2026 IL App (1st) 250698-U FIFTH DIVISION February 13, 2026
No. 1-25-0698
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ALICE L. DALE, as Trustee of the Allan L. Lorincz ) Revocable Trust, dated September 24, 1998, as amended ) and restated, ) ) Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of v. ) Cook County. ) LINDA L. SHELTON, ) ) No. 21 CH 03572 Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) Honorable ) Alison C. Conlon, EDUARD ADAM GLAVINSKAS, TIMOTHY ) Judge Presiding. RITCHEY, KERRY PECK, HOWARD HELSINGER, ) AARON GOLE, RITCHEY PECK, LLC, and DONALD ) LORINCZ, ) ) Counterdefendants. )
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Oden Johnson concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s orders granting plaintiff judgment on the pleadings, granting plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaims, and denying defendant’s motion for substitution of judge for cause. No. 1-25-0698
¶2 Plaintiff Alice L. Dale, as trustee of a trust created by her father, Allan Lorincz, filed a
complaint to terminate the life estate in a condominium that was granted to her sister, defendant
Linda L. Shelton, in a prior probate proceeding following Mr. Lorincz’s death. Ms. Shelton now
appeals, making arguments related to the circuit court’s orders (1) denying her motion to dismiss
Ms. Dale’s complaint, (2) dismissing Ms. Shelton’s counterclaims, (3) granting Ms. Dale judgment
on the pleadings, and (4) denying Ms. Shelton’s motion for substitution of judge for cause. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Mr. Lorincz’s Will and Trust Agreements
¶5 The following background is the predicate for the claims in this case and is taken from the
parties’ pleadings and attachments to those pleadings.
¶6 In 1998, Mr. Lorincz, father of both Alice Dale and Linda Shelton, created the Allan L.
Lorincz Revocable Trust (the Lorincz Trust). The trust agreement originally named Mr. Lorincz
as trustee and Ms. Shelton as successor trustee.
¶7 In 2005, Mr. Lorincz prepared a will that named Ms. Shelton as executor of his will. The
will provided that, besides certain enumerated property, his estate was to be given to the trustee of
the Lorincz Trust for the trustee to administer and distribute pursuant to the provisions of the trust
agreement in effect when he died. According to Ms. Shelton, Mr. Lorincz also amended the
Lorincz Trust to put the assets that Ms. Shelton was entitled to upon his death into “a special needs
subtrust with the intent of protecting [her] inheritance due to her congenital and acquired physical
disabilities.”
¶8 In 2007, Mr. Lorincz prepared a second amended trust agreement, that again named Ms.
Shelton as successor trustee. It also named her as a co-trustee, along with Ms. Dale’s husband
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Doug Dale, of a subtrust, the Linda L. Shelton Trust (the Shelton Trust), although it provided that
she could not serve as trustee of the Shelton Trust during any period in which her financial
condition and physical or mental disabilities qualified her to receive public assistance funds. Ms.
Dale was named as her husband’s successor as co-trustee of the Shelton Trust, in the event that he
was unable or unwilling to serve. During any period in which Ms. Shelton was able to serve as
trustee of the Shelton Trust she could remove her co-trustee and replace that person with a
successor trustee of her choosing. She claims that she removed Ms. Dale as co-trustee in 2010.
The agreement further provided that, upon Mr. Lorincz’s death, Ms. Shelton could live, rent-free,
in a house that, according to Ms. Shelton, was then Mr. Lorincz’s home. Mr. Lorincz also amended
his will to name Ms. Dale as the successor executor to Ms. Shelton.
¶9 In June 2010, Mr. Lorincz prepared a third amended trust agreement, that named himself
and Ms. Dale co-trustees of the Lorincz Trust and Ms. Dale the sole successor trustee. This third
amended trust agreement further provided that, upon Mr. Lorincz’s death, if Ms. Shelton was
living and any portion of the trust estate consisted of an interest in a certain condominium, the
trustee was to “pay off all mortgage indebtedness” on the condo and “any interest in such property”
was to be “retained in trust by the Trustee” in the Shelton Trust, the beneficiary of which was Ms.
Shelton and which was to be “held, administered and distributed” pursuant to Article XV of the
trust agreement. That article provided that, while Ms. Shelton lived, she could reside in the condo
“rent-free; provided that during the term of the [Shelton Trust], [Ms. Shelton] shall be responsible
for paying all real estate taxes” and other costs associated with the condo.
