Curry v. Black

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 2, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-04603
StatusUnknown

This text of Curry v. Black (Curry v. Black) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Curry v. Black, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOHN CURRY, Plaintiff, 24-CV-4603 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND PAROLE OFFICER L. BLACK; A. RAMIREZ, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in the Bronx, New York, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights during his parole violation proceedings. Plaintiff names as Defendants his parole officer, L. Black, and her supervisor, A. Ramirez, both of whom are employed in the Bronx. At the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was detained at Rikers Island. By letter dated July 15, 2024, Plaintiff informed the court that he had been released from custody. On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed an in forma pauperis application, and the Court granted the application on October 21, 2024.1 For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days, from the date of this order, to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff writes that, in June 2023, Officer Black “said I wasn’t making my parole visits. I found out that P.O. Black put a fake warrant out for my arrest along with her supervisor.” (ECF 1, at 4.) During a court proceeding, the presiding “judge lifted that warrant and cut me lose with revoke and restore.” (Id.) The

following year, however, on May 6, 2024, Defendants “picked me up . . . for the same violation.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “was never brought to my preliminary hearing . . . [but rather] was brought to my final hearing.” (Id.) He asserts that “[t]hey are holding me against my will . . . [and that his] judge [from Kings County] never . . . sentenced me to Level I sex offender.” (Id.) He indicates that his underlying criminal proceeding occurred in Kings County, New York, in either 1988 or 2005. Plaintiff attaches to his complaint several documents arising from his parole proceedings, including: (1) an August 2, 2023 violation of release report, issued by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), listing Plaintiff’s parole

revocation charges; (2) a January 1, 2024 supplementary violation of release report, issued by DOCCS, indicating that Plaintiff’s final hearing of December 22, 2023, was adjourned to March 19, 2024; (3) a DOCCS May 7, 2024 memorandum indicating that Plaintiff’s final parole revocation hearing was adjourned to May 9, 2024; (4) a May 9, 2024 DOCCS memorandum, indicating that the final hearing was adjourned to July 8, 2024; (5) Plaintiff’s state writ of habeas corpus, indicating that on May 9, 2024, Plaintiff was indicted on the parole revocation charges; and (6) a May 20, 2024 email from Plaintiff’s lawyer, indicating that Plaintiff was in custody. (ECF 1-1, at 1-9, 25-28.) Plaintiff does not indicate when he was taken into custody, or the date he was released. Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff challenges the procedures followed by Defendants when moving to revoke his parole. In order to state a Section 1983 claim for the denial of

procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege that he “possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes,” and that his protected interest entitled him to process before being “deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). The revocation of parole implicates a protectable liberty interest. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (“[T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others . . . [T]he liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Suce v. Taylor, 572 F. Supp. 2d 325, 334 (S.D.N.Y 2008) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the

revocation of parole.”). The Supreme Court in Morrissey outlined the procedures that due process requires in the parole revocation setting. A preliminary hearing must be conducted “at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest.” Id. at 485. “The parolee should be given notice that the [preliminary] hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should state what parole violations have been alleged.” Id. at 487. “There must also be an opportunity for a [final parole revocation] hearing” conducted “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” Id. at 488. The Supreme Court also articulated minimum requirements of due process for the final hearing. Under New York law, the State Division of Parole generally must schedule a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the issuance of a parole warrant, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 259– i(3)(c)(i), and, if probable cause exists, convene a revocation hearing within 90 days of the

probable cause hearing, see id. § 259–i(3)(f)(i). In some circumstances, “[i]f these requirements are not timely met, the parole warrant is rendered void, and the prisoner is entitled to be released.” McDay v. Travis, 303 F. App’x 928, 929 (2d Cir. 2008) (relying on Levy v. Dalsheim, 48 N.Y.2d 1019 (1980)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that his parole officer never scheduled a preliminary parole revocation hearing. The attachments to the complaint do show that several hearings were held before Plaintiff was detained, but it is unclear whether a probable cause hearing was held before his detention.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Morrissey v. Brewer
408 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
455 U.S. 422 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Suce v. Taylor
572 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D. New York, 2008)
People Ex Rel. Levy v. Dalsheim
402 N.E.2d 141 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
Green v. Bauvi
46 F.3d 189 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
McDay v. Travis
303 F. App'x 928 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Curry v. Black, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/curry-v-black-nysd-2025.