OPINION
POGUE, Judge.
On June 23, 1998, this Court remanded certain aspects of the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or “the Department”) determination in
Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, From Germany,
61 Fed.Reg. 38,166 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final de
term,)(“Germany Final
”).
See Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,
22 CIT -, 15 F.Supp.2d 834 (1998)
(“KBA
/”). On September 17, 1998, Commerce issued its Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (Redetermination List, Pub. Doc. 8, Conf, Doc. 4)(Sept. 17, 1998) (“Redetermination”).
On remand, Commerce did not adequately address the Court’s concerns regarding the issues of “collapsing” and cost-averaging; thus the Court remanded these issues for a second time.
See Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,
23 CIT -, -, 44 F.Supp.2d 280, 287 (1999)
(“KBA
77”). On August 10, 1999, Commerce issued its Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Second Court Remand (Second Re-determination List, Pub. Doc. 5)(Aug. 10, 1999) (“Second Redetermination”). The Court now reviews Commerce’s Second Redetermination.
Standard of Review
The Court will uphold a Commerce determination in an antidumping investigation unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.l” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i)(1994).
Background
MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG and MAN Roland Inc. (“MAN Roland”), respondents in the underlying administrative proceeding before Commerce, produce large newspaper printing presses (“LNPPs”) at a facility in the western German city of Augsburg; MAN Roland’s wholly-owned subsidiary, MAN Plamag, produces LNPPs at a facility in the eastern German city of Plauen. The Plauen facility incurs lower labor and overhead costs than the Augsburg facility.
See
MAN Roland Supp. Questionnaire Secs.
C, D,E (Final List, Conf. Doc. 39)(Dec. 13, 1995)(“MAN Roland Responses”) at Sec. D, p. 54.
MAN Roland alleged throughout Commerce’s investigation that it and MAN Plamag met the criteria for “collapsing,” and that therefore, in calculating the cost of production (“COP”)
and constructed value (“CV”)
of its LNPPs, Commerce should have averaged the labor and overhead costs of both factories.
See Germany Final
at 38,187-88.
1. Collapsing MAN Roland and MAN Plamag
a. Background
Collapsing is a practice whereby Commerce determines that affiliated companies should be regarded as one entity, and therefore calculates a single, weighted-average dumping margin to be assessed to the collapsed entity as a whole.
See AK Steel Corp. v. United States,
22 CIT-, -, 34 F.Supp.2d 756, 764 (1998),
aff'd in part, rev’d in part,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed.Cir. 2000);
Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores v. United States,
22 CIT -, -6 F.Supp.2d 865, 893 (1998)(“Asocia
cion Colombiana
”).
Commerce initially disagreed with MAN Roland’s argument that MAN Roland and MAN Plamag should be collapsed.
See Germany Final
at 38,188. Apparently because it decided not to collapse the two companies, Commerce determined that “[it] should not average costs for [MAN Roland] and MAD [sic] Plamag.”
Id.
In
KBA I,
the Court found Commerce’s explanation insufficient and directed Commerce to reconsider on remand its decision not to average costs.
See
22 CIT at-, 15 F.Supp.2d at 849-50.
“[T]he only context in which the discussion of whether to average the production costs of affiliated parties ... occurfs] is in the context of collapsing.”
KBA II,
23 CIT at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287. Yet in its Redetermination, Commerce failed entirely to address the collapsing issue, while explaining at length its decision not to average the costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag.
See
Redetermination at 2-9. Upon review, the Court remanded the collapsing and cost-averaging issues for a second time, and ordered Commerce to “apply its collapsing practice as it then existed [i.e., at the time of
Germany Fi
nal] and was later codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.401(f).”
KRA II,
23 CIT at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287.
In its Second Redetermination, Commerce applied its collapsing regulation and decided to collapse MAN Roland and MAN Plamag for purposes of calculating COP and CY.
See
Second Redetermination at 1. As a result, if affirmed by the Court, the revised final dumping margin of 39.53% will be applied to subject merchandise entered by either MAN Roland or MAN Plamag.