¶ 10 B. The Probate Proceedings
¶ 11 In September 2010, Mr. Lorincz died. His will was admitted to probate in case No. 10 P
6117. That will contained a residuary bequest to the Lorincz Trust. Through counsel, Ms. Shelton
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filed a petition, in the probate proceeding, to contest the validity of the Lorincz Trust. Ms. Dale
participated in that proceeding as the executor of Mr. Lorincz’s will and trustee of the Lorincz
Trust. The record is unclear as to when Ms. Dale was named executor of the will—Ms. Shelton’s
pleadings allege that it occurred in 2010, and also suggest that Ms. Dale may have been named
because Ms. Shelton was a felon and therefore could not serve in that position.
¶ 12 Ms. Shelton brought three claims in her trust contest: undue influence, interference with
testamentary expectation, and lack of testamentary capacity. Ms. Shelton alleged that, beginning
in 2006, she had lived with Mr. Lorincz and cared for him while he was ill with Parkinson’s
disease. She assisted with his personal and financial affairs. When Ms. Shelton became
incarcerated from May 2010 to November 2010, Ms. Dale became Mr. Lorincz’s caretaker and
“controller of [his] daily activities and *** property.”
¶ 13 Ms. Shelton alleged in the trust contest that, while Mr. Lorincz was elderly, depressed, and
starving himself before his death, Ms. Dale hired an attorney to create the third amended trust
agreement. Ms. Shelton claimed that Ms. Dale “defame[d]” Ms. Shelton to Mr. Lorincz and led
him to believe that Ms. Shelton had exploited him. Ms. Shelton alleged that, if Mr. Lorincz had
not been unduly influenced by Ms. Dale, he would not have removed Ms. Shelton as successor
trustee, appointed Ms. Dale executor, or amended the distribution to Ms. Shelton from Mr.
Lorincz’s house to the condo, because he knew that Ms. Shelton was physically disabled and could
not navigate the stairs to the walk-up condo. Ms. Shelton requested the third amended trust
agreement be regarded as invalid and a nullity.
¶ 14 On January 6, 2012, the probate court dismissed Ms. Shelton’s trust contest with prejudice
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007)—which allows for dismissal for
a claimant’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence in serving their claim on the defendant—and
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for want of prosecution. On February 28, 2012, the probate court also issued an order imposing
sanctions on Ms. Shelton and finding that she brought her trust contest and other claims for the
purposes of harassment, delay, and increasing the cost of litigation. After these orders, Ms. Shelton
filed multiple appeals from the probate proceedings. These appeals were consolidated and it
appears from this court’s records that Ms. Shelton never filed any briefs, and the consolidated
appeal was dismissed on May 30, 2013.
¶ 15 On April 21, 2014, the probate court issued an order on the “presentation of the Trustee’s
Second and Current Account of the [Lorincz Trust] and Petition to Approve Second Account of
the [Lorincz Trust] With Final Distribution to the [Shelton Trust].” The court noted that “due notice
[had] been given,” and that appellate court proceedings related to the estate had concluded and the
probate court’s orders “remain[ed] unchanged.” The order approved an accounting of the trust
from September 2011 to September 2013. The order further stated:
“The Court having found that Linda Shelton’s only interest in the Allan L. Lorincz
Revocable Trust, and any sub-trusts created thereunder, is a life estate interest in the Trust-
owned [condominium], Alice L. Dale, as Trustee of the Allan L. Lorincz Revocable Trust,
is authorized to transfer a life estate interest in said Trust-owned real property to the Trustee
of the Linda Shelton Trust.”
That transfer was to “constitute a final distribution to Linda Shelton and Linda Shelton shall not
be entitled to any further distributions from the Allan L. Lorincz Revocable Trust, or any sub-
trusts created thereunder.”
¶ 16 In another order entered on April 21, 2014, the probate court, on application of Ms. Dale,
found that “all acts necessary for the full administration of the Estate ha[d] been performed
according to law,” ordered Ms. Dale discharged as Independent Representative of the estate, and
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closed the estate.
¶ 17 C. The Proceedings in This Case
¶ 18 On July 21, 2021, Ms. Dale, as trustee of the Lorincz Trust, filed a complaint to terminate
Ms. Shelton’s life estate in the condo. Citing the third amended trust agreement and the probate
court’s orders sanctioning Ms. Shelton and finalizing her distribution, Ms. Dale alleged that Ms.
Shelton was obligated to pay real estate taxes on the condo during the term of her life tenancy and
failed to do so.
