IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 85962-5-I CRYSTAL D. THACKER (NKA SKOV), DIVISION ONE Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and
DAVID M. THACKER,
Appellant.
COBURN, J. — Three years after David Thacker and Crystol Skov entered into an
agreed parenting plan, and two years after a relocation trial where neither party asked
to revisit the existing parenting plan, Skov petitioned to modify the parenting plan and
place restrictions on David 1 based on a substantial change in circumstances and to
protect their children from additional harm. The trial court rejected David’s request to
limit evidence to a period after entry of the relocation order. In consideration of evidence
presented of domestic violence that pre-dated the agreed parenting plan and of more
recent emotional and psychological abuse of the children, the trial court suspended
David’s residential time and restricted his contact with the children. David challenges
the trial court’s orders modifying the parenting plan and ordering an upward adjustment
1 We refer to David Thacker and his current wife, Julia Thacker, by their first name for clarity because they share the same surname. 85962-5-I/2
in child support following a 14-day trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
David and Skov married in 2004. They had three children together, a daughter
A.T. and two sons L.T. and G.T. 2 Skov petitioned for dissolution in July 2017.
During the dissolution litigation, Skov requested, under RCW 26.09.191, that the
court impose contact restrictions on David. As a result, the dissolution court appointed
guardian ad litem (GAL) Kathleen Kennelly to investigate relevant issues, including
domestic violence and emotional abuse. Kennelly completed her report in 2018 and did
not recommend .191 restrictions. Kennelly’s report was not filed with the dissolution
court.
In February 2019 the parties entered into an agreed parenting plan that gave the
parties joint-decision-making and named Skov as the children’s custodian. Under the
plan, the parties agreed that Skov would have the majority of the residential time with
the children and that, as the parent with majority residential time, Skov was required to
notify David if she planned to move to a new school district. The plan further stated that
“[i]f the relocating person wants to change the Parenting Plan because of the move,
s/he must deliver a proposed Parenting Plan.” The dissolution was finalized on June 19,
2019.
In May 2020 Skov petitioned to relocate the children to a new school district
within the same county, which the presiding court granted over David’s objection in
January 2021 following a trial. GAL Kennelly’s 2018 report was filed with the relocation
court but neither party offered the report or called Kennelly to testify at trial. In its order
2 At the time of the trial in 2023, A.T. was 15 years old, L.T. was 12, and G.T. was nine. 2 85962-5-I/3
granting relocation, the court expressly recognized that neither party asked to modify
the parenting plan because of Skov’s proposed relocation and found that the action was
“a relocation matter that should be decided under the relocation act.” The court found
that consideration of the parties’ contact with the children was not applicable because
neither party sought modification of the parenting plan and their contact would not be
disrupted by the move. Additionally, the court found that .191 restrictions on either party
did not apply because the current parenting plan order did not include .191 limitations.
The parenting plan order, as expressly stated by the trial court’s relocation order,
“remains in effect.”
In April 2022 Skov petitioned to modify the parenting plan, claiming a substantial
change in the children’s circumstances under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2). 3 Skov
asserted that the children’s current living situation was harmful to their well-being. Skov
also requested restrictions on David as the parent with less parenting or residential time
under RCW 26.09.260(4). The court appointed GAL Lynn Tuttle to investigate potential
issues regarding a parenting plan for the children, including domestic violence between
the parties, emotional or psychological abuse of the children by the parties, and the
children’s mental health. In June the court issued temporary orders suspending David’s
in-person visitation with A.T. and L.T.
In May 2023 David moved, under RCW 26.09.260, to limit the scope of
testimonial and documentary evidence at trial. David asked the trial court to limit
evidence to occurrences on or after the issuance of the relocation order in 2021,
arguing that subsection .260(1) prohibited the court from considering allegations
3 David agreed that adequate cause supported a modification of the parenting plan, but for different reasons not relevant in this appeal. 3 85962-5-I/4
contained in GAL Kennelly’s 2018 report because the report was filed with the
relocation court and thus rendered the facts “already … ‘known’ to the trial court for the
Relocation trial.” David claimed that collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of matters
that arose prior to the relocation order. The trial court denied David’s motion.
Following a 14-day trial, the court granted Skov’s motion to modify the parenting
plan. The court issued a written order that incorporated extensive supplemental written
findings.
