On February 2, 1998, an immigration judge denied the asylum claim because Andreiu’s testimony was not credible. The credibility determination was based on the immigration judge’s conclusion that Andreiu’s description of events was implausible. Although the BIA found that Andreiu’s testimony was consistent and reversed the negative credibility determination, it affirmed the denial of asylum on February 26, 1999. The BIA concluded that Andreiu failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, or a clear probability of persecution, because he did not produce documentary evidence that he was a member of the National Liberation Party or that people associated with the [1113]*1113Romanian government threatened to kill him. Because the evidence did not establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, and because the State Department cited Romania as a constitutional democracy that respects human rights, the BIA decided that asylum was inappropriate.
Andreiu filed a petition for review with this court and requested a stay of his removal. In the motion for a stay, An-dreiu argued that he was detained by the INS during the proceedings before the immigration judge and was prevented from obtaining documentary evidence. Andreiu asserted also that the BIA’s requirement that he produce evidence to support his credible testimony is contrary to the rule that objective evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution “may be satisfied by the production of specific documentary evidence or by the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant.” Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On March 15, 1999, we temporarily stayed Andreiu’s removal pursuant to De Leon v. INS, 115 F.3d 643 (9th Cir.1997). We subsequently appointed pro bono counsel and requested additional briefing on section 1252(f)(2)’s applicability to a stay of removal pending resolution of a petition for review.
II
Prior to the September 30, 1996 enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), stays of removal were generally automatic. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994) (“The service of the petition for review ... shall stay the deportation of the alien pending determination of the petition by the court, unless the court otherwise directs or unless the alien is convicted of an aggravated felony .... ”), repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B). The grant of automatic stays ended with the passage of IIRIRA, which “dramatically altered this court’s jurisdiction to review final deportation and exclusion orders.” Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir.1997).
The new standards of review became effective on April 1,1997. See Pub.L. 104-208, § 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009-625; Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149-50. IIRIRA, however, applied special “transitional rules” to “cases in which a final deportation or exclusion order was filed after October 30, 1996, and which were pending before April 1, 1997.” Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1150; see Pub.L. 104-208, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3009-625 to -627. Under the transitional rules, aliens encountered IIRIRA’s elimination of the automatic stay: “Service of the petition [for review of an order of removal] ... does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B); see Pub.L. 104-208, § 309(c)(4)(F), 110 Stat. 3009-626 (applying discretionary stay to transitional cases).
Pursuant to our discretion under the transitional rules, we held that “[t]he filing of a motion for a stay or a request for a stay contained in a petition for review will stay a petitioner’s deportation temporarily until the court rules on the stay motion.” De Leon, 115 F.3d at 644. When reviewing the merits of a discretionary stay request, we required the petitioner to “show either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s favor.” Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998) (applying preliminary injunction standard).
Because Andreiu’s removal proceedings began after April 1, 1997, the transitional rules do not apply to his stay request. See Pub.L. 104-208, § 309(c)(4), 110 Stat. 3009-626; Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1150. We must therefore determine the standard under which IIRIRA’s permanent rules allow us to grant a stay of removal.
[1114]*1114III
The government argues that IIRIRA changed the standard for granting stays, and now requires that “no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2). Andreiu contends that section 1252(f)(2) does not apply to stay requests because it addresses only actions collateral to the petition for review process, and that we should review his motion under the traditional discretionary stay test, see Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514.
To determine whether section 1252(f)(2) applies to stays, “we must first look to the statutory language: 'The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’ ” United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). In interpreting the statute, we are mindful of “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). Similarly, “we should not construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command,’ or an ‘inescapable inference’ to the contrary.” Miller v. French, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 2254-55, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
Section 1252(f)(2) limits a court’s power to “enjoin the removal of any alien.” At issue is whether section 1252(f)(2)’s use of the word “enjoin” encompasses the temporary stay of an alien’s removal. We hold that it does.
“Enjoin” is defined as: “To legally prohibit or restrain by injunction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 550 (7th ed.1999); see also id. at 788 (defining “injunction” as “[a] court order commanding or preventing an action”). “Stay” is “[t]he postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the like.” Id. at 1425. These definitions show that the plain meaning of “enjoin” includes the grant of a “stay.”