¶ 19 In her complaint, Ms. Dale alleged that in 2016, the nonpayment of taxes resulted in a
mortgage foreclosure action being filed against the Lorincz Trust, requiring the Lorincz Trust to
make additional escrow payments, pay additional lender fees, and pay additional attorney fees to
reinstate the mortgage on the condo. As part of the settlement of the foreclosure proceeding, the
trust was required to maintain an amount in escrow that raised the trust’s monthly mortgage
payments for the condo by 43%. By May 2021, the trust had lost $44,704.54 due to Ms. Shelton’s
failure to pay real estate taxes for the condo, which she continued to refuse to pay.
¶ 20 Ms. Dale requested the court find that Ms. Shelton had breached her duties as life tenant
of the condo, terminate her life estate in the condo, revert title to the property in fee simple to the
Lorincz Trust, enter judgment against Ms. Shelton and in favor of the Lorincz Trust in the amount
of $44,704.54, and award Ms. Dale fees and costs for bringing the action.
¶ 21 Ms. Shelton represented herself pro se in the circuit court, as she does on appeal. She filed
an answer to the complaint in which she admitted she had not paid any real estate taxes for the
condo, alleging that failure was due to poverty stemming from prior legal proceedings, including
the probate proceedings. Ms. Shelton also alleged in her answer that, in violation of the trust
agreement, Ms. Dale failed to pay off the mortgage on the condo. Further, Ms. Shelton alleged in
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her answer that she had removed Ms. Dale as co-trustee of the Shelton Trust and appointed new
co-trustees in 2010 and 2012.
¶ 22 Ms. Shelton also filed a countercomplaint, which was amended several times. In addition
to Ms. Dale, Ms. Shelton named as counterdefendants Ms. Dale’s attorney (who continues to
represent Ms. Dale on appeal); Ms. Shelton and Ms. Dale’s brother, Donald Lorincz; several
attorneys who previously represented Mr. Lorincz, Donald Lorincz, or Ms. Dale; and the law firm
where two of those attorneys were employed.
¶ 23 Ms. Shelton raised eight counterclaims. Counts I through III were the same as those she
asserted in her trust contest: undue influence, interference with testamentary expectation, and lack
of testamentary capacity. Counts V through VIII were claims for a breach of fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries of the Lorincz Trust, fraud, the violation of section 1962(c) of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act) (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2018)), and a
conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) of the RICO Act (id. § 1962(d)). In those counts, Ms. Shelton
alleged that the attorney counterdefendants, in a long-running scheme to extract fees from Mr.
Lorincz’s estate, manipulated Ms. Dale into forging the third amended trust agreement,
“fraudulently” acting as trustee, removing Ms. Shelton’s property from the house, and bringing
this suit against her. The counterdefendants also misrepresented the validity of the third amended
trust agreement to the courts and bribed the judge in the probate case. She noted that two of the
attorneys, their relatives, their law firm, and other attorneys at the firm contributed to the judge’s
campaign fund for an election to the Illinois Supreme Court while the probate proceedings were
ongoing.
¶ 24 In Count IV, Ms. Shelton alleged the breach of an employment contract between Mr.
Lorincz and Dr. Maisha Hamilton. According to Count IV, Dr. Hamilton had a contract to care for
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Mr. Lorincz, hold his power of attorney, and supervise his assets in 2010 while Ms. Shelton was
incarcerated. The allegation is that under the agreement between Mr. Lorincz and Dr. Hamilton,
Dr. Hamilton “would make sure” that Ms. Shelton received Mr. Lorincz’s house upon his death,
making Ms. Shelton an intended beneficiary of the contract. Dr. Hamilton and Mr. Lorincz
executed a fidelity bond as evidence of their agreement but “the written employee contract was
not signed due to illegal active interference by [Donald Lorincz and Ms. Dale] and the police they
called.” Dr. Hamilton performed her duties under the contract “to the extent that [Ms. Dale] would
allow,” but the counterdefendants breached the contract by failing to pay Dr. Hamilton and
removing property belonging to the estate and Ms. Shelton from Mr. Lorincz’s house.
¶ 25 Ms. Dale moved to dismiss Ms. Shelton’s countercomplaint under sections 2-619(a)(4) and
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (9) (West 2020)). Ms.
Dale argued that, besides her, the counterdefendants were not subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction, as Ms. Shelton did not properly serve them. Further, Ms. Shelton lacked standing to
bring the breach of contract claim on behalf of Dr. Hamilton. Ms. Dale argued that the remainder
of Ms. Shelton’s counterclaims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because they
were premised on the same allegations as her trust contest, namely, that the third amended trust
agreement was invalid.