See id.
at 1-2.
b. Discussion
The antidumping statute does not directly address collapsing. Thus, in determining whether Commerce’s collapsing practice is in accordance with the law, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)
(“Chevron”).
In other words, the Court must determine whether Commerce’s collapsing practice is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Commerce has interpreted the statute as giving it discretion to collapse and has developed a collapsing practice.
See, e.g., Certain Pasta From Italy,
61 Fed.Reg. 30,326, 30,351 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final determ.);
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products From, Canada,
58 Fed. Reg. 37,099, 37,107 (Dep’t Commerce 1993)(final determ.);
Certain Granite Products From Spain,
53 Fed.Reg. 24,335, 24,337 (Dep’t Commerce 1988)(final de-term.).
To conform with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), Commerce promulgated 19 CFR § 351.401(f).
See supra
note 4.
Commerce’s collapsing practice has been approved by the court as a reasonable interpretation of the antidumping statute.
See Asociación Colombiana
22 CIT-, --6 F.Supp.2d 865, 893;
Queen’s Flowers de Colom. v. United States,
21 CIT 968, 971-72, 981 F.Supp. 617, 622-23
(1997)(“Queen’s Flowers
”).
AK Steel
con
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OPINION
POGUE, Judge.
On June 23, 1998, this Court remanded certain aspects of the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or “the Department”) determination in
Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, From Germany,
61 Fed.Reg. 38,166 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final de
term,)(“Germany Final
”).
See Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,
22 CIT -, 15 F.Supp.2d 834 (1998)
(“KBA
/”). On September 17, 1998, Commerce issued its Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (Redetermination List, Pub. Doc. 8, Conf, Doc. 4)(Sept. 17, 1998) (“Redetermination”).
On remand, Commerce did not adequately address the Court’s concerns regarding the issues of “collapsing” and cost-averaging; thus the Court remanded these issues for a second time.
See Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,
23 CIT -, -, 44 F.Supp.2d 280, 287 (1999)
(“KBA
77”). On August 10, 1999, Commerce issued its Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Second Court Remand (Second Re-determination List, Pub. Doc. 5)(Aug. 10, 1999) (“Second Redetermination”). The Court now reviews Commerce’s Second Redetermination.
Standard of Review
The Court will uphold a Commerce determination in an antidumping investigation unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.l” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i)(1994).
Background
MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG and MAN Roland Inc. (“MAN Roland”), respondents in the underlying administrative proceeding before Commerce, produce large newspaper printing presses (“LNPPs”) at a facility in the western German city of Augsburg; MAN Roland’s wholly-owned subsidiary, MAN Plamag, produces LNPPs at a facility in the eastern German city of Plauen. The Plauen facility incurs lower labor and overhead costs than the Augsburg facility.
See
MAN Roland Supp. Questionnaire Secs.
C, D,E (Final List, Conf. Doc. 39)(Dec. 13, 1995)(“MAN Roland Responses”) at Sec. D, p. 54.
MAN Roland alleged throughout Commerce’s investigation that it and MAN Plamag met the criteria for “collapsing,” and that therefore, in calculating the cost of production (“COP”)
and constructed value (“CV”)
of its LNPPs, Commerce should have averaged the labor and overhead costs of both factories.
See Germany Final
at 38,187-88.
1. Collapsing MAN Roland and MAN Plamag
a. Background
Collapsing is a practice whereby Commerce determines that affiliated companies should be regarded as one entity, and therefore calculates a single, weighted-average dumping margin to be assessed to the collapsed entity as a whole.
See AK Steel Corp. v. United States,
22 CIT-, -, 34 F.Supp.2d 756, 764 (1998),
aff'd in part, rev’d in part,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed.Cir. 2000);
Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores v. United States,
22 CIT -, -6 F.Supp.2d 865, 893 (1998)(“Asocia
cion Colombiana
”).
Commerce initially disagreed with MAN Roland’s argument that MAN Roland and MAN Plamag should be collapsed.
See Germany Final
at 38,188. Apparently because it decided not to collapse the two companies, Commerce determined that “[it] should not average costs for [MAN Roland] and MAD [sic] Plamag.”
