OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioners Stephen Currier and Carl McClellan seek to have this court reverse the respective dismissals of their petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that the statute of limitations barring these petitions is unconstitutional.2 We conclude that the limitation period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) is an unreasonable limitation on the constitutional right to petition for a habeas corpus writ that violates petitioners’ rights under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution to seek a civil remedy in state courts. We, therefore, reverse both dismissals and remand these cases for consideration of their substantive claims.
FACTS
Although we have consolidated these two cases for purposes of this opinion, we present their facts separately.
Currier v. Holden
After Currier was charged with the first degree felony, sexual abuse of a child on October 3, 1988, he entered into a plea bargain whereby he pled guilty to a second degree felony. However, when the trial court sentenced Currier to eighteen months probation and required him to serve six months in the Carbon County Jail as a condition of probation, he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. Currier brought two motions in which he alleged that the plea bargain resulted from wrongful and undue pressure on the part of his counsel and claimed that his counsel admitted un[1359]*1359duly pressuring him. When the trial court denied these motions to withdraw his guilty plea, Currier appealed his conviction. Currier later dropped this appeal and was released from jail, remaining on probation. Subsequently, the State revoked Currier’s probation after he tested positive for a controlled substance and returned him to prison.
On October 21, 1991, Currier’s co-defendant, Mr. Marquez, executed an affidavit, notarized one week later, in which he recanted damaging testimony he had previously given against Currier. After Currier received a copy of this affidavit in November 1991, he contacted the contract attorneys 3 for the Utah State Prison, for assistance in filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. On December 16, 1991, the contract attorneys received Currier’s edited rough draft of his petition. Immediately thereafter, Currier was transferred to San Juan County Jail.
On approximately January 6, 1992, Currier sent a letter to the contract attorneys at the State Prison, and received from them a revised petition for the habeas writ and his transcripts. Along with these papers the attorneys sent a memorandum stating that because Currier had been moved out of their jurisdiction they could no longer assist him and he would have to seek assistance from the San Juan County contract attorney. Currier requested an appointment with this contract attorney, but was unable to see him for five weeks.
Currier was transferred back to the Utah State Prison about March 20, 1992. At that time he gave the prison contract attorneys his petition for writ of habeas corpus and exhibits for them to file with the court. Currier’s paper work was returned to him at the prison for his signature on March 25, 1992 and on April 10, 1992, Currier’s petition was filed.
In his petition, Currier claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the time of his plea agreement and at his sentencing. He alleged that his attorney used undue and wrongful pressure to induce him to enter into a plea bargain.4 Currier claimed his counsel had convinced him to drop his original appeal and to agree not to file suit against counsel because counsel could arrange for his release from the six month term he was serving in the county jail through probation and suspension of his sentence.
The State responded to Currier’s petition by filing a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, claiming that six months had passed since Currier received the affidavit withdrawing the damaging testimony. After the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, Currier filed this appeal.
McClellan v. Holden
On August 28, 1988, two days prior to trial, McClellan’s original public defender withdrew and the court assigned him new counsel. McClellan, however, insisted on proceeding to trial, after which he was convicted of rape and sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State Prison.
About a month after the trial, the trial court received a request for a rehearing in a letter from McClellan which the trial court treated as a motion for a new trial. In his letter, McClellan claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel because his new attorney had not had time to prepare for trial. The trial court denied McClellan’s motion for new trial on February 6, 1989.
Although McClellan’s counsel, James Rupper, filed a notice of appeal of the [1360]*1360original sentence, McClellan complains that he had no communication as to the status of the appeal from counsel and states that he was continually frustrated in attempts to contact Mr. Rupper. On July 12, 1990, McClellan finally communicated with Mr. Rupper who informed him of the status of his appeal and announced that Kent Willis had been handling his case since January 1990. McClellan says that he was unable to contact Mr. Willis until May 1991. At that time Mr. Willis told him that he anticipated filing a motion to remand for new trial with the Utah Court of Appeals. In May 1991, McClellan wrote the court of appeals and was informed that the trial transcript had not been located.5 On August 14, 1991, Mr. Willis withdrew as counsel and Donald Elkins replaced him. McClellan says he was “never able to have any communication from Mr. Elkins.”