¶ 26 On April 19, 2023, the court dismissed Ms. Shelton’s counterclaims with prejudice “on the
grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel and the statute of limitations.” It additionally dismissed
with prejudice, for lack of standing, her breach of contract claim relating to Dr. Hamilton. The
court did not address the other counterdefendants that Ms. Shelton named in her countercomplaint.
¶ 27 On October 19, 2021, and then, again, on May 15, 2023, Ms. Shelton moved to dismiss
Ms. Dale’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the
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Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2020)). She argued that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the condo was owned by the Shelton Trust and she had removed Ms. Dale as
co-trustee of the Shelton Trust in 2010, and Ms. Dale therefore lacked authority to bring this suit.
¶ 28 On May 16, 2023, Ms. Dale moved for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to sections 2-1005 and 2-615(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e), 2-1005 (West 2020)).
Ms. Dale argued there were no genuine issues of material fact and she was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, as Ms. Shelton had admitted that she failed to pay the real estate taxes on the
condo or reimburse the Lorincz Trust for the taxes.
¶ 29 On May 18, 2023, Ms. Shelton moved to reconsider the court’s dismissal of her
countercomplaint.
¶ 30 On September 13, 2023, the court issued a written order denying Ms. Shelton’s second
motion to dismiss Ms. Dale’s complaint, denying Ms. Shelton’s motion to reconsider the dismissal
of her countercomplaint, and granting Ms. Dale’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The order
noted that it was a written statement of the court’s oral rulings from September 6, 2023, prepared
for Ms. Shelton’s benefit, in response to Ms. Shelton’s request that the court speak slowly enough
for her to write down everything that the court was saying.
¶ 31 In its September 13, 2023, written order, the circuit court denied Ms. Shelton’s motion to
dismiss Ms. Dale’s complaint, on the basis that Ms. Dale adequately pleaded that the Lorincz Trust
owned the condo, that Ms. Dale was trustee of the Lorincz Trust, and that Ms. Shelton’s only
interest in the Lorincz Trust was a life estate in the condo. The court found that Ms. Shelton’s
arguments that the third amended trust agreement was invalid and that Ms. Dale was not the trustee
were not properly brought on a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 because they did not accept
the truth of Ms. Dale’s allegations. On Ms. Shelton’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of her
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counterclaims, the court noted her trust contest had been dismissed with prejudice in a January 6,
2012, order, and the probate court recognized Ms. Dale as trustee in an April 21, 2014, order. On
Ms. Dale’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court found that Ms. Shelton held a life
estate in the condo (based on the probate court’s April 21, 2014, order), was responsible for paying
the condo’s real estate taxes during her life tenancy, and admitted in her answer that she failed to
do so. Accordingly, the court found that it was clear from the pleadings that Ms. Shelton breached
her duty as a life tenant and that her life estate should be terminated.
¶ 32 Ms. Dale subsequently filed a written motion for money damages. Ms. Shelton filed
motions for approval of a proposed bystander’s report for September 6, 2023, and “to correct legal
errors” in the court’s rulings in the September 13, 2023, written order.
¶ 33 On December 21, 2023, while these motions were pending, Ms. Shelton moved for
substitution of judge for cause. She claimed that the assigned judge, the Honorable Alison Conlon,
was “ignoring the law and aiding and abetting criminal conduct” by claiming to have jurisdiction
despite Ms. Dale’s lack of authority to bring this suit. On the same day, Ms. Shelton moved for a
rule to show cause why Ms. Dale’s attorney should not be held in contempt of court for
fraudulently stating that Ms. Dale was the trustee of the trust that owned the condo, and failing to
instruct Ms. Dale to pay off the mortgage on the condo.
¶ 34 On April 3, 2024, another judge in the circuit court denied Ms. Shelton’s motion to
substitute judge for cause. On October 2, 2024, Judge Conlon filed a written order striking Ms.
Dale’s motion for money damages because she failed to provide evidence or a legal basis for the
damages; denying Ms. Shelton’s motion for approval of a bystander’s report, as her proposed
report was inaccurate; and denying Ms. Shelton’s motion to correct errors in the court’s rulings
memorialized in the September 13, 2023, written order. On March 21, 2025, Judge Conlon denied
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Ms. Shelton’s motion for a rule to show cause why Ms. Dale’s attorney should not be held in
contempt of court. Ms. Shelton now appeals.