The common use of “enjoin” and “stay” also demonstrate that they are not mutually exclusive. Courts often use these terms interchangeably or to indicate that “enjoin” encompasses “stay.” See, e.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 139-41, 144, 92 S.Ct. 373, 30 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971) (holding that the NLRB’s attempt to “enjoin” or “restrain” a state court injunction fell under the exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2283: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by ... Congress ....”) (emphasis added); Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1087 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that “Congress did not intend the [bankruptcy] stay to enjoin all state criminal proceedings automatically”) (emphasis added); Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir.1991) (applying statute that proscribes appeals from an interlocutory order “refusing to enjoin an arbitration” to an appeal from a court’s “denial of a stay of arbitration”) (emphasis added). Motions for a temporary stay have also long been reviewed under the same standard as motions for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Coleman v. PACCAR, Inc., 424 U.S. 1301, 1305, 96 S.Ct. 845, 47 L.Ed.2d 67 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1976) (“A court staying the action of ... an administrative agency must take into account factors such as irreparable harm and probability of success on the merits.”) (internal citations omitted); Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (“We evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief’) (citing Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.), reversed in part on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1328, 104 S.Ct. 10, 77 L.Ed.2d 1431 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983)).
[1115]*1115Andreiu argues that, under IIRIRA, “enjoin” applies only to permanent injunctions. Section 1252(f)(1) eliminates courts’ (other than the Supreme Court) jurisdiction “to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchap-ter.” Under Andreiu’s construction, section 1252(f)(1) demonstrates that Congress intended to define “restrain” as applying only to temporary orders and to define “enjoin” as referring solely to permanent relief. Andreiu also notes that Congress’s use of “enjoin” and “restrain” has differed in other acts. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (declaring that courts of appeal may “enjoin [ ], set[ ] aside, or suspend[ ], in whole or part, the order of an agency”) (emphasis added), with id. section 2349(b) (stating that “[t]he filing of the petition for review does not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the agency, but the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the order.... The court of appeals, at the time of hearing the application for an interlocutory injunction ... may continue the temporary stay or suspension_”) (emphasis added).
Although in section 1252(f)(1), “enjoin” and “restrain” apply to a wide variety of actions, the use of “enjoin” in section 1252(f)(2) relates solely to an alien’s removal. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (stating that no court, other than the Supreme Court, shall “enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter[, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1231 (Supp. II 1996) (addressing inspection, apprehension, examination, exclusion and removal) ]”), with id. at section 1252(f)(2) (stating that “no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien”). Nothing in section 1252(f)(1) indicates that “restrain” applies exclusively to temporary orders or that “enjoin” is constrained to permanent relief. These terms pertain to the operation of different immigration provisions; thus, the failure to use “restrain” in section 1252(f)(2) shows that the term does not refer to removals, not that it is limited to temporary relief or that it constitutes improper surplusage, see Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (“Judges should hesitate ... to treat statutory terms [as surplusage] in any setting....”); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Similarly, other Congressional uses of “enjoin” and “restrain” do not support An-dreiu’s interpretation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a), (b). The assertion that Congress used “enjoin” only in relation to permanent orders is contrary to the plain meaning of that word. See, e.g., Miller, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 2251-52 (noting motion “for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay”) (emphasis added). Indeed, Andreiu suggests that we review stay requests under the preliminary injunction standard, which is an example of a court’s power to temporarily enjoin. See Black’s Law Dictionary 550 (stating that to “enjoin” is to “restrain by injunction”); id. at 788 (defining “preliminary injunction” as a “temporary injunction”). We are not convinced that section 1252(f)(1), or any other act, counters our interpretation of “enjoin.” Accord Song v. INS, 82 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1130 (C.D.Ca.2000) (holding in habeas proceeding that “[b]y its terms, the IIRIRA standard [under section 1252(f)(2) ] clearly applies because Petitioner seeks a stay of deportation.”); Hypolite v. Blackman, 57 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (M.D.Pa.1999) (holding in habeas proceeding that section 1252(f)(2) applies to a stay motion); Naidoo v. INS, 39 F.Supp.2d 755, 762 (W.D.La.1999) (same).