On September 30, 1991, McClellan submitted his own writ of habeas corpus to the Third District Court.6 In this petition, McClellan claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and complained about the failure of counsel to perfect an appeal, and the unavailability of his trial transcript.
The trial court appointed Mr. Aeschbacher as counsel to represent McClellan in his habeas action and gave McClellan thirty days in which to amend his habeas corpus petition. McClellan submitted his amended petition on January 14, 1992.
On March 3, 1992, the State moved to dismiss McClellan’s petition for writ of ha-beas corpus on several grounds, including that it was untimely. About two weeks later McClellan submitted a memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss, claiming that his inability to obtain effective assistance of counsel for his appeal should preclude dismissal based on the statute of limitations. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the habeas petition as barred by the three-month statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). The district court concluded that February 6, 1989, the date when the trial court denied McClellan’s motion for a new trial, commenced the running of the statute of limitations for purposes of the writ of habeas corpus petition. McClellan appealed this dismissal of his writ.
ISSUES
In presenting their appeals to this court, each petitioner claims that the three-month statute of limitations is unconstitutional. Specifically, Currier argues that the statute (1) does not provide a reasonable period in which to file for relief, (2) contains no provision for excusable delay, and (3) requires invalidation because a judicial rule of procedure should not be subject to a statute of limitations. McClellan argues that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it (1) undermines the extraordinary purpose of the writ, (2) limits the right to remedy by due course of law as provided in the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11, and (3) creates practical problems in administration because of its inherent ambiguity. Because we resolve both cases by evaluating the constitutionality of the statute under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, we need not individually address the other issues raised by the petitioners.
ANALYSIS
I. Statute of Limitations
In both of the cases consolidated in this opinion, petitioners claim that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) violates the “open courts provision,” Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution because it unreasonably curtails their constitutional right to seek a civil remedy in state court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 requires a filing of the petition
[1361]*1361Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
Id. This statute acts as a statute of limitations because it “requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived.” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1992). It is distinguishable from a statute of repose which bars any action after the running of a time period beginning with the occurrence of an event other than the injury underlying the cause of action. Berry, 717 P.2d at 672.
II. The Open Courts Provision
Despite the significant difference between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, both categories of time limitations impact an individual’s right to seek redress in state courts. In Utah this right has a constitutional dimension based upon Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). This provision states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.7
Although as yet no Utah appellate court has analyzed a statute of limitations under this provision, a significant line of cases has examined statutes of repose under this constitutional provision. See Sun Valley Water Beds v. Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989); Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Velarde v. Industrial Comm’n, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah App.1992). However, neither the language of the open courts provision nor supreme court discussion about the provision indicates that its protective scope should be limited to invalidating statutes of repose. The supreme court views section 11 as having potentially broad application. Horton, 785 P.2d at 1093. The open courts provision is not primarily concerned with particular, identifiable causes of action, but rather with the availability of legal remedies to vindicate individuals’ interest “in the integrity of their persons, property, and reputations.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 677 n. 4.
Furthermore, the fundamental principles underlying the open courts provision apply equally to statutes of limitations as to statutes of repose. The open courts provision guarantees “access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality,” and prevents arbitrary deprivation of “effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.” Id. at 675. Section 11 protection specifically extends to “ ‘the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.’ ” Id. at 680 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). See also Horton, 785 P.2d at 1091. To accomplish this purpose, section 11 imposes limits on the legislature for the protection of injured persons who are isolated in society and lacking political influence. Berry, 717 P.2d at 676; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 367 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
These principles certainly apply to the statute at issue in these cases. The constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus relief is a basic individual right and prisoners constitute a group needing protection [1362]*1362because they are isolated in society and lack political influence.
