Daler Singh v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DALER SINGH, Case No. 1:26-cv-00272-JLT-SAB (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER CONVERTING THE MATTER TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 13 v. GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION2; AND REFERRING THE 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,1 MATTER TO THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE 15 Respondents. (Doc. 2) 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Before the Court for decision is Daler Singh’s request for a temporary restraining order 19 (Doc. 2), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. 1.) Having evaluated the TRO request, 21 1 Respondents move to dismiss all unlawfully named officials. (Doc. 9 at 1 n.1.) “[L]ongstanding practice confirms 22 that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held . . . .” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 23 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has “affirm[ed] the application of the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules to core habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed by immigrant 24 detainees.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). Although Doe held that “Padilla set forth a clear rule requiring core habeas petitioners challenging their present physical confinement to name their immediate 25 custodian, the warden of the facility where they are detained, as the respondent to their petition,” 109 F.4th at 1197, Doe did not necessarily preclude naming more than one respondent so long as the immediate custodian is named. 26 Given that Petitioner has named his immediate custodian as a Respondent, the Court declines to dismiss all the remaining named Respondents. 27 2 Upon the agreement of the parties, the Court converts the motion for temporary restraining order into one for 28 preliminary injunction. (Doc. 9 at 1; Doc. 10 at 7.) The parties have also affirmatively declined an evidentiary 1 Respondents’ opposition, (Doc. 9) and Petitioner’s reply (Doc. 10), the Court converts the matter 2 into a motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTS that motion, and REFERS the matter to the 3 assigned magistrate judge for a determination on the merits. 4 II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 Petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection on or 6 around November 28, 2022 near Yuma, Arizona, at which time he was apprehended by the 7 Department of Homeland Security. (Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 9 at 2.) Petitioner was detained pursuant to 8 a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien and subsequently released on an Order of Release on 9 Recognizance ("OREC") and subject to Alternative to Detention ("ATD") monitoring which 10 required regular check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Doc. 2 at 2) Petitioner 11 contends he fully complied with all conditions of release, including appearing for every required 12 ICE check-in. (Id.) 13 Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear placing him in removal proceedings 14 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). (Doc. 9 at 2.) On November 3, 2025, an Immigration Judge 15 ordered Petitioner removed to India. (Id.) Petitioner subsequently appealed the removal decision 16 to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which accepted the appeal on November 7, 2025. (Id.) On 17 or about December 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested when he reported to a routine ICE check-in. 18 (Id.) He is currently being detained at California City Detention Facility in California City, 19 California. (Id.) 20 The government opposes the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief and maintains that 21 Petitioner’s detention is “mandatory” under expedited removal procedures set forth at 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1225(b)(2). (See generally Doc. 9.) 23 III. LEGAL STANDARD 24 The standard governing the issuing of a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard 25 for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 26 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) 27 they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable 28 harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] 1 favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 2 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) 3 (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 4 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”). 5 The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to “make a showing on all four 6 prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 7 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 8 (holding that the moving party has “the burden of persuasion”); see also Hecox v. Little, 104 9 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction 10 with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing 11 on the balance of hardships may support the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are 12 “serious questions on the merits … so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 13 irreparable injury, and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Finally, “a preliminary 14 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 15 IV. ANALYSIS 16 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 17 This first factor “is the most important” under Winter, and “is especially important when 18 a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th 19 Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on his claim that Respondents violated his 20 Fifth Amendment Due Process rights when he was detained without notice or provided a custody 21 hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 2 at 3-6.) 22 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 23 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 24 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 25 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 26 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 27 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 28 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. “Even when the 1 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the 2 individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the 3 conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 4 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 5 482 (1972)). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 6 1:25-CV-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. 7 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). 8 In analyzing procedural due process claims such as this one, courts must first determine 9 whether a protected liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause. See Kentucky Dep’t of 10 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989.) If a protected liberty interest is found to 11 exist, the court then must examine whether the procedures necessary to ensure that any 12 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. (Id.) To the extent 13 that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s due process argument, they deploy a blanket 14 assertion that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 15 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and therefore categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. 16 (Doc. 9 at 2-3.)3 17 Although Petitioner’s claim is ultimately constitutional in nature, it turns on whether 18 section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) justify Petitioner’s re-detention. Courts nationwide, including 19 this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position and found the DHS 20 policy unlawful. See, e.g., Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, 1:25-CV-01228-JLT, 2025 WL 2879514 at 21 *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); see also, M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT, 2025 WL 22 3265446 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 23 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 24 (LAK), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) 25 (estimating over 350 cases ruled the DHS policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in 26 about 50 different courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., 27

