BARBERA, J.
We consider in this case whether and, if so, under what circumstances, a judge who agrees to be bound to the terms of a plea agreement that calls for a sentence “within the guidelines” may impose a sentence that involves a term of incarceration that exceeds the guidelines but suspends all but the part of the sentence that falls within the guidelines. The answer to that question is of great concern to Petitioner Raymond B. Cuffley, Jr., who pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement and was sentenced in the fashion we have described. We hold that, under the circumstances presented here, the sentence imposed exceeded the terms of the plea agreement, rendering the sentence illegal. Petitioner is entitled to the remedy of specific performance of the plea agreement, requiring re-sentencing in conformance with it.
I.
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery, at a hearing in the Circuit Court for Harford County on October 23, 2002. At the outset of the hearing, the State set forth the terms of the parties’ plea agreement:
Mr. Cuffley is here today charged with robbery. There were plea discussions and he has indicated he will enter a guilty plea. As a consequence of the plea, the State will recommend a sentence within the guidelines as formulated by myself and Miss Casper [defense counsel], we came up with four to eight years. The sentencing will be deferred [until disposition of a pending probation violation].
[574]*574Defense counsel’s only addition to the State’s proffer was that “certainly no promises—but that the court might consider somewhere later down the road a commitment to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for purposes of treatment.”
The court restated its understanding of the agreement: Petitioner would plead guilty to the charge of robbery, which “carries a maximum possibility [sic] penalty of 15 years incarceration[,]” and “[t]he plea agreement, as I understand it, is that I will impose a sentence somewhere within the guidelines. The guidelines in this case are four to eight years. Any conditions of probation are entirely within my discretion.”
The Circuit Court engaged Petitioner in a colloquy to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The State then recited the factual basis for the plea. Following that, the Circuit Court accepted the plea agreement, bound itself to its terms, and deferred disposition.
At the sentencing hearing several months later, the court recalled correctly that “the guidelines in the case were four to eight years.” The State asked the court to sentence Petitioner “within the guidelines” and to make the sentence consecutive to a six-year sentence that was imposed in the probation violation case that had precipitated the deferral of disposition in the present case. Defense counsel asked the court to sentence Petitioner at the “bottom of the guidelines,” and “to consider at least part of that time to be concurrent to the time he is now serving, with a later consideration for modification to a drug treatment program.” The court sentenced Petitioner to “15 years at the Department of Correction, all but six years suspended, consecutive to the sentence imposed by [the judge who presided over the probation violation]. Upon release the defendant will be placed on a period of probation for five years [with a number of special conditions].”
Four-and-a-half years later, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence,” pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-[575]*575345(a).1 The motion came on for a hearing before the sentencing judge. Petitioner argued that the sentence violated the plea agreement. He testified that he understood the agreement to call for a total sentence of no more than eight years, and “not to [his] knowledge” did the lawyer who represented him at the time tell him that he could receive suspended time above the eight-year sentencing guidelines cap. Petitioner further testified that he would have remembered had his counsel advised him that his total exposure included suspended time because he is “always concerned” about how much time he “will have over his head.” He also testified that he did not understand that the sentence imposed was illegal until his then-current counsel explained that to him.
Ms. Casper, the lawyer who represented Petitioner at the plea, testified that she could not recall her conversation with Petitioner concerning the sentencing term of the plea agreement. She further testified, however:
I believe that what we discussed, and what the plea agreement was, was that the time to serve was going to be within that four to eight years. That was the plea agreement, was the time to serve. The suspended sentence period and the period of probation are up to the court. And I believe it’s the practice in this court that that wouldn’t be determined until the day of the actual sentence being handed down.
[576]*576The court denied the motion. The court noted preliminarily that “standard procedure in this court, and it still is today, is that suspended time and conditions of probation are within [the court’s] discretion.” The court explained that these discretionary powers were “alluded to” at the plea hearing, even if not specifically stated on the record. With regard to the advice Petitioner received from counsel concerning the meaning of the “within the guidelines” sentencing term, the court stated to Petitioner’s then-counsel: “I’m quite confident that your client was advised, even without hearing from Miss Casper, but having heard from her, I’m certain that she advised him that there would be suspended time.” The court added that Petitioner “got exactly what he bargained for.”