Finally, we note that the supreme court has stated that specific distinctions should not divert the court from the basic issue underlying the constitutionality of a statute under the open courts provision: the critical question is whether a legislative enactment denies a litigant “a remedy by due course of law.” Horton, 785 P.2d at 1092; Berry, 717 P.2d at 679. For these reasons, we agree with petitioners that the statute of limitations barring their petitions for habeas corpus relief merits review under the open courts provision.8
Our decision to review section 78-12-31.1 under the open courts provision invokes the specific analytical framework developed by the supreme court to structure section 11 review. This two part test first inquires into whether a statute abrogating an existing remedy provides “an effective and reasonable alternative remedy,” and second, if no alternative remedy is provided, examines whether the statute eliminates “a clear social or economic evil” through means that are not unreasonable or arbitrary. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680; see also Horton, 785 P.2d at 1094; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358.9
III. Standard of Review
Generally, in considering an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we accord no deference to the conclusions of law upon which the trial court based its dismissal. Rather, as an appellate court, we review the decision to dismiss for correctness. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990); Termunde v. Cook, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989)).
In this case, the district courts specifically based their decisions to dismiss the respective petitions for habeas corpus relief upon a statute of limitations which petitioners challenge as unconstitutional. In response to both appeals, the State claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), as a legislative enactment, deserves a strong presumption of validity. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). It argues that statutes should “ ‘not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to constitutional requirements.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)). However, because this statute of limitations impacts the constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which as a civil remedy is protected under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the usual presumption of validity does not control our review of this statute.
Furthermore, in Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988 n. 4 (Utah 1993), Justice Hall noted that a majority of the Utah Supreme Court had agreed in the Condemarin opinion that analyzing the constitutionality of a state statute under the open courts provision implicated a heightened level of review. Id. (discussing Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989)). At the same time, however, Justice Hall noted an analytical disagreement among the justices concurring in the Condemarin opinion, which requires us to examine other [1363]*1363factors to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny by which to review this particular statute.10
We looked to discussion in section 11 precedent and to other supreme court cases to determine what supplemental factors impact the standard for reviewing legislative enactments. The two criteria which we find relevant are (1) the degree to which a statute impairs an individual’s right to seek remedy, and (2) the nature of the right impaired.
A. Degree of Impairment
In Condemarin, Justice Durham stated that “[t]he greater the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest, the greater and more explicit the state’s reasons must be” for enacting the particular statute. Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1990). After reviewing the supreme court opinions evaluating statutes of repose, we conclude that “degree of impairment” factored into the level of review conducted in those cases. Those courts criticized statutes of repose because (1) they are not designed to provide a reasonable time in which to file an action, and (2) the statutory time period in which to file an action might expire prior to the time when the cause of action accrues. See Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1095 (Utah 1989); Sun Valley Water Beds v. Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989); Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). Their criticism indicates an implicit conclusion that statutes of repose constitute a significant impairment of the right to seek remedy in state court. Each court then discussed in detail the problems that the legislature intended to address, and evaluated the rationality and effectiveness of the statutory means the legislature selected to deal with these problems. Thus, either implicitly or explicitly, the supreme court has considered the degree of impairment prior to implementing section 11 analysis and has conducted a particularistic evaluation on that basis.
In assessing the significance of “degree of impairment” in reviewing a statute of limitations, we note that cases which criticize statutes of repose simultaneously distinguish these statutes from statutes of limitations. “[A] statute of repose begins to run from a date unrelated to the date of an injury, it is not designed to allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action once it arises.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 672. By contrast, a statute of limitations only begins to run from the time that a cause of action accrues or after the violation of a legal right. See Horton, 785 P.2d at 1090; Berry, 717 P.2d at 672; Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1992). Thus, by their nature, statutes of limitations do not present a degree of impairment comparable to that created by statutes of repose. For this reason, factoring the degree of impairment into section 11 review of statutes of limitations requires an explicit threshold inquiry into the actual effect of the statute on the particular right impacted by the statute.