Id.
In
KBA I,
the Court found Commerce’s explanation insufficient and directed Commerce to reconsider on remand its decision not to average costs.
See
22 CIT at-, 15 F.Supp.2d at 849-50.
“[T]he only context in which the discussion of whether to average the production costs of affiliated parties ... occurfs] is in the context of collapsing.”
KBA II,
23 CIT at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287. Yet in its Redetermination, Commerce failed entirely to address the collapsing issue, while explaining at length its decision not to average the costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag.
See
Redetermination at 2-9. Upon review, the Court remanded the collapsing and cost-averaging issues for a second time, and ordered Commerce to “apply its collapsing practice as it then existed [i.e., at the time of
Germany Fi
nal] and was later codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.401(f).”
KRA II,
23 CIT at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287.
In its Second Redetermination, Commerce applied its collapsing regulation and decided to collapse MAN Roland and MAN Plamag for purposes of calculating COP and CY.
See
Second Redetermination at 1. As a result, if affirmed by the Court, the revised final dumping margin of 39.53% will be applied to subject merchandise entered by either MAN Roland or MAN Plamag.
See id.
at 1-2.
b. Discussion
The antidumping statute does not directly address collapsing. Thus, in determining whether Commerce’s collapsing practice is in accordance with the law, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)
(“Chevron”).
In other words, the Court must determine whether Commerce’s collapsing practice is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Commerce has interpreted the statute as giving it discretion to collapse and has developed a collapsing practice.
See, e.g., Certain Pasta From Italy,
61 Fed.Reg. 30,326, 30,351 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final determ.);
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products From, Canada,
58 Fed. Reg. 37,099, 37,107 (Dep’t Commerce 1993)(final determ.);
Certain Granite Products From Spain,
53 Fed.Reg. 24,335, 24,337 (Dep’t Commerce 1988)(final de-term.).
To conform with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), Commerce promulgated 19 CFR § 351.401(f).
See supra
note 4.
Commerce’s collapsing practice has been approved by the court as a reasonable interpretation of the antidumping statute.
See Asociación Colombiana
22 CIT-, --6 F.Supp.2d 865, 893;
Queen’s Flowers de Colom. v. United States,
21 CIT 968, 971-72, 981 F.Supp. 617, 622-23
(1997)(“Queen’s Flowers
”).
AK Steel
con
firmed that Commerce’s collapsing practice continues following the passage of the URAA.
See
22 CIT at-, 34 F.Supp.2d at 765,
aff'd,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed.Cir.2000) at 22. Commerce’s collapsing practice is a permissible construction of the statute, and is thus in accordance with the law.
Commerce’s decision to collapse MAN Roland and MAN Plamag is also supported by substantial evidence. Commerce indicated that it collapsed MAN Roland and MAN Plamag because the two companies “satisfy all three criteria enumerated [in 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f) ] based on the totality of the facts relevant during the [period of investigation (“POI”) ].” Second Redetermination at 5. Commerce found that MAN Roland and MAN Plamag are affiliated companies,
see
Second Rede-termination at 5 (citing MAN Roland Sec. A Questionnaire (Final List, Conf. Doc. 15)(Sept. 27, 1995) at 30); that MAN Roland and MAN Plamag have “production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities,”
see
Second Re-determination at 5 & n. 4 (citing MAN Roland Case Brief (Final List, Conf. Doc. 97)(June 3, 1996) at 75); and that the two companies exhibit a “significant potential for the manipulation of price or production,”
see
Second Redetermination at 5-6 (citing MAN Roland Responses at App. D-6-A, D-6-B; MAN Roland Supp. Questionnaire Secs. A,D,E (Final List, Conf. Doc. 50)(Jan. 31, 1996)(“MAN Roland Supp. Questionnaire Resp.”) at 56-58).
The decision to collapse is not contested by MAN Roland.
See
Comments on Draft Remand Determination (Second Redeter-mination List, Pub. Doc. 4)(June 30, 1999)(“MAN Second Redetermination Comments”).