¶ 35 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 36 Ms. Dale suggests that we “[a]rguably” lack jurisdiction because Ms. Shelton failed to file
a timely notice of appeal. She notes that the circuit court’s October 2, 2024, order resolved every
issue except Ms. Shelton’s motion for a rule to show cause why Ms. Dale’s attorney should not be
held in contempt. Ms. Shelton filed her notice of appeal on April 16, 2025, well more than 30 days
later. However, the court did not enter a final and appealable judgment until it denied Ms. Shelton’s
motion for a rule to show cause. See In re Marriage of Carrillo, 372 Ill. App. 3d 803, 813 (2007)
(a judgment that is final as to all claims besides a pending petition for a contempt finding is not
appealable until the court resolves the petition for a contempt finding). Ms. Shelton filed her notice
of appeal within 30 days of the court’s March 21, 2025, order denying that motion. We therefore
have jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303(a) (eff.
July 1, 2017).
¶ 37 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 38 In her pro se appeal, Ms. Shelton claims that the circuit court: (1) lacked jurisdiction
because Ms. Dale was not the trustee of the Shelton Trust, which, according to Ms. Shelton, owns
the condo; (2) erred in denying her motion to dismiss Ms. Dale’s complaint; (3) erred in granting
Ms. Dale’s motion to dismiss her countercomplaint; (4) erred in granting judgment for Ms. Dale;
(5) erred in denying her motion to substitute the judge for cause; and (6) entered a decision that
was against the manifest weight of the evidence when it found that Ms. Dale was the trustee of the
trust that owned the condo.
¶ 39 The majority of these arguments rest on the same false premise, which is that Ms. Shelton
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can continue, in this proceeding, to question the final determination by the probate court that she
was entitled only to a life estate in the condo, that Ms. Dale was the trustee of the Lorincz Trust,
and that the Lorincz Trust owned the condo. These determinations can no longer be litigated. We
will begin by addressing the res judicata and collateral estoppel impact of the probate court
proceedings on this case and then address Ms. Shelton’s remaining arguments.
¶ 40 A. The Decisions of the Probate Court Bar Most of Ms. Shelton’s Claims and Defenses in
This Case
¶ 41 The doctrine of res judicata prevents a subsequent suit between two parties involving a
cause of action on which a court of competent jurisdiction has already rendered a final judgment
on the merits. Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, IFT-AFT,
AFL-CIO, 2024 IL App (1st) 240613, ¶ 23. The bar includes both matters that were actually
decided and matters that could have been decided in the first action. Id. Res judicata applies where
there is “(1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) an
identity of cause of action, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
¶ 42 The related doctrine of collateral estoppel also bars the relitigation of issues where there is
a final judgment on the merits, the issue decided in the prior adjudication and the issue raised in
the present case are identical, and the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication. LeMaster v. Hynds, Yohnka, Bzdill & McInerney,
LLC, 2025 IL App (1st) 242172, ¶ 26. Collateral estoppel can be applied once the potential for
appellate review has been exhausted. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1986).
“[T]he pertinent inquiry for collateral estoppel purposes is whether some controlling fact or
question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the
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former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LeMaster,
2025 IL App (1st) 242172, ¶ 28.
¶ 43 Whether res judicata and collateral estoppel bar claims are questions of law that we review
de novo. Lelis v. Board of Trustees of Cicero Police Pension Fund, 2013 IL App (1st) 121985,
¶ 13. As our review is de novo, we may affirm on any basis apparent in the record regardless of
whether the circuit court relied on that reason. Harding v. Shi, 2025 IL App (1st) 240317, ¶ 35.
¶ 44 The circuit court properly found that Ms. Shelton could not relitigate the claims that were
made in the probate court or the determinations by that court regarding her interest in the condo.
On January 6, 2012, the probate court dismissed with prejudice Ms. Shelton’s claims regarding
the validity of the third amended Lorincz Trust. In addition, on April 21, 2014, the probate court
recognized that Ms. Dale was the trustee of the Lorincz Trust and approved a final distribution to
the Shelton Trust, under which the probate court ruled that Ms. Shelton’s “only interest” in the
Lorincz Trust or any subtrusts was a life estate in the condo.
¶ 45 These findings foreclose most of Ms. Shelton’s claims and arguments in this case. Based
on her arguments in this appeal, however, it appears that Ms. Shelton may misunderstand some of
the probate court rulings. The probate court did not grant the Shelton Trust ownership of the condo.