The definitions of “enjoin” and “stay,” in addition to courts’ ordinary use of the terms, indicate that the plain meaning of “enjoin” includes the grant of a temporary stay. We therefore hold that section 1252(f)(2)’s limit on the power of [1116]*1116courts to “enjoin” the removal of an alien clearly applies to the stay of a removal order pending resolution of a petition for review.
IV
Although our analysis should end with the conclusion that statutory language clearly demonstrates Congress’s intent to apply section 1252(f)(2) to temporary stays, see Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105, we address Andreiu’s further assertions to the contrary. In particular, Andreiu argues that the structure of section 1252(f) precludes the application of section 1252(f)(2) to stays.
The Supreme Court held that section 1252(f)(1) limits “classwide injunctive relief against the operation of sections 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend to individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (“[N]o court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction ... to enjoin or restrain the operation of [sections 1221 to 1231] ... other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien-”). Section 1252(f)(1), according to Andreiu, addresses only collateral review for class actions; therefore, we should interpret section 1252(f)(2) as limiting only collateral injunctive relief for individuals.
Even if we agreed that section 1252(f)(1) applies only to collateral review — and we do not address that issue here — we see nothing in the statutory language suggesting that section 1252(f)(2) implicates only collateral matters. Section 1252(f)(2) limits a court’s power to “enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section.” “Section” refers to the whole of section 1252, which implicates direct judicial review of orders of removal, not merely subsection 1252(f). See American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 487, 119 S.Ct. 936 (holding that section 1252(g)’s reference to “this section” refers to the entirety of section 1252). Moreover, a BIA decision is a “final order” of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1996). Because Andreiu moves that we stay, i.e., “enjoin,” his removal pursuant to a final order pending resolution of his petition for review, section 1252(f)(2) applies.
Andreiu argues also that . section 1252(f)(2) would improperly require a higher standard to obtain a stay of removal than to succeed on the merits of a petition for review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (stating in part that “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary, ... [and] a decision that an alien is not eligible for admission to the United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law”). Even if we assume that Andreiu’s characterization of the standards is correct, applying a higher standard on motions for a stay is not inconsistent or superfluous. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. 655.
IIRIRA “introduced sweeping changes into our immigration laws.” Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149. One of these changes was to allow the review of an alien’s petition for review even if the alien is no longer in the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (replacing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)). Increasing the burden needed to stay a removal order is consistent with IIRIRA’s intent “to vest the BIA with final appellate jurisdiction for most INS deportation proceedings.” Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149; see also American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 486, 119 S.Ct. 936 (“[MJany provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts — indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”) (emphasis in original). Congress has made clear its desire to expedite removal proceedings and has even foreseen the possibility that an alien with a meritorious petition for review may be removed from the country before a court grants the petition. The section 1252(f)(2) standard, although it may be severe as applied to temporary stays, is consistent with the provisions and policy goals of IIRIRA.
[1117]*1117Andreiu contends as well that applying section 1252(f)(2) to stays inappropriately compels the court to engage in a full review of the merits. This argument is unpersuasive. The need to examine the merits of a petition for review will often exist under both the standard of section 1252(f)(2) and the preliminary injunction standard that Andreiu advances. See Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (requiring the alien to “show either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s favor”).
We also find unconvincing Andreiu’s assertion that the structure of section 1252 precludes application of section 1252(f)(2) to stays. Andreiu notes that section 1252(a)(1) declares that “[¿Judicial review of a final order of removal ... is governed only by [the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (providing courts of appeal with exclusive jurisdiction over certain administrative decisions),] except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.” Section 1252(b)(3)(B) eliminates the automatic stay provision, but provides no standard for granting a discretionary stay. According to Andreiu, section 1252(a)(1) indicates that section 1252(f)(2) applies only to collateral review because Congress would have situated a new standard for temporary stays in section 1252(b).
Although the lucidity of section 1252(a)(1) would have benefitted from the placement of the stay standard in section 1252(b), Congress’s failure to do so is not paramount. Section 1252(f)(2) explicitly states that it applies “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law.” Moreover, sections 1252(c) and (d) govern judicial review of petitions for review. The structure of section 1252, therefore, does not require that section 1252(b) act as the sole provision related to petitions for review and does not gainsay our conclusion that section 1252(f)(2) clearly applies to the grant of a temporary stay. Cf. Maldonado v. Fasano, 67 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1175 (S.D.Cal.1999) (stating that section 1252(f)(2) “appears to displace” the pre-IIRIRA stay standard).
