[423]*423HEFFERNAN, J.
This case arises out of the attempted enforcement of restrictive covenants in a deed to two lots in an area known as “Meadowlane” in the outskirts of Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin. The property was purchased in 1978 by Donald F. Knapp and his wife, Bette M. Knapp (hereafter the Knapps), for the purpose of establishing a non-institutional home for retarded adults. Neighbors, who took title to their property from a common grantor, brought an action to enjoin the defendants from using the property for this purpose on the grounds that it violated the restrictive covenants. The court, after a trial, enjoined the defendants from the use of the property as a residence for retarded adults upon finding that the Knapps had violated the following deed covenants:
“1) The use of said premises shall be restricted to the construction of one single family dwelling, with a one or two car garage, and shall be used for residential purposes only.
“2) No garage or outbuilding or part of the same shall be used as a residence at any time, either before or after construction of the residence.”
[424]*424Although no specific finding was made in respect to the covenant violated, the court also enjoined the defendants from carrying on any commercial activity on the premises. The appeal by the Knapps is from the entire judgment.
The basic question is whether, based on the undisputed facts, the defendants’ use of the property as a state-licensed, run-for-profit group residence housing eight unrelated retarded adults violated the covenant requirement that the property’s use “shall be restricted to . . . one single family dwelling . . . for residential purposes only.” Before that question can be addressed, however, it must be determined whether the plaintiffs, neighboring landowners, who derive their titles from a common grant- or, can enforce restrictive covenants incorporated in a deed to which they are not parties.
The record demonstrates that the original landowners of the parcel known as Meadowlane were Clarence and Mildred Ahrens (hereafter Ahrens). On March 28, 1968, Ahrens conveyed a lot to Gerald E. and Linda L. Wright (hereafter the Wrights), who are plaintiffs in this action. On May 10,1968, Ahrens conveyed a lot to the other plaintiffs, John F. and Eileen M. Crowley (hereafter the Crowleys). On the same day, Ahrens conveyed two lots to Franklin A. and Mary A. Weeks (hereafter the Weeks). It is the use of this property, conveyed to the Knapps on November 2,1973, which is in question in this action. At the time of the initial conveyance to the Wrights, each lot of the Ahrens’ property was marked by stakes. Each of the Meadowlane lots subsequently conveyed by Ahrens was subject to restrictive covenants which were substantially identical to those applicable to the Knapps’ property.
The plaintiffs in this case were not privy to the restrictive covenants in the deed from Ahrens to the Weeks or the deed from the Weeks to the Knapps. The [425]*425Knapps take the position that, although an owner of land may impose restrictions upon the portion conveyed, those restrictions create only a personal right in the grantor unless it is apparent from the face of the instrument or it is clear by fair implication that the right will inure to the benefit of other grantees acquiring title in the same tract. Stated differently, the fact that the owner of one lot would be benefited by the enforcement of a restrictive covenant in a deed conveying a nearby lot to another party does not entitle the former to enforce the covenant where there is no privity of contract, unless it is shown that the parties derived title from a common grantor, that the restrictions were imposed for the benefit of the other lot, and that the party seeking to enforce the covenant purchased his lot with the knowledge of, or in consideration of, the restrictions:
State courts have adopted different theories to justify the enforcement of restrictive covenants by one who is not privy to the instrument containing the covenant sought to be enforced. See generally, Annot., Who May Enforce Restrictive Covenant, 51 A.L.R.3d 556 et seq. (1973); 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, sec. 292 et seq.
In Wisconsin, this court has enforced private deed covenants on the theory that the common grantor imposed restrictions on each parcel of property sold, with a general scheme in mind of making the individual lots more attractive to all purchasers. According to this theory, even in the absence of privity of contract, another purchaser of land in the same tract may enforce the covenant when there is evidence to show that the original grantor inserted the covenant to carry out a general plan or scheme of development. The question, then, is whether the common grantor, Ahrens, placed the restrictive covenants in the deed for the purpose of carrying out a general plan of development, which was to inure to the benefit of other grantees.
[426]*426This court has repeatedly accepted the “general plan or scheme doctrine” in determining whether a person purchasing property in a particular tract may invoke the equitable powers of the court to enforce a covenant to which he was not privy. Representative cases approving relief on this theory are Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856 (1926); Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907). The court most recently stated the doctrine in Hall v. Church of the Open Bible, 4 Wis.2d 246, 248, 89 N.W.2d 798 (1958). The court said:
“It is a well-established rule that a covenant restricting land to residential use, inserted by the proprietor in a conveyance of his lands, inures to the benefit of all the purchasers where it is inserted for the purpose of carrying out a general plan or scheme of development, and that it constitutes at least an equitable servitude upon the land, and constitutes a valuable property right which a court of equity will enforce in the absence of facts and circumstances making such enforcement unjust or inequitable.”
