Cyber Power Systems (USA) Inc. v. United States

2023 CIT 24
United States Court of International Trade·Decided February 27, 2023·No. 20-00124·Published

Opinion

Slip Op. 23-24

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

CYBER POWER SYSTEMS (USA) INC.,

Plaintiff,

Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge v.

UNITED STATES, Court No. 20-00124 Defendant.

OPINION

[Following trial on the issue of substantial transformation for purposes of determining country of origin under 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a), judgment for Plaintiff as to the origin of one model of subject merchandise, and judgment for Defendant as to the remaining five.]

Dated: February 27, 2023

John M. Peterson, Richard F. O’Neill, and Patrick B. Klein, Neville Peterson LLP, of New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff Cyber Power Systems (USA) Inc.

Luke Mathers, Trial Attorney, and Beverly A. Farrell, Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, N.Y., argued for Defendant United States. With them on the brief were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Justin R. Miller, Attorney-in-Charge. Of counsel was Yelena Slepak, Attorney, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of New York, N.Y.

Gordon, Judge: Plaintiff Cyber Power Systems (USA) Inc. (“Cyber Power”)

commenced this action contesting a denied protest regarding the country of origin marking of five models of uninterruptible power supplies (“UPS”) and one model of surge voltage protectors (“SVP”). Upon entry of the subject merchandise, which Plaintiff had marked as “Made in the Philippines,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”)

determined that the country of origin for the five UPSs and one SVP was China and excluded their entry when Cyber Power refused to change its markings. Cyber Power contended before Customs, and now before the court, that its operations in the Philippines, conducted by Cyber Power Systems Manufacturing, Inc. (“Cyber Power Philippines”), resulted in a “substantial transformation” of the merchandise into Philippine origin, having a name, character, and use different from each device’s Chinese components.

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2018). The court presumes familiarity with its prior opinions in this action. See Cyber Power Sys. (USA) Inc. v. United States, 44 CIT ___, ___, 471 F. Supp. 3d 1371 (2020); Cyber Power Sys. (USA) Inc. v. United States, 46 CIT ___, ___, 560 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (2022). For the reasons that follow, the court enters judgment for Plaintiff as to the Philippine origin of one model of subject merchandise, UPS Model No. CP600LCDa, and judgment for Defendant as to the Chinese origin of the remaining five models.

I. Standard of Review and Legal Framework A. Standard of Review

The court reviews Customs’ protest decisions de novo. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2640(a)(1) (2018). For contested factual issues, a statutory presumption of correctness imposes the burden of proof on Plaintiff. See id. § 2639(a)(1); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 33 CIT 90, 97, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353–54 (2009), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Despite its name, the statutory presumption of correctness is not a true evidentiary

Court No. 20-00124 Page 3

presumption governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301, but rather an “assumption” that allocates to Plaintiff the burden of proof on contested factual issues that arise from the protest decision. Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 492 n.2; 21B Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5124 (2d ed. 2022) (“Rule 301 does not apply to ‘assumptions’—rules for allocating the burden of proof that are often mislabeled as ‘presumptions.’ . . . [T]he best known include: . . . the ‘assumption’ that official duty has been regularly performed.” (footnotes omitted)). Plaintiff’s burden of proof carries an initial burden of production (to make an evidentiary proffer), and an ultimate burden of persuasion to establish the operative facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 492.

B. The Marking Statute (19 U.S.C. § 1304(a))

Section 304(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a), 1 requires that all merchandise imported into the United States be marked permanently, legibly, indelibly, and in a conspicuous place, to indicate to the ultimate purchaser the English name of the product’s country of origin. The implementing regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b), defines the term “country of origin” as “the country of manufacture, production, or growth of any article of foreign origin entering the United States.” Section 134.1(b) explains that “[f]urther work or material added to an article in another country must effect a substantial transformation in order to render such other country the ‘country of origin’ within the meaning of this part.” 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) (emphasis added). Simply stated,

1Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2018 edition.

Court No. 20-00124 Page 4

imported merchandise originates for marking purposes in the last country in which it underwent a “substantial transformation” prior to importation into the United States. Merchandise not marked with the proper country of origin may be excluded by Customs from entry into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.3(a). 2 C. Substantial Transformation Plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its subject merchandise is substantially transformed in the country it wishes to represent as the merchandise’s country of origin. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1); Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 492 (plaintiff bears burden of proof on contested factual issues arising from underlying protest decision).

2 Additionally, effective July 6, 2018, the Office of the United States Trade Representative imposed an additional tariff—twenty-five percent ad valorem—on certain products from China, including those in issue in this action, that are classified in the subheadings enumerated in Section XXII, Chapter 99, Subchapter III U.S. Note 20(b), Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court articulated the purpose of the Section 301 tariffs:

[T]he purpose of the imposition of the Section 301 tariffs was to promote a change in the “government of China's acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation.” . . . Additionally, the Section 301 tariffs were intended to encourage a partial de-coupling of China’s economy from that of the United States, by discouraging investment in, and trade with, China.

Cyber Power, 46 CIT at ___, 560 F. Supp. 3d at 1352 (citations omitted). It is evident to the court that Cyber Power was engaging in that decoupling process. However, the mere fact that Cyber Power was attempting to meet the policy objective does not overcome its inability to demonstrate that five of the six devices were substantially transformed in the Philippines.

Court No. 20-00124 Page 5

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