II. Averaging MAN Roland and MAN Plamag’s Production Costs
The central dispute in this case is which costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag Commerce should average in determining the COM component of CV for the collapsed company. In the Second Redeter-mination, Commerce determined that it should not average the labor and overhead costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag, as requested by MAN Roland, because “the Department’s normal practice is to compute costs on a control-number-(CONNUM-) specific basis.”
Second Redetermination at 6. All parties agree that each LNPP falling within the scope of the
Germany Final
investigation was a unique product.
Id.
at 7. Accordingly, each LNPP had been assigned a unique CONNUM.
Id.
Therefore, according to Commerce, “there was no need to weight-average production costs between the two factories” of the collapsed companies, because there was no matching CONNUM— that is, no identical LNPPs — produced at both factories.
Id.
Commenting on Commerce’s draft Second Redetermination, MAN Roland conceded that the two facilities did not produce “identical” LNPPs having the same CONNUM, but rejected Commerce’s position that its “normal” or “established” practice is to average production costs only for identical merchandise.
See
MAN Second Redetermination Comments at 2. MAN Roland has alleged from the start of this litigation that Commerce’s “established practice” is, rather, to average costs “where a respondent has the
ability
to produce the subject merchandise at two plants .... ” MAN Roland’s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. at 33 (emphasis added).
In
KBA I,
this Court could not verify Commerce’s assertion that averaging costs only for identical merchandise is its “normal practice” in the context of affiliated parties.
See
22 CIT at-, 15 F.Supp.2d at 849 n. 7. As a procedural matter, the Court found Commerce’s explanation of its cost-averaging practice to be based on a post hoc rationalization, and therefore did not consider it on the merits.
See id.
The Court commented that if Commerce were to rely upon the “identical merchandise requirement” in its remand determination, it would have to explain how its stated cost-averaging practice was consistent with two earlier Commerce determinations that appeared to contradict its position:
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Colombia,
55 Fed.Reg. 20,491, 20,497 (Dep’t Commerce 1990)(final results admin, re
view)(“Fresh Flowers
”); and
Silicon Medal From Brazil,
59 Fed.Reg. 42,806, 42,808 (Dep’t Commerce 1994)(final results admin.
review)(“Silicon Metal
”).
See id.
In
KBA II,
the Court determined that Commerce had failed on remand to provide sufficient evidence of an identical merchandise requirement in the context of affiliated parties.
See KBA II
at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 282-87. First, Commerce did not explain to the Court’s satisfaction how the “identical merchandise” requirement was consistent with
Fresh Flowers
and
Silicon Metal. See id.
at -, 44 F.Supp.2d at 282-83.
Second, the Court found that three other determinations cited by Commerce in its Redetermination “failed to demonstrate that its identical merchandise requirement is its established practice in the context of affiliated parties.”
KBA II,
23 CIT at -, 44 F.Supp.2d at 283.
Finally, the Court found that Commerce had not explained how its identical merchandise requirement was consistent with its collapsing practice.
See id.
at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 283-87. The Court noted that the language of 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f) and Commerce’s collapsing practice prior to promulgation of that regulation indicated that Commerce would collapse where producers “have production facilities for
similar or identical
products that afford the company the ability to manipulate its manufacturing priorities.”
Id.
at-, 44 F.Supp.2d at 285 (emphasis added). The Court asked Commerce on remand to address its concern that “Commerce’s application of the identical merchandise requirement is inconsistent with 19 C.F.R. § 351.401 and contrary to Commerce’s collapsing practice.”
Id.
at --•, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287.
Cost-averaging for affiliated entities is not explicitly addressed in the anti-dumping statute. Thus, as with collapsing, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In other words, the Court must determine whether Commerce’s identical merchandise requirement for collapsed entities is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
While, as noted, “the only context in which the discussion of whether to average the production costs of affiliated parties ... occur[s] is in the context of collapsing,”
KBA II,
23 CIT at -, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287, this Court has recognized that “Commerce’s collapsing analysis and its constructed value calculation are separate.”