In making this inquiry, we compared the three month limitation period in section 78-12-31.1 (1992) to the time limitations imposed by comparable statutes of limitations in other states and by other statutes of limitations in the Utah Code. In his brief, Currier notes, and the State does not dispute, that Utah’s three-month limitation period for the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the nation’s shortest, when compared with other states.11 We [1364]*1364also note that, in comparison to other limitation periods in effect within this state, this statute of limitations creates the shortest filing period specifically mandated by the Limitations of Action chapter of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1 to -48.12
Regardless of the reasons for the selection of the abbreviated filing period,13 these comparisons indicate that section 78-12-31.1 creates a relatively severe limitation on an individual’s right to petition for habe-as corpus relief. This level of impairment indicates that we should carefully scrutinize the purpose and effectiveness of the statute that petitioners challenge. However, because we recognize that even this abbreviated limitation period lacks the potential severity and inherent unreasonableness created by statutes of repose, we look to our second criteria before finally deciding on the proper level of review for the statute of limitations challenged by these petitioners.
B. Nature of the Right Impaired
Previous cases from the supreme court indicate that the nature of the individual right impacted by a statute influences the level of scrutiny which a court should employ in examining that legislation. Generally, “a court will exercise stricter scrutiny in evaluating measures that encroach upon civil liberties than it will with respect to statutes that impact what can be characterized as only economic interests.” In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 57, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (1941) (Wolfe, J., concurring)). Utah courts attribute “very different legal significance” to individual liberties historically considered as “the indispensable conditions of a free society” than to “liberties which derived merely from shifting economic arrangements.” Allen, 110 P.2d at 365. They refuse “to presume the constitutionality of a statute when the statute deprives one of a right established by ... the state constitution,” for the reason that a constitutional right carries greater weight than “a nonconstitutional interest, such as a general social or economic interest.” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 370 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring). Even the supreme court, “while adopting a perfunctory standard of review under the federal due process clause for economic regulation in general, ... explained that legislation impairing rights specifically protected by the federal constitution would require more careful review.” Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (discussing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938)).
In the cases consolidated in this opinion, petitioners claim unconstitutional impairment of individual rights having character[1365]*1365istics that generally suggest heightened scrutiny. In Utah, the right to petition for habeas corpus relief in state court is protected through Article I, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. This provision, which essentially parallels Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution, provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.” The express constitutional protection accorded the writ of habeas corpus evolved out of recognition of the significant role that the writ played in the history of state law. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). Its function is to “provide a means for collaterally attacking convictions when they are so constitutionally flawed that they result in fundamental unfairness and to provide for collateral attack of sentences not authorized by law.” Id. at 1034-35. The Utah Supreme Court has deemed the writ “the precious safeguard of personal liberty” and defined habeas corpus as “a procedure for assuring that one is not deprived of life or liberty in derogation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 1034.
Having determined that the statute at issue in this case creates a significant impairment of an important constitutionally based personal right, we conclude the challenges of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) require higher scrutiny than minimal deferential review and demand more than a determination that the statute does not represent a “case[ ] of extreme arbitrariness.” Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 369 (Stewart, J., separate opinion). We believe that this conclusion is consistent with discussion in Berry noting that the open courts provision has no analogue in the federal constitution, Berry, 717 P.2d at 674, and declaring the state constitution “free to provide greater protections for our citizens than are required under the federal constitution." Id. at 677.
IV. Application of Heightened Scrutiny in Section 11 Analysis
In conducting the analysis of a statute under the open courts provision, the Berry court began with the proposition that government was fundamentally obligated “to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs done [to] persons.” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 679 (Utah 1985) (discussing Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 22 S.Ct. 573, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902)). Any attempt to “ ‘bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this opportunity [to try rights in the courts] ... would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions.’ ” Id. at 679-80 (quoting Wilson, 185 U.S. at 62, 22 S.Ct. at 575); see also 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions, § 28, at 613 (1970).
