[275]*275Morse, J.
Plaintiff Dali appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dali, a Vermont resident, brought suit in Rutland Superior Court against Maryland defendants for breach of warranty arising from the purchase of a Hanoverian horse. Defendant Baron, a Maryland resident and owner of the horse, hired defendants Kaylor and Westphalian Pride Farm to sell it. Defendant Kaylor, d/b/a Westphalian Pride Farm, is a horse breeder and trainer in Maryland. Defendant Westphalian Pride Farm holds itself out as a breeder and developer of “world-class” Hanoverian horses. The sole issue is whether defendants’ contacts with Vermont were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in Vermont. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.
Dali read Westphalian Pride Farm’s classified advertisement in a nationally circulated publication, Chronicle of the Horse. Westphalian Pride Farm had placed advertisements in Chronicle of the Horse over a hundred times since 1990. In September 1992, Dali visited Westphalian Pride Farm in Maryland to view the horses available for sale. Upon her return to Vermont, she communicated with defendants by mail and telephone and ultimately agreed to purchase a horse. In October 1992, Dali mailed a check to defendants as payment for the horse. Defendant Kaylor mailed Dali the completed bill of sale for the horse, a transfer of ownership form and an application for membership in the American Hanoverian Society.
The horse sustained injuries during its trip to Vermont. A veterinarian’s treatment of these injuries led to the discovery that the horse suffered from congenital and chronic bone disease in his rear legs.
Vermont’s long-arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 913(b), confers jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 40, 572 A2d 1382, 1385 (1990); see also Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.E 4(e) (statute allowing personal service outside state reaches to “outer limits permitted by the due process clause”). The Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments” of a foreign state with which the individual has no meaningful contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). A state court may assert jurisdiction and comport with due process where a nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [276]*276(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The critical consideration in determining if defendants’ activities satisfy the minimum contacts requirement is whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41, 572 A.2d at 1386. This reasonableness requirement is met when the defendant purposefully directs activity toward residents of a forum state and the litigation arises out of, or relates to, that activity. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41, 572 A.2d at 1386. The reasonableness requirement also prevents a defendant from being subjected to jurisdiction on the basis of fortuitous, attenuated, or random contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41-42, 572 A.2d at 1386.
Defendants argue that they did not affirmatively seek to do business with any Vermont resident by placing classified advertisements in a nationally circulated publication and that placement of their ad did not establish minimum contacts with Vermont. They further argue that they did not purposefully direct activity toward Vermont during negotiations with Dali. Defendants rely, in part, upon Carothers v. Vogeler, 148 Vt. 316, 532 A.2d 580 (1987), in which this Court found insufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction. In Carothers, the Vermont defendant advertised his restored Porsche in a nationally circulated publication and subsequently sold it to the Ohio plaintiff who had seen the advertisement. The plaintiff obtained a judgment in Ohio. When the plaintiff sought to enforce that judgment in Vermont, we held that because defendant’s sole contact with Ohio was the advertisement, defendant had not “avail[ed] himself of any benefit or law of Ohio.” Id. at 319, 532 A.2d at 582. Carothers, however, involved the private sale of an automobile by placement of a single advertisement in a nationally circulated publication. The seller was not in the business of selling cars. Id. at 317, 532 A.2d at 580.
When, however, sellers intentionally act to advance their commercial interest, they should reasonably anticipate being sued in Vermont if a dispute arises from these activities. Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 43, 572 A.2d at 1387. Unlike the defendant in Carothers, who did not regularly advertise and sell cars, defendants here were in the business of selling horses; they held themselves out as “breeder[s] and developers of world class registered Hanoverians.” Defendants [277]*277initiated the resulting business transaction by advertising, more than one hundred times, in a national market that included Vermont.
It is hardly unfair for defendants to defend themselves in jurisdictions where they choose to advertise their products. See Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, 535 A.2d 26, 27-28 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (forum state claim resulting from New York television broadcast received in New Jersey was “not only to be anticipated, it was predictable”). As technology and economic practices diminish the importance of geographic boundaries, it is not unreasonable to anticipate the expansion of personal jurisdiction to those who deliberately transcend those boundaries in pursuit of economic gain. See id. at 28 (considering personal jurisdiction to be function of contemporary technology and economic practice).
We hold that assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants will not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (requiring consideration of interests of forum state, plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief and burden on defendant). Vermont has a legitimate interest in sanctioning “parties who reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations” with Vermont citizens for the “consequences of their activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473; see also Pasquale v. Genovese, 136 Vt.
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[275]*275Morse, J.
Plaintiff Dali appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dali, a Vermont resident, brought suit in Rutland Superior Court against Maryland defendants for breach of warranty arising from the purchase of a Hanoverian horse. Defendant Baron, a Maryland resident and owner of the horse, hired defendants Kaylor and Westphalian Pride Farm to sell it. Defendant Kaylor, d/b/a Westphalian Pride Farm, is a horse breeder and trainer in Maryland. Defendant Westphalian Pride Farm holds itself out as a breeder and developer of “world-class” Hanoverian horses. The sole issue is whether defendants’ contacts with Vermont were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in Vermont. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.
