Curtis Morgan v. Arviza, et al.

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-01420
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CURTIS MORGAN, No. 4:24-CV-01420

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

ARVIZA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 2, 2025 Plaintiff Curtis Morgan filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging Eighth Amendment violations by prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood (FCI Allenwood), in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He asserts claims for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that FCI Allenwood officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Because Morgan fails to state a claim for relief, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. I. BACKGROUND Morgan initially filed the instant lawsuit in August 2024.1 The Court screened his abbreviated, handwritten complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.2 Morgan filed an amended complaint,3 which is the operative pleading.

In his amended complaint, Morgan contends that he received deficient medical care at FCI Allenwood. He alleges that the medical providers at FCI Allenwood failed to properly treat his injured feet, causing severe and permanent damage.4 According to Morgan’s attached medical records, he was previously

diagnosed with “Charcot’s joint” of the left and right foot, as well as Lisfranc’s dislocations of the left and right foot.5 The gravamen of his amended complaint alleges that FCI Allenwood medical providers failed to treat these serious medical

conditions appropriately.6 Morgan additionally alleges that he attempted to get Warden Arviza to intervene in the medically deficient care but that Arviza ignored his multiple requests for intervention.7

Morgan sues four defendants in his amended complaint: FCI Allenwood Warden Arviza and FCI Allenwood medical providers Gosa, Bizzlak, and Humphill.8 He requests compensatory damages for pain and physical injuries, the cost of future medical care, and future lost wages.9

2 See generally Docs. 5, 6. 3 Doc. 11. 4 Id. ¶¶ 8-21. 5 See Doc. 11-1 at 1-6. 6 See Doc. 11 ¶¶ 8-21. 7 Id. ¶¶ 22-25. 8 Id. at p. 2. 9 Id. at pp. 10-11. Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or alternatively for summary judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.10 Prior to submitting his brief in opposition, Morgan sought appointment of counsel,11 which motion the Court conditionally granted.12 However, after receiving notice from the district’s pro bono coordinator

that pro bono counsel could not be located, the Court was constrained to deny Morgan’s motion for appointment of counsel and require him to continue in his pro se posture.13 Defendants’ motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment is

now fully briefed and ripe for disposition. The Court need only address Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as it is dispositive to the outcome of this case. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”14 The court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.15 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

10 Doc. 15. 11 Doc. 23. 12 See Doc. 24. 13 See Docs. 31, 32. 14 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). 15 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.16 When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry.17 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”18 Second, the court should distinguish well- pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.19 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”20 Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”21

Because Morgan proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

16 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 17 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 18 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)). 19 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 20 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”22 This is particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Morgan, is incarcerated.23

III. DISCUSSION Defendants raise two overarching arguments: (1) Morgan’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims represent an unwarranted extension of

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and thus should be dismissed; and (2) alternatively, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Morgan’s claims. The Court reaches Defendants’ first argument only.

A. Bivens Claims In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “even absent statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy” to compensate

individuals who experienced violations by federal officers of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.24 Subsequently, the Court extended the Bivens cause of action in two cases involving other types of constitutional violations. First, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,

248-49 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provided an implied damages remedy to an administrative assistant claiming that a

22 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 23 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 24 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. Congressman had discriminated against her based on gender. Next, the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment implied a cause of action for damages against federal prison officials who had failed to provide adequate medical treatment to an asthmatic inmate.25 “These three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in

which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.”26 Over the years that followed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to expand Bivens actions beyond these three specific contexts.”27 The Supreme Court

has specifically noted that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”28 In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court provided a “restrictive, two-step framework for courts to follow when analyzing Bivens claims.”29 First, courts must determine

whether the case presents a “new context,” i.e., if it is “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.”30 The Supreme Court has defined “new context” broadly,31 explaining that “even a modest

25 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980). 26 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 131; see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022). 27 Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020). 28 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 135 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). 29 Mack, 968 F.3d at 317. 30 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139). 31 See id. [Bivens] extension is still an extension.”32 A Bivens claim “may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case

in which a damages remedy was previously recognized.”33 If the case presents a new context, courts must then consider whether special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy.34 If so, the court must reject the requested extension.35 The Supreme Court has clarified that courts are required

“to ask whether ‘the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress’ to weigh the costs and benefits of a damages action.”36 If the court “ha[s] reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants,”

then special factors counseling hesitation exist.37 There may be many special factors, but two are “particularly weighty: the availability of an alternative remedial structure and separation-of-powers concerns.”38 Indeed, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the existence of an alternative remedial structure—like the Federal Bureau of Prison’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP)—is a “special factor” that can create a new context at step one of the two-step analysis.39

32 Abassi, 582 U.S. at 147. 33 Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 103 (2020). 34 See Mack, 968 F.3d at 317 (citing Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136). 35 See id. (citing Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102). 36 Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492). 37 Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102. 38 Mack, 968 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 See Muniz v. United States, 149 F.4th 256, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2025); Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2024). But see Muniz, 149 F.4th at 266-67 (Restrepo, J., concurring) Defendants contend that Morgan’s Eighth Amendment claims present a new context and that special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy here.