Queen’s Flowers,
21 CIT at 975, 981 F.Supp. at 624. In the Second Redetermination, Commerce explained how its collapsing practice differs from its cost-averaging practice with reference to the identical merchandise requirement:
The Department’s collapsing test relies, in part, upon the ability of two (or more) affiliated producers to produce identical or similar merchandise. However, the Department’s requirement for weight-averaging production costs in calculating COP and CV is actual production of identical
(i.e.,
same CONNUM) products at both (or multiple) production facilities.
Id.
at 9.
This difference reflects Commerce’s contention that each practice addresses a different issue in relation to the dumping margin. As described by Commerce, “collapsing, as it relates to computing COP, is a specific rule dealing with whether the Department should include facilities owned by an affiliate in its weighted-average, CONNUM-specific COP computation.”
Id.
at 10. The cost-averaging issue, on the other hand, “deals with the general rule for computing a single, CONNUM-specific, weighted-average COP.”
Id.
Further, Commerce explained that different policy goals underlie collapsing and cost-averaging. Commerce collapses facilities to prevent the possibility of manipulation of the antidumping law through shifting production to a less expensive, affiliated facility.
See
Second Redetermination at 4. As Commerce explained in a subsequent review of the
Fresh Flowers
determination discussed above:
[O]ur concerns over shifting production refer to a longer period of time; thus, if Company A receives a lower margin
than Company B, we are concerned that Company A would increase production of new flowers to take advantage of a lower margin while Company B would, over time, reduce production due to its higher margin. Alternatively, more of the production of Company A could be shifted to the U.S. market.
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Colombia,
61 Fed.Reg. 42,833, 42,854 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final results admin, reviews).
To prevent such manipulation, Commerce applies a single dumping margin to “the entire producer or reseller, not merely a part of it;” that is, to the collapsed entities. Second Redetermination at 4. Thus, in the example above, if collapsed, Company A and Company B would be assigned the same dumping margin, and consequently would not be able to take advantage of Company A’s lower dumping margin. In sum, in order to satisfy the criteria of the collapsing regulation, “there is no requirement that the companies produce the identical products
(ie.,
the same CONNUMs), only that they produce (or have the ability to produce) similar products.”
Id.
at 9-10.
By contrast, when calculating the dumping margin, regardless of whether that margin is applied to the entities of a collapsed company or to a single company comprised of one or more facilities, Commerce focuses on the
actual
costs of production.
See
Second Redetermination at 10. As such, only the costs of facilities that in fact produce identical merchandise are included in the weighted average. According to Commerce, including the theoretical costs of MAN Plamag merely because it had the ability to produce the subject merchandise “fails to account for the reality of the production process.”
Id.
Commerce’s explanation of the differences between its collapsing and cost-averaging practices demonstrates that its identical merchandise requirement is not unreasonable. Commerce collapses where facilities actually produce
or
have the ability to produce identical or similar merchandise to prevent manipulation of the antidumping laws. On the other hand, Commerce cost-averages only where facilities actually produce identical merchandise in order to arrive at the actual, rather than theoretical, costs of production.
Implicit in Commerce’s explanation of its cost-averaging practice is a general policy favoring accuracy in calculating dumping margins, which the Federal Circuit has recognized as “the basic purpose of the statute.”
Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States,
8 Fed. Cir. (T) 61, 67, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (1990).
Accordingly, Commerce’s explanation on remand addresses the Court’s concern, expressed in
KB A II,
that Commerce’s “identical merchandise” requirement for cost-averaging was inconsistent with its collapsing regulation and contrary to its collapsing practice.
See KBA II,
23 CIT at -, 44 F.Supp.2d at 282-84, 286-87. Collapsing effectively prevents manipulation by applying a single dumping margin to collapsed facilities, while the identical merchandise requirement promotes accuracy in the calculation of the dumping margin to be applied. In this case, because each LNPP was determined to be unique, including weight-averaged labor
and overhead costs for merely similar or merely theoretical LNPPs would diminish the accuracy of Commerce’s margin calculation.
Moreover, Commerce’s explanation resolves the question of whether the identical merchandise requirement was Commerce’s established practice at the time
Germany Final
was issued. “Commerce has the flexibility to change its position providing that it explains the basis for its change and providing that the explanation is in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence.”