In its supplemental findings, the trial court addressed the procedural history of
the case and found that the parties agreed to the existing parenting plan because of
GAL Kennelly’s 2019 recommendations. Citing Skov’s testimony and the 2021
relocation order, the trial court also found that the relocation proceedings did not involve
litigation regarding modification of the parenting plan or RCW 26.09.191 limitations. The
court found that a substantial change occurred in the children’s circumstances under
RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2) since entry of the agreed parenting plan in 2019. The
court found that maintaining the existing plan would be detrimental to the children’s
physical, mental, and emotional health.
Finding Skov’s testimony credible, the court also found that David committed
multiple acts of domestic violence against Skov. The court cited GAL Tuttle’s concern
regarding a consistent pattern of reports that David committed domestic violence in
each of his three marital relationships, including against his current spouse Julia
Thacker.
The court cited Skov’s testimony in its finding that David engaged in emotional
abuse of A.T., L.T., and G.T. Skov testified that David would pull on the children’s arms
4 85962-5-I/5
and rage-yell or scream at them. Skov described David’s rage incidents as “terrifying”
and “a norm in our family.” Skov testified to an incident in 2013 when L.T. was two years
old and playing loudly while David was watching television and David “got in [L.T.’s]
face and held onto him” while “rage screaming” in L.T.’s face with an intensity that
caused L.T. to start screaming because “it freaked him out.” The older the children got,
the harder David was on the children.
David’s norm of raging and screaming was corroborated by David’s adult
daughter Ashley from his first marital relationship before Skov. 4 Ashley referred to Skov
as her “previous stepmother” with whom she is very close. Ashley moved in with David
and Skov around 2006 when she was about eight years old and lived with them until
she went to college. Ashley testified that David would scream at L.T. and physically
restrain him by laying on top of him or binding his arms and legs while L.T. cried. Ashley
also described how David emotionally abused her by berating her when she did not do
something like he wanted. David’s screaming made Ashley feel like “the worst person
on earth.”
Relying on testimony from multiple health professionals, school personnel, and
Skov, the trial court found that the children demonstrated symptoms of emotional abuse
as evidenced by A.T.’s and L.T.’s suicidal ideation since entry of the parties’ agreed
parenting plan, A.T.’s suicide attempt in 2022, and A.T.’s and L.T’s. consistent reports
that David was the source of their mental health challenges. The court found that A.T.
and L.T. “have been in a mental and emotional crisis since at least January 26, 2022,
4 Ashley was 25 years old at the time of trial. 5 85962-5-I/6
and that the crisis has been exacerbated by their continued unsupervised contact with
[David].”
On January 26, 2022, law enforcement became involved in an incident that
started when L.T. refused to get out of Skov’s car for residential time with David. David
forcefully pulled L.T. out of her car, wrestled with L.T. in the front yard, and pulled L.T.
into his house where he continued to wrestle with L.T. on the ground of the foyer. After
L.T. subsequently got away and ran out of the house, David caught up to L.T. and
picked him up and put him over his shoulder. David then put L.T. on the ground and,
with Julia’s assistance, held L.T. to the ground. GAL Tuttle concluded in her report that
the three children experienced the January 26 incident as a traumatic event that
impacted their feelings of safety and heightened the anxiety they already experienced
with David. Ex. 342, at 54.
School counselor Melissa Ballard testified that L.T. showed an escalation in
challenging behaviors, including “class refusal behaviors, a hard time staying in the
classroom or coming into the school building” and problems “getting calm when he had
big emotions,” in early 2022 and that he reported suicidal ideation in 2022. L.T. reported
to Ballard that his negative feelings were triggered because he felt unsafe around David
and was scared to go to his house.
Neuropsych evaluator Tammara Bode assessed L.T. and testified that he
showed “overt symptoms of [unspecified] trauma” and had attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 5 Emergency medicine
5 Bode did not testify as to when her assessment of L.T. occurred but the trial court’s written findings place it as occurring sometime prior to L.T.’s evaluation at Seattle Children’s Hospital for suicidal ideation in April 2022 (referred to in the following sentence above), which David does not challenge. 6 85962-5-I/7
physician Dr. Hiromi Yoshida evaluated L.T. at Seattle Children’s Hospital for suicidal
ideation in April 2022 and testified that L.T. reported he did not feel safe in his father’s
care, observed his father be aggressive toward his stepmother, described his father’s
house as a “big stressor,” and asked to be discharged to his mother’s care.
