Cruz v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n

2025 IL App (1st) 240170-U

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 240170-U No. 1-24-0170 Order filed November 18, 2025 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JERICO MATIAS CRUZ, ) Petition for Direct ) Administrative Review of a Petitioner-Appellant, ) Decision of the Human Rights ) Commission. v. ) ) Charge No. 2022 CP 2303 THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ) ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and ) CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY—MAYFAIR BRANCH ) LIBRARY, ) ) Respondents-Appellees. )

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Illinois Human Rights Commission did not abuse discretion in upholding determination of lack of substantial evidence of discrimination.

¶2 Petitioner, Jerico Matias Cruz, filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois

Department of Human Rights (IDHR) pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775

ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2022)). The charge alleged the Chicago Public Library (CPL) No. 1-24-0170

Mayfair Branch Library discriminated against him based on race, ancestry, national origin,

military status, citizenship status, and color. The IDHR dismissed the charge for lack of

substantial evidence. Cruz requested review with the Illinois Human Rights Commission

(Commission), which sustained the finding. Cruz filed pro se a direct appeal with this court. We

affirm.

¶3 On June 29, 2023, Cruz filed a “corrected” charge of discrimination with the IDHR. In

his charge, Cruz alleged CPL discriminated against him on June 14, 2022, when it denied him

the full and equal enjoyment of the CPL Mayfair Branch’s facility based on his race (Asian),

ancestry (Filipino), national origin (Philippines), military status (U.S. armed forces veteran),

citizenship status (U.S. citizen), and color (light complexioned). Cruz argued that, under similar

circumstances, CPL treated similarly-situated patrons who did not have these characteristics

differently.

¶4 The IDHR investigated Cruz’s charge and prepared a report dated August 24, 2023. As

part of its investigation, the IDHR’s investigator interviewed Cruz, Librarian Rebecca Berg,

District Chief Gregorio Rodriguez, and Human Resources Director Mary Robinson.

¶5 During the interview, Cruz stated that he had been a patron of the CPL Mayfair Branch

for over 20 years. He did not know whether CPL collected information on the protected

categories of its patrons. He also did not know whether CPL was aware of his military status or

citizenship status, but he considered himself a public figure and stated his congressional

campaign website included information pertaining to his protected categories.

¶6 Cruz stated that on June 14, 2022, he visited the CPL Mayfair Branch to use the public

computers. While on the computers, he answered a cellphone call and spoke for less than 10

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seconds. Security Officer Lacey told Cruz that he was being too loud and could not speak on the

phone in the library. Lacey also informed him that he was violating CPL guidelines and needed

to leave. Cruz recorded video of the interaction and told Lacey that he was not violating any laws

or policies and was “ ‘not going anywhere.’ ” CPL’s manager called the police, and Cruz waited

in the computer lab for the officers to arrive. The police arrived, instructed Cruz to leave, and

informed him he would be charged with criminal trespassing if he returned. CPL provided Cruz

with a suspension notice and a copy of its guidelines. Cruz then left the facility.

¶7 Cruz stated that CPL’s security and staff “sometimes allow other non-Asian, non-

Filipino, non-Philippines, differently colored patrons to speak on their respective cellular

telephones in the computer lab.” He was unaware of the names of these patrons and could not

provide specific dates on which any of these incidents occurred.

¶8 Cruz received a suspension notice, which reflected a 30-day suspension for “ ‘engaging

in disruptive or unsafe behavior including interfering with the use or operations of the library by

users or staff’ ” and for violating a first suspension.

¶9 CPL provided the IDHR with its equal employment opportunity policy, which prohibits

discrimination based on race, color, national origin, ancestry, and military service, and indicates

that CPL follows all applicable federal, state, and local laws and ordinances prohibiting

discrimination. Berg told the IDHR that CPL does not maintain information on the protected

categories of its patrons, and Berg was unaware of Cruz’s protected categories. CPL’s library use

guidelines indicated that CPL asks patrons to abide by any reasonable request from staff or

security to refrain from disorderly or disruptive behavior, and violations of policies or guidelines

may result in removal from the facility and/or suspension of library privileges. The guidelines

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also ask patrons not to engage in disruptive or unsafe behavior, which includes interfering with

the use or operations of the library users or staff, harassing users or staff, or taking photographs

or videos of library users without their permission.

¶ 10 CPL also provided “March 29, 2021 - February 2, 2022 Incident Reports,” indicating

seven incidents in which Cruz was reported speaking loudly on his phone or in the library and,

on one occasion, using profanity and racial slurs.

¶ 11 Berg told the IDHR that on June 10, 2022, Cruz received a three-day suspension from the

CPL Mayfair Branch after he talked loudly on his phone and disturbed other patrons, despite

three warnings from Lacey. He then recorded staff and security with his tablet in violation of

CPL guidelines. Berg verbally notified Cruz of the suspension and told him that he would be

trespassing if he returned during that time.