28 3 Respondents note that because Petitioner’s appeal of his order of removal remains pending before the BIA, his 1 No. 25-CV-08002-JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); 2 Armando Modesto Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 3 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 4 Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 5 authority for all “applicants for admission,” Respondents fail to meaningfully contend with the 6 liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in 7 November of 2022, before the current manifestation of this interpretation. Thus, the Court must 8 evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to 9 determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are 10 sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue. Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921at *3. In Mathews, the 11 Court determined the following: 12 [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 13 distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 14 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 15 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 16 procedural requirement would entail. 17 During his three years on parole, Petitioner built a life. Petitioner has a substantial private 18 interest in being out of custody and his detention denies him that liberty interest. Zadvydas v. 19 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 20 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due 21 Process] Clause protects.”). 22 Respondents offer little to rebut Petitioner’s due process claim and do not provide any 23 justification for detaining Petitioner. (Doc. 9 at 3-5.) Respondents rely on Shaughnessy v. 24 United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) and its progeny for the proposition that the 25 Fifth Amendment does not apply to Petitioner. (Id. at 8.) This Court has rejected this exact 26 argument on numerous occasions. See e.g., M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT-SKO, 27 2025 WL 3265446, at 10* (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025). 28 As such, nothing in the record suggests a change in circumstance material to the question 1 of whether Petitioner is a danger to public safety or a flight risk. It is clear to this Court, despite 2 Respondents arguments otherwise, that Petitioner established his liberty interest. 3 Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, this Court concludes that the government’s 4 interest in detaining Petitioner without proper process is slight. “Since respondents did not 5 engage with Petitioner’s due process arguments, they have not provided the court with any 6 information regarding the burden on the government.” Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at 7 *4. In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 8 merits of his due process claim. 9 B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 10 The remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, 11 and the public interest—decidedly weigh in favor of Petitioner. “[I]t is well established that the 12 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 13 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 14 see also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical 15 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”). By successfully demonstrating that 16 Respondents lack a basis to detain him, Petitioner has succeeded in showing irreparable harm. 17 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 18 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat'l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 19 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 20 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in 21 the Government's favor. Though the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the 22 immigration laws, granting relief to Petitioner will not seriously impinge its ability to do so. The 23 Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 24 enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 25 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 26 against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 27 immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at 28 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No, 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 1 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in 2 Petitioner's favor. 3 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is converted to a 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and it is GRANTED. 6 2. Because the government has no evidence that Petitioner poses a risk of flight or 7 poses a danger to the community, Petitioner SHALL be released IMMEDIATELY from DHS 8 custody. DHS SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions on her, such as electronic 9 monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a later custody hearing. 10 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from rearresting or re- 11 detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, which include, at a 12 minimum, pre-deprivation notice4 of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation hearing at 13 which the government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence 14 that he is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if not arrested. 15 4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 16 Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 17 like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 18 Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 19 5. The parties are directed to meet and confer no later than 14 days from the date of 20 the entry of this order, and, if possible, submit a joint proposed briefing schedule discussing the 21 abeyance of further proceedings on the merits pending the 9th Circuit Appeal of Rodriguez 22 Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). If the parties are unable to agree to 23 a joint proposed briefing schedule, the Court will rule on the request. 24 6. The government may file a further brief on the merits of the habeas petition 25 within 45 days. Alternatively, as soon as it can within that 30-day period, the government may 26 file a notice that it does not intend to file further briefing. If the government files an additional 27

28 4 If legally sufficient circumstances justify arrest without notice in advance, a post-deprivation hearing consistent 1 | brief, Petitioner may file a further brief within 30 days thereafter. 2 5. The matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the 3 | merits of the petition as quickly as possible. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 | Dated: _ February 3, 2026 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28