Cross v. Fong Eu

430 F. Supp. 1036, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16453
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 8, 1977
DocketC-76-1988-WWS
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 430 F. Supp. 1036 (Cross v. Fong Eu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16453 (N.D. Cal. 1977).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, District Judge.

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, seeks a declaration that certain sections of'’the California Elections Code are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to her. She has previously sought to gain ballot listing as a candidate for the office of United States Senator in the November 1976 General Election. 1 This Court has entered orders: (1) denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction; (2) dismissing plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to amend; and (3) ordering the clerk of this Court not to enter default against defendant.

Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint, and defendant has again moved to dismiss. Plaintiff has filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate this Court’s order not to enter default and to strike the motion to dismiss. Upon a review of plaintiff’s complaint and the motion papers, the Court has determined that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Moreover, since plaintiff has already been permitted an opportunity to amend and no purpose would be served by a further amendment, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff requested on February 16, 1976, nomination papers for the office of United States Senator from the San Mateo County Clerk. It further alleges that the clerk refused to issue such nomination papers “on the ground, solely, that plaintiff’s registration as a voter lacked an oath or declaration that plaintiff belonged to one of four private political parties.” 2 (Doc. # 17, ¶ 9, p. 4) The complaint further alleges that she again demanded nomination papers (apparently this time for the November 1976 General Election) from the San Mateo County Clerk on July 30, 1976, such demand includ *1039 ing the condition that papers be provided “without fee or work alternative to a fee.” (Doc. # 17, ¶ 10, p. 4) A deputy clerk responded that forms could be issued only upon payment of a fee of $892.50 or upon presentation of a petition with 10,000 signatures. (Id.) 3

The complaint reveals that plaintiff subsequently returned a petition bearing 234 signatures, 217 of which were found sufficient by the clerk. Although plaintiff had not met the 10,000 signature requirement, the clerk nonetheless issued plaintiff independent nomination papers. Plaintiff returned the forms with 100 signatures, 93 of which were found sufficient, and was denied ballot listing because of failure to comply with § 6831, which requires signatures of not less than 1% of the number of registered voters in California at the close of the preceding general election. It is not disputed that plaintiff’s signatures were far below the required number. Defendant represents that the appropriate number of registered voters was 9,982,115, resulting in a 1% requirement of 99,821 signatures for independent ballot listing. (Doc. # 21, pp. 4-5)

Pared of rhetoric, the complaint asserts that the California election scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause in the following respects: (1) the filing fee constitutes wealth and sex discrimination; (2) the signatures alternative to the filing fee discriminates in favor of party candidates and against independent candidates; and (3) provisions requiring filing of a declaration of candidacy and a specified number of signatures before write-in votes will be counted likewise discriminate against non-party candidates.

Plaintiff’s challenge of the filing fee of $892.50 is plainly without merit. As the Supreme Court held in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) in sustaining a constitutional challenge to predecessor statutes of §§ 6551, 6552 and 6554:

“[I]n the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees he cannot pay.” 415 U.S. 718, 94 S.Ct. 1321. (Emphasis added.)

California has amended its election statutes since Lubin to provide an alternative means of ballot access — a candidate may obtain ballot access by demonstrating the seriousness of his candidacy as measured by specified numbers of voter signatures on a petition supporting him. §§ 6555; 6831. If this alternative is a reasonable one, plaintiff has no constitutional claim against the filing fee. 4 Lubin v. Panish, supra; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). The reasonableness of the alternative is the subject of plaintiff’s second claim, which the Court will now examine.

In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the predecessor of the California independent nomination scheme challenged by plaintiff herein. Two of the plaintiffs in that case, Hall and Tyner, claimed the right to ballot position as independent candidates for President and Vice President of the *1040 United States. Although the court did not hold the scheme unconstitutional, it remanded for reconsideration in light of further facts to be developed in the district court. 5 California law required Hall and Tyner to present a petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes cast in California at the last general election. The court had previously approved a Georgia independent nomination requirement of 5% of the registered voters at the last general election for the office in question. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).

The Court did not have difficulty with the 5%-of-total-votes-cast requirement in the abstract, but was concerned that the interaction of (1) a provision disqualifying all registered voters who voted in the primary from signing the independent’s petition; and (2) a provision limiting the time for obtaining signatures to 24 days between the primary and general election, would make the 5% requirement impossible or unreasonably difficult to meet. The Court stated:

We are quite sure, therefore, that further proceedings should be had in the District Court to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates for President and Vice President under California law. Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days would not appear to be an impossible burden. Signatures at the rate of 13,542 per day would be required, but 1,000 canvassers could perform the task if each gathered 14 signers a day.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
430 F. Supp. 1036, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cross-v-fong-eu-cand-1977.