It granted the trustee of the Shelton Trust a life estate interest in the condo, confirming Ms.
Shelton’s right to live in the condo rent-free pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement. The
Lorincz Trust continued to own the condo. The other April 21, 2014, order by the probate court
did not terminate the Lorincz Trust and discharge Ms. Dale as trustee. It merely closed the estate
and ended the probate proceedings.
¶ 46 Returning to the issue of res judicata, it appears that the probate court dismissed Ms.
Shelton’s trust contest on January 6, 2012, pursuant to Rule 103(b) and for want of prosecution.
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While Ms. Shelton does not make this argument, we are aware that an involuntary dismissal with
prejudice pursuant to Rule 103(b) has been held not to necessarily have a res judicata effect. As
this court has recognized, a Rule 103(b) ruling does not constitute a judgment on the merits because
the reason for dismissal bears no relationship to the merits. Brady v. Joos, 273 Ill. App. 3d 793,
797-98 (1995) (citing Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 77 (1994)).
¶ 47 However, the probate proceeding is still a bar in this case because, in addition to dismissing
Ms. Shelton’s claims, on April 21, 2014, the probate court recognized that Ms. Dale was the trustee
of the Lorincz Trust and that the Lorincz Trust owned the condo, and found that Ms. Shelton’s
only interest in the Lorincz Trust and any subtrusts was a life estate in the condo. Ms. Shelton had
filed appeals from the probate court following the dismissal of her claims, and the probate court
noted they were resolved when it entered its finding that Ms. Shelton’s only interest was a life
estate in the condo. The probate court also closed the estate on April 21, 2014. Ms. Shelton does
not appear to have appealed following the court’s April 21, 2014, orders.
¶ 48 The probate court’s orders show there was a final determination by that court as to who the
trustee of the Lorincz Trust was, who owned the condo, and what Ms. Shelton’s rights were. Any
contention by Ms. Shelton that questions any final determination by the probate court is barred by
res judicata and is not a proper basis for either a claim or a defense in this case. That includes Ms.
Shelton’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Ms. Dale and her attorney
committed fraud against the circuit court by claiming that Ms. Dale was the trustee of the trust that
owned the condo.
¶ 49 As to the other people that Ms. Shelton named as counterdefendants besides Ms. Dale, they
are more properly considered potential third-party defendants than counterdefendants, as they were
not parties to the proceeding before Ms. Shelton filed her countercomplaint. Carmichael v. Union
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Pacific RR. Co., 2019 IL 123853, ¶ 32 (noting that a counterclaim is an action brought against
another existing party). But Ms. Shelton does not appear to have served them, and the record does
not reflect that they ever appeared in the proceedings. The circuit court therefore had no personal
jurisdiction over these counterdefendants. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL
116311, ¶ 18 (“Personal jurisdiction may be established either by service of process in accordance
with statutory requirements or by a party’s voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.”). That
is one basis to affirm the dismissal of her claims against them. See Harding, 2025 IL App (1st)
240317, ¶ 35 (noting that the appellate court can affirm on any basis apparent in the record).
¶ 50 The dismissal of Ms. Shelton’s claims against these other counterdefendants is also
appropriate under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Res judicata does not apply to these
counterdefendants because they were not parties to the probate proceedings. However, these
claims are premised on the same issues relating to the validity of the trust agreement and Ms.
Dale’s status as trustee that the probate court resolved. See LeMaster, 2025 IL App (1st) 242172,
¶ 26 (noting that collateral estoppel applies when there is a final judgment on the merits, that the
issue raised be identical to the issue decided in the prior case, and the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted was a party in the prior case). Thus, as with the claims against Ms. Dale, these
claims cannot now be asserted in this case.
¶ 51 Ms. Shelton’s argument against the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel is
that the probate court’s orders were void as the result of fraud and thus need not be followed here.
She claims that Ms. Dale and the other counterdefendants lied to the probate court in stating that
Mr. Lorincz had agreed to the third amended trust agreement. However, this does not impact the
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel in this case.