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion. The court recognized that the term “sentence” can mean a combination of suspended and executed periods of incarceration. The court also noted statements in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual that “[suspended time is not considered in determining whether the sentence falls within the recommended guidelines range[,]” and “[t]he guidelines range represents only non-suspended time.” Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 12. 1, at 42 (2005).2 Based on those statements, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “for the purposes of determining whether a sentence is within the guidelines ... only the active portion of the sentence is considered[.]” The intermediate appellate court found “substantial evidence in the record” to support the Circuit Court’s finding that defense counsel had informed Petitioner that a sentence “within the guidelines” meant a sentence of actual incarceration only, which supported the Circuit Court’s conclusion that the sentence was consistent with the plea agreement.
[577]*577We granted Petitioner’s writ of certiorari, Cuffley v. State, 406 Md. 743, 962 A.2d 370 (2008), to address the following question:
Where petitioner pled guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement, which called for a sentence within the sentencing guidelines range of four-to-eight years incarceration, is a sentence of fifteen years incarceration, -with all but six years of that term suspended in favor of probation, illegal?
II.
It is well documented that plea bargains play a crucial role in the system of criminal justice in Maryland and throughout the United States. In addition to relieving overburdened courts, the termination of charges following plea negotiations:
“leads to [the] prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.”
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1976) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)). Plea agreements, moreover, “eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance.” Brockman, 277 Md. at 693, 357 A.2d at 381. For these reasons, “plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.” Id, 357 A.2d at 381.
[578]*578Rule 4-243 governs plea agreements and addresses the procedures to be followed when the State and a defendant have entered into a plea agreement. That rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Conditions for agreement. (1) Terms. The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State’s Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following:
(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule.
(e) Agreements of sentence, disposition, or other judicial action. (1) Presentation to the court. If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State’s Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such presentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs.
(2) Not binding on the court. The agreement of the State’s Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented approves it.
(3) Approval of plea agreement. If the plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.
[579]*579(d) Record of proceedings. All proceedings pursuant to this Rule, including the defendant’s pleading, advice by the court, and inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea or a plea agreement shall be on the record. If the parties stipulate to the court that disclosure of the plea agreement or any of its terms would cause a substantial risk to any person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisal, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment, the court may order that the record be sealed subject to terms it deems appropriate.
(Emphasis added.)3 See also Rule 4-242(b), (c) (addressing the requirements of the guilty plea itself and mandating, inter alia, that the guilty plea be offered by the defendant personally on the record and in open court, and that the trial judge “may not accept a plea of guilty until after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof,” during which the court must “determine[ ] and announce[ ] on the record that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea....”).
Rule 4-243 expressly states that the terms of the plea agreement are to be made plain on the record, in the presence of the defendant, for the court to hear and accept or reject. The terms, moreover, must be made “ ‘express’ ” and “ ‘clearly agreed upon before the guilty plea is accepted.’ ” Solorzano v. State, 397 Md. 661, 672, 919 A.2d 652, 658 (2007) (quoting Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 487, 845 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2004)).
Plea bargains are likened to contracts. Tweedy, 380 Md. at 482, 845 A.2d at 1219. Consequently, “‘contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement.’ ” Solorzano, 397 [580]*580Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656 (quoting State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 604, 640 A.2d 1104, 1118 (1994)). Contract principles, however, “are not enough to resolve disputes over the proper interpretation of a plea bargain.” Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656. Indeed, this Court has previously recognized the limited applicability of contract law principles to plea agreements. Brockman, 277 Md. at 697, 357 A.2d at 382-83 (“the standard to be applied to plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from ... the strict application of the common law principles of contracts.”).4 Rather, “[d]ue process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards guide any interpretation of a court approved plea agreement.” Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656.