Dr. Daniel Crawford, psychiatrist at Seattle Children’s Hospital, testified that A.T.
was admitted to the hospital for attempting suicide in spring 2022 and diagnosed with
depressive disorder. A.T. expressed to Dr. Crawford that she “found it very difficult to be
at her father’s home” and “she had tried to kill herself because she was about to go to
her father’s home per the current [residential schedule] and she did not think she could
bear that.” According to Dr. Crawford, A.T. “expressed multiple plans for how to end her
life should she have to return to her father’s house.” Two other medical professionals
who cared for A.T. after her hospitalization at Seattle Children’s Hospital testified that
she suffered from anxiety and depression, and that her symptoms were directly related
to being in David’s care. School counselors testified to A.T. expressing she did not want
to go home with her father and showing fear of him, including Julianna Jenkins who
observed A.T. in a “panic” and hiding under a school desk when David arrived to pick
her up from school.
G.T. described his father as “really abusive” and said that “[h]e abuses the power
of a grown-up.” Ex. 342, at 34. G.T. expressed that his father’s house was “scary” and
that none of the children want to go there “in case he gets mad.” Id. Like A.T. and L.T.,
G.T. described their father’s “yelling [at the children] and screaming at them and being
unpredictable.”
7 85962-5-I/8
GAL Tuttle testified that David’s yelling caused a lot of fear and anxiety for the
children and created a stressful environment for them. The children reported observing
domestic violence between their father and Julia, including David being physical with
her, locking her out of the house, and breaking a laptop. Tuttle reported that David’s
behavior constituted emotional abuse of the children.
The trial court found that the children needed mental health treatment and “time
to heal from their traumas relating to David’s parenting, his exposing them to domestic
violence, and his emotional abuse while parenting them.” The court adopted GAL
Tuttle’s recommendation to modify the parenting plan and restrict David’s contact with
A.T. and L.T. based on domestic violence and emotional abuse. Ex., 342 at 61.
Additionally, the court found that G.T. “is just as affected by the exposure to domestic
violence and emotional abuse at the hands of his father” and determined it would not
wait for G.T.’s mental health to decline like A.T., L.T., and David’s adult daughter
Ashley, who testified to struggling with suicidal ideation and self-harming behaviors
when she was a child in his care. The court restricted David’s contact with the children
under RCW 26.09.260(4) to protect the best interests of the children, stating:
Without treatment addressing his rage, domestic violence, and emotional abuse, and without limitations on his ability to physically compel any of his children to attend visits, David is not fit to parent his children as he is not capable of providing a home that is free from emotional abuse and domestic violence. As such, the Court finds it is necessary to restrict contact between David and all three children and that restricting his contact protects the best interests of the children under RCW 26.09.191.
The court suspended David’s residential time with the children pending his compliance
with domestic violence intervention treatment and a parenting program.
8 85962-5-I/9
Additionally, the trial court approved Skov’s request for an adjustment in child
support. Based on its consideration of various factors, the court concluded an increased
adjustment above the standard monthly calculation of $2,382.60 was necessary to meet
the children’s needs and commensurate with the parties’ income, resources, and
standard of living under RCW 26.19.001. The court ordered David to pay $3,500 in
monthly child support to Skov.
David appeals.
DISCUSSION
Modification of Parenting Plan
A. Standard of Review
Generally, “trial courts are given broad discretion in matters dealing with the
welfare of children.” In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239
(1993). A trial court’s order modifying a parenting plan is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Kinnan, 131 Wn. App. 738, 746, 129 P.3d 807 (2006).
David asserts that his challenge to the trial court’s modification of a parenting
plan requires this court to engage in statutory interpretation to determine whether a
relocation order constitutes a custody decree under RCW 26.09.260(1). Accordingly, he
avers that we should review the issue de novo. We disagree.
RCW 26.09.260(1) states,
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4), (5), (6), (8), and (10) of this section, the court shall not modify a prior custody decree or a parenting plan unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree or plan, that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party and that the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
9 85962-5-I/10
David makes a tortured argument that the trial court misapplied subsection
.260(1) when it considered facts prior to the relocation order in its decision to modify the
agreed parenting plan. David asserts that the relocation order constitutes a “custody
decree” that should have narrowed the court’s scope of inquiry to only include events
that arose after entry of the relocation order in 2021. By attacking the trial court’s scope
of inquiry at the modification trial, David merely attempts to revive a challenge to the
court’s evidentiary rulings. Skov argues that because David did not ask the trial court to
find that the relocation order was a custody decree for the purpose of the court’s
application of RCW 26.09.260(1), he waived this argument under RAP 2.5(a).