¶ 52 The kind of fraud that Ms. Shelton alleges, “such as false testimony or concealment” that
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occurs after a court validly acquires jurisdiction, is called “intrinsic” fraud. Leroy K.D. v. Nicole
B., 2021 IL App (3d) 200010, ¶ 37. Intrinsic fraud renders an order or judgment merely voidable,
not void. In re M.B., 235 Ill. App. 3d 352, 377-78 (1992). Orders that are voidable “may only be
challenged directly, and the challenger must proceed under section 2-1401 [of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-1401 (West 2020))] and comply with all the requirements of that section.” In re Custody of
Ayala, 344 Ill. App. 3d 574, 584 (2003). Thus, even if Ms. Shelton’s fraud allegations are true, she
is required to bring them in a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code, seeking to vacate the
allegedly void orders. Ms. Shelton’s allegations of fraud have no effect on the res judicata and
collateral estoppel impact of the probate court proceedings in this case.
¶ 53 The final determinations of the probate court mean that many of Ms. Shelton’s claims and
defenses are barred in this case and resolve most of the arguments Ms. Shelton makes on appeal.
We turn now to the other arguments that Ms. Shelton makes, which we also find to be without
merit.
¶ 54 B. The Breach of Contract Count
¶ 55 In count IV, Ms. Shelton alleged that the counterdefendants breached an employment
contract that Dr. Hamilton had with Mr. Lorincz to care for Mr. Lorincz, hold his power of
attorney, and supervise his assets. This claim may not be barred by res judicata or collateral
estoppel, but it fails for other reasons. Specifically, Ms. Shelton had no standing to raise this claim
because she was not a party to the alleged contract and has not adequately pleaded that she was in
privity with either party or was an intended third-party beneficiary. See Stop NorthPoint, LLC v.
City of Joliet, 2024 IL App (3d) 220517, ¶ 70 (noting that only a party to a contract, one in privity
with a party to a contract, or a third-party beneficiary of a contract has standing to sue on the
contract).
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¶ 56 Ms. Shelton alleges that under Dr. Hamilton’s agreement with Mr. Lorincz, the doctor
“would make sure” that Ms. Shelton inherited the house rather than the condo. This is a conclusory
assertion that neither the circuit court nor this court need accept as true. McIntosh v. Walgreens
Boots Alliance, Inc., 2019 IL 123626, ¶ 16 (a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a) does not
admit conclusory factual allegations). Ms. Shelton would only be an intended beneficiary if she
was named in the contract and liability to her “affirmatively appear[ed]” from the contract’s
language and the circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution. Carlson v. Rehabilitation
Institute of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143853, ¶ 14. Only intended third-party beneficiaries have
standing to sue on a contract. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Ms. Shelton cites no specific language from the contract
and no facts surrounding its execution that support a showing that she was an intended beneficiary.
At most, Ms. Shelton’s conclusory allegation suggests that she is an incidental beneficiary of the
contract, who “has no rights and may not sue to enforce them.” Id. ¶ 14. The circuit court properly
dismissed this claim for lack of standing.
¶ 57 C. Judgment in Favor of Ms. Dale
¶ 58 Ms. Shelton argues that the circuit court erred in granting Ms. Dale “summary judgment,”
which we will construe as an argument that the court erred in granting Ms. Dale judgment on the
pleadings, which is what Ms. Dale sought in the alternative in the motion that the court granted.
We also note that the denial of Ms. Shelton’s motion to dismiss Ms. Dale’s complaint, which Ms.
Shelton also challenges on appeal, has merged into the court’s final judgment granting Ms. Dale
judgment on the pleadings. County of Peoria v. Couture, 2022 IL App (3d) 210091, ¶ 39.
¶ 59 Ms. Shelton offers no substantive argument on this issue besides directing us to her
arguments that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. To the extent that Ms. Dale is again asking us
to reconsider the rulings of the probate court we are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
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collateral estoppel. However, this ruling granting Ms. Dale judgment went beyond following the
rulings of the probate court to find that Ms. Shelton should lose her life estate in the condo.
¶ 60 Under section 2-615(e) of the Code, “[a]ny party may seasonably move for judgment on
the pleadings.” 735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2020). Judgment on the pleadings is proper if there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hooker
v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 21. In deciding a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the court “may consider only those facts appearing on the face of the pleadings,
matters subject to judicial notice, and any judicial admissions in the record.” Id. The court must
also take as admitted all the nonmoving party’s well-pleaded facts “and the fair inferences drawn
therefrom.” State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 65. We review the grant
of a judgment on the pleadings de novo. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 21.
¶ 61 Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact that Ms. Shelton had lost any right to
retain a life estate in the condo. The third amended trust agreement provided that Ms. Shelton
could live in the condo, rent-free, “provided that during the term of the [Shelton Trust], [Ms.