The trial court specifically held that the Crowleys and the Wrights, the common grantees, were proper parties to enforce the restrictions, because it found:
“That it was the intent and purpose of Ahrens to create and adopt a general plan or scheme for a subdivision to be known as Meadowlane Addition which would contain only single family dwellings used exclusively for residential purposes . . . .”
A trial court’s finding of fact in respect to a grantor’s intention to create a restrictive covenant running with the land is entitled to the same weight on appeal as are other findings of fact by a court. Clark v. Guy Drews Post, 247 Wis. 48, 18 N.W.2d 322 (1945). Accordingly, [427]*427the court’s finding must be accepted unless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.
Our examination of the record shows that Ahrens consistently inserted substantially identical covenants into the Meadowlane deeds. When he made his original conveyances, Ahrens stated that he intended to put the same restrictions on all the Meadowlane property, and he instructed his real estate representative to put the same deed restrictions on any remaining Meadowlane property when it was sold. Additionally, when Ahrens sold the first parcel, the entire Meadowlane tract had been staked out, showing that a common plan for the disposition of all the Meadowlane property existed from at least 1968.
The defendants assert, however, that a general plan of development can be proved only if there was evidence that the plan existed when the initial conveyances were made to the Weeks and the Crowleys on May 10, 1968. The defendants argue that there was no legally cognizable subdivision on that date and that it is only from the pattern of the subsequent conveyances that any evidence can be gleaned of a common plan. The Knapps argue that no general plan existed at the time of the original conveyance of the property eventually acquired by the Knapps, and that, therefore, the covenants in the chain of title by which the Knapps acquired the property were enforceable only by the privies to those deeds.
The record shows that the trial court considered not only the conduct and representations of the common grantor at and prior to the original conveyance, but also considered his subsequent conduct in selling other Mead-owlane parcels.
Boyden v. Roberts, supra, and Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., supra, conclude that the general plan or scheme for the subdivision could be ascertained from the common grantor’s manifestation of intent prior to conveying any [428]*428part of a defined area. Although such prior manifestations of intent are sufficient to show a general plan, a Wisconsin court is not restricted to the examination of conduct occurring at or prior to the original conveyance. In Schneider v. Eckhoff, 188 Wis. 550, 206 N.W. 838 (1926), the court stated that the grantor’s intent to create a general development plan could best be determined by examining the pattern manifested by all of his conveyances. In Schneider, the court considered whether a grantee could build a combination residence-retail building in a platted subdivision containing individual deed restrictions. The court stated:
“The serious question involved on this branch of the case consists of whether or not the evidence warrants the conclusion that the original grantors adopted a general plan or scheme which was designed not only for the benefit of the grantors’ remaining property but also for the benefit of the various grantees of the lots or parcels sold and their successors or assigns. ... In the instant case, if it be held that a general scheme or plan was adopted, it must follow from the execution of the various deeds containing the restrictions to the respective purchasers. . . . Whether or not these restrictions were intended for the benefit of the grantees is largely a matter of intention, and this intention can be gathered not only from the nature and form of the deeds themselves but from all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (pp. 556-57)
Perhaps most significantly, the court in Schneider said, “Even the last deed contained these restrictions, which fact is of evidentiary value . . . .” (p. 558) Thus, in Schneider, the court examined not only the conveyances to the parties involved, but also examined subsequent conveyances and the subsequent conduct by the common grantor as evidence of his intent to adopt a general plan for the benefit of other grantees of the lots.
The trial judge in the instant case applied the rationale stated in Tubbs v. Green, 30 Del. Ch. 151, 161, 55 A.2d 445 (1947). Therein the court said:
[429]*429"Implicit in the very creation of a residential plan by the practice of inserting residential restrictions in deeds is the fact that the plan evolves and does not immediately burst into full bloom. Therefore, I cannot agree that restrictions imposed subsequent to the date of those imposed on defendant’s property may not be considered in determining whether a residential plan was created.”