Prior to the modification trial, David moved to limit the scope of evidence under
RCW 26.09.260(1), which the trial court denied. At that time, David did not argue that
the relocation order should be considered a custody decree under .260(1). He does not
show that he raised this argument below. See RAP 2.5(a), 10.3(a)(6); State v. Scott,
110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988) (“The appellate courts will not sanction a
party’s failure to point out at trial an error which the trial court, if given the opportunity,
might have been able to correct to avoid an appeal and a consequent new trial.”) (citing
Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wn.2d 596, 597, 354 P.2d 928 (1960)). Moreover, David does
not assign error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to limit the scope of evidence or
any of the court’s evidentiary rulings during the modification proceedings. We conclude
that David waived his argument challenging the trial court’s scope of inquiry under RCW
26.09.260(1), and review the trial court’s order modifying the parties’ agreed parenting
plan for abuse of discretion.
10 85962-5-I/11
B. No Abuse of Discretion
An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d
23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). “‘[A] reviewing court may not find abuse of discretion
simply because it would have decided the case differently—it must be convinced that no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” Gilmore v. Jefferson
County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area, 190 Wn.2d 483, 494, 415 P.3d 212 (2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420, 427, 403
P.3d 45 (2017)).
We uphold a trial court’s findings of fact in its order modifying a parenting plan so
long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Hansen,
81 Wn. App. 494, 498, 914 P.2d 799 (1996). Substantial evidence is “defined as a
quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is
true.” In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (quoting
Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003)). The
party challenging the court’s findings has the burden of showing that substantial
evidence does not exist. In re Marriage of Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. 1, 9, 57 P.3d 1166
(2002). An appellate court will not supplant a trial court’s determination as to the
persuasiveness of evidence, even where conflicting, or the credibility of witnesses. In re
Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017); In re Marriage of Bundy,
12 Wn. App. 2d 933, 938, 460 P.3d 1111 (2020). “So long as substantial evidence
supports the finding, it does not matter that other evidence may contradict it.” Burrill v.
Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002). A trial court’s unchallenged findings
11 85962-5-I/12
of fact are verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. 861, 865,
815 P.2d 843 (1991).
Once a court finds adequate cause to schedule a parenting plan modification
hearing under RCW 26.09.270, the trial court may then modify the existing parenting
plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) if it finds that a substantial change has occurred in the
child’s circumstances and the modification is in and necessary for the best interests of
the child. Subsection .260(1) provides a timing provision wherein the court is authorized
to consider in its modification determination “‘facts that have arisen since the prior
[parenting] plan’ and ‘that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior [parenting]
plan.’” In re Marriage of Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 803, 811, 226 P.3d 202 (2010) (alteration
in original) (quoting RCW 26.09.260(1)). “‘Unknown’ facts include those facts that
existed before an agreed parenting plan was entered.” Id. (second emphasis added)
(citing In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wn.2d 594, 598-99, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980)).
The trial court also may alter “the residential schedule established by … the
parenting plan” based on a finding under RCW 26.09.260(2), such as a finding that the
present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and the advantage of a change in the child’s environment outweighs the harm likely to
be caused by the change in environment. RCW 26.09.260(2)(c). Additionally, under
RCW 26.09.260(4), “[t]he court may reduce or restrict contact between the child and the
parent with whom the child does not reside a majority of the time if it finds that the
reduction or restriction would serve and protect the best interests of the child using the
criteria in RCW 26.09.191 and 26.09.192.” As plainly shown by the “except as otherwise
provided” language of RCW 26.09.260(1), the basis for a court’s finding regarding
12 85962-5-I/13
contact reduction or restriction for a parent with less than the majority of residential time
under subsection .260(4) is not limited to facts that have arisen since or were unknown
by the court at the time of the prior parenting plan.
Here, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to the parenting plan that was
entered as part of their dissolution in 2019. David’s argument in his briefing that the
relocation court had reconsidered the parties’ parenting plan is unpersuasive. As
expressly acknowledged in the relocation court’s order, neither party petitioned to
modify the plan when Skov’s relocation request was litigated. Indeed, the relocation
court deemed that the matter before it fell under Washington’s child relocation act. 6
After finding adequate cause and holding a 14-day trial, the trial court found a
substantial change in the children’s circumstances based on their suffering of emotional
abuse from David’s parenting and determined that modification of the parenting plan
was in the children’s best interests under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2). For this same
reason, the court restricted David’s contact with the children as the parent with less than
the majority of the parenting time under RCW 26.09.260(4).
