Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States

21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1059, 980 F. Supp. 1268, 21 C.I.T. 1059, 19 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2245, 1997 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 136
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedSeptember 17, 1997
DocketCourt No. 96-09-02222
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1059 (Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1059, 980 F. Supp. 1268, 21 C.I.T. 1059, 19 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2245, 1997 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 136 (cit 1997).

Opinion

Opinion

Vogue, Judge:

Plaintiffs1 (“Miramonte”) challenge certain aspects of the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) final determination in the consolidated fifth, sixth, and seventh administrative reviews of the antidumping order covering entries of fresh cut flowers [1060]*1060from Colombia between March 1,1991 and February 28,1994. See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,833 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 1996)(final results admin, rev.). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)(1994) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1994).

Miramonte’s motion for judgment on the agency record2 raises three issues: (1) whether Commerce’s change of practice in its treatment of Miramonte’s land preparation costs was in accordance with law; (2) whether Commerce’s use of best information available (“BIA”) to adjust Miramonte’s seventh review cost data for inflation was in accordance with law, and if in accordance with law, whether Commerce’s use of a twelve-month compound inflation adjustment factor was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether Commerce’s substitution and use of a 7.0 percent U.S. interest rate in the calculation of U.S. credit expense for the seventh period for all flower types instead of the actual percent rate reported by Miramonte and verified by Commerce was supported by substantial evidence.

Background

Miramonte received de minimis margins in the two administrative reviews preceding the three consolidated reviews at issue here. See 56 Fed. Reg. 50,554,50,558 (Oct. 7,1991); 59 Fed. Reg. 15,159,15,179 (Mar. 31, 1994). Under its regulations Commerce may revoke an antidumping order covering a particular respondent if that respondent has zero or de minimis (less than 0.50 percent) dumping margins for three consecutive reviews, see 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a)(2)(i), and that respondent will not likely sell the merchandise at less than foreign market value in the future. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a)(2)(h).

Unable to conduct the fifth and sixth administrative reviews, Commerce consolidated them with the seventh. Commerce’s preliminary determination resulted in antidumping margins for Miramonte of 0.27 percent, 0.10 percent, and 0.11 percent in the fifth, sixth, and seventh administrative reviews, respectively. See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Colombia, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,270, 30,274 (Dep’t Commerce June 8, 1995)(prelim. results admin, rev.). Commerce also announced its intent to revoke the antidumping duty order for Miramonte. Id. at 30,270.

In the final results Commerce found antidumping margins of 0.36, 0.00, and 2.08 percent for Miramonte in the fifth, sixth, and seventh reviews, respectively. 61 Fed. Reg. at 42,867. Thus, Miramonte’s seventh period margin of 2.08 percent precluded revocation of the antidumping duty order. Id. at 42,833.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the final results of an administrative review, the Court of International Trade must decide whether Commerce’s determination is [1061]*1061in accordance with law and whether Commerce’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence on the record. See Section 516a(b)(l)(B)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994).

In determining whether Commerce’s interpretation and application of the antidumping statute is in accordance with law, this court applies the two-step analysis articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984), as applied and refined by the Federal Circuit. The first task is “to determine whether Congress has ‘directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’” Id. If the statute unambiguously deals with the subject matter in issue, the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the intent of Congress. Id. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States, 13 F.3d 398, 402-403 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. Considerable weight is accorded Commerce’s construction of the antidumping laws, whether that construction manifests itself in the application of the statute, see, e.g., Daewoo Elec. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1996), or in the promulgation of a regulation, see, e.g., Smith Corona Group v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir (T) 130, 138, 713 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022, 104 S.Ct. 1274 (1984).

When examining Commerce’s factual determinations to decide whether they are supported by substantial evidence, the court must determine whether the record contains “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [Commerce’s] conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 216 (1938); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459 (1951)(quoted in Matsushita Comm. Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 44, 51, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (1984)). Substantial evidence “is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026-27 (1966).

Discussion

The antidumping statute applicable to the consolidated reviews in issue provides that if the Department of Commerce (Commerce) through the International Trade Administration (ITA) determines that less than fair value (LTFV) sales exist and the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that material injury exists, then the ITA will issue an antidumping order directing the United States Customs Service to col[1062]

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21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1059, 980 F. Supp. 1268, 21 C.I.T. 1059, 19 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2245, 1997 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cultivos-miramonte-sa-v-united-states-cit-1997.