¶ 12 Cruz left but attempted to re-enter the building through the front door. Security physically

prevented Cruz from reentering. Cruz’s 3-day suspension was increased to 30 days because he

attempted to re-enter the facility while suspended. An incident report dated June 10, 2022,

reflects Cruz’s suspension for causing a disturbance by using “ ‘loud, abusive, or profane

language,’ ” violating the photography policy, harassing library users and staff, and engaging in

disruptive or unsafe behavior.

¶ 13 Berg also told the IDHR that on June 14, 2022, Cruz entered the building. Both Lacey

and Berg told him he was suspended. Cruz told Lacey that “ ‘he can go wherever he wants’ ” and

walked to the computer room. Cruz used his tablet to film Lacey and all patrons and staff present

in the room in violation of library policy. Berg called the police, who instructed Cruz to leave

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and handed him a 30-day suspension notice and copy of CPL’s guidelines. CPL submitted to the

IDHR two incident reports documenting the June 14, 2022, incident.

¶ 14 Berg told the IDHR that she only considered Cruz’s behavior and violation of CPL’s

policies, and not his protected categories. Berg had issued 30-day suspensions to other patrons,

asked them to leave, and disallowed their use of the facility during their suspensions. She

provided incident reports for other patrons showing incidents in which patrons were removed

from the facility for various behaviors, including refusing to wear a mask and yelling at staff,

using foul language toward a security officer and another patron, and returning to the facility

after being barred from entry.

¶ 15 In rebuttal, Cruz denied that he had violated CPL guidelines and maintained that he

walked outside when he accepted a longer phone call. He admitted that, on June 14, 2022, he

refused to leave and recorded video despite being told that doing so violated CPL guidelines.

However, he denied that he had an active suspension on that date, that he was informed about a

suspension, or that he attempted to reenter CPL’s facility while under suspension.

¶ 16 The investigator recommended a finding of lack of substantial evidence on all counts.

The investigation revealed that, on June 14, 2022, Cruz violated CPL guidelines by refusing to

cooperate with staff’s instruction to leave the facility and by continuing to record footage of staff

after being notified it violated guidelines. The investigator concluded there was no evidence of a

nexus between Cruz’s protected categories and CPL’s decision to remove him from the premises.

The investigation also did not show that CPL’s reason for removing Cruz from the premises—

i.e., Cruz’s violations of CPL guidelines—was a pretext to remove Cruz from the premises based

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on his protected categories. Cruz was also unable to identify any patrons of different protected

categories whom CPL treated more favorably under similar circumstances.

¶ 17 On August 28, 2023, the IDHR accepted the investigator’s recommendations and

dismissed Cruz’s charge for lack of substantial evidence.

¶ 18 On November 29, 2023, Cruz filed a request for review with the Commission. He denied

taking photographs of other patrons on June 14, 2022, and claimed there were no patrons in the

computer lab. He claimed he had only answered his smartphone for 10 to 15 seconds and went

outside to continue his conversation. He denied having an active suspension as of June 14, 2022,

from the CPL Mayfair Branch when he entered the library on that date. Cruz argued that the

IDHR erred in dismissing his charge, as he presented substantial evidence showing Berg and

Lacey provided “false statements” during the fact-finding conference.

¶ 19 Cruz provided a number of exhibits, including his charge, the IDHR’s investigation

report, and email exchanges between him and the IDHR regarding his charge and the fact-

finding conference. He also provided a notice of violation of CPL guidelines issued on June 14, a

sheet of paper with two URLs on it purporting to contain “prima facie evidence,” and what

appears to be screenshots from one or more video files being played on a computer.

¶ 20 The IDHR filed a response to Cruz’s request for review. The IDHR reiterated that its

investigation did not reveal substantial evidence supporting Cruz’s charge and stated that Cruz

did not present any additional evidence warranting a reversal of the IDHR’s original

determination.

¶ 21 On January 17, 2024, the Commission entered a final order sustaining the IDHR’s

dismissal for lack of substantial evidence. The Commission found that Cruz failed to identify

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similarly situated persons outside his protected class who had not been suspended from CPL’s

facility under similar circumstances. The Commission also noted that citizenship status is not a

protected class in public accommodation claims under the Act.

¶ 22 Pursuant to section 8-111(B)(1) of the Act, Cruz timely filed a pro se petition for

administrative review in this court. See 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1) (West 2022); Ill. S. Ct. R.

335(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 23 On appeal, Cruz seeks reversal of the Commission’s decision sustaining the dismissal of

his charge. We review the Commission’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Young v. Illinois

Human Rights Comm’n, 2012 IL App (1st) 112204, ¶ 32. Under the abuse of discretion standard,

we will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, meaning “it

contravenes legislative intent, fails to consider a critical aspect of the matter, or offer[s] an

explanation so implausible that it cannot be regarded as the result of an exercise of the agency’s

expertise.” Id. ¶ 33. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

Commission. Id.