Statutes of limitations, like statutes of repose, however, do not create the total abrogation of all remedies forbidden in the Berry decision. Because these statutes only bar a cause of action “after a specified period of time has elapsed,” evaluation of the constitutionality of these statutes must consider the legislative purpose out of respect for the legislature’s prerogative “to cope with widespread social or economic evils.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. Because of this accommodation, “section 11 does not recede before every legislative enactment, but neither may it be applied in a mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which there may be conflict.” Id. Instead, the reviewing court will only declare a statute unconstitutional if it is “arbitrary, unreasonable, and will not achieve the statutory objective.” Id. at 681. If a reviewing court closely examines an enactment under section 11, it will invalidate that act if it imposes a disability “on individual rights which is too great to be justified by the benefits accomplished.” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). When reviewing a statute that abrogates a remedy or cause of action without providing an “effective and reasonable alternative remedy ‘by due course of law,’ ” section 11 requires a “balancing analysis.” See Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094 (Utah 1989); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358; Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. The statute must be justified by its elimination of a clear economic or [1366]*1366social evil through a reasonable and non-arbitrary means. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.14
A. The Legislation’s Purpose and Effect
In examining the legitimacy of the legislature’s purpose in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), we note that Utah courts have validated the State’s general interest in placing a reasonable time limit on when an action can be brought. Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989). However, closely reviewing this particular statute under the open courts provision requires us to specifically assess “the legitimacy of the legislative purpose and the extent to which said purpose was reasonably and substantially advanced by the means utilized.” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). This review includes both an examination of the legislature’s selection of a three-month limitation period and' inquiry into the degree to which that particular time period reasonably and substantially advances the legislature’s stated objectives.
The State contends that this three-month limitation on the right to petition for a habeas writ is reasonable because the short time period (1) keeps evidence fresh and records available, (2) promotes finality which helps the state and is vitally important to victims and witnesses, (3) conserves state resources, (4) prevents unfair delay in hope of faded memory or unavailable witnesses, (5) curtails belated suits with resulting increased costs, burdens and delay, and (6) prevents unjustified acquittal in instances where the State cannot re-prosecute the case. Although we acknowledge the legitimacy of these purposes for statutes of limitations in general, we question whether these particular purposes justify a three-month limitation period. As the court noted in State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Comm’n, 116 Utah 279, 209 P.2d 558, 559 (1949), the construction of a statute “which requires such undue haste, which is fraught with such potential hardships is not in keeping with the spirit of a statute of limitations, the purpose of which is to put at rest stale claims.” As a later court explained in discussing statutes of repose, the open courts provision “make[s] certain that periods of repose only be allowed when the possibility of injury and damage has become highly remote and unexpected. Short of that, injured persons are to be allowed their remedy.” Horton, 785 P.2d at 1095.15 Because problems with excessive delay, fading memories and unjustified acquittals may take years, not merely three months, to develop, we do not find the State’s explanation of legislative objectives adequate.
We next question whether this inflexible three-month statute of limitations substantially advances any other objective expressed by the legislature. To explain the legislative purpose, the State, in the appendix to its brief, submitted certified transcripts of the 1979 senate and house debates during which legislators introduced the limitations bills to the state legislature. In the senate transcript, Senator Barlow, referring to the highly publicized Hi-fi murders and the Carbon County motorcycle case, described the senate bill’s purpose as eliminating a defense counsel’s technical device of using “a series of habeas corpus actions ... to delay the eventual carrying out of the sentence of the court.” The statute of limitations would prevent exorbitantly expensive delays in the execution of a sentence caused by “throwing” out known grievances one at a time over several years. The house transcript also includes discussion focused on the use of habeas petitions in notorious murder cases to improperly delay the execution of justice. Representative Sykes condemned this “charade and ... mockery of justice in [1367]*1367bringing these last minute appeals based upon frivolous grounds.”
These transcripts indicate that the legislature’s goal was the deterrence of serial filing of habeas petitions in order to prevent undue delay in the execution of sentences. Proponents of the legislation appeared to consider the excessive delays and costs generated by perennial petitioners improperly delaying capital punishment to be “a clear social or economic evil.”
However, the cases before this court demonstrate that this statute of limitations adversely impacts habeas corpus actions unrelated to the problems described by the legislature. In these cases, the petitioners are not death row inmates attempting to delay execution of their sentence, but rather prisoners currently serving their sentences who are highly motivated to expedite proceedings which might vindicate their allegedly wrongful incarceration. This distinction underscores Senator Barlow’s statement indicating that the bill targeted attorneys trying to delay the execution of their client’s sentence, not inmates serving sentences and challenging some aspect of their incarceration.