We accept the statement in Tubbs and explicitly approve it as an expression of Wisconsin law. We conclude that the trial judge appropriately applied Wisconsin law when he examined all the common grantor’s conveyances and all manifestations of intent in determining that there was a general plan or scheme. The restrictive covenants which were a part of that plan could be equitably enforced by all of the grantees whose titles derived from the common grantor. The facts found by the judge to show a common plan of development are not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge correctly determined that the Crowleys and the Wrights, although not privy to the particular instrument conveying the land in question, had the right to enforce the covenants contained therein.
The principal question to be resolved on this appeal, however, is whether the defendants’ use of the property violates the restrictive covenants. The trial court found, as a fact, that they were in violation of restrictive covenants 1 and 2 of the deed. A finding of fact, if it indeed be one, cannot be reversed unless it is contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. However, that rule is inapplicable if what is labeled as a finding of fact is essentially a conclusion of law. Boutelle v. Chrislaw, 84 Wis.2d 665, 673, 150 N.W.2d 486 (1967). The construction of the terms of an ordinance restricting the use of property is a question of law when there is no dispute in the evidence in respect to the use of the prop[430]*430erty. Browndale International, Ltd., v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis.2d 182, 199-200, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973). The same rule applies to findings of fact pertaining to private deed restrictions. See, State ex rel. Bollenbeck v. Shorewood Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 508, 297 N.W. 568 (1941). Because there is no dispute about the defendants’ use of the Meadowlane property, the questions posed are matters of law, and the trial court’s interpretation of the deed restrictions is entitled to no special weight on appeal.
A review of the facts concerning the use of the property is, however, appropriate. The record shows that in 1972 the defendants, Donald F. Knapp and Bette M. Knapp, organized a business corporation known as Lori Knapp, Inc. This corporation was organized to operate a non-institutional family care home for retarded children. This home operated successfully. At the suggestion of a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, the Knapps undertook the establishment of a similar type of residential home for retarded adults. In July of 1973, the Knapps negotiated for the purchase of two adjacent lots from the Weeks. Located on the property was a large residence which could be made suitable for this purpose. The Weeks, as recited above, secured their title from Ahrens, the common grantor, on May 10, 1968. In the course of negotiations, the Weeks told the defendants that the property deed contained restrictive covenants which might be construed to prevent the use of the property for a group home. These restrictions in part provided:
“The real estate described in the annexed deed is sold and conveyed subject to the following restrictive covenants, which shall be in full force and effect hereafter and shall be in the nature of covenants running with the land and which, by the acceptance of this conveyance, shall bind the grantee or grantees and his, her or their successors in title, to-wit:
[431]*431“1) The use of said premises shall be restricted to the construction of one single family dwelling, with a one or two car garage, and shall be used for residential purposes only.
“2) No garage or outbuilding or part of the same shall be used as a residence at any time, either before or after construction of the residence.
“7) No residence shall be constructed or remodeled which will house more than one family nor shall any residence be higher than two stories.
“13) No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on or conducted on the premises, nor shall anything be done therein or thereon which may become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighbors.
“14) Invalidation of any one of these covenants by any Court shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions which shall remain in full force and effect . . . .”
Prior to proceeding with the transaction, the Knapps told the Crowleys and the Wrights of their plan to purchase the property and explained its intended use. Before the closing of the sale between the Weeks and the Knapps, the Crowleys and the Wrights served a written notice stating that they objected to the intended use of the property because it violated the restrictive covenants. Although the Weeks offered to release the defendants from the sales contract, the Knapps purchased the property. The deed contained the restrictive covenants set forth above.
The Knapps then leased the property to the Lori Knapp Corporation. Before using the property, a number of improvements and alterations were made to the premises, the most notable of which was the conversion of the attached garage into two bedrooms. Through the cooperation of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, the defendant, Lori Knapp, Inc., secured eight mentally retarded adult occupants as volunteer residents of the home. The building was used as a resi[432]*432dence, and the persons living on the premises shared the common areas of the house — the living room, dining room, and recreation rooms — and they ate their meals together. They left the house during the day to attend a county-operated development center and some of them apparently had jobs for which they were paid. They were “high functioning persons,” in that they were able to take care of their personal needs and assisted with the cooking and the housekeeping. A nonprofessional couple resided at the house on a full-time basis to feed the occupants and to serve in a parental role for the eight residents. The eight residents lived there voluntarily on a permanent basis. No professional care or therapy was available in the house. The purpose of the home was to provide a residential living environment for retarded citizens to enable them to become a part of the community. 1
[433]*433Although the evidence indicates that, before the establishment of the home, the plaintiffs were concerned that the activities at the home would create a common-law nuisance or be an annoyance, the evidence is uncon-tradicated that these retarded adults created no problems or annoyance in the neighborhood.