KBA II,
23 CIT at -, 44 F.Supp.2d at 287 (quoting
Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States, 21
CIT 1059, 1064, 980 F.Supp. 1268, 1274 (1997)(footnotes omitted));
see also AK Steel,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.2000) at n. 10 (“That Commerce changed its interpretation, however, need not change the court’s analysis.”)(citing
Chevron,
467 U.S. at 863, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”)). As observed in
KBA II,
the determinations Commerce cited in its Redetermination in support of its identical merchandise requirement did not clearly indicate the existence of an established practice. 23 CIT at ——, 44 F.Supp.2d at 283-84. In the Second Redetermination, Commerce provided no further evidence of an established practice, but did adequately explain its cost-averaging practice. Thus, whether this explanation constitutes a “change” of practice, or simply illuminates a practice that had previously been applied, but not weh documented, the Court finds that Commerce’s cost-averaging practice as explained in the Second Redetermination is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and is thus in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the Court finds that Commerce correctly determined not to average the overhead and labor costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag.
III. Valuation of Transferred Inputs
Though refusing to average the labor and overhead costs of MAN Roland and MAN Plamag, Commerce determined that it was required to revalue inputs transferred between the two companies at the cost of producing the input rather than the transfer price used in
Germany Final.
See
Second Redetermination at 6,7.
Commerce explained: “Treating these affiliated companies as a single entity necessitates that inputs transferred between them also be valued based on the group as a whole.”
Id.
at 6;
see also AK Steel,
22 CIT at-, 34 F.Supp.2d at 764-66,
aff'd,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed.Cir.2000) at 22-25. The recalculation of CV on this basis resulted in a reduction of the final dumping margin from 39.60% to 39.53%.
See
Second Redetermination at 1-2; IA Staff to File: Adjustment Calculations for Second Remand — MRD (Second Redetermination List, Pub. Doc. 1, Conf. Doc. l)(June 10, 1999).
In
AK Steel,
the court approved Commerce’s method of valuing costs of transfers between collapsed companies based on COP.
See
22 CIT at-, 34 F.Supp.2d at 764-66. The court held that Commerce’s decision to value costs of transfers between collapsed companies based on COP was in accordance with the law: “Once collapsed, the POSCO Group was treated as a single entity, not a set of affiliated persons. Commerce reasonably determined that it should act consistently with its collapsing determination and not apply inconsistent solitary provisions, thereby arbitrarily increasing respondents’ liability.”
AK Steel,
22 CIT at-, 34 F.Supp.2d at 766. A recent Federal Circuit decision affirms the court’s ruling, noting that “once Commerce has decided to treat the companies as one ‘person’ for purposes of the anti-dumping analysis, it is not statutorily required to apply the [fair value] and [major input] provisions.”
AK Steel,
203 F.3d 1330 (Fed.Cir.2000) at 24.
In this case, Commerce acted consistently with the practice approved in
AK Steel
by this court and affirmed by the Federal Circuit. Commerce collapsed MAN Roland and MAN Plamag according to its collapsing regulation. Once collapsed, it treated the two companies as a single producer rather than affiliated parties, and thus properly disregarded the “fair value” and “major input” provisions. Further, MAN Roland has raised no objection to
the calculation of the revised dumping margin, and the Court can find none on independent review. Therefore, the Court concludes that Commerce’s valuation of the cost of transfers between MAN Roland and MAN Plamag based on COP is supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise in accordance with the law.
Conclusion
Commerce’s revision of its determination of sales at less than fair value with respect to LNPPs from Germany is supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record and is otherwise in accordance with the law. Accordingly, Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermi-nation Pursuant to Second Court Remand are affirmed.
JUDGMENT
This case having been duly submitted for decision, and the Court, after due deliberation, having rendered a decision herein; now, in conformity with said decision, it is hereby
ORDERED that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Final Results of Redeter-mination Pursuant to Second Court Remand in
Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled (“LNPP”) from Germany
is sustained.