Shelton] shall be responsible for paying all real estate taxes” associated with the condo. The
probate court recognized that Ms. Shelton had a life estate interest in the condo. Ms. Shelton
admitted in her answer that she had not paid property taxes on the condo.
¶ 62 The Lorincz Trust conditioned Ms. Shelton’s residency in the condo on her paying the real
estate taxes. Further, as the circuit court noted, “a life tenant has a duty to pay real estate taxes
assessed against the land during his life tenancy.” Hausmann v. Hausmann, 231 Ill. App. 3d 361,
366 (1992). Our supreme court has held that a life estate may be “defeated” where the instrument
creating the life estate provides that a certain event should terminate the tenancy and that event
occurs, “or where the life tenant has failed in the performance of duties upon the performance of
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which the life tenancy depends.” Cummings v. Hamilton, 220 Ill. 480, 484 (1905).
¶ 63 We note that Ms. Shelton has also alleged that Ms. Dale failed to pay off the mortgage on
the condo following Mr. Lorincz’s death, which the trust agreement required. Ms. Shelton appears
to be correct, given that Ms. Dale sought monetary damages in this case because Ms. Shelton’s
failure to pay the real estate taxes resulted in greater mortgage payments. However, Ms. Shelton
does not explain, and we fail to see, how this failure by Ms. Dale impacts Ms. Dale’s right to
terminate Ms. Shelton’s life estate. Further, the circuit court declined to find Ms. Shelton liable to
Ms. Dale for any monetary damages related to the mortgage.
¶ 64 Because Ms. Shelton had a duty to pay the real estate taxes as long as she lived in the
condo, which she has admitted she did not do, Ms. Shelton breached a duty upon which her life
tenancy depended. Therefore, the court did not err in granting Ms. Dale’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings and terminating Ms. Shelton’s life estate interest in the condo.
¶ 65 D. Substitution of Judge
¶ 66 Ms. Shelton argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to substitute Judge
Conlon, based on the arguments she made in that motion, i.e., that Judge Conlon demonstrated
bias against her by claiming to have jurisdiction over the case, ignoring the evidence Ms. Shelton
presented that the Shelton Trust owned the condo and that Ms. Dale was not trustee of the Shelton
Trust, and “aiding and abetting” the “criminal conduct” of the counterdefendants she named.
¶ 67 Section 2-1001 of the Code allows a litigant to file a petition for substitution of judge for
cause. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)(i) (West 2020). To show cause, a movant must establish actual
prejudice, by rebutting a presumption of impartiality with evidence of “prejudicial trial conduct or
personal bias.” In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶¶ 30-31. The alleged bias or prejudice
“must normally stem from an extrajudicial source, i.e., from a source other than from what the
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judge learned from her participation in the case before her.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519,
554 (2010). An opinion formed from the course of the proceedings at issue is not “a basis for a
bias or partiality motion unless [the judge] display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would make fair judgment impossible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of
O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 31. “A judge’s previous rulings almost never constitute a valid basis
for a claim of judicial bias or partiality.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 554.
¶ 68 Here, Ms. Shelton points to no facts suggesting actual prejudice on the part of Judge
Conlon. Instead, she rests solely on Judge Conlon’s rulings against her. This is not a basis for
removal of a judge.
¶ 69 Moreover, the record on appeal lacks a transcript of the proceedings or any acceptable
substitute from which we could determine that Judge Conlon displayed bias against Ms. Shelton.
As the appellant, it was Ms. Shelton’s duty to provide a complete record on appeal to support her
claims of error, without which we must presume the lower court’s order conformed with the law
and had sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).
¶ 70 Ms. Shelton notes that she filed a proposed bystander’s report, which could be a substitute
for a report of proceedings (Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)), in the circuit court but Judge
Conlon declined to approve it. She argues that a judge is “unlikely to approve any bystander report
that would prove” that the judge was biased. In any event, however, Ms. Shelton makes no
allegations that Judge Conlon made statements during hearings that established cause for
substitution of judge. Her arguments rely only on the allegation that Judge Conlon ignored the law
and the evidence of fraud that she had presented. As noted, that argument is premised only on the
fact that Judge Conlon made rulings against her, which is insufficient to establish actual prejudice.
¶ 71 IV. CONCLUSION
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¶ 72 For the foregoing reasons, we will not disturb the circuit court’s orders dismissing Ms.
Shelton’s counterclaims, granting Ms. Dale judgment on the pleadings, or denying Ms. Shelton’s
motion for substitution of judge. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 73 Affirmed.