Two crucial conclusions of the trial court must be examined in light of the uncontroverted facts. It is apparent that the trial court’s finding that the defendants were in violation of covenant 2, which prohibits living in a garage or outbuilding, is erroneous as a matter of [434]*434fact. The portion of the building which had been used as a garage prior to the purchase by the Knapps was not an outbuilding, but was attached to the main portion of the house. Although a garage prior to the alterations, the defendants, immediately upon purchase, converted the area into two bedrooms. The remodeling included raising the floor to conform to that of the contiguous house and adding interior lights, insulation, windows, carpeting, and drapes. The floor plan of the remodeled building shows that no part of the structure could be used for garage purposes. Covenant 2 does not prohibit the conversion of a garage into bedrooms. It was contrary to the evidence for the trial court to conclude that a garage was being used as a residence. After the remodeling, the area was an integral part of the residence and bore no resemblance to a garage.
The court also concluded that the grantor, by the covenant, intended to restrict the properties’ use to single family residences “occupied by a group of people who were related to one another by blood or marriage and who resided in such dwelling as a single housekeeping unit.”
In reaching that conclusion, the trial judge construed the term “family” in the restrictive covenant to mean only those persons who are related by consanguinity or marriage. An inspection of the covenants themselves makes it obvious that the drafter of the covenant did not define “family” in that manner. “Family” is used without definition.
This court consistently holds that public policy favors the free and unrestricted use of property. Accordingly, restrictions contained in deeds and in zoning ordinances must be strictly construed to favor unencumbered and free use of property. McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis.2d 607, 619, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968); State ex rel. Bollenbeck v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 297 N.W. [435]*435568 (1941); Cohen v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, 74 Wis.2d 87, 91, 246 N.W.2d 112 (1976). In Cohen, we cited Rathkopf, 1 The Law of Zoning and Planning (4th ed.), ch. 9, at p. 9.1, for the proposition that restrictions on the use of property are to be construed in favor of free use. A provision either in a zoning ordinance or in a deed restriction which purports to operate in derogation of the free use of property must be expressed in clear, unambigous, and peremptory terms.
This rationale was employed in Missionaries of La Salette v. Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954). In that case, the Village of Whitefish Bay, by zoning ordinance, purported to restrict the use of property in the particular district to single-family dwellings. The ordinance defined “family” as “one or more individuals living, sleeping, cooking, or eating on premises as a single housekeeping unit.” (p. 611) In La Salette, the building in a residential neighborhood was occupied by a group of priests and lay brothers, who at no time exceeded eight in number. The two lay brothers did the housekeeping and prepared and served the meals. The priests lived at the home but performed their religious duties elsewhere. The Village of Whitefish Bay argued that the term “family” was restricted in meaning to a group of individuals related to one another by blood or marriage. This court disagreed, relying upon the public policy that restrictions placed upon the use of land must be strictly construed. We stated that a violation of a zoning ordinance can only occur when there is a plain disregard of limitations imposed by express words. The court, relying upon Bollenbeck, supra, said:
“ ‘Covenants restricting the use of land are construed most strictly against one claiming their benefit and in favor of free and unrestricted use of property; a violation of the covenant occurs only when there is a plain disregard of the limitations imposed by its express words.’ ” (p. 614)
[436]*436The court pointed out that this rule is equally applicable to private deed restrictions and building and zoning ordinance's. The court held that the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette were not in violation of the zoning restriction, because the ordinance did not expressly define a “family” to' exclude all who are not related by blood or marriage relationship. The court stated:
“Had it been the pleasure of the legislative body when defining the word ‘family,’ to have excluded in the district any dwelling use of premises there situated, by a group of individuals not related to one another by blood or marriage, it might have done so. Since there is a complete absence of any such limitation, it seems clear that it was not the legislative intent to restrict the use and occupancy to members of a single family related within degrees of consanguinity or affinity.” (p. 615)
The court went on to discuss the ordinary meaning of the word, “family”:
“It is to be noted that aside from the definition of the term ‘family’ in the ordinance, the ordinary concept of that term does not necessarily imply only a group bound by ties of relationship.
“ ‘Family’ is derived from the Latin ‘familia.’ Originally the word meant servant or slave, but now its accepted definition is a collective body of persons living together in one house, under the same management and head subsisting in common, and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness.”