Thus, the three-month limitation appears to have caused the classic problematic result of “crisis” legislation against which Justice Durham warned in Condemarin. She described efforts to resolve a “crisis” as “ ‘a truly marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension of established rights.’ ” Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 362 (citations omitted). Considering that the State presented no empirical or factual data to the effect that prior to enacting this statute, non-death row inmates’ petitions created a problem, much less a “clear social evil,” the overly broad impact of this statute is particularly disturbing.
Adequately assessing the effectiveness of the rigid three-month limitation period in preventing the serial filing of petitions requires an awareness of certain background information. Inmates can petition for ha-beas corpus relief in both the state and the federal court systems.16 In order to prevent abuse of the writ, each court system has developed separate procedures to limit the availability of habeas corpus relief. Although the federal rule was also “intended to minimize abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by limiting the right to assert stale claims and to file multiple petitions,” it does not bar a petition for habeas corpus relief until the state satisfies its burden of demonstrating that it has been unfairly prejudiced by delay. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 Rule 9 advisory committee note at 1137 (West 1977). Federal courts do not recognize even a rebuttable presumption of prejudice until a petitioner has delayed more than five years after the judgment of conviction. Id. To accommodate a state’s desire for finality and for dealing with claims while they are still fresh, the federal system relied on the equitable doctrine of lach-es which focuses on whether one party’s delay disadvantaged the other party, rather than a statute of limitations. Id. (discussing 30A C.J.S. Equity § 112 p. 19 (1992)). Flexibility was also incorporated into the rule through the permissive language stating that “ ‘a petition may be dismissed.’ ” Id. at 1137 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9). This language provides the federal court discretion to balance the equities of the particular situation, encourages a petitioner to act with reasonable diligence and guarantees necessary safeguards in hardship cases. Id. at 1137-38 (noting the suggestion of ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 2.4, commentary. at 48 (Approved Draft, 1968)).
The distinction between state and federal limitations on habeas corpus actions became significant when, in 1969, Utah courts incorporated the Uniform Post-Conviction [1368]*1368Procedure Act into Rule 65B. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). The objective of the uniform act was to liberalize proceedings for state habeas corpus petitions in order to make them “ ‘flexible enough so that with sympathetic consideration of pleadings and methods of presenting issues, a prisoner will always be able to raise his claim in a state court and thus, ... there will be no occasion for federal habeas corpus, because a state remedy is available.’ ” Id. (quoting Annotation, Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 11 U.L.A. 477, 482 (1974)).
In conflict with this objective, by superimposing a state limitation substantially more rigid than its federal counterpart, the legislature forces petitioners to file petitions in federal court. This practical reality contravenes the legislative purpose of deterring numerous petitions and is repugnant to the judicial purpose expressed in Hurst. If, contrary to the intent of the uniform act, petitioners must raise their claims of deficient state court criminal proceedings in a federal venue, our state courts will not have the initial opportunity to address those claims and make needed corrections.
Furthermore, if the legislative purpose is to prevent delay due to sequential habeas corpus actions, a rigid three-month limitation may not be necessary. The substantive provisions in Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure already forbid serial filing of state habeas corpus petitions. The current version of Rule 65B(b)(3) requires that “The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown.” (Emphasis added.)17 Although these provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure do not set a time limitation for submitting a habe-as corpus petition, they directly address the problem of delay by expressly insuring that undeserving serial petitions need not be considered by the state courts.18
B. Reasonableness of the Statute of Limitations
In both of the cases before this court, petitioners contend that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) is unconstitutional because it creates an unreasonable time constraint on their right to petition for habeas corpus relief. Currier claims that Utah’s three-month statute of limitations is unreasonably short and lacks any provision which could excuse delayed filing because of circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control. McClellan, too, claims that the time limitation in the statute is unreasonably short because it places an unduly harsh burden on an incarcerated petitioner and because a petitioner faces an ambiguity problem in determining when the statutory period commences.