Dali read Westphalian Pride Farm’s classified advertisement in a nationally circulated publication, Chronicle of the Horse. Westphalian Pride Farm had placed advertisements in Chronicle of the Horse over a hundred times since 1990. In September 1992, Dali visited Westphalian Pride Farm in Maryland to view the horses available for sale. Upon her return to Vermont, she communicated with defendants by mail and telephone and ultimately agreed to purchase a horse. In October 1992, Dali mailed a check to defendants as payment for the horse. Defendant Kaylor mailed Dali the completed bill of sale for the horse, a transfer of ownership form and an application for membership in the American Hanoverian Society.
The horse sustained injuries during its trip to Vermont. A veterinarian’s treatment of these injuries led to the discovery that the horse suffered from congenital and chronic bone disease in his rear legs.
Vermont’s long-arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 913(b), confers jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 40, 572 A2d 1382, 1385 (1990); see also Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.E 4(e) (statute allowing personal service outside state reaches to “outer limits permitted by the due process clause”). The Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments” of a foreign state with which the individual has no meaningful contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). A state court may assert jurisdiction and comport with due process where a nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [276]*276(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The critical consideration in determining if defendants’ activities satisfy the minimum contacts requirement is whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41, 572 A.2d at 1386. This reasonableness requirement is met when the defendant purposefully directs activity toward residents of a forum state and the litigation arises out of, or relates to, that activity. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41, 572 A.2d at 1386. The reasonableness requirement also prevents a defendant from being subjected to jurisdiction on the basis of fortuitous, attenuated, or random contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 41-42, 572 A.2d at 1386.
Defendants argue that they did not affirmatively seek to do business with any Vermont resident by placing classified advertisements in a nationally circulated publication and that placement of their ad did not establish minimum contacts with Vermont. They further argue that they did not purposefully direct activity toward Vermont during negotiations with Dali. Defendants rely, in part, upon Carothers v. Vogeler, 148 Vt. 316, 532 A.2d 580 (1987), in which this Court found insufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction. In Carothers, the Vermont defendant advertised his restored Porsche in a nationally circulated publication and subsequently sold it to the Ohio plaintiff who had seen the advertisement. The plaintiff obtained a judgment in Ohio. When the plaintiff sought to enforce that judgment in Vermont, we held that because defendant’s sole contact with Ohio was the advertisement, defendant had not “avail[ed] himself of any benefit or law of Ohio.” Id. at 319, 532 A.2d at 582. Carothers, however, involved the private sale of an automobile by placement of a single advertisement in a nationally circulated publication. The seller was not in the business of selling cars. Id. at 317, 532 A.2d at 580.
When, however, sellers intentionally act to advance their commercial interest, they should reasonably anticipate being sued in Vermont if a dispute arises from these activities. Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 43, 572 A.2d at 1387. Unlike the defendant in Carothers, who did not regularly advertise and sell cars, defendants here were in the business of selling horses; they held themselves out as “breeder[s] and developers of world class registered Hanoverians.” Defendants [277]*277initiated the resulting business transaction by advertising, more than one hundred times, in a national market that included Vermont.
It is hardly unfair for defendants to defend themselves in jurisdictions where they choose to advertise their products. See Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, 535 A.2d 26, 27-28 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (forum state claim resulting from New York television broadcast received in New Jersey was “not only to be anticipated, it was predictable”). As technology and economic practices diminish the importance of geographic boundaries, it is not unreasonable to anticipate the expansion of personal jurisdiction to those who deliberately transcend those boundaries in pursuit of economic gain. See id. at 28 (considering personal jurisdiction to be function of contemporary technology and economic practice).
We hold that assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants will not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (requiring consideration of interests of forum state, plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief and burden on defendant). Vermont has a legitimate interest in sanctioning “parties who reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations” with Vermont citizens for the “consequences of their activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473; see also Pasquale v. Genovese, 136 Vt. 417, 419, 392 A.2d 395, 397 (1978) (finding it “equitable to imply submission to jurisdiction” when defendant’s conduct was “purposefully directed toward Vermont” and inevitably affected Vermont residents); Electronic Media Int'l v. Pioneer Communications of Am., Inc., 586 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Me. 1991) (affording redress against nonresidents who incur obligations to residents).
Defendants do not argue that Vermont is an inconvenient forum in which to try Dali’s claim. It is not too great a burden to defend the breach of warranty claim here, and it may even be easier to litigate damages. See New Bern Pool & Supply Co. v. Graubart, 381 S.E.2d 156, 160 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (assertion of jurisdiction convenient when potential witnesses available in forum state); see also Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 558 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. 1989) (finding no burden on nonresident because interstate travel “not qualitatively that different” from travel within state). The horse’s diseased condition was discovered in Vermont, and potential witnesses to the horse’s condition and expenses incurred are likely to be in Vermont.
Reversed.