In La Salette, this court said that the term, “family,” did not necessarily exclude from its meaning a group of unrelated persons living together in a home. The court held that the eight priests who lived, slept, cooked, and ate upon the premises as a single housekeeping unit were not in violation of the zoning ordinance. It concluded that the term, “family,” would not be construed to import the requirement of consanguinity or affinity between the [437]*437parties when those requirements were not expressly set forth. By dicta, the court expanded its holding by stating:
“The arrangement appears to be no different than were a group of school teachers, nurses, etc., in some collective capacity, to acquire the premises, use the same as a residence for the group, and pursue their avocations away from the place.” (pp. 616-17).2
The factual similarity between the nature of the occupancy of the priests and the persons in the Knapp home is striking, and the term, “family,” used in imposing the purported restriction is identical. La Salette held that in legal usage, unless otherwise defined, a family may mean a group of people who live, sleep, cook, and eat upon the premises as a single housekeeping unit. Moreover, as was also pointed out in La Salette, the commonly held understanding of the term, “family,” like its legal usage, “does not necessarily imply only a group bound by ties of relationship.” Id. at 615. If the meaning of that term is to be further limited, the limitation must be expressly stated. As in La Salette, the restrictive covenant in the present case did not define “family” to be a group related by consanguinity or marriage.
[438]*438It is contrary to the public policy of this state to impose a restriction upon the use of land when that restriction is not imposed by express terms.3 We accordingly conclude that the occupancy of the home by the adult retarded residents did not violate the restrictive deed covenants.
This conclusion is further supported by this court’s discussion in Browndale International, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis.2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1978). In Browndale, this court found that the use violated the Dane County zoning ordinances, because:
“The use of the premises is not even principally for residential living purposes. Rather, its primary use is to provide care and treatment for emotionally disturbed children.”
The children in Browndale were there for psychiatric and medical care. The court harkened back to the language of La Salette, stating:
[439]*439“The therapeutic home ‘arrangement’ is substantially different than a group of priests, nurses, school teachers, students or others who acquire premises to use as a residence for a group.” (p. 201)
Browndale is different from La Salette and different from the instant case, because, in the instant case, as in La Salette, the structure is used only as a residence and not for therapy. Browndale was a treatment center. Additional distinctions exist between Browndale and this case. In Browndale, the defendant intended to use the property for a cluster of six homes. The court pointed out that what was proposed as an “institutional complex.” (p. 201) Browndale, then, posed an entirely different problem than that presented in this case or in La Salette. Aside from whether the persons in Browndale constituted a family, it was apparent that they were not occupying the property as a residence when they were placed there involuntarily by court order for temporary psychiatric and medical care. Moreover, it should be emphasized that, unlike the transient nature of the childrens’ occupancy of the treatment centers in Browndale, the Lori Knapp residents regard the home as their permanent residence. This is not a boarding house; the same eight people have resided at the home since it opened, and the record clearly indicates that they planned to remain there permanently.
An additional distinction between Browndale and this case is important. In Browndale, this court found a violation of the zoning ordinance, because Browndale’s sole purpose was commercial. Under the Dane County zoning regulations, no commercial establishment was permitted in a one-family-use district.
In the instant case, we are confronted not with a zoning ordinance, but with a restrictive covenant in a private deed. The covenants in the deeds here do not foreclose the use of the property for commercial purposes. In fact, they specifically provide that “[n]o noxious or [440]*440offensive trade” shall be carried on. It is noteworthy that there is no prohibition whatsoever of commercial use. A reasonable inference to be derived from the covenant is that commercial use is permissible if not “noxious or offensive.” The use of the premises annoyed no one, and no attempt was made to show any noxious or offensive trade.
The rationale of Browndale is not applicable. This court, in Browndale, properly excluded commercial activity, because, under the scheme of zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to Wisconsin law, any use not expressly permitted is prohibited. See, Cohen v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, supra. Hence, under the zoning ordinances in Browndale, any commercial use was banned in a residential zone. No hierarchy or use, prohibited or allowed, applies in the interpretation of restrictive covenants. When a land use is restricted by covenants, it must be expressed and unequivocal. Commercial use per se was not banned by the covenants here, and by implication a commercial use not noxious or offensive was permissible. Nothing in the deed restrictions authorized the court to enjoin any commercial use of the property.
We conclude that, although the plaintiffs had the equitable right to enforce restrictive covenants contained in all the Meadowlane deeds, no covenant was violated. The judgment enjoining the defendants from the present use of their land must be reversed.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dissolve the injunction.