In response to the claims made by petitioners, the State concedes that “[t]o be constitutional, a statute of limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises.” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). However, the State emphasizes that a statute of limitations does not, per se, offend Article I, Section 11 because the State has a legitimate interest in placing a reasonable time limit on when an action can be brought. Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1990).
[1369]*1369The State argues that the relatively short limitation period in this statute creates no presumption of unreasonableness, but rather that reasonableness depends on three factors: the nature of the action, the interests of government and the interests of the litigant. See Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Iowa 1989). We find this suggestion consistent with Justice Durham’s comment that the legislature, in the first instance, and secondly, appellate courts must “balance the weight of the governmental interest at stake against the countervailing importance of the individual rights being compromised.” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). We, therefore, analyze these three factors in the context of this appeal and then balance them to determine the statute’s reasonableness.
First, as discussed earlier in this opinion, the writ of habeas corpus is considered so important in Utah that Article I, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution expressly prohibits its restriction unless public safety requires it. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). The writ is an extraordinary remedy, invocable “where the requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or where some such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction.” Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968).
Second, the State notes that the core purpose of any statute of limitations is to compel exercise of a right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence and faded memories. Horton, 785 P.2d at 1091. The State claims that in addition to this purpose, the three-month statute of limitations is necessary to promote finality, to conserve state resources and to avoid further litigation expenses. The State also claims that preventing the challenge to a conviction “long after its occurrence” avoids what is in effect an unjustified acquittal when the State cannot re-prosecute the case because witnesses and evidence have become unavailable.
Third, the litigant’s interest in petitioning for habeas corpus relief includes both minimizing the burden created by any limitation period and maximizing the benefits that exercising the right to petition can confer upon an incarcerated litigant. In both of the State’s briefs for this court, the State asserted that the time limitation does not create a burden on a petitioner. The State claims (1) the acts giving rise to the claim for habeas corpus relief are readily ascertainable, (2) the tolling provision provides relief from the relatively short time period, and (3) inmates having access to free, competent legal assistance experience no delay obtaining an attorney or promptly identifying potential habeas claims.
In challenging the State’s contention that the three-month limitation period is not an undue burden, Currier described difficulties facing- prisoners required to meet the three-month filing deadline. He specifically questioned the State’s assertion that prisoners are “in a particularly enviable position as to receiving legal assistance.” Noting that prison attorneys operating under limited contracts to assist inmates in preparing their initial pleadings constitute an inmate’s only access to legal assistance, he explained the potential for delay inherent in the possibility either that an inmate might miss an opportunity to meet with the contract attorney or that the contract attorney might fail to move forward promptly. He also described the time constraints created by the inmates’ burden to obtain their own documentation in order to prepare the petition for writ of habeas corpus.19
[1370]*1370In addition to acknowledging the unre-futed burden which a three-month time limitation creates for a petitioner, we must also consider the benefits that a petitioner can receive from having a court review the propriety of his or her incarceration. The writ is considered “one of the most important of all judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty,” as it “has become a procedure for assuring that one is not deprived of life or liberty in derogation of a constitutional right.” Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989).
C. Balancing the Reasonableness Factors
Balancing these three reasonableness factors requires us (1) to weigh the countervailing interests of the State and of a petitioner and (2) to consider these interests relative to the nature of the writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, we must consider how all three factors are impacted by the brevity of the limitation period and by its lack of any provision for excusable delay.
Utah courts have long recognized that a decision on whether a court should grant a habeas corpus petition represents a balance between “the observance of the rights of the individual in order to protect the innocent, ... [and] the necessity of protecting rights of the public to be kept safe from crime by encouraging effective law enforcement.” Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (Utah 1968). To implement this balance, the writ “direct[s] the inquiry to this foundational question: Was substantial justice done and has guilt been established?” Id. at 969-70.
