CSX Transportation Inc v. South Carolina Department of Revenue

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedNovember 24, 2020
Docket3:14-cv-03821
StatusUnknown

This text of CSX Transportation Inc v. South Carolina Department of Revenue (CSX Transportation Inc v. South Carolina Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CSX Transportation Inc v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, (D.S.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION CSX Transportation, Inc., ) ) C/A No. 3:14-3821-MBS Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) South Carolina Department of ) ORDER AND OPINION Revenue and W. Harley Powell, Agency ) AND FINAL JUDGMENT Director of the South Carolina Department ) of Revenue, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) On September 30, 2014, Plaintiff CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”) filed a complaint against Defendants South Carolina Department of Revenue and Rick Reames III,1 Agency Director of the South Carolina Department of Revenue (together, the “DOR”), asserting that the South Carolina Real Property Reform Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-37-3110 to -3170 (the “Valuation Act”), discriminates against CSX in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b) (the “4-R Act”). Section 12-37-3140 of the Valuation Act provides: (A)(1) For property tax years beginning after 2006, the fair market value of real property is its fair market value applicable for the later of: (a) the base year, as defined in subsection (C) of this section; (b) December thirty-first of the year in which an assessable transfer of interest has occurred; (c) as determined on appeal; or 1Defendant W. Hartley Powell now is Agency Director. The caption has been revised pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). (d) as it may be adjusted as determined in a countywide reassessment program conducted pursuant to Section 12-43-217, but limited to increases in such value as provided in subsection (B) of this section. (2) To the fair market value of real property as determined at the time provided in item (1) of this subsection, there must be added the fair market value of subsequent improvements and additions to the property. (B) Any increase in the fair market value of real property attributable to the periodic countywide appraisal and equalization program implemented pursuant to Section 12-43-217 is limited to fifteen percent within a five-year period to the otherwise applicable fair market value. This limit must be calculated on the land and improvements as a whole. However, this limit does not apply to the fair market value of additions or improvements to real property in the year those additions or improvements are first subject to property tax, nor do they apply to the fair market value of real property when an assessable transfer of interest occurred in the year that the transfer value is first subject to tax. (C) For purposes of determining a “base year” fair market value pursuant to this section, the fair market value of real property is its appraised value applicable for property tax year 2007. (D) Real property valued by the unit valuation concept is excluded from the limits provided pursuant to subsection (B) of this section. (E) Value attributable to additions and improvements, and changes in value resulting from assessable transfers of interest occurring in a property tax year are first subject to property tax in the following tax year except as provided pursuant to Section 12-37-670(B). Simply stated, the Valuation Act limited real property to a 15% increase in taxes between five-year assessment cycles. CSX’s real property in South Carolina is valued by the unit valuation concept and thus excluded pursuant to section 12-37-3140(D) from the benefits provided to other real property owners. CSX asserts that, because of the exclusion, its property taxes increased 51% during the period between 2007 and 2014. ECF No. 6-5, 3 (comparing appraised value of CSX’s real property for tax year 2007 of $263,636,352 ($352,804,860 X 0.7474) and 2014 of $397,683,191 ($535,888,951 X .7421)); see also ECF No. 142-2. 2 Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b), (b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them: (1) Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property. (2) Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection. (3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. (4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part. CSX relies on subsection (b)(4) as the basis for its complaint.2 On January 7, 2019, the court issued an order wherein it noted that subsection (b)(4) requires a “‘showing of discrimination – of a failure to treat similarly situated persons alike.” ECF No. 123, 7 (quoting Alabama Dep’t of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1136 (2015)). The court observed that, to show discrimination under § 11501(b)(4), the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discriminatory tax treatment. Id. at 9 (citing CSX Transp. Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 288, n.8 (2011)). If the plaintiff does so, the burden then shifts to the defendant taxing authority to offer “sufficient justification” for the differential tax treatment. Id. If the defendant cannot meet its burden, the tax treatment violates § 11501(b)(4). ECF No. 123, 9. 2 CSX raised identical issues for tax years 2015 (C/A No. 3:15-4625-MBS); 2016 (C/A No. 3:16- 3208-MBS); 2017 (C/A No. 3:17-2646-MBS); 2018 (C/A No. 3:18-2609); and 2019 (C/A No. 3:19- 2446-MBS). These related actions are stayed pending resolution of the within matter. 3 The court found that the appropriate comparison class consists of other commercial and industrial real property taxpayers in South Carolina. The DOR conceded that “in the abstract, the [Valuation Act] may have the potential to treat railroad real property differently from commercial and industrial real property with regard to property taxes.” Id. Accordingly, the court determined

that CSX made out a prima facie case of discrimination. The court also found that the DOR offered sufficient justification for its treatment of CSX under the Valuation Act because (1) railroads are advantaged by a 20% equalization factor that is applied to reduce the assessed value of all railroad property in order to eliminate discrepancies in the fair market value; (2) railroads receive various tax exemptions enacted for their benefit, such as for sales tax on diesel fuel; sales tax on railroad cars, parts, locomotives, and parts; user fees for diesel fuel; and property tax for pollution control facilities; and (3) the extension of the 15% cap to railroads would result in the suppression of fair

market value because railroad real property rarely changes ownership, and thus railroads avoid triggering the reassessment of fair market value that comes with sale. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of DOR. Id. at 10-13. CSX appealed. By opinion issued on May 20, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Court agreed that CSX made out a prima facie showing of discriminatory tax treatment based on the appropriate comparison class of other commercial and industrial real property taxpayers in South Carolina. ECF No. 133, 10. The Fourth Circuit found, however, that DOR had failed to provide sufficient justification for the disparate treatment.

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Bluebook (online)
CSX Transportation Inc v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/csx-transportation-inc-v-south-carolina-department-of-revenue-scd-2020.