In short, fairness and equity govern the enforcement of plea agreements. Brockman, 277 Md. at 698, 357 A.2d at 383. Therefore, “ ‘when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” Id. at 694, 357 A.2d at 381 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495). Judges, too, are required to adhere to their part of the bargain. Tweedy, 380 Md. at 485, 845 A.2d at 1221 (stating that, once the court accepts a plea bargain, the court is “required to impose the agreed upon sentence, assuming that all the conditions imposed upon the defendant were fulfilled”); State v. Poole, 321 Md. 482, 496, 583 A.2d 265, 272 (1991) (stating that “fairness and equity required the trial judge to be held to his bargain, vis-a-vis sentencing”). When a defendant’s guilty plea rests in part on a promise concerning disposition, and the State or the court violates that promise, “the accused may obtain redress by electing either to have his guilty plea [581]*581vacated or to leave it standing and have the agreement enforced at resentencing.” Brockman, 277 Md. at 694, 357 A.2d at 381. Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo.
The parties do not dispute that the terms of a plea agreement are to be construed “according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty.” Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656. The parties disagree, however, about whether extrinsic evidence, that is, evidence outside the “four corners” of the plea agreement itself, may be considered in determining the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement’s terms. Petitioner, relying on Rule 4-243(c), argues that determining his reasonable understanding of a term of a plea agreement must be confined to what the Rule itself expressly mandates be placed on the record at the court proceeding at which the plea agreement is offered and accepted, and that, in keeping with the Rule’s requirements, extrinsic evidence of what the Petitioner did or did not understand about the agreement cannot be considered. The State acknowledges Rule 4-243(c), but argues nonetheless that the Rule ought not be read to preclude application of contract law principles, which, in the State’s words, “does not preclude examination of extrinsic evidence.”
By its express terms, Rule 4-243 mandates that, before the court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea, defense counsel and the State’s Attorney, on the record and in the presence of the defendant, “shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The Rule also mandates that the court, upon accepting and approving the agreement, “shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence^]” (Emphasis added.) The principal purpose of Rule 4-243 is to eliminate the possibility that the defendant may not fully comprehend the nature of the agreement before pleading guilty. Any less would offend notions of due process. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. 495 (“[T]he plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing, and, if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known.”).
[582]*582We conclude that, by its express terms, Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance with its provisions. We further conclude, as the natural consequence of requiring strict compliance with the Rule, that any question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record established at the Rule 4-243 plea proceeding. The record of that proceeding must be examined to ascertain precisely what was presented to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to determine what the defendant reasonably understood to be the sentence the parties negotiated and the court agreed to impose. The test for determining what the defendant reasonably understood at the time of the plea is an objective one. It depends not on what the defendant actually understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law would have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the plea proceeding.5 It is for this reason that extrinsic evidence of what the defendant’s actual understanding might have been is irrelevant to the inquiry.
[583]*583If the record of the plea proceeding clearly discloses what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, which, at the defendant’s option, is either specific enforcement of the agreement or withdrawal of the plea. Solorzano, 397 Md. at 667-68, 919 A.2d at 656. If examination of the record leaves ambiguous the sentence agreed upon by the parties, then the ambiguity must be resolved in the defendant’s favor. See id. at 673, 919 A.2d at 659; see also United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir.2002) (ambiguity in plea agreement is resolved against the government “[b]ecause of the Government’s advantage in bargaining power”); United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (ambiguity in a plea agreement must be resolved against the government because a plea “constitutes a waiver of substantial constitutional rights requiring that the defendant be adequately warned of the consequences of the plea.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)).
III.
We are left to apply our conclusions to the facts of this case. First, it is evident from what transpired at the [584]*584hearing on the motion to correct illegal sentence that the Circuit Court considered extrinsic evidence in determining what Petitioner reasonably understood, at the time he pleaded guilty, was the sentencing term of the agreement. That was error, for the reasons we have discussed.