David specifically challenges some of the trial court’s purported “key findings” in
its modification order. In addition to reviewing challenged findings for substantial
evidence, “we look at the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the respondent.” Zigler, 154 Wn. App at 812.
6 Codified under RCW 26.09.405-.560. See Cowan v. Cowan, 29 Wn. App. 2d 355, 379, 540 P.3d 158 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1020, 542 P.3d 578 (2024) (“The child relocation act (CRA) ‘governs the process for relocating the primary residence of a child who is the subject of a court order for residential time.’”) (quoting In re Marriage of Abbess, 23 Wn. App. 2d 479, 485-86, 516 P.3d 443 (2022)). 13 85962-5-I/14
David argues that the trial court erred in its finding that A.T.’s and L.T.’s
suicidality occurred during his residential time. David bases his challenge on an isolated
phrase in the court’s findings, citing the court’s statements that three out of four of the
children experienced “suicidality and/or self-harm behaviors … while they were in
[David’s] care,” and that Ashley, A.T., and L.T. “had suicidal ideation and self-harming
behaviors while in David’s care.” (Emphasis added.) David literally construes “while in
David’s care” to mean that the court assigned the children’s suicidal ideation and self-
harming behavior to David’s scheduled residential time. However, these findings in
combination with the court’s findings about the children’s mental health challenges can
be reasonably understood as attributing A.T.’s and L.T.’s suicidal ideation to their fear
and anxiety about being returned to David’s care. This is supported by substantial
evidence in the record, including testimony regarding specific crisis incidents when A.T.
and L.T. expressed anxiety and/or fear7 about going with David or returning to his
house.
David next claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he has been “the
only adult who has needed to carry L.T. out of a car when [L.T.] is activated.” 8
(Emphasis added.) David seems to extend the trial court’s finding that he was the only
adult who physically restrained L.T. as discipline to include the incident on January 26,
2022, during which David pulled L.T. out of the car and into his house.
7 Because he raises it for the first time in his reply brief, we do not consider David’s claim that the court “misattributed [statements] to L.T.” when Skov was the source of the statements. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). 8 It is apparent from David’s argument that “when [L.T.] is activated” refers to times when L.T. would exhibit challenging behaviors, such as refusing to go to visits with David because of L.T.’s “severe attachment anxiety.” 14 85962-5-I/15
Even interpreting the trial court’s finding this way, David fails to establish that the
court abused its discretion. The court heard testimony from GAL Tuttle that the children
suffered from emotional abuse from David in part based on the incident on January 26,
2022 when David “pulled [L.T.] out of the car and held him on the floor” as well as
reports from A.T. and L.T. that David would grab the children and Ashley’s description
of incidents in which David would slam her against the wall by the shoulders, carry A.T.
or L.T. by the arm, and hold or lay on top of L.T. Ashley testified it was difficult to
observe David lay on top of L.T. or bind L.T.’s arms and legs with his full body weight
while L.T. cried. Ashley said that L.T. had some behavioral issues and challenges
controlling his emotions, but that “no one else in the house treated [L.T.] like that.” David
does not provide record cites to establish an incident where a different adult carried L.T.
out of the car or physically restrained him. David points to Skov’s statement to GAL
Kennelly that L.T. would sometimes need to be physically dragged out of the car for
visits with David. Ex. 447, at 16. But Skov’s general statement did not identify who was
pulling L.T. out of the car. 9 David has thus not met his burden to show that substantial
evidence does not exist on this record. See Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. at 9.
We also disagree with David’s claim that the trial court’s rationale for terminating
David’s visits “immediately and indefinitely” is not supported by the record. The court did
not restrict David’s contact with the children indefinitely. Rather, finding that the
children’s best interest required contact restrictions under RCW 26.09.191, the court
imposed a detailed phased plan predicated on David’s compliance with domestic
9 GAL Kennelly’s report states in relevant part, “The mother maintains …. [that L.T.] alternates between being okay with the visits and having to be physically dragged out of the car – [L.T.] has had severe attachment anxiety with me in the last six months.’” Ex. 447, at 16. 15 85962-5-I/16
violence evaluation, treatment recommendations, and a parenting course. Based on
testimony from Skov, Ashley, school personnel, and medical professionals, the record
supports the trial court’s finding that the children suffered from emotional abuse as a
result of David’s parenting and that it was thus in the children’s best interest not to have
contact with David until he engaged in interventions for his rage and abusive behaviors.