Morgan, for his part, has not responded to Defendants’ Bivens arguments whatsoever. The Court finds that Defendants’ unopposed Bivens arguments are correct and foreclose relief in this case.

First, although Morgan is asserting an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim, like the claim raised in Carlson, his facts present a new context. In Carlson, an inmate’s family sued federal prison officials, alleging the inmate had died from a treatable asthma attack after medical providers failed to give him

competent medical attention for eight hours, administered contraindicated drugs that made his asthma attack more severe, and substantially delayed his transfer to an outside hospital.40 The plaintiff in Carlson further alleged that the federal officials’ deficient medical care was motivated in part by racial animus.41

Morgan, on the contrary, asserts that FCI Allenwood medical providers failed to properly treat his Charcot foot deformity and Lisfranc fractures over an extended period of time, resulting in the worsening of his severe foot problems and

pain and suffering. As Defendants correctly observe, the facts in Carlson bear

(disagreeing with approach taken in Kalu v. Spaulding and observing that Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits consider “alternative remedial structures” only at step two, not as part of step one, which better aligns with the Supreme Court’s approach in Egbert and Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025)). 40 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1. 41 See id. little resemblance to the facts of the case at bar, thus presenting a new Bivens context. Moreover, even if Morgan’s ailments, injuries, deficient-treatment

allegations, and targeted defendants were identical to those in Carlson, the availability of the BOP’s administrative remedy program—which was not in existence when Carlson was considered by the Supreme Court—creates a new Bivens context here.42

The second step in the Bivens analysis asks whether special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy. The Court answers this question in the affirmative. Specifically, a Bivens extension is unwarranted here primarily

because there are multiple alternative remedies available. As the Third Circuit has repeatedly noted, the availability of the BOP’s administrative remedy program often provides an alternative to a federal Bivens lawsuit.43 Through the administrative remedy process, federal prisoners “can alert

the BOP to unconstitutional officer conduct and policies and prevent such constitutional violations from recurring.”44 And even if Morgan’s attempts to resolve his medical care disputes through the administrative process were

ultimately unsuccessful, he had access to at least “some redress,” and therefore the Court finds—as in Mack—that the BOP’s administrative remedy program offers a

42 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 263-64; Kalu, 113 F.4th at 327-28. 43 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 264-65; Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2022); Mack, 968 F.3d at 320-21. 44 Mack, 968 F.3d at 321. “convincing reason” to refrain from extending Bivens to claims like those raised by Morgan.45

Additionally, the possibility of relief under the FTCA—“a statutory scheme for torts committed by federal officers”—“weighs against inferring a new cause of action” under Bivens.46 That remains true even if the FTCA fails to “provide the exact same kind of relief Bivens would.”47 In this case, Morgan could have

asserted (and may still be able to assert) state-law medical malpractice claims against the FCI Allenwood medical providers through the FTCA.48 In sum, Morgan’s Eighth Amendment claims would extend Bivens to a new

context, yet special factors counsel against such an extension. The Court will therefore dismiss Morgan’s Bivens claims.

45 See id. (citations omitted); see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 137 (“[I]f there is an alternative remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.”); Muniz, 149 F.4th at 265 (“At bottom, Muniz’s Bivens claim fails because an alternative remedy existed and was made available to him.”). 46 Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018); Jones v. Bradley, No. 4:21-CV-00026, 2023 WL 2088430, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (Brann, C.J.) (noting that alternative remedy provided by FTCA counsels against Bivens extension); Oliveras v. Basile, 440 F. Supp. 3d 365, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases). 47 Oliva, 973 F.3d at 444 (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 129 (2012)); see also Xi v. Haugen, 68 F.4th 824, 837 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that “an alternative remedy need not provide ‘complete relief’ or be as ‘effective as an individual damages remedy’ to foreclose Bivens relief” (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493, 498)). 48 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 79 F.4th 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2023) (discussing FTCA claim of medical malpractice under Pennsylvania law raised by detainee in federal detention center). B. Leave to Amend Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”49 Here, leave to amend will be denied as futile.50 Morgan seeks an extension of Bivens that is both judicially disfavored and

unwarranted under the circumstances. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court is constrained to dismiss with prejudice Morgan’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann Matthew W. Brann Chief United States District Judge

49 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 50 See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (“‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” (citation omitted)); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court may properly deny leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”).