Simply put, the facts that the court and defense counsel understood a sentence “within the guidelines” to refer only to actual incarceration, and that the court could impose a suspended sentence that exceeds the guidelines, are irrelevant to what Petitioner reasonably understood at the time of the plea to be the agreed-upon sentence. Also irrelevant are declarations in the Guidelines Manual that suspended time is not considered in determining whether a sentence falls within the guidelines range, which the Court of Special Appeals evidently found significant in affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court. Neither is it relevant that Petitioner’s defense counsel believed that she had explained to Petitioner what was meant by a sentence “within the guidelines.” Furthermore, it is not relevant that the Circuit Court made a factual finding that defense counsel actually explained to Petitioner sometime before the on-the-record plea proceeding that the court retained the discretion to impose a split sentence exceeding the sentencing guidelines.6 All that is relevant, for purposes of identifying the sentencing term of the plea agreement, is what was stated on the record at the time of the plea concerning that term of the agreement and what a reasonable lay person in Petitioner’s position would understand, based on what was stated, the agreed-upon sentence to be.
The record of the plea proceeding reflects the following: The prosecutor advised the court that the agreement called for a “sentence within the guidelines as formulated by” the State and the defense, which was “four to eight years.” [585]*585Defense counsel added nothing to explain further what the parties meant by that sentencing term. The court then expressed to Petitioner its understanding of the sentencing term: “The plea agreement, as I understand it, is that I will impose a sentence somewhere within the guidelines. The guidelines in this case are four to eight years. Any conditions of probation are entirely within my discretion.” No mention was made at any time during that proceeding—much less before the court agreed to be bound by the agreement and accepted Petitioner’s plea—that the four-to-eight-year sentence referred to executed time only. Neither counsel nor the court stated that the court could impose a sentence of more than eight years’ incarceration that would include no more than eight years of actual incarceration, with the remainder suspended.7 Based on this record, a reasonable lay person in Petitioner’s position would not understand that the court could impose the sentence it did.
The court’s comment at the plea proceeding that “[a]ny conditions of probation are entirely within my discretion” does not change our conclusion. A reasonable lay person in Petitioner’s position could understand the court’s comment to mean that the court reserved the right to suspend a part of what, at most, would be an eight-year sentence and impose a period of probation accompanied by conditions.
In short, the sentencing term of the agreement to which the court bound itself, when determined by reference to what Petitioner reasonably understood that term to be at the time he pleaded guilty, was that the court would impose a total sentence of no more than eight years, a portion of which the court in its discretion might suspend in favor of a period of [586]*586probation, with conditions. But even if the sentencing term of the plea agreement as expressed at the plea proceeding was ambiguous (a point Petitioner concedes), he is entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in his favor. See Solorzano, 397 Md. at 673, 919 A.2d at 659 (any ambiguity in plea agreement must be resolved against the State).
We therefore hold that, regardless of whether the sentencing term is clear or ambiguous, the court breached the agreement by imposing a sentence that exceeded a total of eight years’ incarceration. The sentence is illegal and, upon Petitioner’s motion, the Circuit Court should have corrected it to conform to a sentence for which Petitioner bargained and upon which he relied in pleading guilty.
Our holding should not be interpreted as foreclosing a binding plea agreement that provides for a so-called “split sentence” like the sentence imposed in this case, that is, a sentence that exceeds the guidelines, with all of it suspended save for that portion of the sentence that falls “within the sentencing guidelines.” To the contrary, such plea agreements are entirely permissible, if, as we noted in Solorzano, 397 Md. at 674 n. 2, 919 A.2d at 659 n. 2, either the State or defense counsel makes that term of the agreement absolutely clear on the record of the plea proceeding and the term is fully explained to the defendant on the record before the court accepts the defendant’s plea.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE SENTENCE AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY FOR RE-SENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY HARFORD COUNTY.
HARRELL, MURPHY, and ADKINS, JJ., dissent.