We thus do not disturb the trial court’s finding that the evidence necessitated the
phased restriction of David’s contact with the children under RCW 26.09.191.
Finally, David asserts that the trial court erroneously found that he did not rebut
certain portions of Skov’s testimony and asks this court to reweigh evidence, which we
do not do. 10 Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127; Bundy, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 938.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the
parties’ parenting plan.
Child Support Order
David contends that the trial court erred by ordering an adjustment over the
standard calculation in his monthly child support payments. He asserts that the trial
court relied on generalities and trivial evidence in its determination that Skov’s child-
related costs will increase based on the fact that the children will reside with her 100
percent of the time under the modified parenting plan. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on child support for manifest abuse of
discretion and recognize that such decisions are rarely disturbed on appeal. In re
10 In his opening brief, David assigned error without substantive argument “to any and all [of the trial court’s] findings and conclusions” that are “substantially similar” to the challenged findings addressed herein. Because David did not provide argument for any of these “substantially similar” findings—much less identify what they are—we need not further address findings and conclusions other than those discussed in this opinion. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). 16 85962-5-I/17
Marriage of Booth, 114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990); In re Marriage of Fiorito,
112 Wn. App. 657, 663-64, 50 P.3d 298 (2002). A manifest abuse of discretion occurs
where the court’s decision is outside the range of acceptable choices given the facts
and the applicable legal standard, the court’s decision is based on an incorrect standard
or improper facts given the correct standard, or the court’s factual findings are
unsupported by the record. Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. at 664. An appellate court will not
substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s where the record shows the court
considered all relevant factors and the award is not unreasonable under the
circumstances. Id.
Washington’s child support statute is intended to ensure that “child support
orders are adequate to meet a child’s basic needs and to provide additional child
support commensurate with the parents’ income, resources, and standard of living.”
RCW 26.19.001. When determining the amount of child support, the trial court starts
with the statute’s economic table in the child support schedule, which is presumptive for
combined monthly net incomes up to and including $12,000. RCW 26.19.011(1), .020,
.065(3). Above the $12,000 threshold, trial courts have discretion to “exceed the
presumptive amount” of child support upon written findings of fact. RCW 26.19.065(3).
So long as the trial court considers the parents’ standard of living and the children’s
special medical, educational, or financial needs, the court is neither required to use any
specific method in determining an amount that exceeds the economic table nor limited
in its consideration of other relevant factors based on the circumstances. See
McCausland v. McCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 616-17, 620, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007).
17 85962-5-I/18
In the instant case, the trial court found that based on the parties’ stipulated
incomes, their combined monthly net incomes totaled more than $45,000 and thus was
not contemplated by the statutory economic table. The court found that an upward
adjustment of the standard calculation of child support was necessary to provide Skov
with sufficient funds to raise the children and meet their special needs as the parent with
100 percent of the residential time. Additionally, the court determined that David had the
ability to provide for the increased adjustment in child support.
David does not dispute the trial court’s authority to adjust the monthly child
support to an amount higher than the standard calculation under RCW 26.19.065(3) and
does not challenge the court’s findings regarding his income, assets, and liabilities. He
also does not argue that the court failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of issuing
written findings and to consider the parties’ standard of living and the children’s special
needs as part of its award determination under subsection .065(3).
He instead challenges the trial court’s finding that Skov’s childcare expenses will
necessarily increase by having the children on a full-time basis, asserting that the trial
court erred in its comparison of Skov’s expenses in 2018 to 2022 when she began to
care for the children 100 percent of the time. However, a review of the court’s findings
shows that it made no such comparison. Nor was it required to. See McCausland, 159
Wn.2d at 616-17.