¶ 24 Cruz argues that the Commission failed to (i) “properly review” the exhibits attached to

his request for review, (ii) “procedurally follow and review” his request for review as provided

under the Act and the administrative code, and (iii) “properly review the prima facie evidence

and material facts” in his complaint and request for review. Cruz does not develop any

cognizable substantive argument supported by relevant authority addressing the basis for the

dismissal: his failure to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination by identifying a single

person of a non-protected class who received more favorable treatment under similar

circumstances. Cruz’s failure to set forth any cognizable and developed substantive argument

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could serve as a basis to find his claims of error forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral

argument, or on petition for rehearing.”). However, we will put aside forfeiture and consider the

merits of the appeal, as it is clear that Cruz is challenging the dismissal of his charge, and we

have the benefit of cogent response briefs. See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising,

Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001) (finding meaningful review was not precluded where

merits of appeal could be readily ascertained from record).

¶ 25 Under the Act, the IDHR conducts an investigation and may dismiss a charge of

discrimination upon a determination that there is no “substantial evidence” supporting the

charge. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(C), (D)(3) (West 2022). The Act defines “substantial evidence” as

“evidence which a reasonable mind accepts as sufficient to support a particular conclusion and

which consists of more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance” of

proof. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(D)(2) (West 2022). “[M]ere speculation and conjecture does not

constitute substantial evidence.” Folbert v. Department of Human Rights, 303 Ill. App. 3d 13, 25

(1999).

¶ 26 A complainant may seek review of the IDHR’s dismissal of the charge by filing a request

for review with the Commission. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(D)(3) (West 2022). During its review, the

Commission “may consider the [IDHR’s] report, any argument and supplemental evidence

timely submitted, and the results of any additional investigation conducted by the [IDHR] in

response to the request.” 775 ILCS 5/8-103(B) (West 2022). Where the Commission sustains the

dismissal, the complainant may, as here, seek direct appellate review of the Commission’s final

determination. 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1) (West 2022).

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¶ 27 A complainant may prove discrimination by presenting direct evidence of discrimination,

such as proof of a racial slur or a written or oral admission, or through indirect evidence. Board

of Education of City of Chicago v. Cady, 369 Ill. App. 3d 486, 495 (2006); Lalvani v. Illinois

Human Rights Comm’n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 774, 790 (2001). Here, there was no direct evidence of

discrimination, so Cruz was required to establish unlawful discrimination through indirect

evidence. To show indirect evidence of discrimination, the complainant bears the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Young, 2012 IL App (1st) 112204, ¶ 34.

¶ 28 Cruz asserted discrimination premised on the denial of full and equal enjoyment of the

CPL Mayfair Branch’s facility. Section 5-102(A) of the Act provides that it is a civil rights

violation for any person, on the basis of unlawful discrimination, to “[d]eny or refuse to another

the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of any public place of

accommodation.” 775 ILCS 5/5-102(A) (West 2022). A library constitutes a public place of

accommodation under the Act. Id. § 5-101(A)(9).

¶ 29 The Act defines “unlawful discrimination,” in relevant part, as discrimination against a

person because of his actual or perceived race, ancestry, national origin, military status, and

color. Id. § 1-103(Q). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in public accommodation,

a complainant must show (1) “he is a member of a protected class”; (2) “he attempted to exercise

the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public accommodation”; (3) “he was denied

those benefits and enjoyment”; and (4) “he was treated less favorably than similarly situated

persons outside his protected class.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunn v. Human Rights

Comm’n, 2022 IL App (1st) 211155-U, ¶ 34 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

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¶ 30 The Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Cruz failed to establish a

prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. As an initial matter, the Act does not recognize

citizenship status as a protected class for purposes of a public accommodation claim under the

Act. See 775 ILCS 5/1-103(Q) (West 2022). Thus, Cruz’s count alleging discrimination based on

citizenship status was properly dismissed on that ground.

¶ 31 During the IDHR’s investigation, Cruz acknowledged that he was asked to leave the

library and recorded video of library staff after being told doing so violated CPL guidelines. He

claimed that other patrons at the library were not suspended under similar circumstances. But as

the Commission noted, Cruz failed to identify any specific patrons outside the protected classes

of which he was a member who were treated more favorably. Because Cruz did not establish that

he was “treated less favorably than similarly situated persons outside his protected class,” the

Commission properly determined that he failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunn, 2022 IL App (1st) 211155-U, ¶ 34. We

therefore find that the Commission’s final order sustaining the IDHR’s dismissal of Cruz’s

charge for lack of substantial evidence was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 32 Cruz claims the Commission failed to properly review the exhibits attached to his request

for review and the “prima facie evidence and material facts,” and likewise failed to follow the

“administrative procedure” of the Act and administrative code. However, Cruz’s vague,

speculative, and undeveloped allegations are not enough to overcome the Commission’s finding

that the IDHR’s investigation did not reveal “substantial evidence” supporting his charge. See

Folbert, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 25. We note that Cruz submitted documents as an appendix in this

court that are not included in the record on appeal, but we cannot consider facts and evidence not

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presented to the Commission. See 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2022) (“No new or additional

evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination, or decision of the

administrative agency shall be heard by the court.”).

¶ 33 For these reasons, this court could not possibly find that the Commission acted in an

arbitrary or capricious manner in upholding the IDHR’s dismissal for lack of substantial

evidence. We affirm the Commission’s final decision.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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