We hold that section 1252(f)(2) applies to an alien’s motion to stay a final removal order pending resolution of a petition for review.
V
Under section 1252(f)(2), we cannot stay a final order of removal “unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.” We must now determine what this standard requires.
“Phrases such as ‘clear and convincing,’ ‘clear, cogent, and convincing,’ and ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ have all been used to require a plaintiff to prove his case to a higher probability than is required by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 172, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). Similarly, we have held that “the ‘clear and convincing’ burden is not the same as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.... [Ajfter discussing the preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt standards, the [Supreme] Court referred to the clear and convincing standard as ‘an intermediate standard of proof.’ ” United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 577 (stating that clear and convincing evidence “indicates] that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence, ... but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt....”).
With respect to factual challenges, section 1252(f)(2) requires that the alien show by clear and convincing evidence that the removal order was based on an erroneous finding of fact. We have difficulty, however, in applying this standard to legal [1118]*1118questions because “clear and convincing evidence” speaks only to factual issues. See, e.g., California ex rel. Cooper, 454 U.S. at 92-93, 102 S.Ct. 172 (stating that standards of proof such as “clear and convincing” instruct “the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Black’s Law Dictionary 576 (defining “evidence” as something “that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact”). Section 1252(f)(2)’s imposition of a factual standard of proof compels us to establish a standard of review for legal issues that best reflects Congress’s intent.
Congress’s mandate that “clear and convincing evidence” show that the removal order “is prohibited as a matter of law” informs our analysis. Section 1252(f)(2) significantly heightens the burden placed on an alien requesting a stay; thus, our normal de novo review of legal conclusions is inappropriate. Rather, with respect to questions of law, we believe that the standard of review that best adheres to the language of section 1252(f)(2) is that we will not stay a final removal order unless the alien establishes that the order was “manifestly contrary to law.”
Although the phrase “manifestly contrary to law” is not well-established, its terms are familiar. “Manifest” describes something that is apparent, clear, indisputable, obvious or plain. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (stating that “manifest error,” “clear case of error” and “clearly wrong” are terms that “might be thought to mean the same thing”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1375 (1993) (defining “manifest” as, inter alia, “capable of being easily understood or recognized at once by the mind: not obscure: obvious”); Black’s Law Dictionary 563 (defining “manifest error” as “[a]n error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record”); id. at 814 (defining “manifest intent” as “[ijntent that is apparent or obvious”). “The term ‘contrary to law’ means contrary to any existing law.” Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1158 n. 8 (9th Cir.1969) (citing Callahan v. United States, 285 U.S. 515, 517, 52 S.Ct. 454, 76 L.Ed. 914 (1932)). More specifically, “contrary” is defined as “ ‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed.’ ” Williams v. Taylor, - U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 495 (1976)). That we would reach a different legal conclusion is insufficient; to grant a stay under the “manifestly contrary to law” standard, we must hold that the removal order is clearly antithetical to an existing law.
We believe that Congress’s requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” that a removal order is “prohibited as a matter of law” is best satisfied, with regard to legal issues, by requiring an alien to establish that a removal order was “manifestly contrary to law.” This standard represents a legal approximation of “clear and convincing evidence” and furthers IIRIRA’s goal of respecting the finality of BIA orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C), (D) (stating that eligibility decisions and the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment to grant asylum are conclusive “unless manifestly contrary to law”); American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 486, 119 S.Ct. 936; Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149.
We hold that in order for us to stay the removal of an alien pursuant to a final order under section 1252, the alien must either: 1) show by clear and convincing evidence that the order was based on an erroneous finding of fact; or 2) establish that the order was manifestly contrary to law.
VI
We do not grant Andreiu’s motion for a stay because there is no showing that the BIA’s order was based on an erroneous [1119]*1119finding of fact or that it was manifestly contrary to law. Because we interpret new law, this opinion will not prejudice a subsequent motion for a stay of Andreiu’s removal, should he choose to file one.
MOTION FOR STAY DENIED.