Because of this concern with substantial justice, petitioners argue that the right to petition for the writ of habeas corpus outweighs any state interest in a rigid three-month limitation for the purpose of preserving finality, convenience and efficiency. Their arguments reflect a statement by the Utah Supreme Court, declaring, “As important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty.” Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). Even while legitimizing the general concept of time limitation, the Horton court stated, “The notion that rights of action should be terminated because of the difficulty of proof which accompanies the passage of time is not a valid justification” for a statute which prematurely cuts off a plaintiffs right of action. Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094-95 (Utah 1989). That court noted that “[a]l-though the passage of time increases the difficulty of providing reliable evidence, the difficulties of proof fall much more heavily upon the plaintiffs, who have the burden of establishing a prima facie case ... to survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict.” Id. at 1095.
In weighing the interests of the litigants on either side of a habeas corpus action, we note that a petitioner trying to ascertain his or her rights and to file all reasonably known claims in the initial petition20 must make these complex legal decisions with limited knowledge of the law, limited access to legal assistance and often no access to a law library. As Justice Murphy of the United States Supreme Court said,
Prisoners are often unlearned in the law and unfamiliar with the complicated rules of pleading. Since they act so often as their own counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, we cannot impose on them the same high standards of the legal art which we might place on the members of the legal profession.
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1063, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). Furthermore, the decisions made by these petitioners impact their personal liberty interests.21 When such an interest is at [1371]*1371stake, an individual has “a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the resolution of disputed questions of justification.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1415 (1977).
In addition to comparing the interests of the two parties in the litigation, we also note that the effect of this statute is to curtail the right to a writ of habeas corpus that this state has declared to be “a constitutional fixture in American law.” Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). The statute superimposes the legal defense of a statute of limitations on an equitable doctrine, the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 848, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). Because Utah’s statute of limitations is a legal rather than an equitable defense, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1992), the State may interpose this legal defense regardless of the equities of the particular situation. Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712, 716-17 (1934). The inherent lack of flexibility in a statute of limitations combined with the lack of any provision for excusable delay contributes to our conclusion that the nature of the'habeas corpus action received insufficient consideration from the legislature when selecting the inflexible three-month limitation period.
Petitioner Currier has questioned the legitimacy of any statute of limitations barring a petition for habeas corpus which does not excuse the tardy filing of a writ when good cause is shown.22 While no Utah decision has previously addressed this particular claim, the Utah Supreme Court did discuss the need to excuse unavoidable delay when it interpreted Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i)(4) requiring all claims for post-conviction relief to be raised in an initial petition “except for good cause shown therein.” See Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037.23 In this context, the court decided that “good cause” justifying the filing of a successive petition included situations involving “a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.” Id. We find this interpretation of the rules of civil procedure inconsistent with the statutory bar of an original petition delayed for the same reasons.24 Therefore, having considered the interests of the State and the petitioners in light of the nature of the right impacted by this statute of limitations, we conclude that the inflexible three-month limitation on the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is unreasonable.
In summary, although we recognize a relevant distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, we do not believe that this distinction should immunize statutes of limitations from section 11 analysis. On the other hand, while the [1372]*1372“degree of impairment” criteria subjects statutes of repose to particularistic evaluation almost automatically, that criteria may have no impact on appellate review of less invasive statutes of limitations. Furthermore, the second factor focusing on "the nature of the right impaired” only has potential to modify the review of limitations on important, if not constitutionally based personal rights. Thus, we suspect that the analysis in this opinion will rarely trigger heightened scrutiny of statutes of limitations, preserving the legislative prerogative in most instances.
Despite the narrow focus of our holding in this case, we find no legitimate governmental interest in keeping a person in prison who may actually have done nothing more than miss the deadline created by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). Furthermore, having balanced the petitioners’ interest in habeas corpus relief, and the State’s interest in limiting the filing period in light of the nature of the writ, we find that the inflexible three-month filing period created by this statute of limitations is unreasonable. We therefore declare Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Because Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) creates a significant impairment on the constitutionally protected right of an individual to petition for habeas corpus relief, we evaluate the constitutionality of the statute under a heightened scrutiny standard. Having thereby concluded that the statute does not achieve any legitimate statutory objective by a reasonable means, we find that this statute denies a petitioner a civil remedy in state court by due course of law and is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. We therefore remand both of these cases to the district courts for consideration of their respective substantive claims.
GARFF, J., concurs.