In its child support order, the trial court stated that Skov’s residential costs have
increased because of the necessary care she provides for the three children and that
the children have special needs, which amplifies such necessary care. The court cited
Skov’s testimony wherein she stated that total child-related expenses have increased
18 85962-5-I/19
since she began having the children on a full-time basis in 2022, including day-to-day
living costs for utilities, food, gas, and clothing. Skov testified that her overall costs
related to the children increased by about $1,300 a month. The court also observed
that, based on her testimony, Skov “was really struggling” in 2022 and that the children
“barely did anything” in 2022. Skov hoped the children would participate in more
activities based on their new engagement in therapy. Thus, reviewing the record in a
light most favorable to Skov, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s
reasonable conclusion that Skov’s childcare expenses will increase based on her role
as the parent with 100 percent of the residential time. See In re Marriage of Kaplan, 4
Wn. App. 2d 466, 479, 421 P.3d 1046 (2018) (“‘In determining whether substantial
evidence exists to support a court’s finding of fact, the record is reviewed in the light
most favorable to the party in whose favor the findings were entered.’”) (quoting In re
Marriage of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390, 404, 948 P.2d 1338 (1997)).
The child support order shows that the court considered an increase in Skov’s
child-related expenses in light of the parties’ financial resources. The court referred to
its supplemental written findings, wherein it found a disparity in the parties’ income, with
David’s income being more than six times Skov’s and accounting for 86 percent of the
parties’ combined monthly incomes. Based on her 2023 financial declaration, the court
found that, excluding her personal and unidentified expenses, Skov could not afford
$2,000 of her monthly expenses based on her income. The court also found that
compared to David’s $507,500 in liquid assets and multiple properties, Skov had more
than $30,000 in credit card debt with $9,000 in liquid assets. 11
Because he does provide any supporting authority, we reject David’s complaint that it 11
was improper for the trial court to consider Skov’s litigation expenses as part of its consideration 19 85962-5-I/20
Lastly, David argues that the trial court’s finding that Skov’s child-related costs
will increase is inconsistent with his and Julia’s double insurance coverage and the
court’s determination that he is responsible for his proportional share of any uninsured
medical expenses and educational expenses as well as 100 percent of therapeutic visit
costs.
David disregards the part of the trial court’s findings where it acknowledges the
adjusted child support award was “not inclusive of the children’s costs for unreimbursed
medical care,” schooling costs, or “necessary educational, behavioral, and other
psychological assessments and treatment.” The court ordered David and Skov to pay
their proportional share of these costs that exceed “costs associated with raising
children.” Viewed in the light most favorable to Skov and in context, the court’s findings
indicate that the upward adjustment in child support addresses, in addition to the
children’s basic needs, day-to-day costs associated with raising children that may be
related to medical and psychological treatment, such as the cost of gas required to
transport the children to various appointments.
The court had wide-reaching discretion to determine a child support amount
beyond the statutory economic table based on a consideration of relevant factors,
including the parties’ standard of living and the children’s special needs. Under such
circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s award of $3,500 in monthly child
support, which encompassed an upward adjustment of $372 for each child above the
standard monthly calculation, was unreasonable or not supported by sufficient
of her financial constraints. See Peterson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 17 Wn. App. 2d 208, 237, 485 P.3d 338 (2021) (“Where a party does not cite to such authority, we assume there is none.”). 20 85962-5-I/21
evidence. See Booth, 114 Wn.2d at 776. David has not established that the trial court
manifestly abused its discretion in increasing the child support award.
Attorney Fees on Appeal
Both parties request attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 26.09.140.
We may award fees on appeal if the “applicable law grants to a party the right to recover
reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review” and the party properly requests it.
RAP 18.1(a)-(b). In determining whether to grant attorney fees on appeal under RCW
26.09.140, we consider “‘the parties’ relative ability to pay’ and ‘the arguable merit of the
issues raised on appeal.’” In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 807, 108 P.3d
779 (2005) (quoting In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d 330
(1998)). Generally, costs are awarded to the party who substantially prevails on review.
RAP 14.2.
Here, the merit of the issues on appeal supports granting fees on appeal to Skov.
Additionally, she filed a financial affidavit in compliance with RAP 18.1(c) that
demonstrates modest income and financial distress by way of monthly expenses that
exceed her monthly income. David did not counter with an affidavit proving his inability
to pay. Therefore, we grant Skov’s request for attorney fees and costs on appeal and
set the matter before a commissioner of this court for a determination of the appropriate
amount consistent with RAP 18.1(f).
21 85962-5-I/22
CONCLUSION
We affirm. 12
WE CONCUR:
12 Because we affirm the trial court’s orders modifying the parenting plan and adjusting child support, we need not consider David’s argument that this matter should be heard by a different judicial officer on remand. 22